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Abstract 
This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the governance of standard development 
organizations (SDOs), with a particular emphasis on organizations developing standards for 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). The analysis is based on 17 SDO case 
studies, a survey of SDO stakeholders, an expert workshop, and a comprehensive review of 
the legal and economic literature. The study considers the external factors conditioning SDO 
decision making on rules and procedures, including binding legal requirements, government 
influence, the network of cooperative relationships with other SDOs and related 
organizations, and competitive forces. SDO decision-making is also shaped by internal 
factors, such as the SDOs’ institutional architecture of decision-making bodies and their 
respective decision-making processes, which govern the interaction among SDO 
stakeholders and between stakeholders and the SDO itself. The study also analyzes 
governance principles, such as openness, balance of interests, and consensus decision-
making, and discusses their interplay. The insights from these analyses are applied to SDO 
decision making on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) policies, which represents a 
particularly salient and controversial aspect of SDO policy development. 
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Executive summary 
In this study, we have sought to add to the body of knowledge concerning standardization 
by conducting an extensive empirical and theoretical study of Standard Development 
Organisation (SDO) governance across a set of 17 SDOs that produce standards in the ICT 
sector: AFNOR, CEN-CENELEC, DIN, DVB Forum, ECMA, ETSI, IEC, IEEE-SA, IETF, ISO, ITU-
T, JEDEC, SAC, TSDSI, VITA, W3C (in alphabetical order of acronym), as well as ANSI 
(although not formally an SDO), given its role in the standardization ecosystem. The 
existing literature highlights how SDOs emerge as transnational regulators, fitting between 
private ordering and public law, and how they play a significant role in the EU in particular. 
The aim of the study was to conduct further research on SDO policymaking, in particular as 
regards Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), and to achieve a comprehensive overview of the 
structure of the interplay of IPR systems and SDOs from a public policy perspective.  
A case-study was prepared on each of the SDOs, including an interview. The information 
obtained through the case-studies was complemented by a survey of stakeholders, including 
active participants in SDOs as well as civil society and public interest organisations. We also 
carried out a stakeholder workshop to obtain further input regarding our empirical findings. 
The standardization ecosystem 
SDOs evolve within a broader standardization ecosystem that constrains their governance 
choices. These constraints on SDO governance include legal constraints, constraints 
resulting from diverse relationships with other SDOs, and constraints due to competitive 
responses to SDO decision-making.  
Legal constraints arise inter alia from international trade law, competition/antitrust law, 
intellectual property law and public procurement law. More specifically, the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade administered by the World Trade Organization and decisions 
taken thereunder specify how SDOs should be governed, in order to avoid the creation of 
barriers to trade. EU instruments (Regulation 1025/2012) dealing with standardization 
under internal market rules build upon international trade law. As for competition and 
antitrust law, the provisions concerning restrictive agreements (Sherman Act § 1, Art. 101 
TFEU) and single-firm conduct (Sherman Act § 2, Art. 102 TFEU) were applied to the 
conduct of firms in and around standardization in major decisions on both sides of the 
Atlantic, eventually feeding into soft-law instruments such as the Horizontal Guidelines of 
the European Commission1 and OMB Circular A-119 in the U.S. The constraints from trade 
and competition law have crystallized around a number of principles that apply to SDO 
governance, including transparency and openness, non-discrimination, impartiality, balance 
of interests and consensus-based decision-making.  
SDOs are also constrained by their relationship with other SDOs. Some of these 
relationships are vertical: the more traditional and established SDOs tend to be part of a 
top-down hierarchical structure – international, regional and national – while more self-
initiated SDOs will tend to gravitate bottom-up towards the established SDOs as they seek 
to achieve recognition for their standards. Next to that, there is also a large nexus of 
cooperative horizontal relationships between SDOs and between SDOs and open-source 
software (OSS) organisations. 
Another major constraint on SDOs comes from competitive forces amongst SDOs. Our 
research revealed these forces to play out in more elaborate ways than the literature has 
envisaged so far. There is some evidence of movement of dissatisfied stakeholders to other 
SDOs, including in response to IPR policy changes. In the early phase of standardization, 
                                           
1 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1. See 
also 2018 Rolling Plan for ICT Standardisation, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/2018-
rolling-plan-ict-standardisation-released_en> 
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‘voting with one’s feet’ seems to be an attractive option, but later on, SDO membership is 
stickier. At that point in time, switching costs, path dependency and IPR in the standard 
may make it more difficult to attract a critical mass of stakeholders to another SDO (as 
opposed to exiting altogether). However, our research points to another form of competitive 
reaction that does take place in those later stages, namely “stepping out of the room”: 
dissatisfied stakeholders form a consortium next to the SDO that will implement the vision 
of these stakeholders, ostensibly in complement to the SDO, with the hope that the 
outcome from the work of that consortium can later be brought back to the SDO and 
endorsed by it. In such a situation, both the dissatisfied stakeholders and the SDO must 
tread carefully in order to avoid falling afoul of legal constraints, in particular competition 
law. Finally, it is also possible for dissatisfied stakeholders to remain within the SDO and try 
to minimize the impact of the decision with which they disagree. 
There are important differences between SDOs with respect to the external constraints that 
are most relevant for their respective governance. SDOs fall into three layers: one layer is 
made up of the formal and established SDOs at international (ISO, IEC, ITU), regional 
(including the European Standards Organisations CEN, CENELEC and ETSI) and national 
levels (in our sample: AFNOR, ANSI, DIN and SAC) that tend to be constrained by law and 
cooperative relationships. A third layer includes the more informal SDOs (often referred to 
as consortia), which compete with other SDOs for members, contributors and adopters, and 
often seek accreditation or approval of their specifications by other, more established and 
formal organisations to strengthen their position (DVB, ECMA, JEDEC, and VITA from the 
sample examined): for them, competitive constraints combine with legal constraints and the 
constraints imposed by the formal organisations with which they collaborate. 
A second layer – including IEEE, IETF and W3C, in our sample – is both less constrained by 
formal networks and regulatory responsibilities conferred by public authorities than SDOs in 
the highest layer, yet sufficiently well-established to be less vulnerable to competitive 
pressures. The second layer might also be less constrained in its ability to have tailor-made 
governance. ETSI and TSDSI do not fit neatly into this layer model: they share features of 
the middle and the highest layer. 
 
From a public policy perspective, we observe the predominance of a light-touch self-
regulatory approach towards SDOs. The role of public authorities in the day-to-day 
functioning of SDOs and in the substance of their work is generally limited. Indeed, SDOs 
have traditionally originated from private-sector efforts, and stakeholders often value the 
autonomy enjoyed by SDOs. The approach of most public authorities to SDOs has generally 
been supportive of industry-led processes. Over the recent decades, both in Europe and to 
an even larger extent in the U.S., a consensus has emerged that the public interest is often 
Layer Attributes SDOs
First - Quasi-regulatory functions delegated by 
government
- Importance of network of vertical relationships
- Specific and formal legal requirements
AFNOR, ANSI, DIN, CEN, CENELEC, 
ISO, IEC, ITU, SAC
- Shares elements with first and second (depending on 
the activity)
ETSI, TSDSI
Second - Established leadership over technical field
- Importance of switching costs
IEEE, IETF, W3C
Third - Significant competitive constraints
- Bottom-up orientation to more formal bodies for 
greater legitimacy
DVB, ECMA, JEDEC, VITA
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best served by relying on the existing system of private-industry driven SDOs, ranging from 
the more established standardization bodies to the more informal SDOs that characterize 
the ICT sector. 
While they rarely participate in the day-to-day functioning of SDOs, public authorities may 
play a significant role in monitoring and enforcing the legal constraints on SDO governance. 
In particular, the self-regulatory approach to SDOs is implicitly or explicitly conditioned on 
SDO decision making following accepted procedural principles, which are meant to ensure 
that the outcomes of SDO activities and decisions are in line with public policy. The foremost 
regulatory tool available for this approach are trade and competition policy, translating the 
general idea that the interests of users of the standardization system (including those 
stakeholders not directly represented in SDO governance) are best served by vigorous 
competition at each layer of the process. 
In particular with respect to standard development, public authorities routinely defer to the 
decisions reached by private SDOs complying with general procedural principles. This 
procedural approach accommodates a fair amount of diversity in SDO governance, within 
the constraints set by law and market forces. That diversity fits with an experimental model 
(regulatory competition, experimentalist governance or legal emulation) where SDOs control 
the flow of solutions between themselves, without precedential effect as between SDOs. 
Governance architecture 
In line with the above, we observed considerable heterogeneity in SDO governance, 
reflecting the different circumstances of each SDO. There is no one-size-fits-all solution. 
SDO internal governance institutions shape the way each organization makes decisions, 
within the constraints determined by the forces analyzed above. Fundamentally, SDO 
governance is built on the tension, which we observed in our research, between a more 
leadership-driven model (in particular IEEE-SA, VITA and W3C from the samples examined), 
and SDOs more strongly oriented towards consensus among members (exemplified by DVB, 
ECMA, ETSI, JEDEC, and TSDSI). IETF does not formally have membership, but its 
processes are strongly oriented towards stakeholder consensus, placing it in proximity to 
the membership-driven model. The international organizations with national membership 
also tend to emphasize consensus decision-making. 
The tension resonates with the divide, mentioned earlier, between formal SDOs and 
industry-driven, more informal SDOs. The more formal SDOs (and in particular CEN, 
CENELEC, ISO, IEC and ITU-T, as well as the National Standards Bodies such as AFNOR and 
DIN) are mandated to consider public interest concerns in their work. This contrasts with 
industry-driven SDOs (such as DVB, ECMA, JEDEC and VITA), which generally emphasize 
technical aspects of their work.  While most SDOs have a written mission statement 
describing their goals and operating principles, these mission statements are rarely referred 
to in practice. Instead, the extent to which SDOs may pursue independent organizational 
goals besides the individual interests of membership or stakeholders depends on specific 
features of SDO governance, including the organizational form, the division of roles among 
governance bodies, the voting rules within these bodies, processes for selecting SDO 
leadership, and the role and responsibilities of SDO staff.  
Most of the SDOs we studied are non-profit, non-governmental incorporated organisations. 
Membership types vary, however: in most SDOs, members are organisations, and most 
prominently companies. ISO, IEC and CEN-CENELEC are made up of national committees, 
which can lead to more consensus-oriented policymaking. IEEE-SA has a large individual 
membership (around 7000 members), meaning that the leadership is elected by a more 
dispersed and less engaged constituency. IETF has no formal membership structure and any 
interested individual may participate. In other SDOs (in our sample, VITA, JEDEC, ECMA, 
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DVB, TSDSI, ETSI), the membership is made up of firms with commercial interests. 
Sometimes these members are grouped into categories by commercial function (e.g. DVB). 
Many SDOs (in particular ETSI and IEC) also have tiered membership, to reflect different 
levels of participation in SDO activities and geographical origin (e.g., ETSI). 
With respect to SDO leadership (governing boards and permanent staff), SDOs typically 
draw board members from their membership. As for permanent staff, both its size and its 
responsibilities vary considerably from one SDO to the other. The existence of a significant 
permanent staff, with leadership functions, is a predictor of more leadership-driven 
governance (observable at W3C, VITA, IEEE SA, DIN, IEC, ISO, ITU-T and SAC). Staff 
typically participates in meetings, without the right to vote. In some SDOs, the staff also 
drafts policy documents for the organization. Other SDOs put policymaking more firmly in 
the hands of the board, with a strong membership representation on the board (ETSI, 
JEDEC, DVB, IETF). 
SDOs differ in respect of the role of individuals participating in SDO policy development (as 
committee or assembly members). Some SDOs expect these individuals to represent a 
member or stakeholder (usually their employer), making governance more membership-
driven. Other SDOs expect individuals not to represent a member/stakeholder but rather to 
act in the interests of the SDO or of society at large, which strengthens the autonomy of the 
SDO towards its membership and makes it more leadership-driven. 
Within governance, the focus of our study was on policymaking. With two exceptions (IETF 
and VITA to varying degrees), SDOs follow different procedures to develop their rules and 
policies as compared to standards. Differences are found in voting rules (more majority 
voting instead of consensus), different decision-making bodies (the general assembly and 
the board instead of working groups), eligible participants (formal members instead of any 
interested party), transparency (generally less than for standards development), and the 
duties of the participants (more emphasis on duties towards the SDO rather than towards 
the member). Most SDOs feature one or more of these differences. At the same time, our 
stakeholder survey indicated that stakeholders would prefer policymaking to follow 
processes that provide at least as many procedural safeguards as for standard 
development.  
One of the most complex issues studied was the decision-making procedure. In some SDOs 
(e.g. ANSI, IETF, ISO), decision-making on policy is shared between different bodies, 
depending on the subject-matter, whereas in others (e.g. IEEE, ITU-T, VITA), a single body 
is responsible for all policy matters. In most SDOs, policy matters must move through many 
bodies (committees and boards); however, the real locus of decision-making varies from 
one SDO to the other, and sometimes within an SDO from one decision to the other.  
In general, where the central decision-maker for policy matters is the general assembly of 
members (e.g. ECMA, ETSI, and TSDSI), policymaking will tend to be membership-driven. 
Where the central decision-maker is a board (e.g. IEEE-SA, JEDEC, and VITA), policymaking  
can be more leadership-driven, to the extent the rules for board appointment and status 
give the board more autonomy vis-à-vis the membership, as outlined above. Where the 
central decision-maker is a specific policymaking body (e.g. at AFNOR) designed to balance 
stakeholder interests, here as well policymaking will tend to be less influenced by powerful 
members and more leadership-driven. Finally, where the ultimate decision-maker on policy 
is a non-elected director or board (such as at W3C), policymaking is predictably leadership-
driven. 
It should be noted that voting rules for policymaking are not always reflective of SDO 
practice. On paper, most SDOs have majority voting for policymaking, with voting 
thresholds ranging from simple to two-thirds majority. Individual votes are mostly kept 
secret. Some SDOs (ETSI, DVB) have specific voting rules designed to make it difficult to 
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overrule significant stakeholders or stakeholder categories. Nonetheless, the empirical 
evidence is that votes are rare, and that policymaking is mostly done on a consensus basis. 
Policymaking is bound to lead to disputes. Save for a few exceptions (IEC, ISO), most SDOs 
offer procedures to issue formal or informal interpretations of policies, although many of 
these interpretations tend not to be made public. Similarly, all SDOs but one allow for 
appeals of policy-related decisions. Disputes can also arise as between SDO members, 
relating to policy-related issues (in particular the application of IPR policies). Here SDOs 
report few disputes, and generally show a strong aversion to intervening in disputes 
amongst members (with the exception of W3C, VITA and DVB). 
The different features of SDO governance architecture combine to lead to a stronger role for 
SDO leadership or a greater emphasis on member or stakeholder consensus. The effect in 
this regard of the different features is summarized in the following table:  
 
 
On balance, our sample can be divided between a more leadership-driven group (AFNOR, 
ANSI, DIN, IEEE-SA, VITA and W3C) and a more membership-driven group (DVB, ECMA, 
ETSI, IETF, JEDEC and TSDSI), with CEN-CENELEC, ISO, IEC and ITU-T falling somewhere 
in-between. 
Governance principles  
The governance principles arising out of the law, as set out above, were formulated with 
standardization activities in mind. From our survey, it appears that stakeholders tend to 
agree that policymaking should follow these principles as well. 
Policymaking is generally less open than standard development, since participation tends to 
be restricted to SDO members, and membership is not free at most SDOs (and not open at 
SDOs that are made up of national standardization bodies).  
As for transparency, different models co-exist with respect to standards development. Some 
SDOs are very transparent in the process of standards development but will then make the 
final standard available only against a fee (e.g. CEN-CENELEC, IEEE, ISO), while other SDOs 
that rely on membership dues will offer less transparency (to the outside world) in the 
Governance feature Leadership-driven model Membership/consensus-driven model
Ultimate decision 
maker
Elected board (DIN, IEEE-SA..
Unelected leadership (SAC, W3C)
General Assembly (DVB, ETSI..
Open processes (IETF)
Voting rules National aggregation of votes (IEC/ISO/ITU, 
CEN-CENELEC, ETSI on HS and policies)
Votes by category (DVB)
Election process Staggered tenure (DIN, IEEE)
Nomination committee approach (ANSI)
Election by dispersed individual 
members (IEEE)
Board members appointed by members 
(DVB, JEDEC)
Overweighting of relevant stakeholders 
(ETSI)
Individual duties Fiduciary duties to organization (IEEE..)
Representation of broader interests 
(ANSI)
Represent membership (ETSI, DVB…)
Organizational form Activity of another organization (IEEE-
SA, W3C)
Activity of its members (DVB, JEDEC, VITA)
Role of staff Extensive staff (AFNOR, DIN, SAC), 
significant staff leaders (ANSI, IEEE, 
VITA, W3C)
Very limited or almost absent (ECMA, IETF)
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course of development, but will make the final standard available for free (e.g. W3C, IETF, 
ECMA). When it comes to policymaking, SDOs tend to be far less transparent, even though 
our survey indicates stakeholders would prefer more transparency. 
Balance of interests is a concern in policymaking just as in standards development. Many 
SDOs seek to achieve a balance of interests in the bodies that decide on policies. Such 
balance has both geographical and commercial dimensions. As regards the latter, the 
categories differ: ANSI’s categorization distinguishes between producers, users, and general 
interest, while EU Regulation 1025/2012 emphasizes the need to involve SMEs, consumer, 
environmental and social stakeholders. Some SDOs (e.g. IEEE SA) use ad hoc 
categorizations, defined per project. In practice, many SDOs experience difficulties in 
attracting sufficient representatives outside of the producer and implementer constituencies. 
In addition to balance in representation, a few SDOs also seek to balance voting, by having 
majority-per-category requirements (e.g. DVB). 
Throughout our study, SDOs reported a tension between openness and balance: both 
objectives can be hard to attain at the same time. Some SDOs privilege openness (e.g. 
IEEE-SA and IETF), others balance (e.g. DVB), and others emphasize openness in standard 
development and balance in policymaking matters (e.g. AFNOR and DIN,). An alternative 
path is to rely on the fiduciary duties of SDO leaders towards the SDO or the general 
interest of SDO members in order to dampen any adverse effects from openness or balance 
(e.g. IEEE-SA). 
After having considered the SDO ecosystem, the governance architecture and the 
governance principles, it becomes possible to draw a model of how and why SDO activities 
and decisions are legitimate, i.e. worthy of support, from a public policy perspective. That 
model draws upon the main sources of legitimacy in the regulatory literature, i.e. consent, 
market forces, democracy, procedure and expertise. In the understanding of SDOs and their 
stakeholders, the consent of participants, as expressed through SDO decision-making, 
provides a substantial measure of ‘internal’ legitimacy to SDO activities and decisions. The 
external constraints applicable to SDO procedures, as found in the principles arising from 
trade, competition/antitrust and procurement law, channel consent so as to avoid clashes 
with the policies underlying these laws. Still, from a public policy perspective, consent might 
not be sufficient, given the broad impact of SDO activities and decisions beyond the SDO 
and its stakeholders. Market discipline is more elaborate than previously thought and can 
also confer some legitimacy. While SDOs are not themselves democratic institutions, in 
certain cases (in the EU in particular) they do receive delegated tasks from democratic 
bodies, also contributing to their legitimacy (ETSI, CEN-CENELEC). Finally, SDOs 
concentrate expertise, even though they sometimes deal with policy matters that lie outside 
of the typically technical expertise of the participants. Through the combination of all these 
sources, SDO activities and decisions can therefore aspire to sufficient legitimacy from a 
public policy perspective, warranting the self-regulatory approach described above.  
Governance and IPR policies 
All SDOs that we studied have IPR policies, which are embodied in a range of documents, 
depending on the SDO. Our survey showed that stakeholders do care about these policies, 
and that they are material in their decisions relating to participation in SDO activities and 
decisions. At the same time, our survey also indicates that Product-Centric and Patent-
Centric firms diverge in their assessment of and expectation towards IPR policies, making 
this policy area both highly salient and highly challenging. 
The main features of IPR policies, for the purposes of this research, are rules on patent 
disclosure of potentially Standard-Essential Patents (SEPs), on patent licensing of such SEPs 
(often on the basis of commitments to Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) 
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licensing) and on the transfer of such licensing commitments upon transfer of SEPs to 
another party. 
IPR policies are made and changed in the standardization ecosystem described above, with 
the procedural approach pursued by public authorities. Yet in the specific case of IPR 
policies, that procedural approach is supplemented with a safe harbour approach. In the 
safe harbour approach, public authorities describe the general content of an IPR policy that 
would usually be deemed to comply with legal requirements applicable to SDOs, including 
competition/antitrust, public procurement, and trade law. These general descriptions have 
developed into a “Baseline Policy”, which is generally understood to be compliant with legal 
constraints. “Baseline Policies” typically define a requirement of patent disclosure and 
licensing at a high level of generality (see Chapter 7.2). Many SDOs’ IPR policies are limited 
to this “Baseline Policy” without significant additional detail. The ISO/IEC/ITU joint IPR 
policy and the IPR policy found in the ANSI Essential Requirements are good illustrations of 
Baseline Policies, and they have been adopted by many SDOs, thus further reinforcing the 
Baseline Policy as a widely shared institutional norm. The Baseline Policy is thus supported 
by significant external factors shaping SDO policy approaches. Accordingly, we find that 
SDOs that are particularly constrained by the external factors from the standardization 
ecosystem outlined above tend to stick more closely to the Baseline (including the first layer 
organizations AFNOR, ANSI, CEN, CENELEC, ETSI, IEC, ISO, ITU; and the third layer 
organizations ECMA and JEDEC).  
Over time, a number of SDOs have developed their IPR policies further, and have gone 
beyond the Baseline Policy (DVB, IEEE-SA, VITA, W3C), or adopted idiosyncratic policy 
approaches that differ from the Baseline Policy (IETF), typically as a result of market or 
legal developments that prompted the SDO or some of its stakeholders to seek a review of 
the IPR policy. Common variations include the creation of a licensing obligation for certain 
parties and/or defining requirements for inclusion of patented technologies that go beyond a 
general FRAND licensing commitment. 
An SDO’s approach to policy provisions going beyond the baseline is a function of its 
internal governance model. In our research, we identified three categories of IPR policy 
changes that move a policy beyond the Baseline Policy: (i) uncontested policy changes, like 
the adoption of a transfer requirement for FRAND commitments and licenses, (ii) changes 
contested among the stakeholders, where the SDO ends up committing itself in the outcome 
(‘committal choices’) and (iii) changes contested among the stakeholders, but where the 
SDO ends up not committing itself in the outcome (‘non-committal choices’), for instance by 
offering a menu of options, an optional choice or a broad interpretation open to many 
readings. When we map IPR policy choices to our study of governance architectures, we 
observe that committal choices tend to be made by leadership-driven SDOs, and non-
committal choices by membership-driven SDOs. 
 
 Committal choices Non-committal choices 
Policy choices 
Ex-ante disclosure 
of licensing terms 
Mandatory ex-ante 
disclosure 
VITA Optional ex-ante 
disclosure 
ETSI, IEEE (2007) 
Dispute resolution Mandatory ADR DVB, VITA Leave dispute 
resolution to 
parties 
most SDOs (incl. 
ETSI, IETF, 
ISO/IEC/ITU) 
Restricting right to 
seek injunctive 
relief 
IEEE (2015) 
Royalty-free 
licensing 
mandatory RF W3C optional IEEE, IETF, many, 
other SDOs potentially 
mandatory RF 
ECMA  
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Interpretations 
FRAND Define specific 
criteria of FRAND 
IEEE (2015) provide no position 
as to what (if any) 
specific pricing 
criteria define 
FRAND 
ETSI, IETF, 
ISO/IEC/ITU, and 
most other SDOs 
Component-level 
licensing 
Specific policy 
provision requiring 
component-level 
licensing 
IEEE No position with 
respect to ongoing 
controversy/ 
ambiguity of policy 
ETSI 
Specific policy 
interpretation 
ANSI 
 
In principle, both committal and non-committal choices can be legitimate, but in different 
ways. As a starting point, IPR policymaking – at least on the issues that are emphasized 
here – is sufficiently close to standardization that it should be analyzed using the same 
approach. The Baseline Policy enjoys legitimacy because of its link with the external 
constraints arising from law. For committal choices, consent is important: given the 
distributive effects of such choices, their legitimacy depends on how solid a consensus was 
reached in the SDO on a contested issue. Non-committal choices might appear to enjoy a 
broader consent within the SDO, but our research indicates that they are more likely to be 
subject to market discipline. In the end, SDOs are forced to confront contested issues and 
seek a legitimate solution, whether head-on by making a committal choice or indirectly by 
facing market responses to a non-committal choice. In all cases, SDOs can seek to bolster 
the legitimacy of their choices through endorsement by a public authority. 
It is part and parcel of the self- or co-regulatory approach to SDO governance, as it applies 
to IPR policies, that SDOs have some autonomy to move beyond the Baseline Policy. Each 
SDO decides for itself, in the light of its specific circumstances, whether and how to manage 
its IPR policy. It is therefore to be expected that some variance in IPR policies will result. At 
the same time, SDOs are in relationships with one another (cooperative, including global 
partnerships such as 3GPP or OneM2M, and competitive), and there is a core of 
stakeholders that participate in multiple SDOs. IPR policy changes are bound to circulate 
amongst SDOs. In our research, we have endeavoured to analyse the circulation 
mechanisms. 
For uncontested policy changes – transferability of FRAND commitments encumbering SEPs 
– circulation and adoption by many SDOs can be very fast, and eventually the Baseline 
Policy can evolve to include these changes. As for contested policy changes, two 
mechanisms are at work. On one hand, horizontally as between SDOs, an experiment or 
emulation mechanism may be at work, whereby the changes adopted by a first-mover SDO 
are studied by subsequent SDOs: these SDOs look at whether the first-mover was 
successful with those changes, and whether the changes are appropriate in the context of 
the subsequent SDO and decide accordingly. This mechanism is likely to preserve diversity 
in IPR policies, all the more considering that membership-driven and leadership-driven 
SDOs will probably opt for different choices (non-committal or committal, respectively). 
On the other hand, circulation through precedent is also possible if a hierarchically superior 
institution is involved. Circulation through precedent means that a decision of one SDO 
becomes binding for another SDO, because the decision of the first SDO would have been 
endorsed by a hierarchically superior institution which the second SDO is bound to follow. 
Historically, competition or antitrust authorities and courts, as well as ANSI, have played 
this role. Competition authorities and courts are constrained by the limits of competition 
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law, and do not always intervene consistently, over time or over jurisdictions. ANSI is not 
truly a public authority, and its remit is limited to a subset of US-based SDOs. 
Outlook and recommendations 
We highlight the predominance of a self-regulatory approach to the development of SDO 
IPR policies. In line with the general benefits of self-regulatory processes, many SDO IPR 
policies were developed with limited use of public resources and within specialized 
governance bodies vested with a technical expertise that it would be difficult for public 
authorities to provide. Furthermore, the process is able to accommodate the diversity of 
SDO circumstances, a point which stakeholders have repeatedly emphasized.  
Public authorities have usefully participated in the governance model through a combination 
of procedural and safe harbour approaches. Through the procedural approach, public 
authorities have supported and defended general procedural principles of SDO decision 
making, such as openness, balance of interests, and consensus. In the realm of IPR policies, 
the safe harbour approach has resulted in a Baseline IPR policy, which ensures compliance 
with basic tenets of competition, trade and public procurement law.  Overall, this general 
and rule-based regulatory approach has served the public interest well. 
Accordingly, we invite public policymakers to prioritize the strengthening and 
further development of the procedural and safe-harbour approaches over more 
direct intervention in SDO decision-making. 
In addition to this general assessment, a number of specific challenges to the current 
regulatory model warrant closer attention. 
For one, there can, at times, be some distance between the ideals of openness and balance 
of interests and the reality of SDO activities and decisions, which can be dominated by a few 
industry stakeholders that are directly concerned and thus take a very active stance. The 
expansion of the realm of ICT standardization to include other industries – with the Internet 
of Things – and a global set of stakeholders only heightens this issue. While commercially 
significant stakeholders from other industries may be able to make their voices heard and 
their influence felt, the same cannot be said for dispersed stakeholders such as small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs), consumers, or civil society and public interest groups. Our 
research indicates that policy approaches aiming to solve this issue through direct 
participation – i.e. by bringing additional voices to the table (consumer associations, SME 
associations, etc.) – have not been very successful. Similarly, mandates for individuals 
participating in SDO governance bodies to pursue broader social interests appear to be of 
limited help. There is no track record of how individuals serving in SDOs interpret their 
mandate, or how (if ever) the mandate is enforced. In practice, we see the danger that 
broad reference to the under-defined interests of SDO “outsiders” is a convenient tool that 
could be used to justify almost any policy decision.  We conclude that the interests of 
under-represented groups are best served when public authorities look out for the 
public interest within the current regulatory scheme, following and deepening the 
previously mentioned procedural and safe-harbour approaches. 
While the SDO governance model overall performs well from a social perspective, on 
perhaps the most contentious issue – the definition of licensing obligations for SEPs – we 
observe a significant departure from the otherwise prevailing self-regulatory model. Most 
SDO policies include a very general FRAND requirement. Attempts at some SDOs to further 
develop that requirement are mired in controversy within SDOs and beyond. The specific 
implications of a FRAND licensing obligation have thus mostly been defined by courts and 
public authorities, but, so far, the results are mixed, with a string of very complex and 
sometimes inconsistent decisions and pronouncements that is unsustainable in the long run. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the general ideal of self-regulation, the specific and often 
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technical details of FRAND obligations have increasingly been interpreted and defined by 
generalist courts and regulators instead of the highly specialized expert bodies available 
within SDOs. Finally, the definition of IPR policy details in national courts poses the risk of 
international fragmentation.  
To guard against these potential risks of departing from an otherwise successful self-
regulatory model, we recommend that the European Commission, together with 
other public authorities, produce clear guidance on the appropriate procedural 
principles for SDO policy development. This guidance would clarify how the procedural 
approach applies to policy development, an issue which is currently ambiguous and 
contested among different stakeholders. Spelling out the procedural principles that should 
generally be regarded as appropriate for policy development would increase the legitimacy 
of SDO decision making following such principles, and may widen the range of instances in 
which public authorities can defer to SDOs for substantive policy choices.  
The guidance on procedural principles should carefully distinguish between different SDOs, 
and the different justifications for SDO self-regulation. Our three-layer model of SDOs could 
provide a useful basis for this differentiation. The large number of SDOs in the third layer 
are subject to significant competitive forces. Cognizant of the benefits of competition and 
diversity among these industry-led SDOs, public authorities should not intervene in  the 
policymaking at these SDOs (unless there is evidence of a clear problem). The SDOs’ own 
processes, to which members assent by joining the SDO, together with the possibility for 
stakeholders to instead participate in competing SDOs, constitute the most effective 
regulation of these SDOs’ conduct. In the first layer, SDOs are shielded from such 
competitive pressures by their quasi-regulatory role conferred by public authorities and their 
position in a formal network of SDOs. Self-regulation of these SDOs gains its legitimacy 
from decision-making procedures based on openness, balance of interests, transparency, 
availability of appeal, and consensus. Given the evident and immediate bearing that IPR 
policies have on standardization decisions, IPR policy deliberations should also fall under 
these procedural principles. SDOs in the second layer usually do not have a formal 
regulatory role conferred by public authorities. Nevertheless, their de facto leadership over 
a technical field and the cost of migrating ongoing standard development efforts to 
alternative venues may constitute significant barriers to competition. Decision-making of 
these SDOs should therefore be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, differentiating in 
particular between policies limited to future standardization projects and those with a direct 
bearing on existing standards or ongoing projects. With respect to SDOs in the third layer, 
these principles are still relevant, but less directly applicable, particularly when third layer 
SDOs are formed by small groups of firms with specific technical goals in mind. 
With such guidance, SDOs should be able to further develop their IPR policies while reducing 
internal and external disputes. This does not imply that different IPR policies will evolve in 
the same direction. If needed, SDOs should be able to coordinate their IPR policies, as is the 
case for instance with 3GPP. Otherwise, a diversity of approaches between SDOs is a prized 
feature of self-regulation. Nevertheless, on certain issues, such as the meaning of a 
commonly-used term such as FRAND, it might be confusing and costly to entertain different 
substantive meanings across SDOs. While SDOs already have venues to discuss their 
respective policies, we see value in an accreditation process on the model of ANSI for US-
based SDOs, which provides for a certain review of SDO practices, interpretation of 
commonly used policy language, and a clearly circumscribed precedential effect to individual 
SDOs’ decisions. We recommend that the European Commission consider expanding 
the role of the Multistakeholder Platform to include the review and/or certification 
of SDO IPR policies. The Multistakeholder Platform’s role in SDO self-regulation could be 
strengthened by expanding its role, while creating the conditions for a more pronounced 
participation by the most relevant and immediately affected stakeholders.  
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The European Commission’s 2017 Communication “Setting Out the EU Approach to 
Standard Essential Patents” describes a path for the Commission’s contribution in support of 
SDO policy development. The Communication describes general principles of IP valuation in 
FRAND negotiations. On many of the most contentious specific other issues, the 
communication does not give direction to SDOs, but rather signals the availability of the 
Commission to engage in a collaborative process. The clarification regarding the 
transferability of SEP licensing obligations constitutes a model for such a collaborative 
process, which we call a tandem approach (next to the procedural and safe-harbour 
approaches). Pursuant to a tandem approach, public authority pronouncements and SDO 
decision making interact to clarify and further develop institutional norms and general legal 
principles. We recommend that the European Commission pursue this tandem 
approach carefully, taking into account the overall self-regulatory scheme. 
Collaborative efforts involving the participation of SDOs, industry stakeholders, public 
authorities, and independent experts can provide useful guidance regarding the application 
of general legal principles and policies common to a larger number of SDOs, provided these 
efforts are in phase with SDOs’ internal governance processes and respect SDOs’ autonomy 
over their policies. 
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1 Introduction 
This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the governance of standard development 
organizations (SDOs), with a particular emphasis on organizations developing standards for 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). The analysis is based on 17 SDO case 
studies, a survey of SDO stakeholders, an expert workshop, and a comprehensive review of 
the legal and economic literature. The study considers the external factors conditioning SDO 
decision making on rules and procedures, including binding legal requirements, government 
influence, the network of cooperative relationships with other SDOs and related 
organizations, and competitive forces. SDO decision-making is also shaped by internal 
factors, such as the SDOs’ institutional architecture of decision-making bodies and their 
respective decision-making processes, which govern the interaction among SDO 
stakeholders and between stakeholders and the SDO itself. The study also analyzes 
governance principles, such as openness, balance of interests, and consensus decision-
making, and discusses their interplay. The insights from these analyses are applied to SDO 
decision making on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) policies, which represents a 
particularly salient and controversial aspect of SDO policy development. 
Standardization has long been recognized as playing an important role in technological 
innovation, the diffusion of new technologies, and economic growth. Standardization is 
particularly important for ICT. Over just a few decades, the rapid progress and diffusion of 
ICT have transformed many aspects of our economy, and indeed our daily lives. Currently, 
researchers and industry are working on a new set of ICT, with a focus on communication 
between devices and machines. In a near future, these technologies, collectively labeled the 
Internet of Things (IoT), may enable among other advances autonomously driving cars, 
smarter grids for electricity, gas and water, and significant improvements in the production 
and distribution of goods and services.  
Nevertheless, these potential benefits can only be realized with the help of advanced 
technology standards that guarantee interoperability and facilitate seamless communication 
among a large number of devices offered by different vendors. The success of the future IoT 
thus hinges upon the successful development of a new generation of ICT standards and the 
novel technological inventions that are essential to these standards.  
 While technology standards can be developed in a variety of ways, including government 
regulation and de-facto standardization by market selection, most ICT standards are 
developed through explicit coordination among industry stakeholders. SDOs – open, 
voluntary and consensus-based organizations specializing in the development of such 
standards – play a central role in this process. SDOs have developed a great number of ICT 
standards, and are already playing a crucial role in the development of standards in support 
of the IoT. In spite of their fundamental importance, SDOs remain insufficiently understood 
by both policy makers and researchers. Indeed, there is a large variety of SDOs, and many 
of these organizations are highly complex and dynamic. The study of SDOs is therefore an 
important and challenging field of research in economics, law, and other social sciences. 
One aspect of SDOs that has attracted significant policy and research interest is the 
interplay between SDO standardization and IPR systems, in particular patenting. A growing 
body of research documents that IPR and standardization systems are complementary and 
interdependent. Both patents and SDO standards contribute to the codification of technical 
knowledge, support the rapid disclosure of new inventions, and facilitate transactions and 
coordination in a complex process of distributed innovation involving a continuously 
increasing number of heterogeneous actors. Nevertheless, policy makers, regulators, 
researchers, and industry practitioners have long been aware of significant potential 
concerns arising at the interface of the SDO and patent systems. A particular concern is that 
the standardization of technology by an SDO might unduly leverage the patent rights 
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protecting technology that is required for the implementation of the SDO’s standards and 
allow the owners of such standard-essential patents (SEPs) to extract excessive royalty 
payments from manufacturers of standardized products. Most SDOs developing standards 
for ICT technologies have adopted IPR policies in order to address this and other potential 
concerns. The efficacy of these policies is the subject of a contentious, ongoing debate. 
As part of this ongoing debate, the European Commission published in November 2017 a 
communication setting out the EU approach to Standard-Essential Patents (SEP). The 
Commission declared that there is “a need for a clear, balanced and reasonable policy for 
Standard Essential Patents in the EU”. Nevertheless, the Commission laments that 
“conflicting interests of stakeholders in certain SDOs may make it difficult for these 
organisations to provide effective guidance on such complex legal and intellectual property 
(IP) policy issues”. The Commission thus not only recognizes the importance of SDO policies 
on SEPs for EU policy objectives, it also recognizes that these policies are primarily defined 
by the SDOs themselves in a complex interplay with SDO stakeholders and diverse external 
forces and constraints. As a premise for Commission policy action with respect to SDO 
policies on SEPs, it is therefore crucial to gain a better understanding of the processes 
through which these policies are developed and modified. 
There is significant disagreement in the industry about appropriate SDO policies on IPR. In 
particular, companies with a primary business interest in patent licensing revenue 
commonly have policy preferences that differ from those of companies with a primary 
business interest in revenue from the sales of standard-compliant products. These different 
preferences may lead to conflicts when SDOs change or consider changing their IPR policies. 
Controversies about IPR policy choices thus have recently fueled significant interest in SDO 
governance; i.e. the various processes and forces conditioning and shaping SDO policy 
choices on potentially controversial issues. Unfortunately, there is to date only very limited 
evidence on SDO governance, and no comprehensive analysis of all major aspects of SDO 
governance relevant to the development of IPR policies in a significant and representative 
sample of major SDOs. 
In order to fill this gap, the Joint Research Center (JRC) of the European Commission in 
collaboration with the Commission’s Directorate General for Communications Networks, 
Content and Technology (DG Connect) has called for a comprehensive study on SDO 
governance, in particular as it applies to the development of IPR policies and with a 
particular emphasis on ICT standards for IoT. To this end, the JRC published an Invitation to 
Tender in March 2016 (JRC/SVQ/2016/J.3/0003/OC) (Tender). The Technical Specifications 
for the Invitation to Tender set out the following questions for the study: 
The present study aims at achieving a comprehensive overview of the structure of 
the interplay of IPR systems and SDOs from a public policy perspective. Considering 
the past experience and stakeholder interests as well as the global context in which 
this interplay is taking place, the study should identify elements of best practices for 
this interaction.  
The study must find out whether the current model of governance for the interplay of 
IPR systems and SDOs in Europe is well functioning from a welfare perspective. In 
the case that it is not, it should identify why is it not operating in an optimal way and 
how could the interplay of systems be improved, providing concrete 
recommendations in that case.  
The analysis will take into account in particular the following questions:  
[…] Do SDOs have to consider a horizon that goes beyond the interests of their 
members?  
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What is or can be the role in standardisation setting of societal groups such as 
consumers, end-users etc. and those of other industry players, in particular the so-
called “vertical” players (transportation, life sciences, energy, etc.)? How are they 
represented in the process of ICT standard making?  
[..I]s there a need for SDO policy coordination in general and for IPR policies 
coordination in particular? If coordination is not possible, what are the potential 
points of conflict?  
What would be an appropriate plan and infrastructure to allow collaboration between 
SDOs, between Patent Offices and between SDOs and Patent Offices?  
What is in particular the role of patent quality (and implicitly of quantity) as an 
essential input factor into the standardization system?  
What are the most important factors for a sustainable co-existence of IPR systems 
and standardization systems in Europe in the context of the Digital Single Market?  
What are the benefits of standard setting and of specific IPR rules in standard setting 
and what their impact on the European economy?  
What role does transparency play in building SDO policies? In this context and that 
copyright (and/or open access).  
What role can or should policy makers, such as the European Commission, play to 
ensure that the interplay between IPR systems and SDOs has a positive effect for the 
society?  
The present study results from the successful bid to perform the study requested by the 
Tender and responds to the Commission’s Technical Specifications for this study. In line with 
the Technical Specifications, the research team has carried out a comprehensive literature 
review, 17 SDO case studies, an online survey of diverse SDO stakeholders, and an in-
person stakeholder workshop.  We selected the SDOs and stakeholders for their importance 
to the debate on IPR policies in the field of ICT standardization. Our study thus rests on a 
comprehensive analysis of policy development in the major SDOs in which ICT 
standardization is carried out, and the input received from a large and diverse pool of expert 
practitioners representing many of the most significant SDO stakeholders from various sides 
of the debate. 
For purposes of our analysis, we considered an SDO to be an open organization developing 
technical standards. We thus excluded consortia or alliances consisting of a fixed set of 
member organizations that are not open to the participation of other interested 
stakeholders. We furthermore did not include in our sample any of the large number of 
organizations that participate in standard development in an ancillary role, without 
developing their own standards and specifications. We do however include organizations 
developing technical specifications published as technical standards by another SDO; and 
we include ANSI, an accreditation body that, even though not developing its own standards, 
defines essential requirements for standard development that inform the policies applicable 
to the development of a large number of important standards. We also included the National 
Standards Bodies (NSB) AFNOR and DIN, even though these organisations have additional 
responsibilities extending beyond the development of standards, and do not refer to 
themselves as SDOs. For the remainder, we selected a sample of SDOs that are both 
individually important, geographically diverse, and sufficiently representative of the much 
larger universe of diverse SDOs. 
Our analysis focuses on SDO governance, i.e. how SDOs are governed, including their 
organizational architecture, their leadership, their membership and their decision-making 
processes. In so doing, given the focus of this study, we concentrate on governance as it 
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relates to rules and policies, such as the SDOs’ membership agreement, bylaws, 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), other binding policies as well as non-binding 
strategy and guidance documents. We also consider the processes for specific policy 
decisions as opposed to the development of generic rules, e.g. dispute resolution 
mechanisms. We only consider the processes through which SDOs make policy choices, and 
do not analyze or assess the content or effects of individual policy choices, except with 
respect to their implications for the policy development processes. We first develop a 
general analysis of SDO governance, which we then corroborate and refine by studying the 
special case of IPR policies. As the goal of this analysis is to compare the rule-making 
process of different SDOs in practice, we do not comprehensively include all IPR-related 
policies in this analysis, but focus on a somewhat narrower subset of particularly salient IPR 
policy questions that are relevant to all SDOs in our sample. We therefore concentrate on 
SDO policies relating to the disclosure and licensing of (potential) SEPs, and only briefly 
touch upon policy provisions with respect to prior art status of standards-related 
documents, copyrights, trademarks and other issues.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: in Section 2, we position our studied 
research questions in the context of existing studies and scholarship. In Section 3, we 
explain the methodology for our case studies, interviews, surveys and stakeholder 
workshop. Section 4 provides a broad overview of the standardization ecosystem and its 
external constrains: law, mutual relationship among SDOs, interactions with public 
authorities and limits of the competitive environment. In Section 5, we present the findings 
of our study concerning the governance architecture of SDOs, including issues such as SDO 
staff, policy development, dispute resolution and the types of stakeholder influence. In 
Section 6, we discuss the most fundamental SDO governance principles and develop an 
analytical framework to analyze the legitimacy of SDO policy making. In this section, we 
present a number of important findings concerning openness, due process, transparency, 
balance of interest and consensus-building. In Section 7, we turn our attention to IPR 
policies of SDOs, review the typical approaches, provide results of our fact-finding exercise 
and draw a number of conclusions about how changes are made, what influences their 
acceptance or contestation and their impact on legitimacy of such changes. 
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2 Literature Review 
In this section, we briefly review three streams of existing research to which our study most 
closely relates: (1) general studies of SDOs, including a large number of case studies, as 
well as studies of SDOs in their interaction; (2) studies of SDO processes, including many 
analyses of standardization processes, and some very limited research on processes for the 
development or modification of SDO policies; and (3) the broader institutional literature on 
organizations and their governance, as it most directly applies to SDOs. We conclude on a 
statement of the gaps in the existing knowledge that our study aims to fill.  
In addition to the research summarized in this background literature review, a much larger 
body of literature has informed our analysis of SDO governance. We reference and discuss 
these other sources throughout the study where appropriate and useful. 
2.1 General studies of SDOs 
The international standard-setting “ecosystem” and its principal components are described 
in detail by David and Shurmer (1996), Mattli and Büthe (2003), Nickerson and zur Muehlen 
(2006), Cargill and Bolin (2007), Biddle et al (2012), Ernst (2012), Bekkers et al. (2014) 
and Lundqvist (2014).  
Standards can be developed in a variety of ways, including by public sector agencies, 
market selection, or explicit coordination in consensus-driven organizations. Wiegmann et 
al. (2017) review the available literature on each of these ‘modes’ of standard development 
and their different interactions. Our study focuses on standard development by consensus-
driven SDOs; even though we take into account and analyze the interaction of SDOs with 
both government and competitive market forces. 
There is a large array of different organizations participating in the development of 
consensus standards. Updegrove (2017) catalogs more than 1,000 active consortia, trade 
associations and other SDOs operating in various fields. Not all of these organizations 
develop their own standards or specifications. Many consortia participate in the 
development of standards taking place at other organizations in a variety of ancillary roles. 
A growing literature analyzes the role of such consortia for standard development in 
interplay with a broader and more formal organization where the standard is developed 
(e.g. Leiponen, 2008; Baron and Pohlmann, 2013; Bar and Leiponen, 2014; Baron et al., 
2014, and Delcamp and Leiponen, 2014). In our study, we analyze the governance 
processes of SDOs, i.e. organizations that develop standards and specifications, and do not 
include consortia that only support standard development at other organizations
2
.  
Nevertheless, in section 4.4.2, we explore the role of such consortia for SDO governance. 
Even restricting the focus on SDOs, i.e. organizations that develop and publish voluntary 
consensus standards, there still is a large number and variety of organizations, including 
formal and established international bodies as well as short-lived single-project 
organizations with a narrow technical focus. Consequently, theoretical research on the 
functioning of these organizations has long been highly abstract and general. One stream of 
research investigates and compares different decision rules within SDOs. Farrell and Saloner 
(1988) e.g. model the consensus standardization process in an SDO as a war of attrition 
between opposing stakeholders.  Though this process was shown to result in greater 
coordination than decentralized activity, it is cumbersome.  Farrell and Simcoe (2011) 
further explore and expand the war of attrition model to analyze standard-setting by 
consensus. Other analyses study standard development by voting. Goerke and Holler 
                                           
2 As discussed, the definition of “SDO” varies. We thus do include several organizations that do not consider 
themselves SDOs, such as the national standards bodies AFNOR and DIN; the accreditation body ANSI; and 
DVB, which develops technical specifications published as standards by the SDOs CEN and ETSI. 
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(1995) and Bonatti and Rantakari (2016) analyze the efficiency of alternative decision rules 
in SDOs. Spulber (2018) analyzes decision-making in SDOs and predicts that the interplay 
between voting in SDOs and competition in the market results in the selection of efficient 
standards. We will discuss the theoretical research comparing the efficiency of decision-
making processes in Section 5.1., as a background to our empirical analysis of the 
processes in the SDOs in our sample. 
In addition to comparing decision-making processes within SDOs, existing theoretical 
research has investigated the interplay between SDO decision making and public regulation 
(e.g. Cabral and Salant, 2014) or between SDO decision making and competitive forces 
(Lerner and Tirole, 2015; Spulber, 2016). Of particular interest to our study are analyses of 
how SDO decision making rules are shaped by these interactions. Lerner and Tirole (2006, 
2015) and Chiao et al. (2007) analyze SDO processes as endogenous outcomes of the 
competition between SDOs to attract new standardization projects. We will discuss at 
greater length the implications and empirical relevance for our analysis of SDO governance 
in section 4.4.1.  
A significant focus of the research interest is the interplay between SDO standardization and 
IPR, and in particular patents (see e.g. Bekkers et al., 2014). Empirical research has 
investigated the relationship between patenting and standardization at the industry level 
(e.g. Blind, 2002); the firm level (Gandal et al., 2007; Blind and Thumm, 2004; Fischer and 
Henkel, 2013); or the individual inventor level (Kang and Motohashi, 2015). Most of the 
research however has focused on the specific issue of SEPs. Large bodies of legal (e.g. 
Lemley and Shapiro, 2007) and both empirical (e.g. Rysman and Simcoe, 2008) and 
theoretical (e.g. Lerner and Tirole, 2015) economic research have investigated questions 
and issues related to SEPs. In section 7.1, we will review some findings of this existing 
literature, in particular insofar as they compare and discuss features of SDO policies on 
SEPs (e.g. Lemley, 2002; Bekkers and Updegrove, 2012). For more comprehensive surveys 
of this literature, see Contreras (2018a) and Baron and Pohlmann (2018) 3.   
Besides the significant research focus on SEPs, there is limited comprehensive comparative 
research on the functioning of different SDOs. There are currently only a few studies 
comparing larger samples of SDOs with respect to their membership, procedures and output 
(e.g. Chiao et al., 2007; Baron and Spulber, 2018) 4.  Economists have therefore used 
practitioner surveys (Weiss and Sirbu, 1990; Blind and Thumm, 2004; Blind and 
Mangelsdorf, 2013; Fischer and Henkel, 2013) or companies' business communications 
(Aggarwal et al., 2011) to study company participation in SDO standardization.  
In addition, a number of detailed qualitative (e.g. Bekkers, 2001; DeLacey et al., 2006; 
Murphy and Yates, 2009) and quantitative (e.g. Simcoe, 2012) studies of single 
organizations have significantly contributed to the analysis of SDO standardization. For a 
more comprehensive review of SDO case studies and a comprehensive data description, see 
Baron and Gupta (2018). 
2.2 Studies of SDO processes 
The processes of an SDO are usually defined in the SDO’s bylaws (sometimes also called 
constitution), policies or membership agreement. The extent to which the bylaws define the 
specific aspects of SDO operations varies greatly, as SDOs may be more or less formally 
established organizations. As a rule, an SDO’s bylaws stipulate the SDO members’ rights to 
                                           
3 See Baron and Pohlmann (2018) for a survey, methodological discussion and presentation of a new database of 
SEP declarations. 
4 See Baron and Spulber (2018) for a survey, discussion and a new database. 
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participate in the standard development and other activities of the SDO, and their 
obligations to pay membership dues and comply with its policies.  
Baron and Spulber (2018) categorize SDOs into three groups according to the composition 
of their membership
5
.  In several international SDOs, membership consists in member 
countries, and the SDO policies define how members are represented (e.g. by national 
standards organizations like AFNOR, BSI or DIN). In the majority of SDOs, membership 
consists in legal persons, with private companies constituting the majority of membership. 
In addition, universities, government agencies, consumer or industry groups or other SDOs 
are also frequently SDO members. The policies of SDOs operating under these rules may 
differentiate between different categories of member entities, e.g. by granting rebates on 
membership dues for academic research institutions or consumer groups; or by stipulating 
standard development processes aiming at a balance of the interests of different categories. 
Finally, some SDOs are based on individual participation, including e.g. engineering societies 
and IETF.  
Another set of SDO policies that fundamentally affect the nature of the SDO are the rules on 
standard approval. Baron and Spulber (2018) compare the voting rules of 36 SDOs, and 
find that approval requirements for standard adoption range from simple majority to 
unanimity. The majority of these SDOs also have consensus rules, where consensus is 
sometimes defined as a specific super-majority voting in favor of a standard, and absence of 
qualified disagreement
6
.  Many SDOs allow a standard to be adopted if all objections against 
the standard have been addressed, and allow dissenting members to appeal decisions on 
standard adoption. SDOs that require a lower threshold of approval for standard adoption 
and have a more limited set of members can decide more quickly on standards, while SDOs 
with broad participation of stakeholders from different interest groups and high approval 
thresholds issue standards that are more authoritative. SDOs with different rules for 
participation and standard adoption thus occupy different roles in the standardization 
ecosystem, and are active in different stages of the technological life-cycle.  
It is also common for SDOs to cooperate. In particular, SDOs with lower approval thresholds 
may submit their standards for additional endorsement to a more inclusive, consensus-
oriented SDO (see e.g. Blind, 2011). Many formal SDOs have specific policies for the 
consideration of standards that have already been approved by another, usually less formal, 
standardization body (Baron and Pohlmann, 2013; Baron et al., 2014). 
The focus of our study, the processes of SDOs for revising their rules and procedures, has 
by comparison received relatively little academic attention. More than 20 years ago, David 
and Shurmer (1996) argued that formal, international SDOs are characterized by a clear 
distinction between standard setting and governance. “The intention of these institutional 
arrangements, if not always their effect, is to very clearly separate the political from the 
technical aspect of the SDO’s decision process.” (David and Shurmer, 1996, p. 794). David 
and Shurmer (1996) argue that this division reflects a “technological idealism”, whereby 
engineers should not be encumbered by strategic considerations, and focus on selecting 
technological solutions purely based on merit.  We will investigate the degree to which these 
decades-old observations still hold in today’s dynamic standardization environment. 
                                           
5 This classification system roughly corresponds with Bekkers et al. (2014) discussed in Part 1.2 above. 
6 Standards bodies have developed a standardized definition of consensus.  Under the ISO/IEC Guide 2.2004, 
“consensus” is defined as “General agreement, characterized by the absence of sustained opposition to 
substantial issues by any important part of the concerned interests and by a process that involves seeking to 
take into account the views of all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments. NOTE 
Consensus need not imply unanimity." 
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Only few studies have analyzed processes for decision making specifically on SDO IPR 
policies. Iversen (1999) offers a case study of one such process, the adoption and 
subsequent revision of ETSI’s IPR policy in 1993 and 1994. This case study highlights the 
importance of the influence of SDO stakeholders, as well as political pressures from 
governmental authorities. Layne-Farrar (2014) analyzes revisions of SDO IPR policies as 
responses to potential antitrust concerns, and discusses the relationship between SDO 
policy making and the actions taken by antitrust authorities. Tsai and Wright (2015) also 
document a larger number of changes to SDO IPR policies and discuss the implications of 
SDO-initiated changes for antitrust policy. In addition, Willingmyre (2016) offers a 
comparative view of SDO policy development procedures based on review of publicly-
available policy documents of five SDOs. He highlights that SDOs’ procedures typically differ 
from the processes for standard development and place varying priorities on the balance of 
SDOs’ constituencies and consensus decision-making. 
2.3 General institutional literature on the governance of 
organizations 
In the above, we have covered in detail the institutional aspects of SDOs themselves, taken 
in isolation. In a broader perspective, SDOs are seen as an institutional response to 
governance issues surrounding standardization. SDOs create standards and standardization 
processes, which complement the regulatory functions of other institutions, including 
national regulatory authorities and international organizations. This privatization of the 
creation of rules raises important questions regarding the enforcement of public policy 
objectives. Courts and competition authorities are already intervening in and around the 
activities of SDOs, which prompts the question whether they bring an institutional 
advantage over SDOs in dealing with the issues in question.  
Once it is assumed that governance implies some public functions, then the large literature 
on regulatory institutions becomes relevant. The work of Majone (1996), for instance, is 
concerned with establishing the proper conditions for regulatory institutions to achieve 
legitimacy and accountability. Many authors have developed this further, leading to a 
number of sets of “good governance” principles, some of which have been issued by official 
institutions such as the OECD. See here the work of Lavrijssen, Larouche and Hancher 
(2003), Ottow (2015) or the more recent synthesis attempted by CERRE (2014).  
Within the EU context, this has led to a complex regulatory architecture, with EU authorities 
and Member State authorities, giving rise to horizontal and vertical relationships, some 
cooperative, some conflictual (see the contributions in Geradin, 2005). In their overview 
piece, Larouche and Hancher (2011) show that EU law has tended to create boundaries and 
draw lines to regulate these relationships at first, and is slowly moving towards a more 
integrative approach. This line of analysis can probably be applied to the regulation of 
standardization processes. 
There is an extensive general literature on institutions, as it is available in the legal and 
economic scholarship concerning competition/antitrust and economic regulation. For general 
overviews, see Ogus (1994), Baldwin and Cave (2012) and Baldwin et al. (2010). Some 
literature concerns the respective merits and demerits of institutional solutions that leave 
room to private actors, such as self-regulation and co-regulation. The work of Black is 
central to this area (see for instance Black, 2001). See also Senden (2005). 
Recent developments in competition law – with the promotion of private enforcement – 
have also revived the literature on the advantages and disadvantages of enforcement via 
courts or regulatory authorities (see for instance Hüschelrath and Schweitzer, 2014).  
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From a regulatory perspective, SDOs engage in a type of private ordering. According to 
Abbott and Snidal, standards are pervasive mechanisms of international governance (Abbott 
and Snidal 2001, 2009). States and private actors create them “across a wide range of 
circumstances to promote their collective welfare by coordinating and constraining individual 
behavior” (Abbott and Snidal 2001). Private ordering refers to the use of systems of rules 
that private actors create, observe, and often enforce through extra-legal means (Ellikson, 
1991; Schwarcz, 2002). As collected by Contreras (2018a), there are multiple case studies 
that look into this regulatory aspect of private ordering in diverse areas, such as diamond 
and cotton trade (Bernstein, 1992; Bernstein, 2001), Japanese organized crime syndicates 
(Curtis and West, 2000), the Internet domain name authority (Boyle, 2000) or the New 
York Stock Exchange (Schwarcz, 2002; Macey, 1997). Many authors studied standardization 
as a form of a trend of transnational rule-making (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; Shelton, 
2000; Murphy and Yates, 2009; Pauwelyn et al., 2012). 
The institutional perspective has been applied to SDOs in particular in the legal and political 
science literature (Kirton and Trebilcock (ed.) 2004; Schepel 2005; Kerwer 2006).  
While the existing background literature sheds some light on the issues of SDO governance, 
number of issues remain unaddressed, which this project tries to study. To begin with, there 
is no systematic empirical comparison of how SDOs determine their rules; which objectives 
they pursue; who has the authority to make decisions on their behalf; how they coordinate 
with other organizations; and to which legal constraints and competitive forces they are 
subject. Without these analyses, there can be no serious assessment of the overall 
economic, legal and institutional effectiveness of these processes. Such an assessment must 
form the basis for policy guidance. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 General approach 
In accordance with the Technical Specification, the study rests on two main sources of new 
empirical information: first, we conducted 17 case studies of SDO governance. For each of 
the 17 SDOs, we conducted an interview with an SDO representative knowledgeable about 
the SDO’s governance and policies and analyzed publicly available SDO documents relating 
to the SDO’s governance processes. Second, we conducted a stakeholder survey in which 
we asked a diverse set of SDO stakeholders about their views and attitudes with respect to 
SDO governance. Our survey collects the views of organizations with stakes in standard 
development, as opposed to personal opinions of individual SDO participants. We focused on 
organizations that are particularly relevant for the governance of the 17 studied SDOs
7
 . 
3.2 Case studies 
3.2.1 Sample 
We have used four general criteria for the selection of these SDOs: (1) Overall relevance of 
the SDO, and in particular relevance of the SDO for the intersection between standards and 
IPR; (2) Representativeness of the overall diversity of existing SDOs; (3) Particularly 
informative case-study because of a unique approach or a relevant IPR policy change; (4) 
Geographical distribution and significance to the technological areas that are most relevant 
to the aims of the study. 
3.2.1.1 Sample selection criteria 
We defined a sample of SDOs based on the general criteria of relevance, 
representativeness, and distinctiveness.  
In order to select the most relevant SDOs, we used available information on the number of 
patents declared to be essential to different SDOs’ standards. This information provides a 
first indication of the relevance of an SDO for discussions regarding IPR and standardization. 
Together, IEEE, ETSI/3GPP, ISO, IEC, ITU-T, IETF, W3C, OMA, OASIS, ECMA and ANSI 
account for more than 98% of the IPR disclosures included in the Searle Center Database 
(excluding the DVD Forum and BluRay Disc Association, which are ad-hoc consortia and not 
formal SDOs) (Baron and Pohlmann, 2018). These nine SDOs also constitute the group of 
SDOs that have produced standards subject to significant disputes around the world 
regarding SEPs.  
Some SDOs are particularly relevant because their IPR policies influence the practices of 
hundreds of other organizations. A very large number of SDOs worldwide closely follows the 
common IPR policy of ISO, IEC and ITU-T. 3GPP is a consortium of seven important SDOs, 
including ETSI (ETSI collects and publishes declarations of patents that are essential to 
3GPP specifications). The ETSI/3GPP policy
8
  therefore also applies to important parts of the 
work of the member organizations (such as ATIS in the US). Finally, though ANSI is not 
itself an SDO, as the accreditation body for developers of American National Standards, the 
ANSI IPR policy sets minimum standards for more than 200 U.S.-based SDOs. While these 
organizations can follow other procedures in the remainder of their standard development 
                                           
7 This study was exempted from Institutional Review Board (IRB) review at the University of Utah on 1 March 2017 
on the basis that it did not seek to obtain information concerning individual human subjects.  This exemption 
was relied upon by Northwestern University.  Separate approval was obtained from the Tilburg University ERB 
on 22 June 2017. 
8 3GPP project (not an SDO in itself) relies on IPR policies of its partners, such as ETSI. 
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tasks, the ANSI policy is highly relevant for the IPR polices practiced by a large number of 
US-based SDOs. Some SDOs are particularly relevant to our study because of their 
importance for standards development in the technological fields that we are primarily 
interested in. 3GPP with its member organizations and IEEE are the leading SDOs for the 
development of wireless telecommunication standards. This is the field which has been the 
focus of the policy debate on the intersection between IPR and standards over the past two 
decades. IETF and W3C are the leading SDOs in the field of Internet standardization. With 
the development of new generations of ICT standards and the Internet of Things, Internet 
standardization is increasingly relevant to and interrelated with standard development in a 
large number of other industries. 
The sample should also be representative of diversity of SDOs and the variation in SDO 
approaches with respect to IPR. Previous studies have found only limited variation regarding 
the fundamental approaches of SDOs with respect to the inclusion of patented technology 
(see e.g. Baron and Spulber, 2018). In particular, there are two broad groups of SDOs: 
those that require commitments to license patents on Fair, Reasonable and Non-
Discriminatory (FRAND) terms (including SDOs offering menus of commitments, including 
FRAND licensing terms), and SDOs that generally require royalty-free licensing or non-
assertion of SEPs, or allow their working groups to require royalty-free licensing or non-
assertion of SEPs. In order to be representative, the sample should include examples of 
both types (e.g. IEEE, ISO/IEC/ITU-T, 3GPP/ETSI, and ANSI for the former group; W3C and 
Bluetooth for the latter, as well as hybrids such as OASIS and ECMA). 
As stated in the introduction, our definition of SDOs excludes a large number of 
organizations that develop standards or participate in some capacity in the development of 
standards. To make reasonable comparisons, we exclude organizations such as closed 
consortia, open source consortia, or for-profit standards developers.  The sample should 
nevertheless be representative of the different types of SDOs that fall within our definition. 
These SDOs can have very different ways of operating. In particular, there are formal 
international SDOs, in which member countries are represented by their national standards 
body (ISO and IEC) or regulatory bodies (ITU) in addition to sectoral members (e.g. 
companies). In private SDOs such as ETSI, ECMA, and JEDEC, membership is dominated by 
private companies. Engineering societies such as IEEE and SAE have a large individual 
membership base, as well as institutional membership (mostly companies). A special case is 
the IETF, where participation is only on an individual basis. Another relevant distinction is 
between “general purpose” SDOs such as ISO and CEN, and organizations such as the DVB 
Project or Bluetooth with a much narrower technological focus.  
In addition to SDOs that are relevant and representative of the diversity of organizational 
models, we included SDOs that have particularly original and/or instructive specificities. Of 
particular interest are those SDOs that have recently undergone an important change in 
their IPR policies. The most significant policy changes highlighted in the literature 
(Contreras, 2013a; Stoll, 2014; Baron and Spulber, 2018) are changes which occurred at 
JEDEC (changes based on policy gaps identified during Rambus litigation), OASIS and W3C 
(adoption of royalty-free policies), VITA (adoption of a policy of ex-ante disclosure of most 
restrictive licensing terms), and IEEE (restricting access to injunctive relief, specification of 
methodologies for calculating FRAND royalties). VITA is not among the organizations 
featuring very significant numbers of SEP disclosures, but provides an interesting case study 
because of its singular approach to SEP licensing. We have also included W3C because its 
focus on software-based standards and solutions implicates many of the copyright issues 
arising in today’s standards environment.  For example, the integration of open source 
software and traditional standards has caused substantial concern and reactions within the 
ICT sector.  
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Few SDOs intervene directly in IPR licensing. An exception is that set of SDO policies that 
aim to facilitate the creation of patent pools. IEEE had a brief partnership with a patent pool 
licensing administrator. The DVB Project still has a policy designed to facilitate the 
emergence of patent pools for DVB standards. DVB also has other notable policy attributes, 
such as mandatory ICT arbitration, that are interesting to consider, and a recent set of 
policy amendments. 
Last, but not least, our selection of SDOs was motivated by geographical considerations. 
ISO, IEC and, ITU-T are international SDOs based in Geneva; DIN, AFNOR, and SAC are 
national SDOs; ETSI, CEN and CENELEC as European SDOs; ANSI accredits SDOs that 
develop American National Standards; most of the other SDOs that we studied are globally 
active (IEEE, W3C, IETF, JEDEC, VITA, ECMA), although sometimes with a more regional 
footprint (e.g. DVB, whose standards related to European broadcasting). We have also 
included one SDO based in India (TSDSI). 
Based on these criteria, we constituted a sample of 19 SDOs. We contacted each of these 
SDOs; and with the exception of two SDOs (Bluetooth and OASIS), a representative of each 
of these SDOs was willing to meet and answer questions regarding the SDO’s governance 
model. In light of our selection criteria, we decided that this sample of 17 SDOs is 
sufficiently representative and relevant for the topics addressed in our study. 
3.2.1.2 Composition of sample 
Case studies were carried out on the following 17 organisations (in alphabetical order of 
their acronym): 
AFNOR Association française de normalization 
ANSI  American National Standards Institute 
CEN  European Committee for Standardization 
9
 
CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical standardization 
DIN  Deutsches Institut für Normung 
DVB  Digital Video Broadcasting (Project) 
ECMA  European Computer Manufacturers Association 
ETSI  European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
IEC  International Electrotechnical Committee 
IEEE-SA Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association 
IETF  Internet Engineering Task Force 
ISO  International Organisation for Standardization 
ITU-T  International Telecommunication Union Standardization Sector 
JEDEC  JEDEC Solid State Technology Association 
SAC  Standardization Administration of China 
TSDSI  Telecommunications Standards Development Society, India 
VITA  VMEbus International Trade Association 
W3C  World Wide Web Consortium 
                                           
9 While CEN and CENELEC are two separate legal entities, in the areas covered by this report they are usually 
acting in concert, hence their being considered jointly as CEN-CENELEC. 
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3.2.2 Data collection 
3.2.2.1 Desk research 
With respect to each of the 17 SDOs studied, we collected current policy documentation, 
typically from the SDOs’ web sites.  We then summarized the principal governance features 
of each SDO and verified the accuracy of these summaries with the SDO representatives 
interviewed (see below). These summaries also facilitated in-depth discussion during the 
interviews and formed part of later deliverables. 
3.2.2.2 Interviews 
We conducted personal interviews with representatives of each of the 17 SDOs studied.  For 
each SDO, a representative having personal knowledge of and experience with the SDO’s 
governance and policies was selected.  In many cases, the interview subject was an 
executive director or high-level staff member of the SDO. 
We developed a standardized interview script that was adapted for each interview.  In 
several cases, we provided the interview subject with a copy of the interview script to allow 
them to prepare for the interview and, in some cases, to prepare written responses in 
advance. 
Most interviews were conducted in person, but some, for logistical reasons (e.g., SAC), were 
conducted via Skype.  Several interviews were supplemented by written responses 
submitted by the interview subject before or after the interview.  In one case (ITU), at the 
request of the SDO, the representative was not interviewed but provided short responses to 
selected questions and shared reflections on the background research. Apart from ANSI, all 
interviews were fully recorded and transcribed. Apart from AFNOR (French), all interviews 
were conducted in English. The transcripts were shared with the interviewees and approved 
by them. The SDOs and interview subjects were assured that their interview transcripts 
would not be shared beyond the research team. 
3.3 Survey 
3.3.1 Questionnaire 
As prescribed by the Technical Specification, we sought to gather information through the 
survey regarding stakeholder perceptions and experiences relating to SDO governance and 
policy making, particularly as they relate to IPR.  We also collected demographic data 
relating to the survey respondents.  
The survey was designed to be administered and taken online using the Qualtrix survey 
program.  Questions were nested and staged according to prior responses.  We asked a 
total of 57 questions, including Yes/No responses, rankings on both 3-point and 5-point 
Likert scales, and open-ended (text box) questions.  There was no limit to the length of 
open-ended responses.  We also offered an open-ended text box on every page of the 
survey.  Some questions allowed respondents to rank different SDOs on similar sets of 
criteria using Quatrix loop logic. 
Based on testing by the research team, we estimated that completing the survey would take 
a knowledgeable individual between 30-60 minutes.   
The survey was coded and administered by Northwestern University using the Qualtrix 
survey software.  Each recipient was sent an email containing an individualized URL link to 
the survey.   
The full version of the survey is attached as Annex 1 to this document. 
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3.3.2 Sample selection 
As prescribed in the Technical Specification, a structured list of stakeholders was developed 
in which potential survey respondents were identified in four categories:  “holders of 
standard essential patents (SEPs), companies and other organisations in the relevant 
technical fields holding patents other than SEPs, companies and other organisations in the 
relevant technical fields not holding any patents, and representatives of groups that stand 
for consumer interests and the broader interest of society”. 
We identified a total of 475 stakeholders, using the following methodology:  
First, we used quantitative criteria to identify 343 stakeholders with a significant interest in 
standardization, with a particular focus on the sample of SSOs that we study. This exercise 
was mostly based on the Searle Center Database and related databases with quantitative 
information on SDOs (Baron and Spulber, 2018; Baron and Pohlmann, 2018; Baron and 
Gupta, 2018; Baron and Ciaramella, 2018). In particular we included the following 
stakeholders: 
Membership 
Entities that are members of 17 or more SDOs, out of 200 SDOs mainly in the field of ICT 
(Baron and Spulber, 2018) 
SEPs 
Entities that declared 11 or more different patents to be SEPs (Baron and Pohlmann, 2018) 
Entities that acquired 10 or more patents previously declared to be SEPs (Baron and 
Ciaramella, 2018; this analysis is based on USPTO reassignment data and thus covers US 
patents only) 
Implementers 
Entities that produce or have produced 50 or more different certified Wi-Fi products
10
  
Entities that produce or have produced 10 or more different GSM/UMTS/LTE certified 
phones or chipsets
11
  
Contributors 
Entities that submitted 200 or more contributions, such as work items or change requests, 
to 3GPP
12
   
The different databases from which these firms are drawn are not equally large. We selected 
cutoffs that seemed sensible based on the identities of the marginal firms (i.e. reducing the 
cutoff would result in including predominantly firms that do not appear to be significantly 
affected by standardization or actively participate in SDO governance debates). 
Many entities were selected into the sample based on multiple criteria. We did not attempt 
to classify these entities into their “primary” category. 
Overall, the quantitative method identifies 173 regular SDO members, 142 significant SEP 
owners, 111 significant implementers of standards subject to SEPs, and 87 significant 
contributors to standards development at 3GPP. Based on these figures and our review of 
the list, the quantitative method results in a relevant sample of stakeholders, which includes 
many of the stakeholders actively participating in SDO governance debates.  
                                           
10 We used data retrieved from the Wi-Fi Alliance’s certified product finder, https://www.wi-fi.org/product-finder 
11 We used data from the GSM Arena’s product comparison website, https://www.gsmarena.com/ 
12 We used data compiled by Baron and Gupta (2018). There is no comparable database for other SDOs. We 
therefore could not use e.g. data on technical contributions to the entire sample of SDOs studied 
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The selection criteria are nevertheless based on firms’ observed (past) behavior with respect 
to SDOs and SDO standards. It may therefore underrepresent companies that are 
significant stakeholders in current SDO governance debates because they expect standards 
developed by these SDOs to become increasingly relevant to their products. Furthermore, 
as companies are selected based on their individual relevance for the debate, our sample 
overrepresents large and technology-centric companies. A much larger number of other 
companies (and other types of organizations) are also affected by the SDOs in our sample, 
but are either too small, or too remotely affected by SDO standards, to be included among 
the most relevant stakeholders. Nevertheless, collectively, this large group of small or 
peripheral players is an important SDO constituency.  
We therefore complemented the sample selected based on the quantitative criteria with 
manual additions, to ensure greater coverage and representativeness of different types of 
stakeholders. 
First, we added 13 firms from industries where SDO governance with respect to IPR is 
expected to become more important.  
Second, we added 31 public interest or civil society organizations with potential interest in 
standardization.  
Third, we added 100 entities (mostly public interest or civil society) that seemed relevant to 
ensure representativeness. In particular, we included organizations representing large and 
small businesses as well as consumers; societal groups interested in internet governance 
and IPR; and trade associations representing IPR owners, public research institutes, and a 
variety of industries using standardized technology subject to essential IPR. We also 
included associations of IPR lawyers, licensing professionals, pool administrators, and other 
companies or professional associations with a particular expertise related to standardization 
and IPR. We made sure to include stakeholders who volunteered to be surveyed, who had 
responded to the public consultation of the EC, or who participated in recent conferences 
related to SDO governance with respect to IPR. We did not include SDOs (from within or 
outside our sample) in the sample of survey respondents.  
  
The final sample was balanced with respect to geography and type of stakeholders. 176 
stakeholders are based in the US, 155 are based in Europe, and 98 in Asia. 
The sample includes 343 firms, 62 interest groups or trade associations, 30 civil society 
associations, 14 public authorities, 12 public research institutes or government-subsidized 
research organizations, 6 law associations, and 3 universities (only those participating in 
standards, we did not include academics writing on SDO governance).  
For each stakeholder, we identified an individual involved in standardization, of as high a 
rank as possible within the organization, to serve as the primary contact point for the 
survey.  We obtained email addresses for these individuals through personal contacts, direct 
outreach, or searches of public web sites.  
We allowed only one survey response per entity, though individuals within the same entity 
were permitted to consult and collaborate on their entity’s response.   
3.3.3 Response rate 
In total, we received 47 valid and complete responses. Not every respondent answered 
every question, and we report the total number of non-blank responses throughout the 
report, for each question.   
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There are several possible reasons that survey responses may have fallen below the target 
goal of 200 responses.  First, due to the highly contentious nature of the topic, we were 
informed by at least two large stakeholders that they deliberately declined to participate in 
the survey so as not to prejudice themselves in current or future litigation or lobbying 
efforts.  Second, the survey appears to have taken longer than anticipated to complete for 
some organizations.  The time commitment involved may have dissuaded some smaller 
stakeholders from participating.  Third, some stakeholders (particularly those from civil 
society) informed us that they lacked the relevant expertise to complete the survey, or that 
they did not participate actively enough in SDO governance to make their responses 
meaningful.  Fourth, being drafted in English, the survey may have challenged stakeholders 
without relevant staff who are fluent in English (this point is not insignificant, as even some 
large European SDOs interviewed for our case studies preferred to be interviewed in 
languages other than English). As an offsetting benefit, the existence of these obstacles 
suggests that the 47 entities that did respond to the survey were highly motivated. This 
inference is further supported by the number of free text responses that were provided and 
the actual time taken by many respondents to provide comprehensive responses to the 
survey (we were informally told that some respondents spent several hours completing the 
survey).  As a result, we have a high degree of confidence in the survey responses received. 
In order to increase the response rate, we sent multiple reminders, and granted two 
extensions of the deadline for responding. We also identified and contacted secondary 
contacts at a large number of the organizations in the sample, and personally approached 
individual representatives of these organizations at various stakeholder meetings. As 
individual respondents suggested that they preferred a printable version of the survey to 
our online format, we created and distributed a pdf version of the survey (identical to the 
online questionnaire). Our invitation to participate in the survey was also relayed and 
endorsed by EC officials and representatives of various SDOs that we studied. From these 
efforts and informal interactions with stakeholders on our list, we infer that our intended 
respondents were well appraised of the opportunity to participate in this study.  
3.3.4 Respondent demographics, non-response bias 
Beyond the question of the response rate, we considered the self-selection criteria of 
respondents. To do so, we compared respondents to non-respondents using the categories 
of respondents defined above. There is no clear non-response bias by type of organization. 
The response rate among companies was slightly lower than among other organizations, but 
the difference overall does not appear significant. The same is true regarding the 
quantitative criteria we used. Organizations selected because of their high number of 
declared SEPs or active contributions to 3GPP were slightly more likely to respond than 
companies selected because of their large number of SDO memberships or certified 
standard-compliant products, but again, the differences do not appear to be significant. 
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Type Respondents 
Non-
respondents 
Response 
rate 
Company 33 329 0.091 
PRI 1 11 0.083 
University 0 3 0.000 
Law Association 1 6 0.143 
Civil Society 4 27 0.129 
Interest Group / Trade Association 4 68 0.056 
International Organization 0 4 0.000 
Government 1 17 0.056 
Standards-related 2 2 0.500 
Civil Society  0 1 0.000 
    Selected based on quantitative criteria
Membership 19 154 0.110 
SEPs 19 123 0.134 
Implementer 12 99 0.108 
Contributor 13 74 0.149 
Table 3.1. – Survey respondent demographics 
These results do not imply that respondents are similar to non-respondents. We do not have 
an empirical basis to compare the entire set of surveyed organizations, but we can compare 
the characteristics of organizations selected based on quantitative criteria. Differences 
between respondents and non-respondents are unequivocal: respondents are members (on 
average) of 59.1 SDOs (17.6 for non-respondents), have declared 760.1 SEPs (61.6 for 
non-respondents), produced 342 certified Wi-Fi products (59.9 for non-respondents), and 
made 6,656.1 contributions to 3GPP (660.1 for non-respondents). The interpretation of this 
comparison is straightforward: at least among companies selected based on quantitative 
criteria, the stakeholders with the quantitatively largest stake in SDO standards were most 
likely to respond to the survey. The alignment of self-selection with our initial sample 
selection criteria suggests that extending the survey beyond our selected sample would 
have resulted in a further decline in the non-response rate, with only very limited additional 
responses. 
When interpreting our survey results, these characteristics of respondents must be borne in 
mind. We selected a sample of potential respondents based on quantitative or qualitative 
evidence indicating that they are individually important SDO stakeholders, either as 
contributor, implementer, or organization representing a relevant constituency. Among the 
organizations we selected, the most relevant SDO stakeholders (among each of these 
groups) were most likely to respond to the survey. The survey results are thus unlikely to 
be representative of the views of remotely or indirectly affected constituencies. The survey 
results are however representative of the views of the most active elements of SDOs’ 
stakeholder base. This group is quite small, not only in our survey but in general. 
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3.3.5 Characteristics and categories of respondents 
In the literature of standards-essential patents, commentators have observed meaningful 
distinctions between the behavior of firms that generally seek to derive significant revenue 
from the licensing of SEPs (Patent-Centric firms) and firms that participate in 
standardization activities but derive their principal revenue from the sale of standardized 
products and do not seek to derive significant revenue from the licensing of SEPs (Product-
Centric firms) (Contreras 2013a). Additionally, given our focus on SDO governance, we 
wished to differentiate between respondents who actively contributed to or otherwise 
participated in SDOs, versus those who were interested in standardization but did not 
participate in SDOs. Accordingly, we divided respondents into one of three categories: 
Patent-Centric SDO Participants, Product-Centric SDO Participants, or Interested Non-
Participants. 13 
We identified Non-Participants based on responses to Question 10.  Those who selected 
either choices (a - active contributor to standards development) or (b – attendee and 
observer of SDO proceedings) were classified as SDO Participants, while those who selected 
choices (c – user of standards that does not actively participate in standards development) 
or (d – stakeholder interested in standardization processes, without being an active 
participant in SDOs or a user of standards) were classified as Non-Participants.  Three 
respondents skipped this question.  Based on our understanding of the market, we classified 
two of these as Non-Participants and one as a Participant.  A total of 8 of 47 respondents 
were classified as Non-Participants. 
We further classified the 39 SDO participants as either Patent-Centric or Product Centric.  In 
order to develop an objective classification for each respondent, we combined four of the 
respondent’s survey responses that tend to indicate Patent-Centric versus Product-Centric 
preferences with external data regarding the respondent’s SEP holdings and SDO 
memberships.   
The specific survey questions used to classify respondents in this manner were: 
Q10.a – did active contributors to standards development seek to derive patent 
licensing revenue as a primary goal? 
Q41.a – significance to respondent of the risk of exorbitant royalty demands and/or 
patent litigation 
Q41.b - significance to respondent of the risk of making IP available on undesirable 
terms 
Q57 – desirability of SEP owners committing to most restrictive licensing terms 
We normalized each of these responses to a 1-5 scale, with 5 being the highest indicator of 
Patent-Centric preferences, then averaged the four responses for each respondent. 
Respondents who skipped all of these questions were assigned a value of 1. 
In addition, we tabulated the total number of SEPs declared by each respondent at major 
SDOs with publicly-accessible SEP databases. We used a recent database compiling SEP 
declaration information from various SDO databases (Baron & Pohlmann 2018). 14 Firms 
                                           
13 For classification purposes, we avoided the common distinction between “innovators” or “SEP holders” and 
“implementers”, as many of the firms that are involved in standardization, and which responded to our survey, 
both hold SEPs and implement standards in products.  We chose instead to classify SDO participants based on 
their revealed attitudes toward the licensing and enforcement of SEPs. 
14 SDOs included in this data include: Afnor, ANSI, CEN, CENELEC, DIN, DVB Forum, ECMA, ETSI, IEC, IEEE, IETF, 
ISO, ITU-T, JEDEC, SAC, TSDSI, VITA, W3C - though the vast majority of SEPs were declared at ETSI. The 
database is available to academic researchers upon request (searlecenter@law.northwestern.edu).  
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were assigned a score from 1-5 based on the number of SEP families they declared as 
follows: 
 
1 0  
2 1-10 
3 11-100 
4 101-500 
5 > 500 
 
We then averaged each respondent’s score based on its survey responses and its score 
based on SEP holdings to yield a total score between 1-5.  Respondents with scores of 3.0 
or above were classified as Patent-Centric, and lower than 3.0 were classified as Product-
Centric. 15  This methodology yielded 14 Patent-Centric Participants with scores ranging 
from 3.0 to 4.9, and 25 Product-Centric Participants with scores ranging from 1.0 to 2.3.  As 
noted above, 8 respondents were classified as Non-Participants. 
The majority of respondents were based in Europe (62%), followed by North America (23%) 
and Asia (9%) [Q.1].  Most were for-profit firms (70%), with the remainder self-identified 
as civil society (6%), trade associations (6%), not-for-profit organizations (4%) and various 
types of governmental entities [Q.2].  Approximately half of respondents (48%) had more 
than 10,000 employees, while about one quarter (26%) had fifty or fewer [Q.3]. 
The largest number of respondents (55%) indicated that they focus on the 
telecommunications sector (55%), closely followed by computing and networking (51%) 
and consumer electronics (45%) (note that multiple entries were permitted per 
respondent).  Other industries with significant representation were automotive (26%), 
semiconductors (23%) and health care (23%).  Only 4% of respondents indicated a focus 
on civil rights/human rights, and 11% on consumer protection [Q.4]. 
Not surprisingly, the large majority of respondents indicated that technical standardization 
is very or extremely important to their organizations (89%).  No respondents indicated that 
standardization was not important to them [Q.5].  This being said, not all organizations 
devote the same degree of personnel or resources to standardization activities.  Our survey 
indicates that there is a clear a set of respondents that devote substantial resources to 
standardization while others do not.  For example, 41% of respondents indicated that more 
than 50 employees in their organizations are actively engaged in standards development or 
policy, while 43% indicated that 10 or fewer are thus engaged [Q.6]. Likewise, 39% of 
respondents actively participate in 21 or more SDOs, while 34% actively participate in 5 or 
fewer SDOs [Q.7].  And 27% of respondents budget more than €1 million toward SDO 
participation and standards-related advocacy, policy and development work, while 20% 
budget less than €10,000 [Q.8].  These results differ substantially, however, when broken 
down using the classification system outlined above.  For example, of Patent-Centric 
respondents, 75% reported having 100 or more employees devoted to standardization 
activities, 85% reported participating in 21 or more SDOs, and 82% reported 
standardization budgets in excess of €1 million.  Among Product-Centric respondents, on 
the other hand, only 17% reported having 100 or more employees devoted to 
standardization activities, 24% reported participating in 21 or more SDOs, and 17% 
                                           
15 This division represents a natural break in the scores, with several respondents clustered around 2.3 before 
jumping to 3.0. 
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reported standardization budgets in excess of €1 million (with 28% reporting budgets less 
than €10,000).   
These results suggest, consistent with intuition, that Patent-Centric SDO participants, many 
of which seek to earn substantial revenue from SEP licensing, invest accordingly in SDO 
participation, while Product-Centric participants, who, on average, are less inclined to seek 
revenue from SEP licensing, invest less in the SDO processes that are likely to lead to 
enhanced SEP revenue.  In other words, when SEP licensing is a profit-generating business 
unit for firms, firms are more likely to invest in that business unit, as direct firm revenue is 
at stake, while the converse may be true of firms that do not view SEP licensing as a profit-
generating business unit.  In addition, given that our question relating to standardization 
personnel and budgets [Q.6, Q.8] included both technical and policy-related activities, those 
firms with large standardization staffs and budgets (primarily Patent-Centric firms) are more 
likely to devote more resources (personnel and financial) to engaging in and seeking to 
influence policy debates through activities such as public advocacy, lobbying, research 
support, and the like.  An alternative explanation may be that Patent-Centric firms devoting 
more substantial resources to standardization simply value standardization more highly (as 
opposed to SEP licensing revenue).  Our survey does not allow us to draw any definitive 
conclusions about this question. 
3.4 Stakeholder workshop 
Following the completion of our case studies and survey, we, together with the JRC, 
convened a workshop of interested stakeholders to provide additional perspectives and 
texture to the information gathered through these other methods.  Some 40 individuals 
participated in the workshop, consisting of a mixture of representatives from organizations 
that were and were not represented in our case studies and survey, as well as 
representatives of the European Commission.  Each workshop participant was provided with 
a preliminary summary of our case study and survey results and was asked to offer 
comments and potential explanations for the data collected.  The workshop was conducted 
under Chatham House Rule, such that individual participants will not be disclosed unless 
they ask for publication of their names, nor will particular statements be attributed to 
individual participants. 
3.5 Terminology 
In this report, we have adopted a number of terminological conventions for the sake of 
consistency and readability.   
We refer to the organizations that we have studied as “standards-development 
organizations” or SDOs.  Throughout the literature, the term SDO is used interchangeably 
with the term “standard-setting organization” or SSO.  We have chosen to use the term 
SDO simply for the sake of consistency. We refer to the organizations included in our 
sample as SDOs, including the National Standards Bodies such as AFNOR or DIN, even 
though these organizations don’t refer to themselves as SDOs. We include ANSI in the 
sample because of its importance for the governance of many SDOs, even though ANSI 
itself does not develop or set standards, and does not consider itself an SDO. 
SDO IPR policies often refer to the licensing of patents on terms that are “fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) or that are “reasonable and non-discriminatory” (RAND).  
The terms FRAND and RAND are generally used interchangeably throughout the literature, 
and most commentators and courts do not recognize any difference between these terms.  
Accordingly, we choose to use FRAND, except when quoting specific judicial decisions or 
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SDO policies that use the term RAND.  No significance should be attributed to which term is 
used in any given instance in this report. 16 
Throughout this report, we discuss the changes that SDOs make to their policies.  In 
referring to a policy “change”, we are referring to any alteration, amendment or clarification 
to the written text of an SDO policy document.  Such changes could be minor (e.g., 
changing the date of the document) or major, including a complete revocation and 
replacement of a prior policy document.  In referring to policy “changes” we express no 
opinion regarding whether the change was major or minor, or whether it acts primarily as a 
clarification of an existing policy provision or adds new obligations or commitments.   
  
                                           
16 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential 
Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments 1 n.2 (2013),  
www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf (“Commentators frequently use the terms [RAND and 
FRAND] interchangeably to denote the same substantive type of commitment.”). 
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4 Standardization Ecosystem 
In this chapter, we analyze factors shaping SDO governance that are external to the SDO. 
Highlights 
 SDOs are subject to a set of external influences; including legal constraints, 
relationship with government and civil society, formal and informal cooperative 
relationships with other SDOs, and competitive forces (e.g. competition from other 
SDOs and consortia) 
 Legal constraints on SDO governance arise from international trade law, 
competition law, and rules on the use of standards in regulation and public 
procurement; in addition to the SDO’s own legal instruments and national civil 
law. 
 There are numerous vertical and horizontal cooperative relationships among 
SDOs.  
o The international architecture comprising ISO/IEC/ITU at the international, 
the ESOs CEN, CENELEC and ETSI at the regional (European), and AFNOR, 
ANSI, DIN and SAC at the national level represents a hierarchical vertical 
model of cooperation.  
o The ANSI accreditation process and industry-driven SDOs submitting their 
specifications to more formal bodies for adoption as standard (e.g. DVB to 
CENELEC or ETSI, ECMA to IEC) represent a bottom-up vertical model. 
o 3GPP exemplifies the large number of horizontal cooperative relationships 
among SDOs. 
 There are many instances of competition among SDOs; but other competitive 
responses to SDO processes and decision-making are often more prevalent. 
Competitive constraints are more relevant to industry-driven SDOs and consortia, 
as opposed to SDOs with a formal quasi-regulatory role and significant formal ties 
to government and other organizations 
 It is useful to classify SDOs by the different external forces to which they are 
primarily subjected. We propose a three-layer model: 
 
 From a public policy perspective, we identify the prevalence of a self-regulatory 
model; in which public authorities largely defer to the decision-making of private 
organizations, and public intervention tends to be ex post and light-touched. 
 The predominant regulatory approach is a procedural approach, where public 
regulation is more concerned with appropriate SDO processes, and more 
deferential to individual SDO decisions 
 
Layer Attributes SDOs
First - Quasi-regulatory functions delegated by 
government
- Importance of network of vertical relationships
- Specific and formal legal requirements
AFNOR, ANSI, DIN, CEN, CENELEC, 
ISO, IEC, ITU, SAC
- Shares elements with first and second (depending on 
the activity)
ETSI, TSDSI
Second - Established leadership over technical field
- Importance of switching costs
IEEE, IETF, W3C
Third - Significant competitive constraints
- Bottom-up orientation to more formal bodies for 
greater legitimacy
DVB, ECMA, JEDEC, VITA
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All SDOs are subject to legal requirements and constraints, such as contract law, 
competition law, and trade law, in addition to more specific regulations. Furthermore, many 
SDOs operate within a tight network of collaborative relationships with other SDOs and with 
other private organizations, such as consortia. These collaborative relationships may impose 
formal or informal constraints on SDO governance. Finally SDOs are subject to market 
forces, and in particular competitive pressure; and must attract members, technology 
contributors, and implementers. Analyzing the complex interplay of these external 
constraints is a prerequisite for a thorough understanding of SDO governance. 
Standardization lies at the intersection of private coordination and public regulation.  
Historically, SDOs in most Western countries arose out of efforts by private actors – 
engineers and industry – to create a forum for standardization (ISO, 2007; Ruppert, 
1956).17  The benefits of standardization for those private interests are well known, 
including static efficiencies (economies of scale, reduction in transaction costs), the 
reduction or outright removal of adverse information asymmetries,18 and market expansion 
through compatibility and interoperability. These private interests also possess the requisite 
expertise to identify areas where standardization would be beneficial and carry out the 
technical task of standardization.  
At the same time, standards developed by private SDOs are routinely used for binding 
regulation, or referred to therein. Therefore, “technical standard setting, though conducted 
largely through private organizations, possesses many attributes of a public function” 
(Contreras 2017a). There is thus undeniably a public dimension to standardization. 
Many standards directly contribute to the attainment of public policy goals related to safety, 
health, the environment or consumer protection. These standards are not the main focus of 
this report, and as such we will not deal with them extensively. This study is concerned with 
product compatibility or interoperability standards in the ICT sector, a sector where many 
standards also include patented technology. The public dimension of compatibility or 
interoperability standards arises from their impact on trade and competition. 
Interoperability standards may have significant positive effects on competition and 
international trade (Schmidt and Steingress, 2018). At the same time, standardization may 
create market barriers for products or technologies and thus impose unreasonable 
restrictions to competition and/or international trade. The common priority for competition 
and trade policy with respect to standardization is to preserve the benefits of private 
standardization, while curbing its potential to create unnecessary barriers. 
The legal response to trade and competition public policy concerns has less often been to 
control the content of the standards produced by SDOs in order to avoid barriers to trade or 
restrictions of competition. Rather, public authorities have recognized the inherent value of 
the work carried out by private SDOs; and sought to impose constraints on the 
standardization process. This approach is followed worldwide. 
Beyond trade and competition, standardization can affect other public policy objectives, 
such as public procurement, industrial policy19 and innovation. Private standards can reduce 
the cost and increase the effectiveness of public procurement and public regulation. 
Reliance on private standards for these purposes often rests on an approach that is very 
similar to the approach taken by competition and trade policy. More generally, private 
                                           
17 By contrast, in many Asian countries, including China, South Korea and Japan, as well as in Canada, the National 
Standards Bodies setting national industry standards and participating in international standards organizations 
such as ISO and IEC are government agencies. 
18 When standards convey credible information to the customers about product characteristics, in a way that 
customers could not otherwise obtain or trust. 
19 See for instance European Commission, 2011 (A strategic vision for European standards: moving forward to 
enhance and accelerate the sustainable growth of the European economy by 2020 (COM(2011)311) 1 June 
2011). 
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standardization can play a central role in industrial policy, a point that is often emphasized 
in EU policy documents.20 Given the role of private standards for stimulating competition 
and innovation, public authorities have taken an active interest in strengthening the existing 
private standardization ecosystem. On matters of industrial policy and innovation, however, 
policy orientations differ, with the EU taking a more pro-active stance than the US, for 
instance. 
In this chapter, we analyze this complex and evolving standardization ecosystem both from 
the perspective of the SDOs and the public perspective. From the public perspective, we 
highlight the prevalence of a self-regulatory model, whereby public authorities only rarely 
directly intervene in SDO decision making. This deference rests on two basic principles: 
first, procedural principles enshrined in a number of legal instruments and other formal 
mechanisms are meant to ensure that SDOs reach decisions based on due consideration of 
all relevant positions; second, the voluntary nature of standards and SDO participation 
coupled with the existence of a large number of SDOs preserves competition among and 
across SDOs. From the SDO perspective, SDOs differ with respect to whether the legal and 
formal controls of their internal processes or competitive pressures from the outside 
constitute the most immediate check on their decision making. This heterogeneity can 
explain significant differences between SDO governance approaches.    
4.1 Legal constraints on SDOs  
The following paragraphs set out the legal constraints that have resulted from the 
intervention of public authorities in the governance of standardization. A first set of legal 
norms applicable to SDOs can be found in the respective instruments by which they are 
created. These vary from treaties and international agreements – for SDOs with an 
international legal personality, ITU being the main example – to articles of association, 
memoranda of understanding or other similar instruments for SDOs that take a legal form 
arising from the corporate law of a given jurisdiction. These legal instruments are specific to 
each SDO, and to some extent, they are within the power of the SDO and its membership to 
change. Accordingly, they are included in the analysis of SDO governance at Chapters 5 and 
6.  
The present section covers legal norms external to SDOs, over which they have no direct 
control and which accordingly constrain SDOs in the design and operation of their 
governance. Some of these norms are specifically directed at standardization – and hence at 
SDOs. They are usually concerned with how standardization impacts trade, either at the 
international level (4.1.1.) or at the regional or national levels (4.1.2.). In addition to 
specific legislation, important legal constraints on the governance of SDOs comes from other 
areas of law that apply generally to economic activity and therefore to standardization. To 
some extent, one could argue that these generally-applicable laws have had a greater 
influence on SDO governance than specific law. They include competition or antitrust law 
(4.1.3.), intellectual property law (4.1.4) and, indirectly, public procurement law (4.1.5.).  
 
4.1.1 Law specifically concerning SDOs - International trade law 
 
At the international level, standardization organizations are subject to general constraints 
arising out of international trade law, and in particular the Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT). The TBT Agreement is part of the larger World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
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Agreement.21 It aims to “encourage the development of […] international standards” while 
ensuring that they “do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade” (Preamble, 
see also Wijkstrom and McDaniels 2013). In order to reach those goals, the TBT directs 
WTO members to use international standards to the extent possible when they need to 
impose technical regulations on traded goods (Article 2.4).22  When a national technical 
regulation is adopted in accordance with Article 2.2 TBT and based on international 
standards, it is presumed not to be restrictive of trade. 
Since international standards are defined as documents emanating from a “recognized 
body”, which includes non-governmental bodies – that is, most of the SDOs in our sample – 
the TBT contains a provision that seeks to ensure that standard-setting is carried out in a 
context that does not allow for hidden protectionism and the creation of trade barriers. 
Article 4 compels WTO members to comply with a Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, 
Adoption and Application of Standards (WTO TBT Code of Good Practice) in the 
standardization activities directly under their control (public standardizing bodies) and to 
take all reasonable measures to ensure that non-governmental SDOs within their 
jurisdiction also adhere to and comply with that Code of Good Practice.   
The WTO TBT Code of Good Practice is set out at Annex 3 to the TBT. It is open to 
acceptance by: (1) any standardizing body within the territory of a Member of the WTO, 
whether a central government body, a local government body, or a non-governmental 
body; (2) any governmental regional standardizing body one or more members of which are 
Members of the WTO; (3) any non-governmental regional standardizing body one or more 
members of which are situated within the territory of a Member of the WTO. ISO keeps a 
list of standardizing bodies that have accepted the WTO TBT Code of Good Practice.23 From 
our sample, all the SDOs that are part of the hierarchy set out below under Heading 
4.3.1.1.  – ETSI, CEN-CENELEC, DIN, AFNOR, SAC, ANSI – explicitly accepted the 
principles.24 
ISO/IEC Guide 59:1994 was adopted contemporaneously with the WTO TBT Code of Good 
Practice, as a contribution from the ISO/IEC to the discussion of best practices.25 Guide 
59:1994 contains provisions regarding the procedure for the development of standards 
(including the consensus principle, appeals, consultation, publication and review), the 
impact of standards on trade (including the avoidance of anti-competitive behaviour, 
consumer protection, non-discrimination and the use of patented technology), participation 
in standards development (including openness to interested parties, balance of interests and 
coordination via national standardization bodies) and coordination amongst standardization 
organisations. 
Taken together,26 the WTO TBT Code of Good Practice and the ISO/IEC Guide 59:1994 set 
out the broad lines of how standards development should take place.  
By way of further development and synthesis, a subsequent decision of the TBT Committee 
has set out a set of six governance principles regarding SDOs.27 As the TBT Committee 
                                           
21 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). 
22 Exceptions are allowed “when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or 
inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of 
fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.” Note that, as part of 
Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, the TBT Agreement only applies to goods, not services. 
23 See https://tbtcode.iso.org/sites/wto-tbt/home.html. 
24 See https://tbtcode.iso.org/sites/wto-tbt/list-of-standardizing-bodies.html 
25 ISO/IEC Guide 59:1994 – Code of Good Practice for Standardization (1993), available at www.iso.org. 
26 A note prepared by the WTO Secretariat, G/TBT/W/132 (29 March 2000) usefully compares the two documents, 
pointing to overlaps and complementarities. 
27 Decision of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and 
Recommendations, G/TBT/9, Annex 4 (13 November 2000). 
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indicates, “[t]he following principles and procedures should be observed, when international 
standards, guides and recommendations […] are elaborated. The same principles should 
also be observed when technical work or a part of the international standard development is 
delegated […] to other relevant organizations, including regional bodies.” The principles 
include a) transparency, b) openness, c) impartiality and consensus, d) effectiveness and 
relevance, e) coherence, and f) a need to address the concerns of developing countries.  
While most of the principles refer to the process of developing standards, e.g. their drafting, 
discussion, review and adoption, the principle of openness applies to membership as well as 
‘participation at the policy development level and at every stage of standards development’. 
According to the case-law of the WTO, a standard does not qualify as international one if it 
‘is not open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members’.28 
4.1.2 Direct Regulation of SDOs and Standardization 
4.1.2.1 In the EU 
Standards have always been seen as a key component in building the EU internal market. 
The harmonization of technical standards at the EU level dates back at least to the creation 
of CEN in 1961. Until the 1980s, most of this harmonization was achieved through detailed 
product specifications found in directives issued by the Council and the European 
Parliament. This slow and unwieldy approach (Goerke and Holler, 1998) was replaced in the 
run-up to the Single Market: the Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a New Approach to 
technical harmonisation and standards29 introduces a more decentralized system, where EU 
legislation is limited to setting out the procedural and institutional framework and the 
essential requirements to be met by standardized products, and the primary responsibility 
for creating European standards is entrusted to the European Standardization Organisations 
(ESOs). These ESOs comprise CEN and CENELEC, and later ETSI.  The ‘essential 
requirements’ typically concern health, safety, environmental and consumer protection. 
Standards developed by the ESOs, while remaining voluntary, also produce legal effects, 
namely a presumption of conformity with the essential requirements (and thus a safe 
harbor from national regulatory controls) for the purposes of free circulation within the 
internal market. The New Approach creates incentives and opportunities for private 
companies to participate in the standards development activities of the ESOs, with the help 
of national standards bodies. At the same time, the EU retains a direct influence on the 
governance of the standard development process through the framework legislation 
mentioned above, which includes the power to set the agenda (through standardization 
requests, which can be turned down by SDOs but rarely are in practice) and review – 
however marginally – the work of SDOs.30  
The New Approach led to the proliferation of voluntary standards that offer free access to 
the large internal market (Mattli 2001). In the literature, the reform of standardization is 
often studied as a part of the overall integration process (van Gestel and Micklitz 2013; 
Mattli 2001; Austin and Milner 2001). There is an extensive legal literature discussing the 
position of such delegated rule-making in the principles of rule of law (Joerges et al. 1999 – 
providing an excellent summary).  
The central role of the EU – and in particular the European Commission – in organizing the 
development of European standards was further exemplified by ETSI, created upon initiative 
                                           
28 WTO, United States – Measures concerning the importation, marketing and sale of tuna and tuna products, 
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS381/AB/R (16 May 2012) at par. 399. 
29 [1985] OJ C 136/1. 
30 See Goerke and Holler (1998) for a critical discussion of the New Approach.  
  46 
of the Commission in 1988.31 The Commission preserved important prerogatives in the 
newly created ESO. For instance, it could urge the adoption of standards, provide financial 
means for their development, require their use for public procurement, and prevent the 
adoption of standards that it believes contrary to the objective of the Single Market (Besen, 
1990).  
The European Commission once again played a pivotal role in various redefinitions of ETSI’s 
IPR policy, attempting to strike a balance between the protection of patent rights and 
unrestricted access to the standard (Iversen, 1999). With the worldwide success of ETSI 
standards for mobile telecommunication, there was an increase in conflicts regarding the 
interpretation and success of these policies (Bekkers, Verspagen, and Smits, 2002), which 
placed ETSI at the center of an extensive debate on SDO IPR policies (See Part 7). 
Currently, European standardization policy is encapsulated in Regulation 1025/2012 on 
European standardization.32 Regulation 1025/2012 applies both to the ESOs and to the 
national standardization bodies (NSBs) of the Member States, such as AFNOR, DIN, etc. 
Regulation 1025/2012 imposes obligations upon the ESOs and NSBs with respect to 
governance, including transparency (Articles 3 and 4) and stakeholder participation (Article 
5) – including the participation of consumer, environmental and social organizations 
(Articles 5, 16), SMEs (Article 6), public authorities (Article 7).  Furthermore, the Regulation 
sets out an elaborate system for standardization agenda-setting (Articles 8, 10) and the 
financing of European standard development (Article 15). In addition, Article 13 of 
Regulation 1025/2012 creates a mechanism whereby ICT standards developed by other 
SDOs (referred to as ‘ICT technical specifications’ for the purposes of the Regulation) can be 
recognized as valid references for the purposes of public procurement. In order to achieve 
recognition, the SDO that developed the standard must meet the governance requirements 
of Annex II to Regulation 1025/2012. That Annex is largely inspired by WTO law, and 
includes the principles of openness, consensus and transparency.33 These elements of 
Regulation 1025/2012 are discussed in greater detail further below in connection with the 
specific topics of Chapters 5 and 6. 
In addition, it should be pointed out that the Court of Justice of the European Union has 
held that it has jurisdiction over both European standards developed by ESOs – since they 
are part of EU law, even if they are developed by private organizations34 – and national 
standards developed by NSBs – since they are liable to constitute an obstacle to internal 
market freedoms, here as well even if they are developed by private organisations.35 Most 
recently, the CJEU became involved in the interpretation of the harmonized standards when 
it was asked to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of such a harmonised 
standard produced by CEN-CENELEC in the light of the facts available to it and to determine 
the technical standard applicable to a particular product.36 
 
                                           
31 The creation of ETSI was proposed in the Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for 
Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87)290final (30 June 1987) as part of the complete 
reorganization of the European telecommunications sector that would follow in the 1990s. Once the regulatory 
and operational functions of the old legal monopolies were to be split, with the regulatory functions eventually 
going to independent National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), standardization fell uneasily between the two 
sets of functions. In order to preserve the links between what would become industry players and 
administrations and to provide impetus to standardization in the ICT sector, the Commission proposed the 
creation of ETSI. 
32 [2012] OJ L 316/12. Regulation 1025/2012 replaced or modified a large number of EU instruments and 
streamlined the EU standardization framework. 
33 As well as the presence of IPR declarations at least compliant with FRAND, as discussed in Chapter 7. 
34 CJEU, Judgment of 27 October 2016, Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction ECLI:EU:C:2016:821. 
35 CJEU, Judgment of 12 July 2012, Case C-171/11, Fra.bo ECLI:EU:C:2012:453. 
36 CJEU, Judgment of 14 December 2017, Case C-630/16, Anstar Oy ECLI:EU:C:2017:971 
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4.1.2.2 In the U.S. 
In contrast to the EU, there are few specific legal provisions targeting standardization or 
SDOs in the United States. US federal law does not specify the types of SDOs that can 
produce standards that will be incorporated by reference into binding regulation (Bremer, 
2016). Instead, the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, as 
supplemented by OMB Circular No. A-119 (2016), expresses a strong preference for the use 
of standards from private, non-governmental “voluntary consensus standards bodies” rather 
than government-specific standards in regulation and procurement. Circular A-119 provides 
a definition of ‘voluntary  consensus  standards  bod[y]’, which generally has the attributes 
of ‘[o]penness,’ ‘[b]alance of interest,’ ‘[d]ue   process,’ and an ‘appeals process,’ together 
with the goal of ‘[c]onsensus,’ which means that the  procedure must be designed to yield 
‘general agreement, but not necessarily unanimity,’ including a ‘process for attempting  to  
resolve  objections  by  interested  parties.’” The requirements of Circular A-119 are 
presented as an implementation of commitments and obligations under WTO law, in 
particular the TBT Agreement, as described above.37 
In parallel, ANSI administers the designation of privately-developed standards as ‘American 
National Standards’ (ANS). ANS designation is advantageous, both commercially and 
legally. In order to achieve such designation for their standards, SDOs must be ANSI-
accredited. Accreditation occurs when ANSI is satisfied that a SDO meets its ‘essential 
requirements’. These requirements include governance principles that echo those of Circular 
A-119, including openness, lack of dominance among its members, balance of interests, 
coordination and harmonization, notification of standards activity, consideration of views 
and objections, evidence of consensus, appeals, procedures and written procedures.  
4.1.3 Competition/antitrust law 
Next to legal developments that are specific to standardization, as set out above, SDO 
activities are greatly shaped by generally-applicable laws, in particular competition and 
antitrust law.  
The influence of competition and antitrust law on SDO governance is felt in two different 
ways: first, rules concerning agreements between competing firms (Article 101 TFEU, s. 1 
Sherman Act) set out certain principles of SDO governance, including IPR policies. Second, 
rules concerning monopolization or abuse of dominant position (s.2 Sherman Act, Article 
102 TFEU) come to bear particularly in the debates surrounding possible limits for the 
behavior of holders of standard-essential IPR, including related to IPR policies. 
4.1.3.1 Restrictive agreements and SDO governance 
Article 101 TFEU and s. 1 Sherman Act can apply to the collective action of firms in creating 
an SDO, as well as to the collective activities of firms undertaken within SDOs. The creation 
of an SDO can be seen as an agreement between competitors, and a resulting standard can 
also qualify as an agreement, since it can dictate standardization of different grades or sizes 
of a particular product or technical specifications in product or service markets where 
compatibility and interoperability with other products or systems is beneficial.  
SDOs therefore involve horizontal co-operation agreements within the meaning of Article 
101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The extent to which 
Article 101 TFEU applies to such agreements depends on their impact on competition. There 
might be cases where the impact is limited: for instance, on a given relevant product 
                                           
37 See the Revision of OMB Circular No. A-119, “Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary 
Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities” 81 FR 4673 (2016), and in particular the 
explanatory notes at 6.  
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market, products made according to different competing standards (from different SDOs) 
are actually competing with one another. Alternatively, in a given product market, products 
manufactured according to a standard may compete with non-standardized products. In 
such cases, the agreements arising from a single SDO might not have that much impact on 
competition on the derivative product market, and maybe these agreements would fall 
outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU altogether. Glader (2010) explores some of these 
scenarios. 
At the other extreme, if standardization is used as a vehicle to exclude competitors or to fix 
prices, then the standardization agreement underpinning an SDO might give rise to a 
restriction of competition by object within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, in which case 
it is very likely to be found in breach of EU competition law. It is to be noted that, under EU 
competition law, the notion of ‘price fixing’ as a restriction by object is generously 
interpreted, extending not only to the fixing of prices as such, but also to other interference 
with pricing mechanisms that could lead to price coordination (see among others Petit 
2016).  
In between agreements that do not restrict competition and those that restrict competition 
by object (and are thus likely to breach Article 101 TFEU), one finds agreements that would 
restrict competition by effect, for which it is possible that the conditions of Article 101(3) 
would be fulfilled, so as to save the agreement from breaching Article 101 TFEU. The 2011 
Guidelines to the Application of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal cooperation agreements 
(‘Horizontal Guidelines 2011’),  issued by the European Commission in the light of its 
decision practice provide guidance for the assessment of possible effects of standardization 
agreements on competition (Larouche and Overwalle, 2015). The Commission identifies 
three scenarios where agreements concerning standardization could have anti-competitive 
effects: a reduction in price competition, the limitation of technical development and 
innovation, and exclusion through preventing effective access to the standard.  The 
Horizontal Guidelines 2011 also identify a number of safe harbour conditions,  which 
normally take agreements outside of the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU and many of which 
overlap with the requirements emanating from WTO law.  These conditions include: 
unrestricted participation in standard-setting, transparency, the voluntary nature of 
standards as well as access to the standard on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms. First of all, as regards unrestricted participation, SDO policies should ‘guarantee that 
all competitors in the market or markets affected by the standard can participate in the 
process leading to the selection of the standard’ (Horizontal Guidelines 2011). It also means 
that SDOs should have ‘objective and non-discriminatory procedures for allocating voting 
rights’ and also ‘objective criteria for selecting the technology to be included in the 
standard’. Secondly, stakeholders should be able ‘to effectively inform themselves of 
upcoming, on-going and finalized standardization work in good time at each stage of the 
development of the standard’ (Horizontal Guidelines 2011). 
In addition, the Horizontal Guidelines also touch upon IPR policies, since these policies also 
qualify as agreements between firms within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. The impact of 
competition law on IPR policies is discussed at greater length in Chapter 7, below. 
Similar principles are applicable in the US. Following a series of cases in the 1980s involving 
abuses of the standardization process, in two leading cases,38 the U.S. Supreme Court 
established that in order to avoid antitrust liability, SDOs should observe a certain level of 
transparency, openness and due process. These requirements have also been embodied in 
subsequent business review letters (BRLs) and other guidance from U.S. antitrust 
enforcement agencies (BRLs for VITA and IEEE; DOJ-FTC, 2000; DOJ-FTC, 2007). 
                                           
38 American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) v. Hydrolevel 456 US 556 (1982) and Allied Tube & Conduit v. 
Indian Head 486 US 492 (1988). 
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As a result of that case-law, it is agreed in US antitrust law that the cooperation between 
firms that takes place in the course of standardization is to be assessed under the rule of 
reason. In the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act (SDOAA) of 2004,39 
Congress has expressly provided that the conduct of SDOs themselves, when engaging into 
standards development, is to be assessed according to the rule of reason. The SDOAA does 
not extend to the conduct of participating firms, however, hence its limited impact in 
practice. As with EU competition law (and restrictions by object), the SDOAA excludes 
certain harmful conduct from its ambit, namely market allocation, price-fixing and the 
exchange of competition-sensitive information beyond what is required for standardization. 
Traditionally, antitrust concerns regarding the potential for collusive agreements in SDOs 
have focused on potentially anticompetitive effects of standardization processes. In light of 
such concerns, many stakeholders and SDOs are reluctant to engage in discussions of 
patent licensing terms within the standardization process. According to our survey, a 
majority of stakeholders were of the opinion that competition/antitrust considerations 
somewhat or greatly influence their decision whether or not to discuss patent and licensing-
related matters with other SDO participants. That being said, individual disclosure of the 
most restrictive licensing terms, including maximum royalty rates, prior to the adoption of 
the standard is generally seen by competition authorities as non-restrictive of competition 
(Horizontal Guidelines 2011, DOJ VITA business review letter). 
More recently (since November 2017), officials of the US DoJ have repeatedly warned that 
there is a “potential for cartel-like anticompetitive behavior” also in the process of 
developing SDO policies, and in particular IPR policies. According to these statements, if an 
adopted policy appears “designed specifically to shift bargaining leverage” between different 
SDO stakeholders, the process through which such policy was adopted warrants antitrust 
scrutiny.40 It has still to be seen whether and how the DoJ’s recently expressed concerns 
will translate into enforcement decisions and how this approach will square with that of the 
other principal antitrust enforcement agency in the U.S., the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), which continues to focus more on allegedly anticompetitive unilateral conduct by 
patent holders, rather than collusion amongst stakeholders.41 These statements have also 
led to significant debates amongst academics and former policymakers.42 This doctrinal 
tension between the two principal U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies underscores the 
sometimes unstable and unpredictable nature of external legal constraints on SDO 
governance.43 
4.1.3.2 Single firm conduct and SDO governance 
In addition to constraining the actions and policy decisions of SDOs, competition law 
concerns often focus on single firm conduct – Article 102 TFEU and Section 2 Sherman Act 
(or s. 5 of the FTC Act). In particular, starting in the early 1990s and picking up speed in 
the 2000s, competition and antitrust law were applied to police the potential restrictions on 
competition that could arise from the inclusion of patented technology in standards. As will 
                                           
39 Pub. L. 108-237 (codified at 15 USC 4301 and following). 
40 https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-usc-gould-
school-laws-center 
41 See in particular the case against Qualcomm launched on 17 January 2017, which is still pending before a US 
federal district court. 
42 See a supportive statement issued on 13 February 2018, at https://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/31/2018/02/Letter-to-DOJ-Supporting-Evidence-Based-Approach-to-Antitrust-
Enforcement-of-IP.pdf, as well as a critical statement issued on 17 May 2018, at 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/DOJ-patent-holdup-letter.pdf. 
43 F. Scott Kieff has studied the susceptibility of the U.S. DoJ and FTC to political and commercial pressures, coining 
the term “government hold-up” to describe the action of government actors to influence policy in response to 
these pressures (Kieff and Layne-Farrar 2013 at 1098-1100 (commercial pressures); Kieff 2017 at 119 
(political pressures)).  
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be discussed at greater length in Section 7.2.1., the inclusion of patented technology in 
standards may raise competition law concerns, e.g. if standardization of the technology 
softens competition and allows a patent owner to extract excessive royalty payments from 
standard implementers. Excessive royalty requests may be particularly prone to violate 
competition law if a patent owner had previously committed to FRAND licensing terms or 
failed to disclose the existence of patent rights in the course of standard development. 
SDOs may therefore be required under competition law to adopt policies that address the 
potential for anticompetitive effects. In its Horizontal Guidelines 2011, the European 
Commission stipulates that SDOs requiring standardization participants to disclose the 
existence of potential SEPs and requesting commitments to license these SEPs on FRAND 
terms would normally not violate Article 101 TFEU. We discuss in Section 7.2. that these 
policy provisions are elements of a so-called Baseline Policy that many SDOs adopt in order 
to ensure compliance of their IPR policies with legal requirements. 
While antitrust scrutiny of single firm conduct in standardization mostly focuses on the 
conduct of individual standardization participants, it also has significant implications for SDO 
governance. In the past, representatives of antitrust authorities have invited SDOs to adopt 
more specific policies (and particularly IPR policies) to mitigate the risk of anticompetitive 
conduct by individual SDO participants. In Section 7.4.4., we analyze the implications of 
such public advocacy for SDO governance. Furthermore, enforcement of antitrust law 
against single-firm abuses may give additional weight to SDO policies and create additional 
sanctions against violations of policy provisions determined by the SDO.  
In Huawei v ZTE, the CJEU held that "[i]n [certain] circumstances, and having regard to the 
fact that an undertaking to grant licences on FRAND terms creates legitimate expectations 
on the part of third parties that the proprietor of the SEP will in fact grant licences on such 
terms, a refusal by the proprietor of the SEP to grant a licence on those terms may, in 
principle, constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU" (at para. 53). Under 
certain circumstances, the violation of a FRAND commitment may thus constitute a breach 
of Article 102 TFEU, and may give rise to competition law defenses or sanctions, in addition 
to any other consequences that may arise under contract law. 
In Rambus, the European Commission was concerned that Rambus, as a member of JEDEC, 
might have abused its dominant position in the market for DRAMs by intentionally 
concealing that it had patents and patent applications which were relevant to the standard. 
By doing so, Rambus was alleged to have breached JEDEC policy regarding patent 
disclosure.44 Rambus eventually offered commitments regarding its licensing of patents, 
which were accepted by the European Commission. On the U.S. side, enforcement against 
single firm conduct followed a similar approach, albeit with some setbacks for the antitrust 
authorities (as when the Court of Appeal overturned the FTC decision in Rambus45): see 
Hesse and Marshall (2018) for an overview of the cases. As mentioned above, recent 
statements by DOJ officials suggested that U.S. antitrust authorities have “strayed too far” 
in their focus on single firm conduct in SDOs; and that antitrust authorities should be most 
concerned about SEP licensing disputes when these bear elements of collusion.  
4.1.4 Intellectual Property Law  
Another layer of general laws influencing standardization is intellectual property law.  
As discussed, many SDOs adopt policies intended to ensure that patent rights do not act as 
obstacles to broad adoption of standards. Such SDO policies might have an effect on the 
                                           
44 See Case COMP/38.636 – RAMBUS; This behavior is known in the literature as ‘patent ambush’ and it was 
analyzed extensively by scholars around the world (Hemphill (2005), Royall (2008), Hillel (2010), Liguo 
(2010), Abramson (2011), Pappalardo and Suzor (2011)). 
45 Rambus v. FTC 522 F. 3d 456 (DC Cir. 2008). 
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ability of patent owners to seek remedies for patent infringement generally available under 
IP law.  
The effect of SDO policies on the determination of remedies for intellectual property 
infringements is not limited to standardization insiders (SDO participants, who subject their 
patent rights to licensing commitments). The internal policies of SDOs can also influence the 
position of standardization outsiders, non-participants in SDO processes. Contreras and 
Gilbert observe, for instance, convergence of the assessment of damages in situations 
where the FRAND-encumbered and non-encumbered patents are enforced against infringers 
in the United States (Contreras and Gilbert 2015). Contreras studies the assertion of SEPs 
by outsiders in the United States and observes that they constitute a material segment of all 
SEP assertions, and that outsiders are willing to assert SEPs even when they are 
encumbered by FRAND and other licensing commitments (Contreras 2016b). A comparable 
empirical study mapping the scale and consequences of enforcement by standardization 
outsiders in Germany and the UK has also recently been released (Contreras et al., 2018). 
Copyright law is also important to SDOs. Most SDOs have rules relating to the contribution 
of copyrighted material to the SDO’s standardization process, and the use and distribution 
of copyrighted specifications produced by the SDO. Some SDOs (IETF) use copyright to 
prevent others from making derivative works of their specifications (so-called “forking” of 
the standard). Some SDOs charge for copies of their standards. These SDOs sometimes 
assert the copyright in their specifications to prevent distribution of the specifications 
without a required payment.  The exact conditions under which SDOs sell copies of their 
standards are usually defined in the so called ‘Sales Policies’ of the organizations.  
There is ongoing litigation in the US and the EU concerning copyright protection for 
standards.46 In the US, this mostly concerns standards that are incorporated into law by 
reference and the ability of public interest organizations to publish those standards without 
the permission of the relevant SDO. In Germany, the debate about the copyright status of 
standards dates back to 1980s during which the German Federal Supreme Court and the 
Federal Constitutional Court issued important decisions concerning public domain status of a 
sub-set of standards.47 In other countries, this issue regained on importance after the Court 
of Justice of the European Union held in the Elliott case that referenced standards form part 
of the Union law.48 Moreover, the most recent copyright decisions of the CJEU increasingly 
harmonize the notion of a work, including potential exclusions from copyright-ability on the 
public interest grounds.49  
Last but not least, copyright law can also act as a constraint when it comes to reference 
implementations that are developed by SDO members. When such implementations are 
embodied in software, they are protected under copyright law as a computer program and 
thus can be distributed and used only under a valid license. These copyrighted works are 
then protected separately from the underlying text of the standard. 
All of the mentioned issues are important for activities of SDOs, including parts of their 
business models. However, in this study we focused on those IPR policies which are 
particularly important from the perspective of the members who shape their governance. 
                                           
46 See Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., (D.C. Cir., Jul. 17, 2018) and OLG Hamburg, 
Decision of 27 July 2017, Case U 220/15 Kart, GRUR-Prax 2017, 493; MMR 2018, 269/270, WuW 2018, 285-
288, available on www.landesrecht-hamburg.de.  
47 For the situation in Germany, see German Federal Constitutional Court (1998) 1 BvR 1143/90; German Federal 
Supreme Court (1983) I ZR 129/81; Gunda Dreyer, Jost Kotthoff and Astrid Meckel, Urheberrecht: 
Heildelberger Kommentar (3rd edition, 2013), § 5, para 17; Thomas Fuchs Die, Gemeinfreiheit von DIN-
Normen seit dem Inkrafttreten des § 5 Abs. 3 UrhG, available at https://delegibus.com/2004,8.pdf 
48 CJEU, Judgment of 27 October 2016, Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction ECLI:EU:C:2016:821 
49 CJEU, Judgement of 13 November 2018, Case C-310/17, Levola Hengelo; See also Advocate General Szpunar’s 
Opinion in C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW. 
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The copyright policies concerning standards are infrequently raised as an important 
stakeholder issue. This might change in the future with an increased development of 
reference implementations. The practice and effects of copyright licensing of standards and 
reference implementations and their impact on public access and re-use would merit a 
separate study. 
4.1.5 Public Procurement 
In addition to antitrust/competition law and intellectual property law, other areas of law also 
influence the environment of SDOs, albeit more indirectly. In particular, in the course of 
streamlining public procurement, authorities have looked to open standards as a way of 
reducing the cost-of-ownership of certain products covered by legal or de facto standards.50 
In Europe, in particular, this has led to specific measures in the area of public 
procurement.51  
In the European Union, public procurement must comply with Directive 2004/18/EC which 
differentiates between formal standards and other technical specifications (a term which, as 
seen above, encompasses standards developed by private organisations as opposed to 
international standardization organisations, ESOs or NSBs). For the latter, a description of 
functional requirements and use of technology-neutral specifications is additionally 
encouraged. Art 23(1) of the Directive requires that ‘[t]echnical specifications shall afford 
equal access for tenderers and not have the effect of creating unjustified obstacles to the 
opening up of public procurement to competition’. Standards therefore should not be used 
in a discriminatory fashion that is unjustified by the subject matter of the contract 
(Commission v Ireland, 1988; Weston and Kretschmer (2012)). 
The key element in EU public procurement law, for our purposes, is a requirement that 
public authorities procure software or other technology systems by reference to standards 
(as opposed to proprietary technologies).  Various studies cited by Shah and Kesan (2007) 
predict significant cost savings for agencies utilizing standards, which can theoretically 
reduce costs of document format incompatibility and conversion. These standards are often 
referred to as “open standards”, a term which has expanded beyond public procurement 
into general discussions of standards and standardization (Russell, 2014). 
Despite the widespread use of the term, there is no generally accepted definition of “open 
standards” (see generally Ernst, 2012; Updegrove, 2012; Baron and Spulber, 2018 and 
Lundell et al. 2015). Shah and Kesan (2007) define open standards by reference to three 
criteria: public availability, licensing on FRAND terms, and development in a process open to 
public participation. West (2007) offers an economic analysis of openness along several 
dimensions including access, competition and cost. Kretchmer (2011) identifies 17 related 
attributes of open standards, classified according to the requirements of different interest 
groups (SDOs, commercial implementers, end users, economists and attorneys).  
For the purposes of this report, there is no need to take position in this debate. The 
European Parliament considers that “open standards must be based on openness of the 
standardisation process and development and availability of standards for implementation 
and use, in accordance with Regulation 1025/2012 and the WTO principles”.52 The Council 
of the European Union also defined open standards as “those developed within standard 
developing organisations in accordance with WTO principles (i.e. based on transparent, 
                                           
50 De facto standards can naturally be also of an entirely proprietary nature. 
51 See the Commission Communications “Against lock-in: building open ICT systems by making better use of 
standards in public procurement” COM (2013) 455 (25 June 2013). 
52 EP Resolution of 4 July 2017 on European standards for the 21st century, P8_TA(2017)0278, under 8. The EP 
also urges the Commission to clarify the “core elements of an equitable, effective and enforceable licensing 
methodology structured around the FRAND principles.” 
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open, impartial and consensus based processes) and available to fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory (FRAND) terms.”53  
The definitions of open standards used by the EU thus consistently refer to WTO principles 
of standard development, and the availability of standard-essential IPR on FRAND terms. 
The EU definitions of open standards thus further reinforce the normative force of these 
principles for SDOs.   
4.2 Relationship with public authorities and NGOs 
4.2.1 Role of public authorities 
4.2.1.1 Role in creation and establishment of SDOs 
Many SDOs arose out of industry, without much guidance from public authorities. Such is 
the case for JEDEC, DVB and ECMA. Other SDOs – IEEE-SA and IETF –arose out of a 
professional association or a stakeholder community. ANSI’s predecessor, the American 
Engineering Standards Committee, was created as a federating organization by five 
American professional associations in the early twentieth century (Contreras – History 
Chapter 2017).  
A few SDOs have been created directly by public authorities: ITU, for one, was created by 
international treaty. SAC is a governmental agency, and TSDSI maintains close ties with 
various Indian government ministries. ETSI was formed in upon initiative of the European 
Commission in the wake of EU telecommunications liberalization, as part of the official 
roadmap to liberalization.54 IETF also has a hybrid origin, given the involvement of the US 
government in the early days of the Internet.  
Several SDOs have some official existence, even though the impetus for their creation came 
from industry. Such is the case in particular for national standards bodies in the EU, such as 
AFNOR and DIN. Both SDOs were created as industry organizations, and their official role 
was only established later by law or through a contract between the SDO and the 
government. ISO and IEC arose as international federations of national standards bodies. 
ISO arose during World War II out of the cooperation of the private-sector national 
standards bodies of the US, the United Kingdom and Canada. The creation of ISO was 
nevertheless related to the international coordination between allied countries, which also 
led the creation of the United Nations.55 ISO soon acquired an official status with the United 
Nations, e.g. a consultative status at the United Nations Economic and Social Council. CEN 
and CENELEC’s predecessors CENEL and CENELCOM were created as non-profit 
organizations by the national standards bodies of EEC and EFTA member countries to 
facilitate trade in the common market. CEN-CENELEC concluded an agreement with the 
European Commission in June 1984, under which CEN-CENELEC can be commissioned to 
carry out the necessary technical work for the adoption of EN standards. Together with 
ETSI, their current formal relationship with the EU was formalized with the designation as 
ESOs in Regulation 1025/2012. 
                                           
53 Council conclusions on the enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 6681/18 (1 March 2018), point 12. 
54 The creation of a ‘European Telecommunication Standards Institute’ as a permanent forum for “an increased 
contribution by industrial and user experts” was proposed by the Commission in its 1987 ‘Green Paper on the 
Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment’ (Com(87) 290).  
55 This relationship is evidenced e.g. by the fact that Geneva was selected as the seat of ISO, because it was also 
designated as the seat for several specialized agencies of the intergovernmental United Nations organization 
(Yates and Murphy, 2007). 
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4.2.1.2 Role in Day-to-day activities  
The level of, and the processes for, public authority involvement in the day-to-day activities 
of SDOs vary widely. 
At the level of agenda setting, mechanisms are in place to enable public authorities to 
induce certain SDOs to engage into standards development. In the EU, the European 
Commission, after consultations at the European level, can request the ESOs – CEN-
CENELEC and ETSI – to undertake the development of a standard (a request which the 
ESOs may decline). Regulation 1025/2012 includes an elaborate mechanism of yearly 
reporting, the annual EU Work Programme for Standardization, in order to align the agendas 
of EU institutions and ESOs. The European Commission furthermore enjoys a special status 
within the ESOs, as a “counsellor” without voting rights. In addition, in the ICT sector, a 
yearly Rolling Plan for ICT standardization complements the general Work Programme; it is 
prepared by the  European Commission in collaboration with the Multi-Stakeholder Platform 
(MSP) on ICT standardization. 
In the U.S., though ANSI and the U.S. government have engaged in an active public-private 
partnership, “the federal government's role mainly has been reactive, supportive, and, 
ultimately, passive".56 
In the course of standards development, the role of public authorities is usually well 
circumscribed in the governance of the SDO.  In the U.S., federal agencies are required to 
adopt private sector voluntary consensus standards rather than government-developed 
standards, absent extenuating circumstances (e.g., military applications). As a result, 
governmental requirements regarding the nature of voluntary consensus standards, which 
are embodied in OMB Circular A-119, are broadly followed by U.S.-based SDOs. 
For SDOs whose standards are used e.g. by the military, typically a special 
committee/working group is set up to liaise with the relevant government agency (VITA, 
JEDEC). Where standards development closely affects public policy, for instance on privacy, 
culture or the environment, SDOs will try to involve government representatives, either as 
observers (W3C) or within a specific membership category (DVB). Some SDO working 
groups are subject to specific procedures or requirements because their work touches upon 
security-related issues, and involves participation of the military or security agencies.57 
Other SDOs do not grant any specific status to public authorities and simply allow them to 
participate on the same footing as any other member organization (IEEE-SA, IETF).  
In the U.S., the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a non-regulatory 
agency of the Department of Commerce, is chartered “to promote U.S. innovation and 
industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in 
ways that enhance economic security and improve our quality of life.”58  The bulk of NIST’s 
budget is devoted to laboratory science and measurement, though it also coordinates, 
promotes and facilitates standardization activity in areas including cybersecurity and the 
smart grid.  
                                           
56  Sagers (2011) at p. 795: “Like state and local governments, the federal government is a large consumer of 
private standards, but the federal government has also participated in the very creation of the standards 
sector. Still, the federal government's role mainly has been reactive, supportive, and, ultimately, passive. Its 
role has been to nurture or comply in the creation of a regulatory system that, for reasons of politics - not, 
fundamentally, reasons of practical or logical necessity – has remained ‘private’ and that effectively handles a 
very large portion of this country's regulatory work. Over the long history of the growth of this apparatus, the 
federal government's relationship to SSOs has been highly deferential, and, above all, the relationship has 
been ad hoc”. 
57 E,g, ETSI has a working group on ‘Lawful Interception’. Unlike other ETSI working groups and most 
standardization processes in the SDOs in our sample, the work of this group (involving participation of secret 
services) is confidential, thus constituting an exception to the open nature of SDO standardization processes. 
58 See http://www.nist.org. 
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At the international level, national governments directly participate in governance processes 
at ITU-T. Through their contributions to the Telecommunication Standardization Advisory 
Group and its AdHoc Groups, national governments of ITU member countries participate in 
deliberations on standardization processes and SDO policies. For national governments of 
countries such as the US with a tradition of limited government participation in SDO 
governance, these contributions constitute a rare and exceptional direct government 
endorsement of specific SDO policy choices, and provide an opportunity to signal the 
government’s position on contentious SDO policy matters to private sector SDOs.59 
4.2.1.3 Government relations 
Beyond the – usually limited – involvement of public authorities in day-to-day activities, 
SDOs typically also maintain a government relations function. Some of them (ECMA, ETSI, 
IEEE, IETF, OASIS, CEN-CENELEC, ITU-T, W3C), for instance, are members of the European 
Multi-Stakeholder Platform on ICT Standardization.    
4.2.1.4 Stakeholder views on government participation in SDOs 
The limited role of government agencies in SDO processes is in line with the preferences of 
the large majority of stakeholders participating in our survey. Only five (10.9%) of the 
surveyed stakeholders believe that government agencies (other than competition 
authorities) should play a strong or leading role in technical interoperability standardization 
(excluding health and safety standards). While only five (10.9%) respondents indicated that 
government should play ‘no role at all’, 36 respondents (78.3 %) stated that government 
should play a small or moderate role. These preferences seem to be consistent with the 
observed level of government involvement at the SDOs in our sample.  
In line with these observations, patent-centric firms, product-centric firms and non-
participating stakeholders all on average consider ‘intervention of government agencies’ and 
‘administrative (governmental) procedures or complaints’ to be ineffective methods for 
resolving disputes among SDO members.60 Similarly, in a situation where an organization is 
not directly represented in an SDO governance body, patent-centric firms, product-centric 
firms and non-participating stakeholders on average responded that government agencies 
are unlikely to represent their organization’s interests adequately (average score of 2.67 out 
of 5). 
It should however be noted that the stakeholders participating in our survey were 
predominantly larger companies, and probably far more actively engaged in SDO 
governance than the average SDO stakeholder. These stakeholders did not consider that 
any other organization apart from themselves could adequately represent their interests in 
SDO governance bodies (with trade associations the least unfavorably rated option).61 It is 
possible that smaller companies or individual consumers would welcome stronger 
government involvement, because they are less capable of representing their own interests 
in SDOs.  
                                           
59 See e.g. the US contribution 43 of June 2014, detailing the position of the US government on IPR policies seen 
as helpful for industry-led consensus-standard development 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/standardsgov/T13-TSAG-C-0043-A1-r1-E.pdf 
60 Intervention of government agencies received an average score of 2/5, making it the second-lowest scored 
option after ‘Formal (binding) arbitration by SDO staff’ among the proposed options. 
61 Consistently, the surveyed stakeholders on average found ‘seeking a leadership role within SDO’ to be a 
relatively effective means for SDO policy making (3.49/5); whereas ‘petition governmental agencies’ was seen 
as neither effective nor ineffective (3.03/5).  
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Table 4.1. – Relationship with patent offices 
While the surveyed stakeholders were unfavorable to government assuming a leading role 
in SDOs, only a small minority considered that government agencies should play no role at 
all. Asked to what degree SDOs should cooperate with various types of public authorities 
(national ministries, research funding agencies, competition authorities, patent offices, 
health and safety regulators, trade bodies); the surveyed stakeholders were most favorable 
to a closer cooperation with competition/antitrust authorities (3.23/5), followed by patent 
offices (3.12/5). Consistent with this ranking, a majority of the surveyed stakeholders 
(65.3%) considered that governmental agencies should be concerned with ‘Ensuring that 
participants in standardization do not engage in anticompetitive conduct’ and ‘Ensuring that 
SDO patent policies are fair and balanced’. On the other end, only a small minority of 
stakeholders expressed support for governmental agencies choosing which technological 
features to be included in standards or ensuring that standards support the best 
technological features.  
4.2.2 Relationship with patent offices 
The potential relationship of SDOs with patent offices has two dimensions. First, SDO 
activities – and in particular the information circulated in the course of these activities – can 
be considered to form part of the prior art for the purposes of patent examination; such is 
the case at the EPO (Bekkers et al. 2016).62 Nevertheless, patent examiners may not 
always have direct access to such disclosures. IETF and W3C make all technical documents 
available via the Internet at no charge, thus making these materials readily available to 
patent offices and applicants.  Some SDOs make information available to patent offices 
upon request (DVB, ECMA, IEEE-SA). Others prefer to keep this information confidential and 
do not disclose it to patent offices (JEDEC, VITA). Some SDOs (DIN, ISO) are more 
reluctant to disclose their information, because they fear adverse impacts on their business 
model which depends on sales of standard documents, or because they do not wish to 
disclose information contained in preparatory documents that are not released as final 
standards. 
                                           
62 See e.g. EPO Guidelines for Examination, Section 7.6. “Standards and standard preparatory documents”, 
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/guidelines/e/g_iv_7_6.htm  
SDO 
n/a=not 
available 
AFNOR DIN DVB 
Project 
ECMA  ETSI IEEE SA ISO ITU JEDEC W3C 
Documents 
available to 
patent 
offices 
n/a n/a All 
available 
Request 
help from 
time to 
time 
Yes Yes Yes (JTC1 
to JPO) 
MoU with 
EPO 
Requests 
were 
usually 
turned 
down 
No request 
so far 
Help to 
patent office 
in prior art 
searches 
Upon 
specific 
request 
n/a n/a n/a n/a Yes Limited MoU with 
EPO 
n/a n/a 
Cooperation 
with patent 
offices to 
improve 
disclosure 
n/a Limited No No Yes (EPO) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
  57 
Several patent offices, and in particular the EPO, have entered into cooperation agreements 
with individual SDOs (including ETSI, IEEE SA, ISO/IEC JTC1, ITU). Under these 
agreements, patent offices may access final standard documents that would otherwise only 
be available for purchase, and/or access preparatory documents, to build searchable 
databases that examiners can access. Empirical evidence (Bekkers et al., 2016) suggests 
that such SDO cooperation with patent offices can result in an increased number of patent 
applications being rejected for lack of novelty. 
Secondly, patent offices could also play a role in assessing essentiality claims made by 
patent holders. Some SDOs have expressed interest in cooperation with patent offices for 
that purpose, but patent offices have generally been reluctant to respond. The Japan Patent 
Office is the first and currently only patent office to offer such essentiality evaluations upon 
request.63  
4.2.3 Relationship with NGOs 
Even though many SDOs try to achieve a balance of interests, participation by non-industry 
and non-government actors (typically NGOs representing consumers, users, etc.) varies. 
Werle and Iversen study how rules of the process can discourage participation by certain 
players so that minority, civil society and public policy interests are not well-represented 
(Werle and Iversen, 2006). In many cases, however, representativeness of SDO procedures 
is limited by practical constraints such as cost, resources and expertise, rather than 
restrictive policies.64 
Some organizations such as CEN-CENELEC are required to engage in public enquiry and 
consult external organizations, such as environmental groups or trade unions, with regard 
to relevant matters. Comments received through such public enquiry must be taken into 
account in SDO decision-making. Similarly, at ETSI, decision making on European standards 
is based on weighted national votes, where the national vote is cast by a National Standards 
Body in accordance with the outcome of a national public enquiry. Other SDOs conduct such 
outreach on a voluntary basis, either directly or through their members. 
Several SDOs, such as IEEE and IETF, state that they rely on the openness of their process 
to attract all relevant stakeholders to the SDO’s deliberations. In the past, IEEE reports that 
it was more active in this regard, particularly with respect to standards having a broad 
potential impact in areas such as the environment, and in which affected stakeholders were 
likely to be unfamiliar with the standardization process. IETF reports that it previously made 
efforts to engage civil society in its work, but it experienced difficulties in establishing a 
useful dialogue between technical standards developers and those interested in policy 
issues. Similarly, W3C states that it affirmatively seeks involvement of relevant 
stakeholders – including consumer and privacy groups – that are not currently working in its 
technical groups.  
Other SDOs – typically of the ‘bottom-up’ type arising out of industry initiatives – report 
that no NGOs take part in their activities (JEDEC, VITA) because of their technical focus.  
Within the ‘established’ SDOs, the expectation is that NGOs will be included in the work of 
national standardization bodies – DIN, AFNOR, ANSI – and that their viewpoints will be 
reflected in the input coming from these national bodies into regional or international 
standard development work. 
At the EU level, in view of the limited involvement of NGOs, Regulation 1025/2012 has 
provided for the participation – backed by EU financing – of organizations representing 
                                           
63 See <https://www.jpo.go.jp/torikumi_e/kokusai_e/seps-tebiki_e.html> 
64 “In most SDOs, participation is not remunerated and it is a rather expensive undertaking to contribute time and 
work to preparatory work while incurring membership fees and travel expenses” (Iversen et al., 2004, p. 112). 
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SMEs, consumers, environmental interests and social interests. As reported by AFNOR in our 
interview, it is sometimes difficult to organize that representation in practice; with its 3SI 
programme, ETSI has tried to address that problem through the appointment of a specific 
advocate for societal and SME interests, with an ombudsman-like mandate. 
4.3 Relationship with other SDOs and with OSS consortia 
In addition to legal constraints on SDO governance and constraints resulting from SDO 
interaction with public authorities and civil society, SDO governance is also significantly 
influenced by SDO interaction with other SDOs, through contractual obligations or other 
formal requirements. Many SDOs are bound by formal agreements to practice common 
policies, are subject to the requirements formulated by another organization vested with 
superior authority or must ensure smooth technical cooperation with other SDOs. More 
generally, SDOs bring together large numbers of individuals and firms, of which each have 
their respective networks of relationships, and these networks are usually linked with one 
another. Many stakeholders are members or participants in a number of SDOs, thereby 
providing a channel for the circulation of information and for interaction amongst SDOs.  
Constraints on SDO governance can result from either vertical or horizontal relationships 
between SDOs, which affect different SDOs differently. 
4.3.1 Vertical relationships between SDOs 
Perhaps most directly, the governance of numerous SDOs is constrained to different 
degrees by their vertical relationships with other SDOs. These constraints can be indirect 
and relatively loose, but many SDOs are also directly bound to follow the principles and 
even the specific policies defined by an encompassing international or national SDO. This 
complex picture blends two visions, a more structured hierarchical vision and a looser 
bottom-up vision. 
4.3.1.1 Hierarchical vision 
The hierarchical vision is best summed up in the ISO/IEC Guide 59:1994, Code of good 
practice for standardization, at para. 1.2: 
At international level, the voluntary standardization process is essentially coordinated under 
the auspices of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). 
These bodies are apex organizations for an extensive infrastructure which has its 
foundations at national level, and extends into regional activities whenever necessary. This 
global system (i.e. standardization at national, regional and international level) is linked 
together via collaboration agreements between ISO, IEC and ITU at international level; by 
similar agreements between standardization organizations at regional level, such as CEN, 
CENELEC and ETSI in Europe; and at the base, through an extensive array of collaboration 
agreements between the national members of the three apex organizations. 
Under the hierarchical model, general guidelines and principles are defined at a high 
hierarchical level, in encompassing international organizations. The decisions at this higher 
hierarchical level are generally made by consensus of the SDOs to which these guidelines 
will apply. In the realm of SDO governance, in particular, the hierarchical vision is embodied 
in a series of hard-law and softer instruments on both sides of Atlantic, as discussed in 
Section 4.1.1.  
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At the European level, the same hierarchical vision is replicated regionally. As set out above, 
through a combination of primary EU law65 and communications by the European 
Commission,66 a model of SDO governance is set out, which closely tracks the international 
model of the previous paragraph. European standardization organisations – CEN-CENELEC 
and ETSI – embody this governance model.  
National standardization bodies in Europe – such as DIN and AFNOR – are designated by 
their national governments as members of CEN or CENELEC, and are subject to CEN-
CENELEC membership requirements.67 CEN-CENELEC Internal Regulations Part 1D and CEN-
CENELEC Guide 22:2018 define specific due process requirements (regarding transparency, 
openness, impartiality and consensus – see Section 4.1.3), and define principles regarding 
effectiveness, coherence and viability that member SDOs are required to adopt. The 
national standardization bodies accordingly look up to the regional and international levels 
for guidance in matters of governance. AFNOR for instance considers itself as “CEN France” 
or “ISO France”, i.e. the French national representation of the international standardization 
system.68 At the same time, decision making in CEN and ISO is driven by these national 
bodies. Both AFNOR and DIN confirmed that most of governance and policy debates take 
place on the European or international level.69   
Within the EU Member States, the hierarchical model extends further down. In addition to 
their role as standards developer, both DIN and AFNOR have obtained legal recognition from 
their respective national governments, entrusting them with the responsibility to define 
national standardization strategies (often transposing international principles) that are 
followed by numerous sectorial standardization bodies or committees.70 AFNOR furthermore 
controls the French sectorial standardization bodies accredited by the French government.  
On the U.S. side, ANSI, a private organization, makes the connection between the 
international standardization organisations and numerous, mostly private-driven, US-based 
SDOs. US interested parties participate in ISO and IEC through Technical Advisory Groups 
(TAGs) accredited by the ANSI Executive Standards Council (ISO) and appointed by the 
USNC (IEC) and the procedures that govern these TAGs are the International Procedures 
(ISO) and the USNC Statutes and Rules (IEC). US representation in ITU-T is by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Nevertheless, the standardization system in 
the US is far less hierarchical than in the EU. 
4.3.1.2 Bottom-up vision 
Next to this hierarchical vision, there is a bottom-up vision, whereby SDOs arise out of the 
desire of stakeholders to develop standards, and then grow into established organizations. 
                                           
65 Regulation 1025/2012 of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation [2012] OJ L 316/12. 
66 See the Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements 
(Horizontal Guidelines) [2011] OJ C 11/1 or the Communication setting out the EU approach to SEPs, 
COM(2017)712 (29 November 2017).  
67 CEN-CENELEC Internal Regulations Part 1:2018. Part 1D: CEN and CENELEC Membership Requirements. 
68 Historically, AFNOR was created with the purpose to allow French industry to be represented in international 
standardization bodies. This history is reflected in the fact that French Law (a decree from 2009) governs how 
AFNOR represents French interests in international standardization bodies, and that by extension these legal 
rules apply to AFNOR’s own governance. 
69 By DIN’s own estimates, only 15% of its activities are confined to the national level, the remainder taking place 
within the international organizations. The National Standards Bodies also have a distinctive role for the 
adoption of European standards at ETSI. In the process of adopting European standards, the National 
Standards Bodies are responsible for conducting the national public enquiry and casting the national vote. This 
process and the relationship between the National Standards Bodies and ETSI is formalized in a Memorandum 
of Understanding. 
70 Article 1 of AFNOR’s statutes stipulates that AFNOR’s mission is the orientation and coordination of standards 
policy in France in the public interest. In Germany, the Normenvertrag of 1975 between DIN and the State 
defines the role of DIN in the development of a national standardization system. 
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Along the way, they develop their own governance and policies. From our sample of SDOs, 
many – VITA, JEDEC, DVB, ECMA – started out from discussions within the industry. Others 
– IETF and W3C – evolved out of the original community of academic and governmental 
developers of the Internet. IEEE-SA is an emanation of a large professional association.  
At some point, however, these SDOs often – but not always - need to connect with the 
established standardization organizations – at the national, regional or international level. 
The need for such a connection typically arises when the standards developed by the SDO in 
question need to be given a more official existence, so as to benefit from the legal 
properties attached to ‘official’ standards, such as recognition across borders, legal 
presumptions attached to conformity, etc. And on the private side, especially, there is 
frequent vertical interaction among smaller consortia and larger SDOs, whereby standards 
developed within consortia are often submitted to larger SDOs such as IEEE or ISO to be 
legitimized and broadly adopted. 
Some US-based SDOs such as IEEE, VITA and JEDEC have achieved ANSI accreditation, and 
must comply with the ANSI Essential Requirements with respect to standards approved as 
American National Standards. Other US-based SDOs, however, such as IETF and W3C, do 
not elect to seek ANSI accreditation for a range of reasons.  ANSI accreditation is not 
required for SDOs to develop standards that will be adopted by US (or international) 
governmental agencies.71 
SDOs originating in the EU, such as DVB and ECMA,72 cooperate with European 
standardization organizations (CEN-CENELEC and ETSI) and are thereby potentially 
influenced by their governance model. DVB specifications for instance are often adopted as 
ETSI standards in view of gaining regulatory recognition.73 If that happens, the ETSI IPR 
Policy applies in addition to DVB’s own policy.74  
There is therefore an interface between the SDOs created through a more bottom-up 
process and SDOs that are part of the more hierarchical vision, in that the former may seek 
to make their standards enjoy the benefits attached to standards produced by the latter. In 
so doing, the former will be expected to align their governance and policies with the latter, 
yet the precise nature of that expectation may vary. First, as ANSI clearly indicates, its 
Essential Requirements concern the development of American National Standards. How 
SDOs arrange their affairs outside of the development of American National Standards is not 
subject to review by ANSI. Second, the models trickling down from the international level – 
as described above – tend not to be couched in very prescriptive terms: they are formulated 
as recommendations or principles. Accordingly, there is some leeway in how SDOs align 
their own governance and policies with these models. The previous sections showed a 
significant level of variation in the governance and policies of SDOs, with few suggestions 
that any of the observed variants would run afoul of the models. In our interviews, SDOs 
also confirmed that they considered that the models set out at the international, regional or 
national levels left them some margin of maneuver in the design of their own governance 
and policies. 
                                           
71 e.g., the Internet as we know it consists of protocols produced by IETF and W3C, yet is used by governments 
around the world 
72 ECMA is part of the European Multi Stakeholder Platform on ICT Standardisation, and cooperates with ETSI. It 
also works with the international bodies. 
73 “DVB develops specifications and looks to recognized standards bodies such as ETSI or CENELEC to adopt 
standards incorporating these specifications” (Eltzroth, 2008) 
74 “While expecting compliance with its own IPR policy, DVB also alerts its members to the need to adhere to the 
rules of the standards body to which its specification is delivered” (Eltzroth, 2008). 
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4.3.2 Cooperative horizontal relationships 
4.3.2.1 Cooperative horizontal relationships among SDOs 
In addition to the potential for competition between SDOs, there are cooperative horizontal 
relationships amongst SDOs. For instance, the three large international SDOs – ISO, IEC 
and ITU – work together on policy matters. They have a joint IPR policy, and ISO/IEC have 
developed a large number of joint activities, including a code of good practice for 
standardization. Similarly, at the European level, CEN-CENELEC and ETSI also cooperate 
frequently. National organizations – such as AFNOR and DIN – cooperate with other national 
organizations within regional or international entities. Within CEN-CENELEC, for instance, 
the British (BSI), French (AFNOR) and German (DIN) organisations have a close working 
relationship. As described by DIN, within the European standardization system, cooperation 
prevails over competition.75 At the other end of the spectrum, many more specialized SDOs, 
such as JEDEC, DVB and VITA, sometimes look to other SDOs for guidance and inspiration 
in the elaboration of their policies.  
Collaboration is sometimes more focused: ETSI, TSDSI and other SDOs not in our sample 
work closely together within the 3GPP.76 Technical specifications developed at 3GPP are 
published as standards by the member SDOs. Formally, each of these SDOs defines its own 
IPR policy, and individual members are bound by the IPR policies of the respective 
‘Organizational Partner’ (i.e. SDO) of which they are member. Nevertheless, article 55 of 
the 3GPP Working Procedures defines general requirements for these IPR policies. In 
particular, it states that “Organizational Partners should encourage their respective 
members to grant licences on fair, reasonable terms and conditions and on a non-
discriminatory basis.” In our interviews, we were told that the close cooperation of SDOs 
within 3GPP in practice requires that the member SDOs apply more or less identical IPR 
policies. With respect to IoT, OneM2M follows the cooperative model of 3GPP.77 
There are other examples of horizontal coordination among SDOs, which constitute a much 
looser form of harmonization. For example, IEEE-SA, IETF and W3C are all part of Open 
Stand, a group promoting a series of open governance and standardization principles.78 
In addition to cooperation among SDOs on policy matters, there is a widespread pattern of 
cooperation among SDOs in standardization. Baron and Spulber (2018) document that the 
average standard document in a large sample had 1.14 equivalent documents at other 
SDOs; i.e. each standard is on average accredited by more than two different SDOs. Co-
development or co-accreditation of standards by different SDOs may result in additional 
constraints on an SDO’s policy making. Cooperation among SDOs may be complicated by 
different policy provisions. DVB specifications adopted as ETSI standards are e.g. subject to 
different approaches, resulting in practical difficulties for the cooperation between both 
bodies and for companies participating in either or both.79 SDOs may further be constrained 
in their technological decisions by the policy provisions of another body (e.g. technology 
available under the policies of an SDO may not be available under the policy of a different 
body, with which the SDO seeks to co-develop its standards; in such cases, the more 
                                           
75 However, we should note that the relationship between national SDOs and ESOs is also governed by the rules on 
competing overlapping projects. Once the proposal for a standardization work is accepted by the relevant ESO, 
any overlapping national work is frozen (so called “standstill”). For national SDOs this means that they have to 
stop and prevent the development of standardisation deliverables at their organizations that would have a 
similar scope as pending European standards. See for broader debate - <https://erncip-
project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/m487-cpexpo.pdf> 
76 Actually, participation in 3GPP is the raison d’être of TSDSI. 
77 See http://onem2m.org/about-onem2m/intellectual-property-rights. 
78 See https://open-stand.org. 
79 As recognized by Eltzroth (2008), “as a practical matter, the match between DVB and ETSI rules does not appear 
to be perfect”.  
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restrictive policy could be decisive for the choice which technologies can be included in a co-
developed standard). 
Co-accreditation of standards by various SDOs may also result in a further competitive 
check on an SDO’s ability to impose policy provisions. If a standard is already formally 
adopted by one or various bodies, the additional benefit from another body’s endorsement 
may be more limited; thus reducing the SDO’s ability to impose conditions. Technology 
sponsors seeking endorsement from more than one SDO may thus use this as a leverage of 
their negotiation power. An example of such a situation is the standardization of Java, 
where Sun chose ECMA in view of easier access to PAS procedure at JTC1, but also to be 
less dependent on JTC1 approval.80 
4.3.2.2 Cooperative relationships with OSS consortia 
SDOs increasingly interact with open source consortia, especially in the area of software 
standards. In the last few years, several SDOs issued reports on the interaction between 
these two communities, and most notably ETSI (ETSI 2005, ETSI 2006, ETSI 2012, ETSI 
2015, ETSI 2016). Moreover, SDOs like ANSI, ITU-T and ETSI held number of special 
meetings devoted to the intersection of the two ecosystems. ETSI has created a special 
group of its Board (Board OSS) to investigate how to improve ETSI’s interaction with the 
OSS community. A number of SDOs, such as ETSI, W3C, IETF, JEDEC or ECMA have direct 
experiences with some type of incorporation of open source projects. 
In our survey, we asked participants to report on their relationship with and views on open 
source consortia. In particular, we enquired about their existing participation, asked them to 
reflect on the question of closer collaboration between two ecosystems, its benefits and 
existing barriers. Of 45 survey participants, 62% reported to have participated in open 
source consortia. Moreover, from 38 respondents, 26 (68%) saw an opportunity for closer 
interactions between SDOs and OSS.  
Benefits of closer integration were summarized by one of the respondents as follows: “[a]s 
technology advances, and the pace of that advancement increases, many new features are 
being implemented in software rather than hardware. Of those software features, many 
benefit from the collaborative nature of open source projects. Close interaction between 
traditional SDOs and OSS consortia will result in better, faster and more efficient technical 
standards, and a better standards ecosystem for all.” Another company went a step further, 
noting that: “Closer interaction is unavoidable”. Some other respondents remarked that any 
growth in collaboration should be determined by market demand or that open source is a 
business model, which ‘has nothing to do with the decision about standardization’.  
The opportunities were especially seen in the implementation phase. As one respondent put 
it, “[w]hen standards are developed, the most natural developers of standard-compliant 
software are those SDO members who create the standard. They already have decided for 
some, usually commercial, reason to contribute to the creation of the standard and are 
those who know the standard best. Obviously, it may make a lot of sense, if these experts 
complement their standard with standard-compliant software. This could for example 
improve adoption of the standard by the market. Thus SDOs should be eager to have those 
SDO members which develop the standard on board when it comes to the implementation 
of standard-compliant software.” 
                                           
80 “Sun understood that in the past ECMA standards had been submitted to a yes/no vote in JTC1 without any 
modifications, and often successfully so. If Java would become an international standard, customers, partners 
and developers would feel more confident about investing in it. But, Sun said, it would also be pleased if Java 
would remain an ECMA standard” (Egyedi, 2001). 
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The areas in which several respondents thought further collaboration of SDOs and open 
source might be fruitful were cybersecurity, internet technologies, software engineering, 
Cloud, Internet of Things (IoT), 5G, Big data, Geospatial technologies or Blockchain. 
When asked to identify the main barrier to collaboration, 13 respondents out of 35 (37%), 
identified intellectual property as an issue.81  A few other respondents also selected 
governance, sustainability of results or culture as barriers to collaboration.  According to one 
respondent, “[b]oth SDOs and open source consortia may collaborate more efficiently if 
each of the actors recognises the strengths that it brings to a project, and their interactions 
between the two communities are strictly governed by agreements in place which define the 
project, the role of participants in the project, project management, milestones and clearly 
set out the obligations regarding receipt and treatment of confidential information.” 
When respondents were asked to assess compatibility of FRAND and OSS, a number of 
participants noted that OSS is not homogenous and thus it depends on the project and the 
specific use case. However, there was less agreement on more specific issues. For instance, 
some respondents stated that most open source licenses can be legally compatible with 
FRAND-licensing, which can also include royalty-free licensing. At least one respondent 
representing a larger firm, however, was of the view that Open Source Initiative (OSI)-
certified licenses are ‘totally incompatible with a FRAND IPR Policy’.82 Another respondent 
noted that it is 'unhelpful towards the aim of integrating elements of standardisation 
development with targeted open source community' to adopt only the OSI definition of open 
source. On the other hand, several respondents negatively reflected on the practice of SDOs 
choosing an open source license that is OSI-certified, such as BSD (Berkeley Source 
Distribution),83 but then adding extensions that carve out patents, and thus making the 
entire license OSI-incompatible for two reasons. Either they questioned the substance of 
such choice leading to royalty-free licensing (see below), or they complained about the 
practice of referring to such licenses as open source licenses, despite noncompliance with 
the OSI definition. 
According to several respondents, rather than incompatibilities, possible ‘inconsistencies’ 
exist between the IPR-regimes of the two ecosystems. As expressed by one: ‘OSS may 
involve royalty-free licensing of patents used for a work and its derivative works which is 
somewhat open, while SDO Policy generally limits or closes the licensing assurance to 
patents needed for the standard as set forth in its specification. An SDO may provide for a 
reasonable royalty for a FRAND license, while OSS may involve royalty-free. That said, an 
initiative can recognize the two regimes and comply with both with proper treatment.’ It 
was stressed that ‘two License Regimes are only then incompatible if they contain 
obligations that cannot be implemented at the same time’. 
At least one respondent emphasized that even open source licenses requiring royalty-free 
licensing are, from such perspective, ‘still compatible with any kind of FRAND licensing 
requirement because even if a FRAND licensing requirement permits [royalty-bearing] 
licenses any patent holder still can grant a royalty-free license’. 
Several respondents also expressed their views on the role of SDOs in the process of 
integration of open source projects. The opinions were not uniform on this matter. While 
some respondents were of the view that since standardization itself is business model 
neutral, its decisions about integration of open source projects should be neutral as well. In 
other words, the corresponding IPR-licensing of such projects should, in their view, be 
                                           
81 One respondent noted that open source communities seem to want free access to intellectual property rights, not 
only fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) access. 
82 OSI is a non-profit organization that evaluates the compatibility of various OSS licenses with its definition of 
OSS.  See osi.org. 
83 See http://www.linfo.org/bsdlicense.html 
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consistent with royalty-bearing patent licensing, at least as a baseline. The ability to choose 
between royalty-bearing and royalty-free modes were emphasized by a few, arguing that 
one-size fits all is not the right approach for the entire ecosystem. On the other hand, even 
some of these respondents emphasized that royalty-bearing licensing should not be referred 
to as ‘Open Source’ when it does not comply with the widely accepted OSI definition. 
Different views were also expressed as to the consequences of SDO choices regarding OSS. 
According to one respondent, preference for OSI-compatible licenses “may have the 
consequence that SDO members who contributed to the development of the standard under 
a FRAND licensing requirement that permits royalty-bearing licensing will not contribute to 
the development of standard-compliant software if the SDO decides to use an aggressive 
OSS license that comprises a royalty-free patent license.” Another respondent put this more 
strongly, noting that “[a]ny extreme position that there is only one type of business model 
or one type of intellectual property will be disruptive to the overall aim of standards 
globally.” 
On the other hand, at least one respondent stressed that opposition to open source licenses 
requiring royalty-free licensing comes mostly from a small group of SEP holders. 
In its 2017 Communication Setting out the EU approach to SEPs, the European Commission 
mentioned that it would continue to investigate the relationship between open source and 
standards, including through the financing of further studies. 
4.4 Competitive forces  
In addition to the vertical and cooperative relationships discussed in the previous heading, , 
SDO governance is also subject to constraints resulting from competition among SDOs, 
including competitive responses that involve non-SDO vehicles (consortia).  
4.4.1 Competition among SDOs  
In parts of the literature, the relationship between SDOs is analyzed as a competitive 
relationship, where SDOs set policies to attract technology owners seeking a forum in which 
to conduct standards development (Lerner and Tirole, 2006; Chiao et al., 2007; Lerner and 
Tirole, 2015).84 This is linked with the general literature on regulatory competition, in its 
original version as set out in Tiebout (1956) (for a review of the literature, see Larouche, 
2013). SDOs can be compared to local authorities that offer different local policy mixes 
(trade-offs between taxes and public services), leading citizens to ‘vote with their feet’ and 
congregate in the localities that offer policy mixes corresponding to their preferences. 
Should stakeholders be dissatisfied with the performance of a given SDO, they can ‘vote 
with their feet’ and take their standards development activities to another SDO, or even 
launch a new SDO. In particular, it has been suggested that, in reaction to a change in SDO 
policy that is perceived as adverse, stakeholders would look for, or create, an alternate 
                                           
84 Lerner and Tirole (2006) analyze how firms self-select into SDOs. They predict that 
owners of lower quality technology are willing to make greater concessions to have their 
technology adopted as a standard. These concessions in particular can take the form of 
more binding licensing requirements. Chiao et al. (2007) empirically test some of these 
predictions using a sample of 59 SDO policies. They find that SDOs that are oriented toward 
a small group of sponsor firms are less likely to demand policy-based concessions from 
members. The significance of this relationship depends on the number of SDOs operating in 
a field, which suggests that it is indeed competition between different SDOs which allows 
patent owners to find a favorable venue for the standardization of their technology.   
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forum to pursue standards development. Our survey [Q.50] suggests that this approach is 
used in practice.  Among 29 respondents, 34% (69% of Patent-Centric respondents and 7% 
of Product-Centric respondents) indicated that they had left an SDO or considered doing so 
because of the SDO’s IPR policy or IP litigation.  There is a difference, however, between 
leaving an SDO (exit option) and being able to find another forum to substitute for that 
SDO. The former is an individual action by a single stakeholder, whereas the latter is more 
difficult to achieve: it requires a sufficient critical mass of stakeholders that move to (or 
create) the new forum in order to make it viable.  
In the economic literature, SDO “forum shopping” is sometimes considered as a source of 
inefficiency in SDO policy design. Lerner and Tirole (2015) find that SDOs requiring specific 
licensing commitments for SEPs would be unable to attract SEP owners if competing with 
SDOs practicing less restrictive IPR policies. Policies requiring such specific commitments 
are thus unlikely to endogenously emerge from competition between SDOs, even though 
Lerner and Tirole (2015) argue that these rules may be socially preferable to existing IPR 
policies. 
However, SDOs compete not only in the technology market to attract valuable technologies, 
but they also compete to attract members, and their standards compete in the product 
market for implementers. It is unclear whether SDOs are more concerned with attracting 
the owners of potential SEPs or standard implementers, and it is likely that the balance 
between implementers and SEP owners varies between industries and technological fields. It 
is also important to take into account the decision-making process within SDOs to analyze 
this multi-sided competition. Spulber (2018) models SDO decision-making when there is 
competition both among technology providers and standard implementers, and concludes 
that the forces of voting within SDOs and competitive pressure balance each other out. 
A different view on competition between SDOs (e.g. Tsai and Wright, 2015) predicts that 
SDO policies are responsive to the risks resulting from the inclusion of IPR in a standard, 
and that a competitive outcome will take into account the interests of both SEP owners and 
implementers. According to this view, competition between SDOs should break up any hold-
up position of SEP owners who imposed their patented technology on a single SDO. 
Furthermore, if an SDO adopts inefficient policies or is subject to paralyzing conflicts of 
interests (so-called “wars of attrition”, e.g. Farrell and Simcoe, 2012; Simcoe, 2012), 
companies have a plethora of alternative SDOs to choose from. 
There are thus a number of important arguments that competition between SDOs 
determines or at least affects SDO governance, resulting in efficient or inefficient outcomes, 
depending on the theoretical approach. The extent to which SDO policy making really is 
constrained by competition with other SDOs is however empirically unclear. Chiao et al. 
(2007) find that in their sample there are on average approximately 14 SDOs operating in 
the same technological field; suggesting a significant degree of competition between SDOs. 
But any count of SDOs by technological field is highly dependent on the definition of fields. 
While a website with information on standards organizations (www.consortiuminfo.org) 
currently lists over 1,000 organizations setting standards in the general field of Information 
and Communication Technologies, most of these organizations are highly specialized. Within 
a narrowly defined technological field, there may thus be only one or a small number of 
active SDOs. Furthermore, it is common for different SDOs to cooperate in the development 
of standards. The presence of various SDOs in one technological field alone is thus not an 
indication of competition.  
More generally, counts of SDOs by field may not be a meaningful measure of competition. 
On the one hand, it is true that a large number of new SDOs are created every year; and 
existing SDOs may change their policies, discontinue operations or begin standards 
development in new technological fields. These observations suggest that the barriers to 
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entry for new organizations, or for organizations practicing new policies or entering new 
fields, are relatively low. The absence of barriers to entry and the potential competition from 
new SDOs would then act as a check on an SDO’s ability to impose policies running counter 
to the interests of its members, even if an SDO faces no competition from SDOs currently 
active in its field. Yet on the other hand, standards development may be tied to specific 
SDOs, and can only be migrated to other SDOs at a substantial cost. These switching costs 
include the cost of coordinating with other SDO members, as well as the loss of 
organizational and reputational capital. Indeed, SDOs provide a framework for repeat 
interaction between their members (Larouche and Schuett, 2016), and the value of a 
technology’s adoption as an SDO standard depends on the SDO’s reputation. The value of 
repeat interaction and reputation are built over time, and cannot be easily reproduced in a 
different organization. SDO members may thus face significant difficulties in migrating their 
standards development projects to a different organization when they are unhappy about a 
policy revision at a particular SDO.85 
Our interviews indicate that, at least from the point of view of SDOs themselves, the scope 
for stakeholder mobility in response to dissatisfaction with the SDO is limited. In other 
words, SDO participation is sticky. A number of factors were advanced to support this 
conclusion.  
First, an SDO concentrates expertise and knowledge concerning the type of technology and 
product category that it is dealing with. All relevant stakeholders will gravitate towards the 
SDO. Accordingly, unless ‘mass defection’ takes place, stakeholders cannot hope to find the 
same critical mass of expertise elsewhere. As was pointed out in one interview, in one 
instance where a major stakeholder was disgruntled, that firm’s only avenue was to exit the 
sector covered by the SDO.  
Secondly, from a dynamic perspective, there is some path dependency to standardization, 
at least in the ICT sector: once a standard is successful, further generations of the standard 
are expected to follow in tune with technological and commercial progress. This reinforces 
the position of the existing SDO as the forum to hold further standards development. Seen 
from such a dynamic perspective, there may be no practical alternatives to the existing 
SDO: stakeholders would introduce disruption if they moved standard development to 
another forum, or worse, the standard could be left at a standstill and eventually 
abandoned.  
Thirdly, SDOs frequently hold intellectual property rights (usually copyright) in the standard 
itself.86 Copyright over standards can make it more difficult to move standardization 
activities to another SDO.  
Finally, many interviewees mentioned that the main factor motivating stakeholders to join 
an SDO was the substance of standard development activities, not the governance or the 
policies of the SDO. This also implies that there is an assumption that SDOs do not differ 
markedly on these aspects, or at least do not seek to differentiate themselves through their 
governance or policies. However, a number of SDOs – ECMA, VITA, DVB, W3C – mentioned 
their IP policies were  distinctive features; these policies came to be as they are, however, 
more as a result of an organic, endogenous evolution (“in tune with the needs of our 
membership”) than an attempt to profile themselves competitively. This is confirmed by our 
survey results [Q9] according to which on a scale from 1 to 5 (with 1 being not important 
and 5 being very important), participants graded the importance of IPR policies to their 
                                           
85 Such transitions do, however, occur.  See, for example, Contreras (2016a), detailing the transfer of Worldwide 
Web standards such as HTML from IETF to the newly-formed W3C due to policy and cultural disagreements, 
while leaving HTTP at IETF. 
86 The standard must be expressed in a document, over which copyright exists. This is in addition to the patent 
rights of stakeholders that would be come into play if the standard requires practicising Standard-Essential 
Patents for its implementation. 
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decision to join or participate in a specific SDO at 3.95 on average. At the same time, IPR 
policies come only after two other factors - relevance to business (4.64) and SDO reputation 
(3.98) - and closely followed by SDO relevance to public policy (3.88), openness of SDO 
processes (3.84) and availability of the standards (3.76). 
In the same vein, participants in our stakeholder workshop indicated that the ‘outside 
options’ available to stakeholders might vary over time. In the early days of a 
standardization effort, competition between SDOs to attract standardization projects is seen 
as a real possibility. Workshop participants even reported that such competition has 
intensified over the recent years, as the number of SDOs has grown faster than the demand 
for standardization. It is thus a common occurrence that various SDOs attempt to initiate 
standardization work in the same emerging technical field.87 As standardization moves 
ahead and standards are set, it often becomes less and less realistic to move out of an SDO 
altogether.88  
Other workshop participants nevertheless pointed to examples of relatively mature 
standardization projects that were abandoned, or fully developed standards that receded in 
the market, as a result of competition from standards developed by other SDOs or 
consortia. One such example is the IEEE 1394 (Fire Wire) standard, which did not achieve 
as much market success as could have been expected, in light of the competition from the 
Universal Serial Bus (USB) standards developed by the USB Implementer Forum (USB-IF). 
Some workshop participants stated that one possible reason for this competitive outcome is 
the fact that essential technology for USB standards is available under USB-IF’s royalty-free 
policy. This example suggests that competition from standards developed in other SDOs or 
groups can act as a check on the market power of the owners of standard-essential 
technology even at a later stage in standard development.   
More generally, an SDO’s ability to impose policies and conditions may be limited by 
competition among SDOs, including at more mature stages of standard development, based 
on a more dynamic analysis of competition. In particular, as confirmed by a representative 
of an SDO stakeholder at the workshop, industry stakeholders self-select into SDOs not only 
based on the SDO’s current policies, but also based on the SDO’s procedures for changing 
its policies. In order to attract standardization projects and technology contributors at the 
competitive stage, SDOs therefore must provide sufficient safeguards against opportunistic 
policy changes at a mature stage. Furthermore, most SDOs have multiple standardization 
projects, and must continue to attract new projects to survive. While an SDO may 
opportunistically change its policies without immediate competitive repercussions to its 
existing, mature projects, such a change could damage its reputation and ability to attract 
or initiate new projects. These arguments suggest that competition among SDOs may 
provide long-run checks on an SDO’s ability to impose unbalanced policies, potentially 
attenuating concerns about SDO lock-in and anticompetitive effects of single policy changes 
at SDOs with mature standardization projects. 
                                           
87 Some workshop participants stated that as a consequence of this rivalry, it has become more common for SDOs 
to initiate standardization projects on their own initiative, rather than as solicited by industry stakeholders. It 
is unclear to what extent this evolution is only driven by rivalry among SDOs. IEEE SA e.g. reports that it has 
recently initiated standardization projects based on staff initiative rather than industry stakeholder demand, 
but attributes these initiatives to a growing concern for societal issues insufficiently addressed by industry-
driven initiatives. 
88 While standardization projects initiated within an SDO may be subject to significant path-dependency, it is not 
uncommon for already well-advanced de-facto standards to be ‘shifted around’ among SDOs. Egyedi (2001) 
analyzes one prominent example for this competition: the Java programming language was developed by Sun 
Microsystems and initially submitted to ISO/IEC JTC1 under the ‘PAS procedure’ for expedited standardization. 
In light of JTC1’s resistance to Sun’s demands regarding intellectual property rights, and in particular the 
trademark rights over Java, Sun withdrew the PAS request and instead chose ECMA for the standardization of 
Java; in particular because “Sun's position in ECMA was stronger than in JTC1.” This example seems to match 
quite neatly the forum shopping model developed by Lerner and Tirole (2006, 2015). 
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4.4.2 Consortia and other competitive responses to SDOs 
In addition to competition among SDOs, there are other competitive responses available to 
dissatisfied stakeholders even at a more advanced stage of standard development. They 
involve either working outside the SDO or trying to voice their disagreement from within the 
SDO. Similar to competition from other SDOs, the availability of these competitive 
responses reduces SDOs’ ability to impose rules for standard development that a critical 
constituency dislikes. 
4.4.2.1 Stepping out of the room 
In a number of instances, dissatisfied SDO stakeholders may “step out of the room” (work 
outside of the SDO) to try to make further progress on a standard, or to begin a new 
standardization project, in line with their own preferences. Once progress has been 
achieved, these stakeholders may gravitate back to the SDO to seek endorsement of their 
work product. Through this action, stakeholders may leverage their position without going 
so far as to leave the SDO.  
For example, Shapiro and Varian first drew attention to this practice in connection with the 
“modem wars” of the 1980s, observing that “If you can follow a control strategy or organize 
an alliance outside the formal standard-setting process, you may be far better off: you can 
move more quickly, you can retain more control over the technology and the process, you 
will not be bound by any formal consensus process, and you need not commit to openly 
licensing any controlling patents.” (Shapiro and Varian (1999, p.239)). 
For instance, in the course of mobile communications standards development, mobile 
operators formed a specific association (Next Generation Mobile Networks or NGMN) 
designed to voice and present the expectations and requirements of mobile operators in the 
course of standard development in 3GPP and other fora.89 More recently, mobile operators 
have stepped up their efforts to open up the radio access network (RAN): two initiatives, 
the xRAN Forum90 and the C-RAN alliance, merged to form the ORAN (Open RAN) Alliance, 
in order to foster the use of open standards, software-based implementation (virtualization) 
and open ‘whitebox’ elements for the RAN.91 ORAN is profiled by stakeholders as a vehicle 
to put pressure on existing SDOs, with the ability to turn it into a stand-alone SDO should it 
ever become necessary. 
Similarly, the Wi-Fi Alliance was created with the aim of streamlining and strengthening the 
IEEE 802.11 family of standards through a certification program around “Wi-Fi” brands.92 Its 
certification role complements the standardization work of IEEE-SA. Nevertheless, the 
certification program rests on the development of a standardized ‘interpretation’ of IEEE’s 
802.11 standards, which can be considered a standardization activity potentially entering 
into competition with the role of an SDO.93 In another instance related to IEEE’s 802.11 
standards, a number of companies formed the Enhanced Wireless Consortium (EWC), 
                                           
89 See www.ngmn.org and Contreras (2013a, pp. 178-79) (discussing NGMN background and experience with ex 
ante disclosure of licensing terms). 
90 See www.xran.org 
91 See the press release on the creation of ORAN on www.xran.org. 
92 See www.wi-fi.org. 
93 DeLacey et al. (2006) describe how by 1998, two different IEEE standards (IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11b) 
existed for wireless connections. A group of companies formed the Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance 
(WECA) – which would become the Wi-Fi Alliance – “to develop a shared interpretation of the 802.11b 
standard—contained in a dense 400 page document—that would avoid interoperability issues.” Subsequently, 
“several major software and computer makers quickly lined up behind the new 802.11b standard, some even 
before the standard was completely ratified.” This description suggests that the work of WECA/Wi-Fi Alliance 
resulted in a coordinated selection among different IEEE standards, and that this outside group of firms built 
support for a specific version/interpretation of the standard even before the standard was approved using 
IEEE’s standard approval process.  
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“supposedly out of frustration with the existing impasse” [over the development of IEEE 
802.11n] (DeLacey et al., 2006). The alignment of positions among EWC members 
substantially impacted standardization of IEEE 802.11n, and in the view of some critics 
amounted to a “form of hijack of the process” (DeLacey et al., 2006).94  
Another example is the CI Plus specification, concerning the Common Interface in the DVB 
standards. A number of stakeholders were dissatisfied with progress within the DVB Project 
regarding the new version of the CI standard: they founded a separate forum, which 
developed the CI Plus specification.95 Given the success of the specification, it was brought 
back to the DVB Project and adopted as a DVB standard. 
Similar to consortia such as the WiFi Alliance or NGMN, OSS consortia can often 
complement the work of SDOs. As discussed in section 4.3.2.2., several SDOs have specific 
policies intended to foster the contribution of OSS consortia to the preparation of technical 
specifications and/or the rapid implementation of their standards. Nevertheless, as is the 
case for other consortia discussed in the previous paragraphs, OSS consortia can also take 
on roles that are often carried out by SDOs, and thus partly or fully replace SDOs in the 
development of technical standards. 
There are also precedents for stakeholders stepping out of the room in reaction to SDO 
policy matters. For example, the Wireless Gigabit Alliance (WiGig) (now folded into the Wi-Fi 
Alliance) arose as a reaction to IEEE-SA’s then IPR policy: the members of WiGig wanted to 
develop a gigabit-speed wireless LAN standard on a royalty-free basis. They brought the 
result of their work to IEEE. More recently, the Video Compression Industry Forum (VC-IF) 
has been set up by a number of stakeholders involved in ISO/IEC MPEG and ITU-T VCEG 
standards, among others. This forum aims to complement the activities of the SDOs and 
address implementation issues, including IPR matters.96 
W3C itself arose out of a desire by the principal developer of the Worldwide Web protocol to 
develop further web standards in an environment that was more streamlined than the 
consensus-driven, and sometimes cumbersome, IETF (Contreras 2016). 
The results of our stakeholder survey also support the existence and significance of this 
“leaving the room” option. In Question 22, respondents listed “participate in industry 
discussions/forums” and “form alliances with like-minded SDO members” as the two most 
effective means for influencing SDO policy-making, well ahead of a set of 10 other options, 
with the options “withdrawing from SDO” and “threaten legal action” ranking a distant last. 
Legally, stepping out of the room is a delicate matter, for both the stakeholders who leave 
the room and for the SDO. 
As regards the stakeholders, their actions in forming the consortium or alliance are 
themselves subject to the same trade and competition law rules as apply to SDO 
themselves. In other words, the consortium or alliance cannot be used as a vehicle to 
violate competition or antitrust law, for instance by excluding certain technological solutions 
without valid justification. The recent DensiFi episode provides a good illustration of how 
stepping out of the room to form a consortium – in this case, a Special Interest Group (SIG) 
                                           
94 The example of EWC is particularly significant, because the group emerged from a gridlock resulting from the 
opposition between two different fractions (TGn Sync alliance and WWiSE) with different preferences regarding 
the licensing terms under which the 802.11n technology should become available (DeLacey et al., 2006). The 
example thus suggests that standardization activities by break-out groups of an established SDO can impact if 
not define the licensing terms for standard-essential technology in addition to the IPR policy of the SDO 
formally in the lead. 
95 See www.ci-plus.com. 
96 See www.vc-if.org. 
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– can give rise to difficulties. The matter  was resolved internally within IEEE-SA,97 but also 
attracted the attention of the US DOJ.98 It centered around the activities of DensiFi, a SIG 
formed by a majority of the firms active in the development of 802.11ax, a new generation 
of the 802.11 wireless LAN standard. The precise aims of DensiFi are not clear from the 
publicly available documents. An internal IEEE-SA investigation found that DensiFi held 
private discussions concerning technical materials ahead of their submission to the IEEE 
Task Group in charge of 802.11ax (TGax), and that the DensiFI members were able and 
expected to vote as a block at TGax to favour their proposals and block other proposals. 
Furthermore, the investigation also noted the tiered governance structure of DensiFi, 
whereby a subset of DensiFi members determined the course of action, and the difficulty of 
gaining admission to DensiFi. The investigation concluded that the DensiFi members had 
breached the internal IEEE rules prohibiting “dominance”99 of standardization by some 
interests, to the detriment of open and fair participation of all interested parties. In 
response, IEEE-SA restricted the voting rights of DensiFi members at TGax (all DensiFi 
members were deemed to hold a single collective vote), unless DensiFi was disbanded, 
which it promptly was. The IEEE 802 Executive Committee also issued prospective 
instructions to participants, in order to prevent similar issues from arising in the future.100 
The DensiFi matter was not decided under competition or antitrust law, but it is not difficult 
to see how the creation and operation of DensiFi could have led to competition/antitrust 
issues.  
As regards the SDO, in addition to the difficulty of navigating a situation in which part of the 
membership disagrees more or less openly with the course of action at the SDO, 
competition or antitrust law issues could also arise if the policing of alliances or consortia 
leads to inadequate or disproportionate remedies. The SDO could either underreact and 
allow anti-competitive conduct by the alliance or consortium members to fester or, 
alternatively, it could overreact and unduly restrict the ability of SDO members to form rival 
fora for standardization (which is protected under competition or antitrust law). It appears 
that the DoJ investigation into the DensiFi case, mentioned above, also extends to the 
manner in which IEEE-SA took remedial action in the case. 
These conflicting legal risks for SDOs expose a tension in the public policy approach to 
SDOs. In pursuit of the public interest, public authorities generally defend both the 
competitiveness of the overall system, in which stakeholders can choose from a variety of 
SDOs for their standardization needs, and the openness and balance of standardization 
processes within each SDO. While both objectives may often be complementary, there can 
be situations in which competition from alternative standardization fora effectively reduces 
the openness and balance of standardization processes within an SDO. 
                                           
97 The case originated in a complaint made by a member of the IEEE-SA 802.11 Working Group (WG), relating to 
the work of the Task Group in charge of developing the 802.11ax standard (TGax). See the Report of the 
Investigating Officer, IEEE 802.11-16/1519r0, at https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/16/11-16-1519 (9 
November 2016). On the basis of that report, the IEEE 802 Executive Committee adopted mitigation actions: 
ec-16-0186-01-00EC, at https://mentor.ieee.org/802-ec/dcn/16/ec-16-0186-03 (8 November 2016). These 
actions were approved by the IEEE SA Standards Board on 7 December 2016. An appeal against the decision 
of the Standards Board was rejected on 20 January 2017: 
http://www.ieee802.org/appeal_decisions/Ericsson_Smith_InterDigital_17_0106/SASB-Appeal-Officers-
Decision-20Jan2017.pdf. 
98 As reported on MLex: https://mlexmarketinsight.com/insights-center/editors-picks/antitrust/north-america/doj-
probes-role-of-special-interest-group-in-new-wifi-standard (26 January 2018). 
99 “Dominance” is not used here in the same sense as under competition law. 
100 See the “Best Practices for Industry Group Interaction with IEEE 802” (November 2016), available at 
https://mentor.ieee.org/802-ec/dcn/16/ec-16-0190-00-00EC-industry-group-best-practices.pdf and the 
proposals for additional guidance (November 2016), available at https://mentor.ieee.org/802-ec/dcn/16/ec-
16-0149-00-00EC-2016-nov-proposed-addition-to-chair-s-guidelines-re-participation.pptx. 
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4.4.2.2 Voicing disagreement from within the SDO 
In addition to leaving an SDO, supporting competing standards, and moving parts or the 
entirety of standardization activities to a break-out group, firms can sometimes resist an 
SDO policy change while continuing to participate in the SDO’s standardization and 
governance activities. The most prominent example of this strategy is the response of a 
number of significant patent holding contributors to IEEE’s 2015 patent policy change. 
These companies, including Qualcomm, Ericsson and Nokia, indicated that they are not 
willing to commit to license their SEPs under the terms and conditions defined by the 
amended IEEE policy. Nevertheless, these companies continue to contribute to IEEE-SA 
working groups. Some companies stated that their SEPs are covered by generic letters of 
assurance issued prior to the 2015 policy change; and some companies have issued 
“negative” LOAs (letters of assurance), i.e. disclosure statements indicating that they own 
potentially standard-essential patented technology that is not available for licensing under 
the terms of the IEEE patent policy (Katznelson 2018; Pohlmann 2017). The IEEE patent 
policy simply states that “An asserted potential Essential Patent Claim for which licensing 
assurance cannot be obtained (e.g., an LOA is not provided or the LOA indicates that 
licensing assurance is not being provided) shall be referred to the Patent Committee.”  
The recent IEEE experience suggests that it is possible for companies to continue to 
contribute to an SDO’s standardization processes while objecting in principle to some of the 
SDO’s policies (Pohlmann 2019). SEP holders may, under the policies of IEEE and several 
other SDOs, indicate that they are unwilling to license patented technology on terms they 
do not wish to offer. If the patented technology is technologically essential or sufficiently 
superior to alternative technologies, SDO participants may nevertheless elect to adopt 
standards including that patented technology even without a licensing assurance.101 Layne-
Farrar et al. (2014) model a standardization process in which an SDO’s ability to adopt a 
restrictive patent policy is constrained by the patent holders’ outside option to leave the 
SDO and offer their technology on terms unconstrained by the SDO patent policy, and find 
that SDO policies that are inconsistent with this “participation constraint” result in socially 
inefficient outcomes. 
These approaches are characteristic of “dissenting” behavior within a group.  In addition, 
dissatisfied stakeholders can also use the governance mechanisms at their disposal 
(appointment, selection or election of officers) to seek to gain a greater voice in SDO 
governance matters. Examples of this approach are discussed in Section 5.2.2.3 below. 
To summarize, there is a variety of potential competitive limitations on an SDO’s ability to 
impose specific policies on industry participants, which may vary by the stage of 
technological maturity of a standard.  
 
  
                                           
101 Of course, if this uncommitted patented technology is not essential to the standard, then the other SDO 
participants may wish to “design around” it, thus excluding it from the standard. See NAS, 2013, p. 73 (“Working 
groups may also use disclosure information to choose between different technical alternatives or to mount efforts 
to design around a certain patented technology”). 
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Table 4.2. – Cooperation and competition among SDOs
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4.5 Interaction between external constraints 
4.5.1 The private perspective: a three-layer model of SDOs 
From the perspective of SDOs, the combined effect of different external constraints on SDO 
governance shapes different SDOs in different ways according to their place in the 
standardization ecosystem.  The analysis of external factors shaping SDO governance thus 
forms the basis of a typology of SDOs. The traditional approach distinguishes between 
“formal” and “informal” SDOs.  On one hand, designated national or European standards 
bodies such as AFNOR, DIN, and CEN-CENELEC, face limited, if any, competition from other 
SDOs in the realm of their designated competencies. These organizations are nevertheless 
subject to relatively tight legal and vertical constraints. On the other hand, industry-driven 
organizations such as ECMA, JEDEC and VITA are subject to far fewer hierarchical 
constraints. They however compete with similar organizations for membership, technological 
contributions and standard adoption.  
Büthe and Mattli (2011) describe two models of SDOs, the “hierarchical” European model 
and the “fragmented” US model. This categorization is only of limited use to describe the 
governance with respect to IPR policies in the SDOs that we analyzed. DIN, AFNOR, and 
CEN fit relatively neatly into the hierarchical model, because they mostly implement the 
policies defined “above” (at the international level) and concentrate most of their policy 
making efforts on influencing what happens at the international level. But at the same time, 
their weight in the international ecosystem is not particularly large, especially in IPR policy 
discussions. Buthe and Mattli’s (2011) finding that the international governance of 
standardization is dominated by European-based, hierarchical organizations is impossible to 
sustain in the primarily-ICT focused IPR policy debates. Organizations with significant IPR 
debates, such as ETSI, IEEE, IETF, and W3C, not only fit less easily into the categorization 
of “hierarchical” or “fragmented” organizations, they also, for the most part, escape a neat 
categorization into “European” or “US-based”. 
For several significant policy changes at organizations that are important for the 
standards/IPR debate, vertical relationships did not appear to be much of a constraint. First, 
even the IEEE IPR policy change in 2015, a widely commented change that most observers 
would probably describe as significant and contentious (see Section 7.x, below), took place 
within IEEE’s corporate governance rules and was approved by ANSI as conforming with its 
essential requirements (in addition to the Business Review Letter obtained from the DOJ). 
In the case of an organization like IEEE, these vertical constraints thus apparently 
accommodate a broad range of IPR policy choices, and leave substantial room for 
maneuver.  
Second, some organizations that have important idiosyncrasies in their governance can 
decide not to seek any endorsements from ANSI or a similar organization if they already 
possess sufficient legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of their stakeholders. This is for 
instance the case of IETF and W3C. These organizations are relatively free of vertical 
constraints precisely because they also face relatively little competitive pressure. Other, 
typically smaller, private and informal organizations seek ANSI accreditation or other means 
of formal recognition to attract members or build support for their standards. Similarly, 
private and informal SDOs that would generally be free to determine their own policies 
within broad confines established by general legal principles, voluntarily decide to adopt or 
copy important policy provisions from established SDOs (such as ECMA using the language 
of the ISO/IEC/ITU patent policy as IPR policy) to build confidence in their governance. 
The vertical relationships with leading entities therefore are most crucial to organizations 
that are smaller or competing with other organizations. In addition to a pyramidal structure 
with ISO/IEC/ITU-T at the top overseeing regional and national bodies next to a mass of 
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competing smaller SSOs and consortia, in our sample, we observe a number of (relatively 
smaller) organizations subject to both competition and vertical constraints, and a number of 
important and quite independent organizations that are each relatively focal for what they 
do (IETF, W3C, IEEE and ETSI). Of course there are interactions between their policies, but 
it would be difficult to discern a significant tendency towards convergence or isomorphism. 
In order to account for these observations, we propose a model with three types or layers of 
SDOs.  
The highest, most stable layer is constituted by the formal and established SDOs, including 
the large international organizations (ISO, IEC, ITU) and the designated national and 
regional standardization bodies. These organizations often have significant functions that 
are shielded from competitive pressure. A significant number of legal instruments confer to 
these officially recognized bodies a quasi-governmental role and authority with respect to 
the development of certain technological standards, and the definition of certain principles 
of standardization policy. At the same time, the exercise of these functions is often 
controlled by specific national or international legal rules, the official status of the 
organization and its standards is conditioned on respecting legally defined governance 
principles, and even the specific procedures of the individual standardization bodies are 
often specified by the law.  
At the bottom layer, no such constraints apply to the large number of informal industry 
consortia that exist and are created and dissolved every year. These organizations however 
must attract members, contributors and implementers, and building confidence in the 
processes and policies of the organization is an important factor for this competition. While 
the existing literature (Lerner and Tirole, 2006, 2015; Chiao et al., 2007) has analyzed how 
this competition induces SDOs to grant some categories of stakeholders particularly 
favorable terms, we observe, instead, that smaller and less authoritative SDOs that need to 
convince stakeholders of their credibility often revert to adopting policies developed by 
established and formal SDOs. These SDOs sometimes seek accreditation by bodies such as 
ANSI or by the national government in certain EU Member States in order to further that 
end, verbatim adopt the policies of large established SDOs, or submit their standards and 
specifications to more formal SDOs for approval (e.g. DVB to ETSI or CENELEC). 
Between the formally recognized standardization bodies and the more informal and smaller 
SDOs, there is a layer constituted by several large and significant SDOs, such as IEEE and 
IETF, that are generally stable and recognized internationally. These organizations receive 
their authority not primarily from a formal legal designation, but instead from their technical 
leadership, their installed base of standards and standardization projects, and their 
established membership. All of these features make it difficult for participants to shift 
standardization to a new organization and erect barriers to entry for competing 
organizations attempting to enter their domain of expertise. Because these organizations 
can develop or modify their policies without the participation of public authorities or civil 
society, and because such actions are not immediately subject to the sanctions of 
competitive forces, these organizations have a realistic chance of developing their own, 
tailor-made policies and processes. At the same time, these organizations can account for 
technology standards subject to a large number of SEPs. These organizations are therefore 
often in the focus of the debates on SDO governance with respect to IPR.  
However, not all formal and established SDOs fit perfectly within a single layer. ETSI, in 
particular, as one of the European standardization organisations represents such a case. 
ETSI shares the features and the behaviour of SDOs from the top and middle layers. Like 
SDOs in the top layer, ETSI carries out important functions conferred to it by public 
authorities, in close hierarchical cooperation with other bodies. In the development of 
harmonized European standards, ETSI decides by national votes that are cast by national 
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delegations after a public enquiry and weighted according to the weighting schemes that are 
also used for the decisions of the European Council. In contrast to this process with its 
elements of public policy, decision making on all other technical specifications follows 
weighted individual voting of ETSI membership (predominantly consisting in private 
companies). In its governance processes, ETSI makes policy decisions that share elements 
with and apply to both the more regulation-oriented process for European standards and the 
industry-driven processes for technical specifications. A further difficulty resides in the fact 
that decisions on IPR policies predominantly affect ETSI specifications adopted through 
3GPP, a partnership of more or less industry-driven SDOs with its own industry-driven 
standard development processes. The diversity of these external constraints on ETSI’s 
governance not only makes it difficult to neatly categorize ETSI into a single layer of the 
model, it also represents a specific challenge for ETSI’s governance features.  
4.5.2 The Public Perspective: Regulatory Models 
The previous section described how external constraints – arising from the law and from the 
market – can combine to create an SDO ecosystem. From the public policy perspective, the 
interaction of public authorities with this ecosystem is part of the broader regulatory 
system. The integration of the standardization ecosystem in the regulatory system follows 
different regulatory models. 
While the prevalent regulatory approach to standardization has evolved over time and 
differs between countries, we observe several regulatory features that characterize the 
regulatory approach to SDOs in the EU and the US:  
1. Overall regulatory involvement is light-touch, emphasizing general 
pronouncements and ex-post involvement. 
2. The prevalent regulatory model is self-regulation, whereby public authorities defer 
or refer to SDO decision making, even though there are significant elements of co-
regulation with a more active role of public authorities (involving public delegation to 
SDOs or collaboration among public authorities and SDOs). 
3. The predominantly light-touch regulation allows for diversity among SDO policies. 
Government pronouncements may confer precedential value to decisions of 
individual SDOs. Nevertheless, circulation of individual SDO decisions more 
commonly follows an experimental model. 
4. Public regulation generally follows a procedural approach, prioritizing regulation of 
process over regulation of outcomes. 
4.5.2.1 General pronouncements and ex post involvement 
As a starting point, that institutional framework can be organized in different ways, 
depending on the following parameters: 
- Degree of detail in tasking. Public authorities can set out their vision of the public 
interest either in general or in more specific terms. General terms could be cast as 
objectives (e.g. “Broadest diffusion and use of the standard”) or principles (e.g. 
“Non-discrimination”). The public interest could even be simply derived from 
generally-applicable laws (competition law, trade law, etc.). Alternatively, public 
authorities could be very specific in the tasks entrusted to the SDOs, as is often the 
case with EU standardization requests under the New Approach (“Create a working 
group to develop a standard to replace Standard XYZ in the light of the technological 
and commercial developments specified below”); 
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- Involvement ex ante or ex post. Public authorities can either kick-start the regulatory 
cycle with an ex ante statement, which then triggers the SDO into action, or take a 
more reactive stance and wait for SDOs to be active before contemplating whether 
SDO actions are in line with the public interest. This design choice ties in with the 
previous parameter: presumably, a more specific tasking would be done ex ante, 
whereas ex post involvement would be more compatible with a definition of the 
public interest in more general terms. 
 
From the available literature and from the data we have gathered throughout our research, 
it is apparent that the institutional framework for standardization – certainly in the ICT area 
where our research focused – tends to rely on general statements and ex post involvement. 
In other words, it is hands-off and light-touch. This conforms with the emphasis placed on 
consent, market constraints and expertise in the legitimacy analysis found below in Chapter 
6. As long as SDO stakeholders consider that a given SDO enjoys “internal” legitimacy 
because its activities and decisions rest on consent,102 since this SDO is subject to market 
discipline (or supervision by a democratic body) and since this SDO gathers the expertise on 
its subject-matter, then public policy can go out from a hands-off, light-touch approach that 
assumes that SDOs activities and decisions are in the public interest unless otherwise 
shown. 
Such a light touch framework brings with it a number of advantages. First, it aligns with the 
perception of the SDOs and their stakeholders themselves. Throughout our round of case-
studies, we have read in SDO documents and heard in our interviews that SDOs are 
primarily industry-driven, as will be detailed in the next Chapter. Similarly, in our 
stakeholder survey, many answers evidence that stakeholders consider that SDOs are 
primarily there to address “internal” industry concerns. In Question 9 of our survey, 
stakeholders listed “relevance to business” as the most important consideration for joining 
an SDO, by a significant margin above other considerations. Questions 31 to 34 concerned 
the role of public authorities in standardization processes. The responses indicate that 
stakeholders see a small to limited role for public authorities in standardization, focusing on 
trade and competition policy, as expressed in the governance principles set out earlier. 
Those results were bolstered by the comments received at the stakeholder workshop, which 
reflected a strong perception that standardization is industry-driven and derives its 
legitimacy from the involvement of stakeholders. 
Whether that perception is accurate or not can be left open, since our research also reveals 
that, to a significant extent, the governance principles arising from the application of trade 
law and competition law have been internalized by stakeholders and have become part of 
the ‘culture’ of standardization. In other words, these principles are frequently assumed, 
without any reference to their legal origins. For instance, a number of participants in the 
stakeholder workshop stated, in the course of their comments, that it went without saying 
that standard development needed to be open and transparent. They did not see any other 
way to proceed. Similarly, during our interviews and at the stakeholder workshop, many 
statements indicated that the use of consensus decision making is more widespread than 
the formal documents would lead one to believe: here as well, it has become part of the 
shared assumptions of the participants.  
                                           
102 In that applicable procedures and due process principles have been followed and the outcome is therefore within 
the scope of what stakeholders agreed to when joining the SDO. At the same time, the legal constraints arising 
from competition and trade law, as described earlier, affect these procedures and these principles in such a 
way as to avert – or at least reduce – the risk of conflict with these bodies of law. “Internal” legitimacy is 
therefore not entirely internal: it arises within the constraints set by law, and accordingly it is appropriate for 
public policy to recognize such legitimacy.  
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As to how such internalization could take place, we would venture one explanation, based 
on our observations. From a public law perspective, the principles of openness, 
transparency, balance of interests, and consensus, can be seen as governance principles, 
i.e. constraints on the governance of SDOs. Yet, from a more private law perspective, these 
principles can also be seen as rights conferred on participants, or put another way, claims 
against other stakeholders and SDOs. Openness comes down to a right to participate in the 
activities of SDOs, transparency to a right to information and access, consensus and balance 
of interests to a right to have a voice in decision-making, etc. Once these principles are 
translated into perceived rights, they become embodied in the governing principles of the 
SDOs and they will form part of the legal position of stakeholders.  
4.5.2.2 Self-regulation 
In terms of regulatory theory, the institutional framework for the SDO ecosystem in the EU 
and the US comes very close to self-regulation. Industry participants, on their own 
initiative, identify standardization needs and develop voluntary industry standards. Public 
authorities, as long as legal constraints are respected and market constraints operate, have 
a high degree of tolerance with respect to SDO activities and decisions; i.e. they consider 
standardization to be primarily a private and commercial activity and see no need to 
intervene either in support of the process or to impose restrictions of any kind. This 
represents a conscious policy choice in many countries (Contreras, 2017; Bremer, 2016; 
Büthe and Mattli, 2011). Standard-setting serves a complementary function to a more 
traditional command-and-control regulation where soft norms act to fill gaps left by hard-
law (Delimatsis 2015). It allows non-state players to participate in regulating the behavior 
mostly thanks to their expertise (Senden 2004).  
In many instances, public authorities can defer to the standardization process; i.e., it 
considers that the existence of a well-functioning self-regulation mechanism obviates the 
need for regulation. As noted above, the U.S. federal government expresses deference to 
privately-developed standards under OMB Circular A-119, which contains an express 
preference for the use of privately-developed standards over government-developed 
standards in federal agency regulation and procurement.  Government deference to SDOs 
extends beyond mere technical standardization, as SDO policies create elements of 
regulation that could otherwise have been created through more explicit regulation.  In 
more limited circumstances, public authorities refers to the activities of private SDOs, e.g. 
by incorporating SSO standards by reference into regulation, from building codes to military 
specifications, or designating SDOs whose standards can be used in public procurement.  
In some instances, public authorities can be more present and engage in a dialogue with 
SDOs and their stakeholders, bringing the relationship away from canonical self-regulation, 
and closer to co-regulation.103 Most prominently, in the EU, as noted above, there is a 
greater degree of public intervention in agenda-setting (even if done in dialogue and 
collaboration with stakeholders, as with the EU Rolling Plan for ICT standardization) and ex 
post approval of officially-sanctioned standards (European or national).104 That intervention 
is usually conceived as a delegation to the SDO.  Usually, delegation is based on an explicit 
                                           
103 For examples of co-regulation in standard-setting, see Weiser (2017), describing, inter alia, the LEED green 
building standard. According to Weiser (2017), these processes are examples of “New Governance” strategies, 
where “public and private actors interact in increasingly complex and collaborative ways to address problems 
of public policy” (Solomon, 2008; citation from Weiser, 2017). The collaborative processes in standard setting 
described by Weiser (2017) furthermore reflect a form of “network governance”, which refers to 
“decisionmaking processes that are neither hierarchical nor closed and that permit persons of different ranks, 
units, and even organizations to collaborate as circumstances demand.” (Sabel and Simon, 2004; citation from 
Weiser, 2017). 
104 Under EU law, such official sanction does not render the standard mandatory, but it does confer some form of 
safe-harbour protection to firms implementing the standard, in respect of the essential requirements identified 
in the relevant EU legislation. 
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mandate to a specific organization, with clearly circumscribed scope and explicitly mandated 
processes. Respect for the scope of the mandate and of the mandated procedural 
requirements can be subject to judicial review, preserving the public law character of the 
regulatory process.  
There are a number of examples of delegation to SDOs: governments in EU member states 
and at the EU level routinely task SDOs to develop specific regulatory standards 
(government is a participant in DIN and AFNOR, at the same level as industry). In Germany 
and France, government has delegated to DIN and AFNOR the role of developing national 
standardization strategies. EU Member States designate a national standards body to the 
EU, in order to represent their national interests at the ESOs. The French government has 
delegated to AFNOR the supervision of French sectoral standardization bodies (based on 
AFNOR’s review, government issues or withdraws accreditation of these bodies). Such forms 
of explicit delegation are rare in the US or at the international level. 
Despite the presence of such delegation, SDOs such as ETSI, CEN-CENELEC, DIN and 
AFNOR, as well as their stakeholders, see themselves as industry-driven, much like their 
counterparts outside the EU.  
4.5.2.3 Diversity and coherence 
As mentioned above, it is the essence of the SDO ecosystem, from a public perspective, 
that the public presence is felt through general pronouncements and ex post control. When 
seen against the backdrop of a multiplicity of SDOs, another advantage of that institutional 
framework becomes apparent: it can accommodate considerable diversity amongst SDOs. 
As will be explained below in Chapter 6, governance principles – openness, transparency, 
balance of interests, consensus – are formulated in general terms and are implemented in a 
number of different ways by SDOs. There is no reason why these principles should receive a 
single interpretation, all the more if, as outlined above, they are conceived of as creating 
claims for stakeholders, which other stakeholders and SDOs must address satisfactorily. 
What is satisfactory in the specific context of one SDO might not be in the context of 
another. In that sense, it is to be expected that these governance principles will be 
interpreted and implemented differently from one SDO to the other. Accordingly, there is a 
certain virtue in generality, in that it allows room to accommodate a diversity of solutions, 
in a context where, as we heard repeatedly from SDOs and stakeholders, each SDO 
operates in a specific context. 
 
Of course, there are limits to the diversity of implementations and interpretations: some of 
them might be outside of acceptable boundaries and aggrieved stakeholders are likely to 
challenge them. The policing of these boundaries is carried out ex post, as set out above, by 
public authorities. Depending on how claimants frame their challenge, the public authority 
could be a court, a competition authority, or a trade authority. In the US, in addition, ANSI’s 
processes for re-accreditation of ASDs and withdrawal of approved ANS for cause provide a 
mechanism for aggrieved stakeholders to request review of the compliance of an SDO’s 
processes with ANSI’s essential requirements. 
 
Once an authority steps in, the room for diversity in interpretation and implementation of an 
SDO’s policies is bound to be reduced. After all, the authority interprets a single set of legal 
norms that apply across the board to many, if not all, SDOs: this could be international 
trade law, EU law (Regulation 2015/2012), competition or antitrust law or – in the case of 
ANSI – the Essential Requirements. From the point of view of the authority, the starting 
point must be that its interpretation of “openness” – to continue with that requirement – will 
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apply across the board to all SDOs. Of course, the authority can – intentionally or not – 
anchor its reasoning so deeply in the specific circumstances of a given SDO that the ruling 
will be difficult to transpose to other SDOs. Failing that, however, the authority cannot 
prevent its ruling from applying to at least some other SDOs subject to the legal norms in 
question.  
Leaving aside cases where an authority intervenes and diversity is reduced or eliminated, 
the question arises whether and how the diversity of implementation and interpretation 
amongst SDOs is to be managed. After all, as highlighted above, SDO pay attention to what 
other SODs are doing – whether because of competitive pressures or collaborative ventures 
– and the set of stakeholders is largely overlapping from one SDO to another: almost all 
patent-centric firms in our survey participate in more than 20 SDOs, whereas the product-
centric firms tend to participate in at least 5 different SDOs. 
Unavoidably, ideas concerning governance are bound to circulate amongst SDOs. As far as 
we know, no conceptual model has been put forward as to how such circulation takes place 
in the specific context of standardization. However, guidance can be sought from the more 
general literature on the circulation of legal ideas, as found in law and economics, public law 
and comparative law. 
A first model would be precedent, as it exists in legal systems in the common law tradition 
and to a large extent in the civil law traditions as well. A system of precedent implies that 
courts are bound by decisions issued by higher courts within the same hierarchy (courts of 
appeal, supreme court), and that they are open to be persuaded by decisions rendered by 
courts at the same or lower level, or – to a lesser extent – by courts in related legal 
systems. The binding or persuasive value of precedent depends of course on the prior 
decision being applicable on its facts to the current case. This reservation creates some 
room for courts to escape precedent via careful distinction of earlier cases.105 While 
appealing at first sight, the doctrine of precedent is not really suitable for SDOs: whatever 
hierarchy might exist cannot compare to the court structure, and SDOs do not share the 
unity of purpose which drives courts to uphold precedent. 
Rather, it seems to us that each SDO is firmly in control of its own governance, much as it 
is in control of its standardization processes. Unless a matter has been decided by a public 
authority, an SDO can decide for itself and should therefore be free to follow what other 
SDOs have done or not. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, SDOs pay attention to what 
other SDOs are doing and try to learn from the experience of other SDOs, but they do so on 
their own terms. We observe neither total divergence and fragmentation nor unstoppable 
convergence around unified solutions. 
From a public perspective, this would imply a form of experimental model. SDOs have room 
to experiment in the face of general pronouncements by public authorities that admit of 
multiple interpretations and implementations. Each SDO can then venture on its own path, 
but it faces pressure to reach an outcome that is satisfactory to a sufficient number of its 
stakeholders. Over time SDOs learn from one another, as ideas circulate. They can distill 
from the experience of other SDOs in order to improve the quality of their own governance. 
The literature offers a number of variants on this theme, ranging from regulatory 
competition (Tiebout, 1956 and Easterbrook, 1983) to experimentalist governance (Sabel, 
2008 and Weiser, 2017), and including more policy-centered models such as legal emulation 
(Larouche, 2013). Experimental settings do require a number of pre-conditions to work: it 
should be clear to all participants that an experiment is taking place, and the requisite 
                                           
105 The doctrine of precedent works slightly differently in civil law systems, where the holding of cases – especially 
higher court cases – tends to be distilled in a legal proposition for precedential purposes, and therefore can 
become more readily divorced from the actual facts of the case than in common law systems. 
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mechanisms should be in place to ensure that learning takes place and lessons are drawn 
(otherwise one simply has a fragmented patchwork of diverging outcomes). 
One downside of such an experimental model is that, outside of cases where public 
authorities intervene to reduce diversity, the SDO ecosystem could very well settle on an 
equilibrium where many different interpretations and implementations of a single general 
pronouncement have currency amongst SDOs. For any given SDO, the outcome will depend 
on its circumstances and possible idiosyncrasies. Public authorities might therefore find it 
difficult to achieve a greater level of convergence, unless they engage into some dialogue 
with SDOs.106  
                                           
106See for instance the United States Standardization Strategy (USSS): “The U.S. government and industry should 
strongly and visibly coordinate their work in international forums to promote the consistent interpretation and 
application of internationally recognized principles on standardization, including those reflected in the WTO TBT 
Agreement and the Decision on Principles for the Development of International Standards.” 
https://share.ansi.org/shared%20documents/Standards%20Activities/NSSC/USSS_Third_edition/ANSI_USSS_
2015.pdf  The development of the USSS itself is an example of explicit co-regulation: “The Strategy was 
developed through the coordinated efforts of a large and diverse group of constituents representing 
stakeholders in government, industry, standards developing organizations, consortia, consumer groups, and 
academia. Throughout the process, all the participants expressed a commitment to developing the USSS in a 
way that was open, balanced, and transparent. The result is a document that represents the vision of a broad 
cross-section of standards stakeholders and that reflects the diversity of the U.S. standards system.” DIN 
described a very similar process for developing the German standardization strategy.  
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5 Governance architecture 
 
Highlights 
 There is considerable heterogeneity in SDO governance, given the different 
circumstances of each SDO. There is no one-size-fits-all solution. 
 By way of broad categorization, we observed a more leadership-driven model (in 
particular IEEE-SA, VITA and W3C from the samples examined), and a more 
membership-driven model (exemplified by DVB, ECMA, ETSI, JEDEC, and TSDSI, ISO, 
IEC, ITU-T, CEN-CENELEC, DIN, AFNOR and to some extent IETF as well). These two 
categories map over the formal vs. industry-driven distinction drawn in the previous 
chapter. 
 In most SDOs, members are organisations (mostly commercial firms). ISO, IEC and 
CEN-CENELEC are made up of national committees. IEEE-SA has a large individual 
membership (around 7000 members), meaning that the leadership is elected by a more 
dispersed and less engaged constituency. 
 SDOs typically draw board members from their membership. As for permanent staff, 
both its size and its responsibilities vary considerably from one SDO to the other. The 
existence of a significant permanent staff, with leadership functions, is a predictor of 
more leadership-driven governance (observable at W3C, VITA, IEEE SA, DIN, IEC, ISO, 
ITU-T and SAC). In some SDOs, the staff also drafts policy documents for the 
organization. Other SDOs put policymaking more firmly in the hands of the board, with 
a strong membership representation on the board (ETSI, JEDEC, DVB, IETF). 
 Some SDOs expect board members to represent a member or stakeholder (usually their 
employer), making governance more membership-driven. Other SDOs expect these 
members rather to act in the interests of the SDO or of society at large, which 
strengthens the autonomy of the SDO towards its membership and makes it more 
leadership-driven. 
 With two exceptions (IETF and VITA to varying degrees), SDOs follow different 
procedures for policy development than standards. Differences are found in voting rules 
(more majority voting instead of consensus), different decision-making bodies (the 
general assembly and the board instead of working groups), eligible participants (formal 
members instead of any interested party), transparency (generally less than for 
standards development) and the duties of the participants (more emphasis on duties 
towards the SDO rather than towards the member). Most SDOs feature one or more of 
these differences. Yet stakeholders would prefer policymaking to follow processes that 
provide at least as many procedural safeguards as standard development. 
 In some organisations (e.g. ANSI, IETF, ISO), decision-making on policy is shared 
between different bodies, depending on the subject-matter, whereas in others (e.g. 
IEEE, ITU-T, VITA), a single body is responsible for all policy matters. In most SDOs, 
policy matters must move through many bodies (committees and boards); however, the 
real locus of decision-making varies from one SDO to the other, and sometimes within 
an SDO from one decision to the other.  
 Where the pivotal decision-maker for policy matters is the general assembly (e.g. 
ECMA, ETSI, and TSDSI), policymaking will tend to be membership-driven. Where the 
pivotal decision-maker is a board (e.g. IEEE-SA, JEDEC, and VITA), a specific 
policymaking body (e.g. at AFNOR) or a non-elected director or board (as with W3C), 
policymaking  can be more leadership-driven.  
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 Most SDOs provide for majority voting for policymaking, with voting thresholds ranging 
from simple to two-thirds majority. Individual votes are mostly kept secret. Some SDOs 
(ETSI, DVB) have specific voting rules designed to make it difficult to overrule 
significant stakeholders or stakeholder categories. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence 
is that in practice votes are rare, and that policymaking is mostly done on a consensus 
basis. 
 Save for a few exceptions (IEC, ISO), most SDOs offer procedures to issue formal or 
informal interpretations of policies, although many of these interpretations tend not to 
be made public. Similarly, all SDOs but one allow for appeals of policy-related decisions. 
Disputes can also arise as between SDO members, with SDOs showing a strong 
aversion to intervening in disputes amongst members (with the exception of W3C, VITA 
and DVB). 
 
 
In Chapter 4, we analyzed how SDO policy choices are constrained and determined by 
external factors. As discussed, SDO policy choices are sometimes fundamentally shaped by 
legal constraints, the SDO’s formal or informal relationships with public authorities or other 
organizations (including other SDOs and open source consortia), as well as the SDO’s ability 
to attract and retain members. In many cases, however, decision-making is more 
significantly determined by the interaction of SDO stakeholders and leadership through the 
internal institutions of SDO governance. These mechanisms will be addressed in this 
Chapter. 
Much of the technical work within SDOs is carried out by experts working for companies 
with commercial stakes in technical standard development and the outcome of SDO policy 
deliberations. These companies bear the major part of the substantial costs of standards 
development. Companies whose employees participate in SDOs generally expect these 
individuals to represent the company’s interests, and sometimes define specific guidelines 
or directions that the employees are asked to follow. These expectations may contrast or 
even conflict with the expectations of SDOs with respect to the behavior and allegiance of 
individuals participating in SDO decision-making. 
Governance feature Leadership-driven model Membership/consensus-driven model
Ultimate decision 
maker
Elected board (DIN, IEEE-SA..
Unelected leadership (SAC, W3C)
General Assembly (DVB, ETSI..
Open processes (IETF)
Voting rules National aggregation of votes (IEC/ISO/ITU, 
CEN-CENELEC, ETSI on HS and policies)
Votes by category (DVB)
Election process Staggered tenure (DIN, IEEE)
Nomination committee approach (ANSI)
Election by dispersed individual 
members (IEEE)
Board members appointed by members 
(DVB, JEDEC)
Overweighting of relevant stakeholders 
(ETSI)
Individual duties Fiduciary duties to organization (IEEE..)
Representation of broader interests 
(ANSI)
Represent membership (ETSI, DVB…)
Organizational form Activity of another organization (IEEE-
SA, W3C)
Activity of its members (DVB, JEDEC, VITA)
Role of staff Extensive staff (AFNOR, DIN, SAC), 
significant staff leaders (ANSI, IEEE, 
VITA, W3C)
Very limited or almost absent (ECMA, IETF)
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In our survey, we asked corporate stakeholders participating in standardization which of 
four statements best describe the expectations they place on their SDO representatives 
(n=38) [Q14]. Almost one third (32%) said that they expect them to use their independent 
expert judgment to pursue the company’s goals and strategies. This was followed by 26 % 
of the respondents which expect them to use their independent expert judgment to 
represent the interests of their company within the SDO; 16 % of the respondents to use 
their independent expert judgment to contribute to the general interest; 10 % to liaise with 
management before taking positions within the SDO. Another 16% said none of the above 
statements best describe their expectations. This position was often chosen to highlight that 
none of these exclusively or predominantly describes their expectations because this might 
depend on the type of decision or the business context. For instance, as noted by one of the 
respondents, in some cases, the participating company might not have a strong opinion in 
which case ‘the employee uses his or her best judgment’.  However, ‘in a leadership role’, 
the individual would be expected to work in the best interest of the SDO. 
Companies and other stakeholders thus are represented in SDOs by their employees, whom 
they more often than not expect to represent the interests of the company. SDO members 
participate in decision-making regarding the SDO’s policies and rules directly through vote, 
and/or indirectly through the election of leadership. There is little explicit analysis of these 
internal institutions in the academic literature on SDOs. Nevertheless, there is a broader 
theoretical literature on public choice, which can be usefully applied to SDOs. 
5.1 Background: Political Economy of SDO decision-making 
Broadly speaking, there are two different theoretical approaches to analyze the relationship 
between an SDO and its stakeholders. We will see in this Chapter that the empirical reality 
of SDO governance often combines elements from both approaches. 
On one side, it is possible to analyze SDOs as monolithic decision-makers pursuing an 
autonomous organizational goal, under the constraints imposed by the divergent goals of 
SDO stakeholders.  Chiao et al. (2007) e.g. analyze the interaction between SDOs and 
“sponsors” of a standard that the SDO may decide to endorse. SDOs differ in the extent to 
which they are likely to endorse a standard submitted by a sponsor. Less sponsor-friendly, 
i.e. more autonomous, SDOs are able to request greater concessions from technology 
sponsors (in the form of more demanding IPR policy restrictions on licensing terms for 
standard-essential technology), because their endorsement carries greater weight. 
Empirically, Chiao et al. (2007) analyze SDOs as more “sponsor-friendly” if they have 
organizational membership (as opposed to individual or national membership), or are self-
declared special-interest groups (SIG). Factors associated with greater autonomy of the 
SDO are consensus decision-making and the age of the SDO. These factors make it more 
difficult for a stakeholder to gain SDO endorsement of its technology. 
This analysis focuses on the relationship between an SDO and a single technology sponsor. 
In many important standard development projects, and in most SDO policy disputes, there 
is not a single external stakeholder, but a heterogeneous group of stakeholders with 
opposing interests. Furthermore, many of these stakeholders are SDO members, and 
directly participate in SDO decision-making. There is thus not always such a neat distinction 
between the interests and actions of the SDO and the interests and actions of its 
stakeholders.  
At the opposite extreme, SDOs can be analyzed as heterogeneous groups of actors (e.g. 
members), that follow pre-determined rules to make decisions as a group based on the 
votes of individual group members. For instance, in our interviews, IEC representatives 
viewed their role as 'the administrative organ of the organization', which doesn't 'manage' 
policy discussion among its members, but only provides a 'platform' for exchange. Similarly, 
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according to the ECMA representative, ‘[i]t is like a hotel. I am the director of the hotel and 
the membership is the hotel guests.’ There is a growing body of economic literature 
analyzing decision-making by groups (also called coalitions), even though it has so far never 
been specifically applied to SDOs. 
A large literature analyzes different voting rules, and in particular compares the efficiency of 
majority and unanimity decision-making on rules. The predominant view suggests that 
unanimous decision-making is more likely to produce Pareto-optimal outcomes107 
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Mueller, 2003), because a rule can only be adopted or 
changed unanimously if it leaves no member worse off than under the status quo.108 
Unanimous decision-making is not adopted in any SDO that we studied. Nevertheless, as we 
will see, many SDOs have governance processes designed to discourage decision-making 
against the sustained opposition of a significant group of stakeholders. 
Independently of the decision rule, the political economy literature predicts that groups may 
fail to adopt new rules, even if these rules are beneficial for all members. Acemoglu et al. 
(2012) find that coalitions or clubs may fail to adopt efficiency-enhancing rules, because 
some members vote against rules that may improve the organization’s performance, if 
these rules simultaneously weaken these members’ influence on future policy revisions. This 
may be relevant for the analysis of SDOs. Different SDO rules, and in particular different 
IPR policies, may have an effect on the composition of the SDO membership. Stoll (2014) 
e.g. finds a substantial decrease in membership at OASIS after a revision of its IPR policy, 
while “among the new members the share of non-profit research organizations and systems 
integrators significantly increases in the aftermath of the change.” A similar decrease in 
membership occurred at W3C after it moved to a royalty-free patent policy, though 
membership recovered thereafter (Contreras 2016a). In contrast, in the years following the 
adoption of a controversial policy change at VITA in 2006, there was a marked increase in 
membership with only one notable defection (Contreras 2013a).  These examples suggest 
that changes to IPR policies may have an effect on the future composition of the SDO.  
In a recent contribution, Dziuday and Loeperz (2016) analyze dynamic decision-making on 
rules in a setting in which decisions on rules have persistent effects. They find that groups 
may fail to adopt efficient rules, and decision-making is characterized by excessive 
polarization. The reason is that group members are reluctant to make concessions, because 
they anticipate that decisions are difficult to reverse.   
To summarize, SDO governance can be analyzed as an interaction between a relatively 
autonomous organization and its stakeholder base, or as a form of decision-making by 
heterogeneous groups of actors participating in organizations with specific rules and 
procedures for making decisions as a group. As we will see, there are various institutional 
features of SDOs that determine whether SDOs make their own autonomous decisions, or 
just aggregate the individual votes of the SDO membership following pre-determined rules.  
We highlight the significant role of the legal form of SDOs, the composition of its 
membership, the distribution of responsibilities among member assemblies, boards, and 
staff,  the election procedures for SDO boards, and the policies describing the 
responsibilities of individuals participating in SDO policy deliberations as important factors 
determining to what extent SDOs make autonomous decisions. We find that SDOs are 
distributed along a spectrum, where at one end SDOs make decisions that are (at least in 
the short term) autonomous with respect to SDO membership, and on the other end SDOs 
act as groups of independent actors (members) with heterogeneous interests. In line with 
                                           
107 A rule is pareto-optimal if it is impossible to find another set of rules that would be more favorable for at least 
some members, while leaving no member worse off. 
108 Other theoretical contributions (Dougherty and Edward, 2012) and experimental evidence (Dougherty et al., 
2014) however suggest that majority voting on rules is more likely to result in pareto-optimal rules. 
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the political economy literature, we find that these groups tend to avoid making decisions 
that are opposed by a significant stakeholder category. As we have seen, the political 
economy literature suggests that the dynamic nature of decision-making further contributes 
to reducing the ability and willingness of such groups to make decisions that are potentially 
controversial among their membership. 
5.2 SDO Processes  
Several institutional features of SDO governance contribute to determine the extent to 
which the SDO makes its own decisions as an autonomous organization as opposed to 
making such decisions by stakeholder consensus. These features can be summarized as (1) 
the SDO’s form and mission, (2) the status of SDO staff and boards, (3) the formal 
procedures for policy development, and (4) rules for dispute resolution. 
5.2.1 The SDO’s form and mission 
5.2.1.1 The legal form 
The majority of the 17 SDOs studied in this project are non-governmental organizations. 
The exceptions are SAC, which is a Chinese governmental agency,109 and ITU, which is an 
intergovernmental organization. Of these non-governmental SDOs, most are incorporated 
as legal entities in a particular jurisdiction, with the exception of W3C and IETF. Among 
those SDOs that are incorporated, all the SDOs have the status of non-profit organizations 
in their respective jurisdictions. AFNOR has the additional status of an ‘organization 
recognized in the public interest’ under French law (“Reconnaissance d’utilité publique”).  
W3C operates as a contractually-defined activity of four host institutions: the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), the European Research Consortium for Informatics and 
Mathematics, Keio University and Beihang University. Most of W3C’s administrative 
functions are centralized at MIT. IETF conducts its work as an organized activity of the 
Internet Society (ISOC), a tax-exempt District of Columbia non-profit corporation, which 
also provides financial support to IETF. Despite its connection to ISOC, IETF maintains a 
separate governance structure which is largely selected by the IETF community, broadly 
defined. Likewise, the IEEE Standards Association (IEEE SA) is an operating unit of the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the professional association for the 
electrical engineering profession. IEEE does not intervene in the daily business of IEEE SA, 
but the IEEE’s governing board can deliberate on IEEE SA policy matters. 
Incorporated organizations have a certain degree of autonomy; and their boards have 
fiduciary duties towards the organization (unlike informal consortia, which are purely 
instruments of their membership). At the same time, incorporated organizations have to 
protect the interests of their members. Some organizations are more removed from 
stakeholder influence, because they are organized activities of other organizations. This is 
most clearly the case of a governmental agency such as SAC. To a lesser extent, W3C 
derives some autonomy with respect to members and other corporate stakeholders from the 
fact that it is an activity of the host organizations, which bear the ultimate responsibility for 
W3C decisions. The W3C Director, who is responsible for the ‘direction of the Consortium’, is 
appointed by MIT, one of the host institutions.110 The remaining three host institutions 
appoint three Deputy Directors. 
Similarly, IEEE SA derives some autonomy with respect to its own membership and 
stakeholders from the fact that it is a part of IEEE, an engineering society with a long 
                                           
109 Though unique in our study, there are other national SDOs in other countries that we did not study.  
110 See https://www.w3.org/2009/12/Member-Agreement (Sec 4d) 
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history and a broad individual membership base. When IEEE SA’s 2015 policy change met 
substantial resistance from a significant group of IEEE SA stakeholders, the IEEE SA Board 
of Governors voluntarily submitted the policy to the IEEE Board of Directors for approval; 
and relied on the broad approval by the IEEE Board of Directors as a significant factor for 
the legitimacy of the controversial decision. Furthermore, while board members at IEEE SA, 
as in many other SDOs, are volunteers and not paid by the organization, IEEE SA places 
particular emphasis on the fiduciary duty of these individuals towards IEEE as an 
organization. For instance, the managing director of IEEE SA is also a member of the 
Management Council of IEEE. This ‘dual position’, according to our interviews, creates a 
broader duty on his/her side toward ‘the entire organization’. 
5.2.1.2 The type of SDO membership:  
All SDOs in our sample except IETF and SAC are membership-based organizations in which 
firms, individuals or other organizations obtain some formal legal status as members of the 
SDO with appurtenant rights and obligations. At most SDOs, members must comply with 
the organizations’ rules and procedures, as well as other membership criteria in order to 
preserve their membership. Every organization with membership allows its members to 
terminate their participation. In such cases, however, the members usually have some 
residual obligations, such as payment of remaining membership fees and, in particular, 
continued observance of licensing declarations or commitments vis-à-vis their copyrights 
and patents. 
There is significant variance among SDOs in terms of membership types. Several SDOs 
have individual members along with organizational members (e.g. ANSI, ETSI, VITA, IEEE). 
AFNOR and W3C permit individuals to join, although membership is meant primarily for 
organizations.111 At CENELEC, individual representation is technically permitted, but this 
appears to be a historical artifact and is not currently used. On the other hand, many SDOs 
only allow organizations to join (e.g. JEDEC, TSDSI, DIN, ECMA). IEC, ISO and CEN-
CENELEC only allow national members, such as national committees, as their members. ITU 
is an inter-governmental organization and agency of the United Nations and its membership 
consists of Member States. In addition, the divisions of ITU (ITU-T, ITU-R, ITU-D) have 
sector members, including international organizations (e.g. EU), national public 
administrations and private companies. IETF has no formal membership structure, and 
permits any individual with an interest in IETF’s technical work to participate, subject to 
compliance with IETF’s policies and rules. SAC, as an agency of the Chinese government, 
does not provide for non-governmental membership.112 
Usually the membership structure of the SDO influences other forms of participation. At 
organizations such as CEN-CENELEC, in which membership is limited to national 
committees, the SDO tries to ensure openness by permitting participation by non-member 
stakeholders in the work of the organization. In some SDOs, these non-members may also 
have more formalized roles as partners or liaison organizations.  
                                           
111 The case at AFNOR is mainly theoretical: the only individuals who enjoy membership are in reality the past 
Chairmen of the Board who are granted the title of honorary members (“membres d’honneur”). 
112 This being said, as reported by a representative of SAC, although SAC does not have the usual SDO 
membership, each technical committee (TC) has its own membership. Each TC will recruit members who are 
willing to join the TC at the time of establishment or change of the committee, and the TC will then submit the 
list of institutions that have applied to join or remain to SAC. Upon approval of the list, SAC will issue a 
certificate to each representative of organizations (stakeholders) certifying the representative's organization's 
status (general membership, chair, secretary, etc.) and tenure in the TC. SAC has specific rules about the 
responsibilities and obligations of every member of its TCs. 
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Organizations with a national or regional focus may limit their membership to firms having 
operations with in their country or region.  For example, both ETSI113 and ANSI114 limit full 
voting membership to firms based in Europe and the U.S. respectively. This being said, in 
today’s global economy, these distinctions may be increasingly meaningless, as 
multinational firms operate in a multiplicity of jurisdictions and both ETSI and ANSI have 
significant voting members that are headquartered outside of their core regions. TSDSI 
offers a different category of membership to firms without a presence in India. These non-
domestic members have limited rights with respect to governance of the organization. 
Several SDOs divide members into categories beyond geography (e.g. ANSI, ETSI, VITA, 
DVB, TSDSI, IEC, ECMA). These categories serve different purposes. In some industry-
specific SDOs such as DVB, membership is limited to categories associated with various 
roles in the industry, e.g. manufacturers or infrastructure providers. Some SDOs formulate 
explicit policies requiring a balance of different categories of interests to be represented 
(Baron and Spulber, 2018). Membership categories can support this goal. At DVB for 
example needs to be endorsed by a majority of members within each category in some 
cases.  
In addition to member categories, many SDOs, such as ETSI and IEC, offer tiered 
membership to allow members to self-select into the kind of membership that best reflects 
their interest in the SDO’s work – be it to merely observe, participate at a technical level, or 
also participate in organizational governance and voting. Lower tiers are usually associated 
with fewer rights, e.g. no right to vote on governance issues, but also lower fees.  
Several SDOs use this strategy to attract broader participation. For example, IEC offers 
different form of affiliation in order to engage countries that do not have a strong interest 
and/or means to work on standardization. On the other hand, SDOs such as AFNOR, DIN 
and W3C have a single membership tier, but different fee structures based on the size of 
the member (as measured e.g. by number of employees). While several SDOs thus adjust 
membership fees according to measures of firm size, in our sample only ETSI weights 
member votes according to the importance of the firms’ sales in the industries affected by 
ETSI standards. This feature, which emphasizes the influence of the commercially most 
relevant stakeholders, applies to ETSI’s decision-making on technical specifications and the 
election of board members, but not to changes to ETSI’s policies. 
Some SDOs also use membership categories to shape the make-up of the organization.  
VITA has a specific category for individuals, who are offered free membership because of 
their expertise and previous work. 
The type of SDO membership and membership categories determine the extent to which 
SDO governance is driven by stakeholders (see also Chiao et al., 2007). In SDOs with 
national representation, such as ISO, IEC, ITU-T, CEN and CENELEC; stakeholders usually 
participate only indirectly, by participating in the definition of the national positions taken by 
the national members of the international SDOs (typically national standards bodies, or 
national committees). On one hand, this indirect participation may contribute to particularly 
consensus-oriented policy development, because the individual positions represented within 
the SDO already represent a national position balancing opposing interests at national level. 
On the other hand, staff or board members of such organizations may acquire a larger role 
in the definition or interpretation of the SDO’s policies, because the stakeholders primarily 
affected by these policies can only indirectly participate and influence these decisions. 
                                           
113 Section 6.4 of the ETSI Statutes provides that “Full Members shall be established in a country falling within the 
geographical area of the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT).”  
114 With respect to ANSI members, ANSI limits voting rights to entities that are “created under the laws of the 
United States or any State thereof”.  ANSI Constitution and Bylaws, Secs. 2.01.3, 2.07 (2015). 
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However, sometimes, such as at IEC, stakeholders might be active as board members of an 
SDO. 
Other SDOs only allow for individual membership, or reserve important prerogatives to 
individual SDO members. At IEEE SA for example, elections for the IEEE SA Board of 
Governors are open to individual membership, as opposed to a general assembly of 
organizational members. Currently, there are approx. 7,000 individual members with the 
right to vote, and in the estimates of the IEEE representative participating in our interview, 
approx. 20% of these members effectively vote in governance board elections. As compared 
to SDOs with organizational membership, board members are thus elected by a 
constituency that is more dispersed and less engaged in SDO governance; reducing the 
extent to which these board members have to satisfy stakeholder expectations. 
In contrast, many other SDOs’ membership consists of companies with direct commercial 
stakes in the SDO’s standards. These SDOs are potentially more directly responsive to 
stakeholder interests. Nevertheless, many of these SDOs actively encourage participation of 
a diverse set of interests. SDOs facilitating the equal participation of entities without 
immediate and significant commercial interests at stake (e.g. through reduced membership 
fees for universities or SMEs) have a more diverse constituency, and are less under the 
influence of direct stakeholders. Other SDOs however reserve lower membership tiers for 
these entities, or give larger weight to the votes of larger companies. These SDOs thus are 
potentially more responsive to the interests of the most significant commercial stakeholders. 
5.2.1.3 The mission statement 
Most SDOs have a written mission statement describing the SDO’s goals and operating 
principles. In general, SDOs seem to consider a broad range of social and technological 
objectives in their work. CEN-CENELEC and ETSI, in this context, distinguish between 
industry-initiated and European (harmonized) standards that are mandated by the European 
Commission. While the latter contribute to implementation of the law and spell out critical 
issues such as safety, the former primarily facilitate market integration, in particular the 
internal market goals of the European Union. Similarly, TSDSI was established to ensure 
that Indian requirements are addressed by global telecom standards. IEC also sees its role 
in taking into account interests of global societies. It claims to support 12 of 17 UN 
sustainable development goals through its standardization work. ITU-T states that it works 
for the public good and considers, in particular, the special needs of developing countries. 
For pure industry-based SDOs, such as VITA, JEDEC and ECMA, the public interest is 
mentioned only occasionally as an underlying goal of the SDO. Instead, these SDOs 
emphasize technical aspects of their work. In general, the perception seems to be that 
SDOs might support the public interest, inasmuch as it is served by the development of 
robust technical standards. 
As to specific issues related to broader public and social goals, IETF and W3C have dealt 
with privacy considerations in their work. W3C has also identified accessibility, e.g. in terms 
of the World Wide Web’s ability to process less widespread languages, as an important 
issue. For DVB, copyright, consumer rights and objectives of the European television and 
audiovisual markets are taken into account. DIN and ETSI emphasize innovation and 
consumers. 
In principle, a specific organizational mission enshrined in SDO policy documents could 
strengthen SDO legitimacy to make decisions as an autonomous organization in pursuit of a 
goal that is common to the SDO’s members. In instances of controversy, SDO leadership 
can refer to its role as custodian of the common interest in pursuit of the organization’s 
mission to overcome opposition of individual SDO members or categories of members. 
Nevertheless, our interviews suggest that SDOs make little reference to their mission 
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statements. While some SDOs, and in particular IEEE, emphasized public policy goals of the 
organization as important objectives of their policy-making, these policy goals are not 
codified as a mission statement in the SDO’s policies and procedures. Other SDOs, such as 
JEDEC, explicitly stated that the mission of the organization is to serve the interests of its 
members.  
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5.2.2 SDO staff and boards  
5.2.2.1 Different types of SDO leadership 
SDO leadership consists of individuals who are empowered to lead the technical and policy 
agendas of the organization, make certain decisions regarding the organization, convene or 
lead meetings, and oversee the financial and business aspects of the organization. In many 
cases, the holders of leadership positions are drawn from the SDO’s membership, while at 
other SDOs full-time staff hold leadership positions. In many cases, SDOs use a combination 
of member plus staff-based leadership. The staff- or board-driven SDOs create more space 
for the steering work of individuals than membership-driven organizations that give most of 
the actual powers to general assemblies. 
Once individuals are selected for leadership positions, they are typically expected to 
represent the interests of the SDO. At DVB, the Steering Board sets the overall policy 
direction and handles its coordination, priority setting and management, approves DVB 
specifications and offers them for standardization to the relevant international standards 
bodies.  According to the DVB Memorandum of Understanding, the Steering Board has a 
maximum of 51 elected representatives with the pre-defined seats for following 
constituencies:115 14 Content Providers/Broadcasters (public and private); 13 Infrastructure 
providers (satellite, cable, terrestrial or network operator); 17 Manufacturers/software 
suppliers; 7 Governments/national regulatory bodies. 
At JEDEC, “[t]he board is responsible for the policies of the organization and for review of 
technical proposals, or technical ballots from our committees, from our technical 
committees, to ensure that the procedural due process has been met.” Seats on the Board 
are thus occupied by Directors representing individual firms. Once elected to a seat on the 
Board, the firm maintains its position until the seat is voluntarily relinquished.   
At the majority of SDOs in our sample, the member leadership positions are not paid (e.g. 
DVB, CEN, CENELEC, IEEE, IETF). It is useful to recall the example of W3C, which was 
created as a response to IETF’s governance limitations. The goal was to establish an SDO 
with faster processes than IETF.116 One of the key features of W3C in this regard was not 
only more power concentration with leadership, but also the paid character of work 
undertaken by the staff. IETF, on the other hand, relies on non-paid volunteers who are 
company or self-supported.117  
Many SDOs employ full- or part-time paid staff that facilitate the day-to-day operations of 
the SDO.  Staff often fill secretariat, website, meeting planning, and technical support roles.  
In some SDOs, such as ANSI, IEEE and VITA, staff hold high-level managerial positions 
usually designated by titles such as chief executive officer, executive director or managing 
director.  These staff positions are often highly compensated.118 Staff leadership of SDOs 
can be quite influential with respect to the SDO’s external communications, operations, 
agenda and processes. In many cases, staff leadership interact closely with member 
leadership to manage the organization. 
Nevertheless, the responsibilities conferred on SDO staff vary considerably among SDOs, as 
does the size of SDO staff. DIN for example employs approximately 400 individuals, whose 
responsibility it is to ensure that DIN policies are followed in standards development. This 
staff also play an active role in the development of standardization processes and policy 
                                           
115 See https://www.dvb.org/resources/public/documents_site/dvb_mou.pdf 
116 (Greenstein 2009, p. 237). 
117 See https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/67/slides/newcomer-0.pdf 
118 E.g., according to its 2016 IRS Form 990, ANSI’s CEO received total compensation in 2016 of approximately 
US$1.75 million. 
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documents, as “they are the experts in standardization” (according to our interviewee from 
DIN). At other SDOs, many of these tasks would be carried out by volunteer participants. 
IETF for example does not have its own employees, though a full-time ISOC employee 
serves as the IETF Administrative Director (IAD) and numerous other administrative 
functions are outsourced to an external association management firm. Even so, a significant 
portion of the IETF standards process is run by volunteer participants. 
In almost all SDOs, SDO staff can provide some form of administrative and technical 
support, including in the course of policy development. Most SDOs have legal counsel 
providing legal advice on policies (at W3C, the staff may also involve the legal counsel of 
the host institutions). SDO staff may act in a secretariat role in governing bodies (e.g. at 
CEN-CENELEC). This secretariat role encompasses purely administrative tasks but may also 
confer the SDO staff the responsibility to ensure that policies are in accordance with other 
rules. 
The existence of a significant full-time staff, including staff positions with leadership 
functions, is a significant factor explaining why some SDOs are more autonomous in their 
decision-making with respect to members and stakeholders than others. This is most clearly 
exemplified by the contrast between W3C, where the executive director holds the highest 
leadership position, and IETF, which has almost no staff of its own. VITA and IEEE SA are 
other examples of SDOs with powerful staff leadership positions. DIN, IEC, ISO, ITU-T and 
SAC all have significant staff, both in terms of numbers and prerogatives. At DIN, while 
technical standardization is mostly carried out by individuals participating in DIN committees 
on behalf of stakeholders, most policy functions are carried out by DIN staff who are seen 
as holding expertise with respect to standardization procedures, and representing the 
interests of DIN and the entirety of its stakeholders. These SDOs can more easily develop 
an autonomous organizational policy than SDOs that rely on volunteers seconded by SDO 
members or stakeholders for almost all their operations.  
5.2.2.2 Role of staff in defining the SDO’s policies 
SDOs differ in the extent to which staff take an active role in defining the SDO’s policies. 
While staff members usually do not have the right to vote, they often participate in SDO 
meetings and provide input. At JEDEC, the board may solicit input from staff depending on 
the type of technical expertise required (e.g. legal implications or financial implications). At 
W3C, staff members do not vote, but can raise support for a proposed policy. “We do not 
vote. We encourage members to express their opinion. We might say we think this is a good 
thing, please vote for it if you agree.” 
In some SDOs, the staff may draft the actual policy documents submitted to the governing 
bodies for vote. At DVB, generally the project office prepares the text of a policy. At IEC, 
the staff members “tend to be the ones preparing the drafts, based on the input that we 
receive. We’ll be the ones wordsmithing, if you wish, but it’s the members that will decide 
on the final policies.” 
At IETF, the IAD facilitates the process of policy development and often prepares drafts of 
documents in coordination with legal counsel. In a very different organizational setup, W3C 
has given a significant role to the W3C team (which includes attorneys), and the W3C 
executive director is the ultimate authority for decision-making. 
5.2.2.3 Procedures for election of boards 
While SDO staff holds influential positions with the ability to determine SDO policies in some 
SDOs (DIN, SAC, W3C), and staff participates in policy development in various functions at 
most SDOs, a larger number of SDOs relies on elected boards for making fundamental 
policy decisions. While boards are generally elected by SDO membership, the specific rules 
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and procedures for the election of boards crucially determine the degree of independence of 
the board with respect to SDO members. 
Some SDOs have rules for the election of boards that give a particularly strong 
representation to significant SDO members. In ETSI, this takes the form of weighing votes 
in according to members’ Units of Contribution,119 which is effectively the size of the 
membership fee. This applies to approval of ETSI Standards (excluding harmonized 
European standards), , but also to election of officials, Board members and the Board 
chairman. 120 At JEDEC, individual members of the Board of Directors are directly appointed 
by companies that are most actively involved in the SDO. Only firms paying maximum dues 
and having an identified representative on two or more committees for at least the past two 
consecutive years, may nominate one candidate for Board membership. Moreover, once 
elected to a seat on the Board, the firm maintains its position until the seat is voluntarily 
relinquished. 
VITA’s Board is partly composed by Sponsor Directors who are appointed by so called 
Sponsor Members. The main difference between sponsor and regular members is their 
contribution (3,000 vs 25,000 USD) which translates into their ability to appoint a Director 
to the VITA’s Board.121 VITA’s Board consist of at least three directors: an elected Executive 
Director, one or more sponsor-appointed Sponsor Directors and number of additional 
Elected Directors as determined by the Board.122 The Board of Directors has a sole 
discretion, when to hold an election for additional directors. Moreover, a majority of the 
directors can create an Executive Committee, consisting of two or more directors, including 
the Executive Director. The Executive Director acts as a CEO of VITA and has general 
supervision, direction, and control of the activities and staff. 
In other SDOs, the election process of the board gives less power to significant 
stakeholders. At DVB, the members of the Steering Board are elected by consensus of the 
general assembly if possible, otherwise by vote. Members of the general assembly vote by 
particular constituencies. No member can have more than one representative.123 The Board 
elects a chairman who holds office for two years and who may be reelected. 
In IEEE SA, the Board of Governors is elected by individual IEEE members as opposed to 
corporate stakeholders. The Board is thus elected by a constituency that is more dispersed 
and less immediately impacted by SDO decisions than the SDO’s organizational members 
and corporate stakeholders. Furthermore, there is a structure of overlapping tenures of 
Board members, whereby in each election one new board member is elected by 
membership, and one new board member is appointed by incumbent board members.  The 
Board of Governors appoints the members of the IEEE-SA Standards Board, the body that 
oversees IEEE-SA standardization processes. 
DIN has a procedure whereby incumbent board members participate in the selection of new 
board members. 
Other SDOs such as ANSI and IETF use a “nominating committee” approach, in which an 
appointed group selects qualified individuals (often meeting certain requirements specified 
in the SDO’s written policies), either to stand for election or for direct appointment to a 
governing body. 
                                           
119 See http://www.etsi.org/membership/fees 
120 It does not apply to amendments to ETSI IPR policy, which is adopted by the General Assembly using weighted 
national voting mechanism. Moreover, even ETSI IPR Guide might be adopted by the General Assembly. For 
more discussion see Chapter 5.2.3.2. 
121 See https://www.vita.com/MembershipBenefits 
122 See https://www.vita.com/resources/Documents/Policies/VITA%20Bylaws%202016%20Final.pdf (Sec 4.3) 
123 See https://www.dvb.org/resources/public/documents_site/dvb_rules_and_procedures.pdf 
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As perhaps the starkest example of autonomous SDO leadership, at W3C, stakeholders have 
no direct influence on the selection of the Director, who is appointed by one of the founding 
hosting organizations. Therefore, the Director is arguably more autonomous in the decision-
making and can afford to make controversial decisions (e.g. a decision to incorporate DRM 
into HTML5 technology despite vocal objections by some commentators).124 
It is worth noting that even in SDOs in which corporate stakeholders do not directly elect or 
appoint members of the governing body, such stakeholders may seek to gain influence over 
the decision-making authority of the SDO by seeking to win seats on the governing body 
through the prescribed electoral or appointment process.  Contreras (2014) observes the 
rapid acquisition of leadership positions in IETF by Chinese firms (relative newcomers to 
IETF) through a deliberate strategy of hiring existing IETF veterans away from long-term 
IETF corporate participants. More recently, employees of two of the companies that objected 
to IEEE’s 2015 IPR policy amendments have sought to join the IEEE-SA Board of Governors 
through its electoral process (even if board members are under a fiduciary duty to the 
institution and do not represent the views of their employers, as discussed in the next 
heading).125 Thus, corporate stakeholders can seek to exert influence even in governance 
structures in which they do not have express voting authority. 
 
5.2.2.4 The role of individuals participating in SDO Activities 
Table 5.2 - Individuals participating in SDO activities are expected to speak on behalf of… 
While some tasks with respect to SDO policy development are carried out by paid SDO staff, 
many SDOs rely on the participation of individuals who are paid and employed by SDO 
stakeholders. These individuals may serve on SDO boards, participate in member 
assemblies, serve in ad-hoc bodies or otherwise contribute to the revision, discussion, and 
approval of new or modified SDO policies. Different SDOs have different expectations 
regarding the allegiance of individuals participating in decision-making on SDO policies.  
Many SDOs expect participating individuals to represent a member organization, or another 
organization with recognized interests in the SDO’s work. This is for instance the case at 
AFNOR, DIN, DVB, ECMA, ISO, ITU-T, and TSDSI. At DIN, everybody participating in the 
SDO needs authorization from a recognized organization. AFNOR requires all participants to 
shed light on which stakeholder they represent. At DVB, an individual who is no longer 
employed by a recognized organization will be replaced by another individual from the same 
organization. At ECMA, individuals expressly represent member companies. Only 
                                           
124 See https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/07/over-many-objections-w3c-approves-drm-for-
html5/  See also Contreras (2016a), discussing W3C leadership model. 
125 See https://www.ieee.org/about/corporate/election/standards-association-board-of-governors-members-at-
large.html  
A
F
N
O
R
 
A
N
S
I 
C
E
N
-
C
E
N
E
L
E
C
 
D
IN
 
D
V
B
 
P
ro
je
c
t 
E
C
M
A
  
E
T
S
I 
IE
C
 
IE
E
E
 S
A
 
IE
T
F
 
IS
O
 
IT
U
 
JE
D
E
C
 
T
S
D
S
I 
V
IT
A
 
W
3
C
 
M
e
m
b
e
r 
e
n
ti
ty
 
A
N
S
I 
a
n
d
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
c
a
te
g
o
ry
  
C
E
N
; 
in
 a
d
v
. 
g
ro
u
p
: 
m
e
m
b
e
r 
M
e
m
b
e
r 
e
n
ti
ty
 
M
e
m
b
e
r 
e
n
ti
ty
 
M
e
m
b
e
r 
e
n
ti
ty
 
M
e
m
b
e
r 
e
n
ti
ty
; 
o
n
 
th
e
 b
o
a
rd
: 
E
T
S
I 
C
o
u
n
c
il
 b
o
a
rd
: 
IE
C
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 
IE
E
E
 /
 p
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
c
a
p
a
c
it
y
 
In
d
iv
d
l.
 p
a
rt
ic
i-
p
a
n
t 
M
e
m
b
e
r 
e
n
ti
ty
 
M
e
m
b
e
r 
e
n
ti
ty
 
B
o
th
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
e
n
ti
ty
 a
n
d
 i
n
d
u
s
tr
y
 
M
e
m
b
e
r 
e
n
ti
ty
 
M
e
m
b
e
r 
e
n
ti
ty
 /
 
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l 
M
e
m
b
e
r 
e
n
ti
ty
; 
in
 
s
o
m
e
 c
a
s
e
s
 o
n
 a
d
v
. 
b
o
a
rd
: 
W
3
C
 
  95 
exceptionally, particularly knowledgeable individuals may be invited to participate as invited 
experts in an individual capacity.  
Other SDOs explicitly require that all individuals participating in decision-making on SDO 
policies act in an individual capacity or represent the SDO’s interests. This is for instance the 
case at IEEE-SA. Regarding questions of SDO governance, it is “strictly forbidden” that 
individuals represent their employer’s or a stakeholder’s particular interests. IEEE 
governors, presidents and directors also have a fiduciary duty to IEEE under applicable 
corporate laws.  
In several cases, individuals elected to governing bodies are asked to represent the entire 
organization or the entire community. At CEN-CENELEC, individuals sitting on governing 
bodies are required to represent the SDO and speak on a personal basis, even if they are 
employed by a member. Individuals participating in advisory groups however sit as 
representatives of a member organization. At IEC, members of the Council board are 
elected as individuals, and are asked to represent the entire IEC community, and not one 
particular national committee or industry. At ANSI, members of the ExSC "should, to the 
extent possible, represent the broadest interests of all standards developers and/or users. 
Next in order of priority, members should represent their assigned interest category [i.e., 
Organization Member, Company Member, Government Member, Consumer Interest Council, 
member-at-large] rather than their employer’s specific interests".126 
Several SDOs adopt mixed approaches. At W3C, individuals participate in governance 
questions as member participants. In some cases however, on the advisory board, they may 
be asked to speak for W3C and not from a specific member perspective. At JEDEC, 
individuals are appointed by member companies to sit on the board. Board members and 
members of ad hoc groups tasked with policy development speak both in their individual 
capacity and as representative of the member. In our interview, JEDEC identified this 
question as “one of the great dilemmas in the trade association business”. In their view, 
‘when you're drafting a patent policy, the primary emphasis is going to be on the interests 
of the industry and the organization rather than your own individual company’. However, it 
is almost impossible for individuals of companies to ‘to withdraw themselves from their own 
company interests and focus instead on the interests of the industry’.  
 At VITA, voting is on an individual basis (each individual vote is counted). However, 
individuals represent their employer’s interests. Each sponsor member can appoint an 
individual to sit on the board of directors. These individuals are vetted to ensure that their 
agenda fits with the objectives of the stakeholder. VITA can turn down applications for 
sponsor membership, and offer regular membership instead, to companies or organizations 
that do not reflect the objectives of VITA. 
At IETF, participation is entirely on an individual basis. Nevertheless, there is no policy 
against representing a company’s interests or making contributions on behalf of the 
company. Officially, every individual participant’s contribution is treated the same, 
regardless of whether it represents an individual opinion or a company’s interests. 
Policies defining obligations for individuals participating in policy development to take into 
consideration the interests of the SDO or society as opposed to the interests of an individual 
SDO member or stakeholder strengthen the autonomy of SDO decision-making with respect 
to the SDO membership or stakeholder base. Policies explicitly requesting individual 
participants to represent an SDO member or recognized SDO stakeholder on the other hand 
                                           
126 ANSI ExSC Operating Procedures art. 1. 
https://share.ansi.org/Shared%20Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20National%20Standards/Pr
ocedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/2015_ANSI_ExSC_Operating_Procedures.pdf 
  96 
strengthen the extent to which SDO decision-making reflects the interests and expectations 
of SDO membership. 
5.2.2.5 Survey Results -  SDO Leadership, Staff 
Our survey posed several questions relating to participant perceptions regarding the role 
and effectiveness of SDO management and staff.  Only 17% and 18% of respondents said 
that SDO staff or elected SDO boards, respectively, would adequately represent their 
interests in SDO governance, as opposed to 47% who felt that SDO staff and elected boards 
would not adequately represent their interests (n=36, 34) [Q21]. In contrast, 38% and 
41% of survey respondents felt that trade/industry associations and firms in the same 
industry (e.g., competitors) would adequately represent their interests in SDO governance 
(n= 39, 37) [Q21]. These findings suggest that some SDO participants believe that SDO 
staff and boards, unlike industry associations and peer firms, may act in a manner that is 
not directly aligned with their corporate interests.  It is interesting that even though SDO 
boards are typically elected from the membership, survey respondents generally viewed 
boards and paid SDO staff as equally unresponsive to stakeholder interests.
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Table 5.3. – Decision-making and role of staff 
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5.2.3 Processes for policy development 
Most of the SDOs studied reported changes to their policies in recent years, and all of these 
SDOs have basic rules and procedures for making such changes. Some SDOs (IEEE, IETF, 
JEDEC, VITA, and W3C) made changes to their IPR policies that they described as significant 
and subject to an important and controversial stakeholder debate.  Nevertheless, such 
significant changes are rare events, while smaller changes can occur at much greater 
frequency. IEEE reports 95 to 100 approved material policy changes over the last 10 years. 
At JEDEC, this number was estimated to be between 10 and 20.  
Some SDOs that we interviewed specifically stated that frequently revising SDO policies is a 
good practice. At DVB, the organization’s approach to its policies is to respond to issues as 
they occur, as opposed to trying to conceive of every possible issue in advance. At VITA, we 
were told, it is “part of the job of the executive director […] to continuously review policies 
and see if there’s anything that needs to be updated, or fixed, or added, or deleted.” 
In this section, we discuss the processes that different SDOs use for these major or minor 
modifications to their policies. Similar to SDO form and mission and the status of SDO staff 
and leadership, these processes influence the extent to which SDO decisions on policies are 
responsive to the interests of the parties with immediate and significant commercial stakes 
in the SDO’s standards, or reflect an autonomous position of the SDO as an organization. 
Whereas many SDO processes are oriented towards reaching a consensus among significant 
SDO stakeholders, other SDO processes are designed to facilitate decision-making even in 
situations where these decisions are opposed by significant SDO stakeholders or stakeholder 
categories. 
5.2.3.1 Processes for policy development as compared to standard development 
 
 
Table 5.4. - Are the same processes used for policy and standards development? 
 
In the majority of SDOs, the processes for adopting and changing SDO policies and rules 
differ significantly from the processes for standards development. There are two notable 
exceptions, IETF and VITA. These two SDOs indicate that they use the same processes for 
developing standards and major policy documents (minor policy revisions and/or guidance 
documents may be adopted in a more streamlined fashion by the management body or 
staff). In the remaining SDOs, the processes for adopting policy documents and standards 
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First, the general nature of decision-making can fundamentally differ between the two 
processes. Many SDOs strive to adopt standards by consensus decision-making. By 
contrast, it is more common that decisions on policy are taken by vote. At IEEE-SA for 
example, standards are adopted by consensus.127 By contrast, the Board of Governors of 
IEEE-SA makes decisions on policy changes by simple majority (the IEEE-SA Standards 
Board, SASB, needs to approve a policy change by two-thirds majority to forward it to the 
Board of Governors). At AFNOR, decisions in technical committees on standard development 
are never taken by vote, and are always adopted by consensus. By contrast, AFNOR’s 
governance body, the Comité de coordination et de pilotage de la normalisation (CCPN), and 
the board of directors of AFNOR can make decisions on rule changes by majority vote. 
AFNOR explains this difference by noting that technical committees are open to everybody, 
whereas the CCPN and board of directors have a clearly defined membership, which is 
balanced among different constituencies.  
Second, decision-making on rules and policies may involve different bodies than those 
involved in standards development. At ISO, decisions on modifications of its statutes are the 
responsibility of the General Assembly, and changes to the rules of procedure are the 
responsibility of the Council. At AFNOR, where the board of directors has largely delegated 
decision-making to the CCPN, decisions on rule changes are the only exception to this 
delegation. The board of directors therefore needs to validate these decisions. At DVB, the 
steering board alone is responsible for adopting rules and procedures, whereas technical 
standardization decisions are initiated in the working groups of the ‘Commercial Module’, 
and then forwarded to the ‘Technical Module’, before being submitted to the steering board 
for final approval. At TSDSI, unlike standards, new or modified rules and procedures have to 
be discussed first in the governing council before being submitted to the general body for 
ratification. Other organizations have special committees that exclusively deal with specific 
or general policy aspects, and where rules and procedures are drafted or discussed.  
Third, the parties that are eligible to participate in decision-making may differ. At many 
SDOs, including AFNOR, DIN and IEEE SA, participation in technical committees is open to 
all interested parties, including non-members, whereas decisions on rules and policies are 
taken by committees and boards that have a defined membership, aiming at achieving a 
balanced representation of all interests. At ETSI, policies can only be modified in the 
General Assembly by a special convened meeting, where only the heads of delegation of the 
full members can vote. Similarly, at ECMA, only ‘ordinary members’ can participate in votes 
on rules and policy changes, whereas other categories of members can participate in 
decision-making on standards.128  
Decision-making on rules and procedures may further differ from standards development by 
the degree of transparency and openness required in such decision-making. At many SDOs, 
meetings of technical committees are open to all interested parties and observers, whereas 
governing boards more often convene privately in executive session.  
Another difference between decision-making regarding SDO rules and policies and technical 
standards relates to the duties of those making the decisions.  When representatives of 
different firms and other organizations participate in standards development, it is generally 
understood that these individuals are acting in their personal capacities or on behalf of their 
employers or sponsors. The individuals participating in SDO rule and policy development, on 
the other hand, are often members of SDO governing boards and may therefore have a 
fiduciary duty towards the SDO, or at least an obligation to act in the best interest of the 
SDO rather than their corporate employers. At IEEE SA, speaking on behalf of a company or 
                                           
127 The principle of consensus decision-making does not rule out the possibility of voting. We were told that IEEE-
SA generally considers consensus to be achieved when 75% of the voters are in favor of a standard. 
128 Other membership categories are associated with lower fees, and include categories reserved to small and 
medium enterprises or non-profit organizations. 
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another stakeholder on matters of governance is strictly forbidden, whereas standards 
development can be individual-based or entity-based, and even in individual-based 
processes it is tolerated that participants make technical contributions on behalf of their 
employers. 
Finally, standards development and procedures for the adoption and modification of rules 
and policies may be subject to different external requirements. As will be discussed in 
Section 6, many SDOs abide by procedural principles for standard development, described 
inter alia in the rules of the WTO TBT. In the industry, it is disputed whether these 
requirements apply to the development of the SDO’s policies and procedures (for more 
discussion, see section 6).  
One of the most notable results from our survey relate to the relationship between 
standardization and policymaking processes. As seen just above, most SDO treat these two 
processes separately, with policymaking often offering less developed procedural 
safeguards. Yet stakeholders do not seem to agree with this state of play. When asked how 
policymaking processes should compare with standardization processes, in terms of 
openness, transparency, balance, consensus and availability of appeal [Q. 28], 85% of 
respondents replied that policymaking processes should be at least the same if not more 
stringent than standardization processes (i.e. 36% chose ‘the same’ and 49%, ‘more 
stringent’). The balance between the two options (‘the same’ and ‘more stringent’) differed 
as between Patent-Centric and Product-Centric respondents: the former overwhelmingly 
prefer ‘more stringent’ processes for policy making, while the latter are more evenly divided 
between the two options. Ultimately, however, the overall picture is clear: procedural 
safeguards in policymaking should be brought closer to the level of safeguards in standards 
development.   
5.2.3.2 Processes for introducing policy modifications 
The processes for introducing policy modifications differ significantly across SDOs. Many 
SDOs allow their members and even non-members to submit recommendations for policy 
modifications. At ETSI, any member can propose modifications of the rules to the ETSI IPR 
Special Committee, after which they might be approved by General Assembly.  In other 
SDOs, these recommendations must be submitted to the secretariat or appropriate board, 
and are advanced at the responsible body’s discretion. At IEEE SA, any person can submit a 
proposed policy change to the Secretary of the appropriate board or committee. The 
secretary can determine whether to submit the recommendation for consideration by the 
board or committee. At AFNOR, members can submit proposals to the CCPN only as part of 
a formal appeal in a dispute in which they are involved. The more general way for an AFNOR 
member to initiate a recommendation is to submit a proposal to the CEO or the Chairperson 
of the Board of Directors. At IETF, anybody can propose a policy change. Many proposed 
policy and interpretive documents are submitted to IETF as Internet-Drafts in much the 
same manner as proposed technical protocols and specifications.  Policy initiatives at IETF 
relating to topics such as meeting location, diversity and meeting conduct have been 
introduced by speakers from the floor of an IETF plenary session. Other policy changes have 
originated with the IESG and have then been progressed through the IETF’s normal 
procedures for standards adoption. 
In addition, SDOs may specify the bodies or individuals that have the ability to propose 
modifications to the SDO’s policies. At AFNOR, the bodies who have the right to introduce 
policy proposals to be considered by the CCPN are the board of directors, any member of 
the CCPN, the permanent working groups (including volunteering members of the CCPN and 
the representatives of the French sectoral standardization bodies), and the AFNOR 
secretariat. At SAC, the initiative for policy modifications is with CNIS, a government think-
tank providing research and analysis on standardization, and other organizations. 
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In our survey, we asked SDO participants about the effectiveness of different means for 
introducing policy amendments.  Most respondents (56%, 67%, n=48) viewed themselves 
and/or other SDO members, respectively as the principal sources of important SDO policy 
proposals and amendments. Only 31% and 33% viewed SDO staff and government officials, 
respectively, as the originators of important SDO policy proposals. 
5.2.3.3 Bodies involved in policy development 
Most SDOs have a variety of governing bodies that share the responsibility for decision-
making on SDO rules. There are two fundamental ways the responsibility between bodies is 
shared: on one hand, different bodies may be responsible for different policy documents, or 
different types of policy changes. On the other hand, different bodies may consider the 
same policy documents or policy decisions sequentially. In these cases, policy documents 
typically advance in a specified order from one body to another.  
 
Table 5.5. – What is the ultimate decision-maker on SDO rules and policies? 
 
In many cases, one body is responsible for the most fundamental SDO policies, whereas 
other bodies are responsible for more mundane policy development and changes. The body 
responsible for the foundational documents of the SDO is not necessarily the most 
significant actor in an SDO’s governance, e.g. because changes to these documents tend to 
be rare, or because these documents speak at a general level. In these cases, the actual 
policy debates within the SDO regarding potentially controversial issues, such as the IPR 
policy, take place in a different body that is responsible for changes to less fundamental 
policy documents. At ISO for example, the general assembly is responsible for changes to 
the statutes. The implementation of the statutes and most of the actual policy development 
(e.g. the IPR policy) are the responsibility of the Council, an elected board, which approves 
changes to the Rules of Procedure. The ISO Directives, which describe details of the 
organization of the standards development work, are the responsibility of the Technical 
Management Board. 
In addition, multiple bodies may have to approve a policy change for it to take effect. 
Formally, proposed policy documents or changes typically progress upwards in the SDO 
hierarchy. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to systematically focus on the last element 
of the chain. At IEEE-SA, for example, the IPR policy is part of the IEEE-SA Standards Board 
bylaws. The Board of Governors needs to approve changes to these bylaws with a simple 
majority. The Standards Board however has to approve changes to its bylaws with a two-
thirds majority to forward them to the Board of Governors. In practice, the Standards Board 
vote may thus be the critical hurdle for policy changes. The Board of Governors may in 
addition submit a policy change, at its own discretion, to the IEEE Board of Directors for 
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further approval. The Board of Governors decided to take this decision with respect to the 
much-discussed 2015 changes to the IEEE-SA IPR policy in order to reduce the political 
pressure on the Board of Governors.129 The IEEE Board of Directors approved the IEEE-SA 
IPR policy with an 80% majority, much larger than the required simple majority and larger 
than the 73% majority achieved in the Standards Board (where a two-thirds majority was 
required). This particular policy change illustrates that the ultimate decision-maker within 
an SDO is not necessarily the most critical step in the process of policy development.  
In many cases, the decisions taken by an executive board must be validated by the 
membership (e.g. CEN-CENELEC, ETSI) or the presiding board (e.g. DIN). Whether this 
validation is a formality or a critical step in the process of policy development may vary by 
SDO. Certainly, there are instances in which the ultimate decision-maker only plays a 
limited practical role. At ISO, the Council has authority over SDO governance and policy 
development. The fundamental role of the General Assembly is to elect the Council. 
Theoretically, the General Assembly may be called upon to validate the Council’s decisions. 
As we were told, “It could happen, but it never happens”. At AFNOR, the board must 
validate the CCPN’s proposals on AFNOR rules and procedures, which, since CCPN’s 
creation, it has always done.  
There are several reasons that may limit the practical significance of the validation by the 
ultimate decision-making body. There may be an imbalance of practical experience and 
competence favoring the executive board (or a similar body taking the role of central actor 
of SDO governance) over the members of the general assembly or a supervisory board. In 
addition, the members of the executive board may be able to spend significantly more time 
on SDO governance. The general assembly usually convenes infrequently, typically once per 
year. At DIN for example, the members of the Executive Board are remunerated and work 
full time for DIN, whereas members of the Presiding Board are volunteers and are required 
to have a profession outside DIN.  
In addition to the bodies with formal decision-making power, one often finds advisory 
bodies with no formal authority on SDO governance, yet significant influence in practice. 
These bodies (which are often specialized by governance area) concentrate technical 
expertise on particular work areas. It is quite common that much of the policy development 
takes place in such advisory bodies, so that the ultimate formal decision-making body votes 
on a text that was actually developed elsewhere, in an advisory body. At ANSI for example, 
the IPR Policy Committee (IPRPC) has no formal authority to approve ANSI policy. 
Nevertheless, IPR policy changes at ANSI are usually debated at the IPRPC, where a task 
force may be created to develop a draft policy text. The task force reports to the IPRPC, and 
when appropriate the IPRPC submits a recommendation to the Executive Standards Council, 
which is the formal decision-making body for ANSI standardization policy.  
Many SDOs have a practice of creating special-purpose groups (sometimes referred to as 
“ad hoc”, for instance at ETSI) for the development of specific policies. These special-
purpose groups usually do not have authority to make decisions, but work together on the 
preparation, discussion and drafting of policy documents (e.g. ANSI, CEN-CENELEC, IEEE 
and VITA). For example, DVB used to have a special-purpose group on rules and 
procedures, but now policy agendas are developed by the steering board with the advice of 
the project office. At DIN, a committee is put in place for the development of important 
strategy or policy documents in order to collect inputs from a large set of stakeholders. SAC 
may create special-purpose groups with experts from SAC and CNIS, a think tank 
supporting SAC in policy making.  
As discussed above, at IETF, policy documents (like standard documents) are often 
developed in working groups or less formal groups (e.g., “birds of a feather” (BOF) session) 
                                           
129 As discussed in the interview with the representative of IEEE-SA. 
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assembled for the purpose, though some guidance and procedural documents are developed 
and approved by the IESG.  
In addition to special-purpose groups, several SDOs have permanent working groups or 
advisory boards that play a similar role, i.e. discuss, prepare and draft policy changes; 
whereas decisions on these changes are made in a different body. This is the case e.g. of 
AFNOR’s permanent working group, and the process community group at W3C. In addition, 
several organizations have specialized permanent working groups on IPR, where possible 
changes to the IPR policy are debated and drafted (e.g. the IPRPC at ANSI, ETSI’s IPR 
committee, the PatCom at IEEE-SA, and the patents and standards interest group at W3C). 
In addition, at W3C specific patent advisory groups (PAGs) are assembled to address 
specific patent-related issues pertaining to proposed W3C standards.130 
The critical body for reaching decisions on SDO rules may vary depending on the nature of 
the policy change, the level of contentiousness, and the distribution of expertise among the 
different players within an SDO. The coexistence of multiple bodies within an SDO sharing 
the responsibility for policy development can thus make it difficult to identify the actual 
locus of power within an SDO. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to discern some patterns and to classify SDOs broadly into 
different groups. Specifically, the critical decision-maker for each SDO can be a general 
assembly of members, a board (typically directly or indirectly elected by members), a 
specific governing council, or the SDO director.131 The locus of decision-making authority 
within an SDO has obvious implications for its autonomy vis-à-vis stakeholders and 
members.  
First, in several SDOs, at least some important changes to policies and procedures must be 
approved by a general assembly of members. This is the case at CEN-CENELEC, DVB, 
ECMA, ETSI, IEC, ISO, ITU-T, and TSDSI. At IEC, the ultimate legislator on policies is the 
council, where only the Presidents of the Full Member National Committees have the right to 
vote. The supreme organ of ITU is the Plenipotentiary Conference, which is composed of 
delegations from the Member States. In addition, ITU-R and ITU-T each have an assembly 
composed of delegations from Member States and representatives of Sector Members 
concerned. These assemblies make the final decisions on the policies of the respective ITU 
sections. 
In several cases, the general assembly of members only votes on changes to the most 
fundamental governance documents (e.g. its statutes, bylaws, or Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with members132). Whether the general assembly must validate 
changes to a specific policy thus often depends on whether the policy is part of the SDO 
statutes, or a separate document. At DVB, the steering board is generally responsible for 
rules and procedures. Nevertheless, the DVB IPR policy is part of its Memorandum of 
Understanding, which can only be modified by the general assembly of members.  
SDOs in which the general assembly of members has the exclusive or ultimate decision-
making authority for most fundamental policy questions most directly respond to the 
interests and expectations of their membership. This is particularly true for SDOs with 
                                           
130 See Contreras 2016b for a discussion of the PAG process and its use at W3C. 
131 Most SDOs are incorporated organizations and thus legal persons (and the other SDOs are organized activities 
of incorporated organizations or governmental bodies). These organizations may be subject to corporate or 
public law requirements regarding their governance structure, including e.g. the existence of a governing 
board and the rights of the organization’s members to participate in the decision-making of the organization. 
These requirements vary depending on the country and/or state where the SDO is incorporated. For the 
purpose of this analysis, we compared SDOs with each other, regardless of the applicable legal requirements.    
132 The term MoU, when used in some SDOs, signifies a generally-applicable policy document that is applicable to 
all SOD members.  This is in contrast to the more common usage of “MoU” to signify a signed contract 
between specific parties. 
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organizational membership (DVB, ECMA, TSDSI). In SDOs with national membership (CEN-
CENELEC, ISO, IEC, ITU), the positions represented in the member assembly, in theory, 
already reflect a national consensus. At ETSI, despite corporate membership, such decision-
making is in the hands of national delegations. While stakeholders thus only indirectly 
participate in the process of reaching decisions in these SDOs, these decisions may be 
particularly oriented towards a consensus of all major stakeholder constituencies, including 
non-member stakeholders. 
Second, in many SDOs, member-elected governing boards act as ultimate decision-makers 
for most of the important decisions on rules and procedures (AFNOR, DIN, IEEE, JEDEC, 
VITA). At AFNOR, the board of directors is the ultimate decision-maker for such decisions. 
At DIN, the presiding board, whose members are elected by DIN membership or appointed 
by incumbent presiding board members, is responsible for policies. At IEEE-SA, the Board of 
Governors approves updates to the Operations Manual and the Standard Board bylaws. 
Members of the Board of Governors are elected by IEEE-SA membership or appointed by 
incumbent board members. At JEDEC, the board is the ultimate decision-making group with 
respect to policies. At VITA, all decision powers on policies are vested in the board. In its 
discretion, the board may decide to delegate decisions to the executive director, or submit 
them to a vote in the member assembly. In addition, at most SDOs where the member 
assembly must validate changes to some of the most important rules and procedures, 
governing boards may be responsible for other, less foundational policy documents, and/or 
may have to decide on changes to rules and policies before submitting them to the 
membership vote. 
SDOs where a member-elected board acts as central decision-maker can potentially develop 
positions that are more autonomous with respect to members or stakeholders. This however 
depends on the status of the board. In SDOs like JEDEC, where the board is particularly 
responsive to the most significant contributors to standard development, the general 
practice is to involve membership in all important policy decisions, even though the board 
formally has the authority for these decisions. At other SDOs, such as AFNOR, DIN, IEEE, 
and VITA, the status of the board and the rules for board elections (e.g. the constituency, 
the term structure, etc.) make the board more independent from the parties with the most 
significant and immediate commercial stakes, and the board can use more discretion in the 
exercise of its decision-making authority. 
Third, SDOs may have specific policy committees or councils designed to reflect a balance of 
stakeholders impacted by the SDO activities. At AFNOR, the CCPN is the decision-maker for 
most aspects of standardization. The CCPN members are appointed by the board of 
directors upon recommendation of the represented stakeholder categories, namely different 
government entities, companies (member companies and French business associations), 
and civil society. Only two of the 15 members of CCPN appointed by the Board of Directors 
are chosen among AFNOR member companies. At DIN, while the DIN members elect the 
members of the presiding board, DIN represents that the presiding board composition 
should reflect the categories of stakeholders and sufficiently represent public 
administrations. At ANSI, the Executive Standards Council (which operates under the Board 
of Directors) is the legislator for the ANSI Essential Requirements. Membership in the 
Executive Standards Council reflects a balance among categories of ANSI members 
(organizational members, company members, governmental members, members of the 
Consumer Interest Council, and members-at-large). On questions of IPR policy, the ExSC 
will often seek the advice and input of the ANSI IPR Policy Committee. 
In SDOs where the authority over policy development to a large extent resides within bodies 
designed to reflect a balance of diverse stakeholder categories (such as ANSI’s ExSC or 
AFNOR’s CCPN), the composition of these bodies reduces the influence of the parties with 
the most significant and immediate commercial stakes in the standards to the benefit of 
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more dispersed and less immediately affected constituencies. This structure also encourages 
SDOs to develop positions that are relatively more autonomous with respect to the 
significant commercial stakeholders. 
Fourth, SAC and W3C have ultimate decision-makers that are not elected by membership. 
At W3C, the ultimate decision-maker for policies is the W3C executive director. W3C 
members can appeal the executive director’s decisions to the Advisory Committee.  The 
case of SAC is different, because it is a governmental agency. Changes to SAC’s IPR policy 
have to be approved by the leadership of both the SAC and SIPO (State Intellectual 
Property Office). Other procedural changes can be approved by the leadership of SAC itself. 
Obviously, SDOs with central decision-making bodies that are not accountable to SDO 
membership and/or stakeholders are most autonomous in their decision making, and can 
more easily reach decisions without the consent of significant stakeholders or stakeholder 
categories.  
Finally, IETF uses its standard development procedures for major decisions on rules and 
policies. New policies or policy modifications are therefore initiated in working groups, “birds 
of a feather” (BOF) or other less formal settings, or by members of the IETF’s governing 
bodies (e.g., the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) or IETF Administrative 
Oversight Council (IAOC)). Proposed policies or rules, or amendments thereto, undergo 
consensus decision-making open to all IETF participants in the same manner as proposed 
technical standards.  This being said, the IESG and IAOC often produce guidance documents 
relating to IETF procedures and practices that are not developed in this manner, but which 
are proposed, considered and adopted by the IESG or IAOC, as applicable. While parties 
holding significant and immediate commercial stakes in IETF standards have no privileged 
position to influence IETF policy, the IETF policy development procedures are open to the 
participation of any interested party, and decisions are reached by consensus. In stark 
contrast in particular to W3C, IETF’s procedures are not designed to reach decisions against 
the resistance of a significant category of IETF stakeholders. 
5.2.3.4  Voting rules used to make decisions on rules and policies 
 
Table 5.6.- Voting rules of SDO bodies making decisions on policy matters 
 
 SDOs can reach decisions on policy matters by formal or rough consensus, vote (simple 
majority or supermajority), or special procedures.  As noted in Section 5.1.1 above, there 
are different understandings of “consensus” even among SDOs that purport to follow 
consensus decision-making. 
A
F
N
O
R
 
A
N
S
I 
C
E
N
-
C
E
N
E
L
E
C
 
D
IN
 
D
V
B
 
P
ro
je
c
t 
E
C
M
A
  
E
T
S
I 
IE
C
 
IE
E
E
 S
A
 
IE
T
F
 
IS
O
 
IT
U
 
JE
D
E
C
 
S
A
C
 
T
S
D
S
I 
V
IT
A
 
W
3
C
 
M
a
jo
ri
ty
 (
in
 p
ra
c
ti
c
e
, 
m
o
s
t 
d
e
c
is
io
n
s
 t
a
k
e
n
 b
y
 
c
o
n
s
e
n
s
u
s
  
2
/3
 m
a
jo
ri
ty
 
M
a
jo
ri
ty
 
C
o
n
s
e
n
s
u
s
 
2
/3
 m
a
jo
ri
ty
, 
n
o
 c
o
n
s
ti
-
tu
e
n
c
y
 a
g
a
in
s
t 
M
a
jo
ri
ty
 
Q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
 m
a
jo
ri
ty
 (
7
1
%
) 
M
a
jo
ri
ty
 
M
a
jo
ri
ty
 
C
o
n
s
e
n
s
u
s
 
M
a
jo
ri
ty
 
C
o
n
s
e
n
s
u
s
 
2
/3
 m
a
jo
ri
ty
 
R
o
u
g
h
 c
o
n
s
e
n
s
u
s
 
M
a
jo
ri
ty
(i
n
 p
ra
c
ti
c
e
 
c
o
n
s
e
n
s
u
s
) 
M
a
jo
ri
ty
 
D
ir
e
c
to
r 
d
e
c
is
io
n
 a
n
d
 
a
p
p
e
a
ls
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
 
  106 
Few SDOs formally require consensus decision-making for policy or rule changes. For 
example, the committee created at DIN for the purpose of developing policy and strategy 
documents makes decisions by consensus (which does not mean unanimity, but that those 
who oppose the rule change “can live with it”). At IETF, there are no votes. All decision-
making, including on rules and policies, is based on rough consensus as determined by the 
relevant Working Group Chair, Area Director or, in the case of IETF-wide policies, the Chair 
of IETF (see discussion in Section 5.1.1 above). 
At SDOs that have voting requirements for policy decisions, rule changes require majorities 
ranging from simple to a two-thirds majority. At CEN-CENELEC, ECMA and VITA, members 
vote in the general assembly by simple majority (one member one vote). At ISO, the 
Council can reach decisions by a simple majority. At IEEE SA, updates to the operations 
manual and the Standards Board bylaws require a simple majority of the Board of 
Governors. At AFNOR, the CCPN can decide by simple majority, though in practice most 
decisions are taken by consensus. At ANSI, each policy committee can adopt its own voting 
rules, subject to the Executive Standards Committee’s approval. The ExSC makes decisions 
on changes to its operational procedures, or for the procedures for standards development, 
by a two-thirds majority of voting members. At DVB, on changes to its rules and procedures 
and other matters the steering board decides generally by consensus (with an “antideadlock 
mechanism” calling for a two-thirds majority and support by all constituencies); changes to 
its Memorandum of Understanding governing document require a super-majority from the 
general assembly. 
Majority-voting, especially voting rules requiring only simple majorities, are in principle 
more prone to reaching decisions against the opposition of significant stakeholders or 
stakeholder categories than decision-making procedures requiring consensus. Nevertheless, 
the significant differences between the voting bodies, the constituencies that have the right 
to vote, and the way votes are counted, make it difficult to compare or even rank the 
different voting schemes. It is nevertheless possible to identify voting rules that are 
designed to make it more difficult to overrule the opposition of a significant stakeholder or 
stakeholder category. This is particularly the case at DVB, where each decision needs to be 
approved by a majority of members within each of the defined membership categories 
(reflecting different business models in the broadcasting industry). 
Since IPR policy of ETSI is an Annex of its Rules of Procedure, the Statute requires that the 
Generally Assembly votes by Weighted National Voting of national delegations.133 Such 
voting requires a qualified majority of 71% of the weighted votes of national delegations to 
agree to an amendment.134 However, in practice, consensus is preferred.135 The national 
delegations are composed of ETSI full members, including national administrations and 
(predominantly) companies.136 The voting rules within national delegations are not specified 
by ETSI, but the vote of each national delegation casted by the head of national delegation 
shall reflect the views of all members in such national delegation.137 According to Bekkers 
(Bekkers 2001 at 151-155), it is not unusual that companies switch national delegations in 
order to influence the vote in the desired direction. The head of the national delegation 
casting the vote is usually a representative of a national government. 
While the procedures of many SDOs allow for majority votes on rule changes, most of these 
SDOs describe formal votes on rule changes as extremely rare. At CEN and CENELEC, the 
respective boards could make decisions on rules by vote instead of consensus, but in 
practice, “that never happens”. At AFNOR, the CCPN, which can make decisions on rules by 
                                           
133 See Art 11.2.1 of the Rules of Procedure and Annex 3 
134 See Art 18 of the Statute, and Art 19 of the Rules of Procedure 
135 Interview. 
136 See Art 3 of the Rules of Procedure 
137 See Art 11.2.1 of the Rules of Procedure 
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vote instead of consensus, has never made use of this possibility since its creation in 2009. 
At ETSI, “it’s very rare that we’re voting”. At JEDEC, board decisions have to be approved 
by a two-thirds majority, “but most of the time, they are in fact unanimous”. At TSDSI, the 
governing council attempts to make decisions by consensus, and only proceeds to vote if 
consensus fails. In its decisions on both standards and policies, DIN attempts to achieve 
support far beyond a simple majority (typically 90% of favorable votes) in order to promote 
broad adoption of its standards. At the ISO council, decisions are typically unanimous, but it 
is possible to vote (by simple majority) in cases of disagreement. 
5.2.3.5 Transparency of policy deliberations 
 
Table 5.7. - Are deliberations and votes on SDO policy matters made available to the public? 
 
As described above, some SDO governing bodies make decisions through consensus. 
Consensus can be determined in a variety of ways, but typically implies that there is no 
sustained opposition. A stakeholder opposing a decision must accordingly raise its 
opposition publicly in order to demonstrate a lack of consensus. Consensus decision-making 
may thus be in contradiction with secret voting. At ETSI for example, the absence of 
consensus would be demonstrated by sustained opposition during the debate. Stakeholders 
will therefore be aware of such opposition. Moreover, unless individual positions are not 
recorded in the minutes of the meeting or these minutes are not made public, the general 
public would also know about such opposition. 
Votes, on the other hand, may be conducted secretly and counted by SDO staff, or taken 
openly at the relevant meeting by show of hands, general acclamation or roll call (individual 
oral) vote.   At W3C, where most processes take place online, decisions are made by vote. 
Upon request of the voting members, votes may be made visible to W3C members, or to 
the ‘W3C team’ alone.138 At AFNOR, the CCPN can elect to take decisions by secret ballot if 
the decision affects an individual, such as an appointment for instance, though in practice 
such decisions have always been taken by consensus. Nevertheless, a ballot box is placed in 
the room to symbolize that at any time it would be possible to proceed to a formal vote with 
secret ballots. Secret ballots are effectively used for elections of officers. Similarly, at 
TSDSI, elections of officers take place using secret ballots, whereas voting on rules is more 
commonly done by show of hands. 
The results of such votes are typically reported publicly, but the votes of individual members 
are often not released to the public or included in the official records of the SDO. This is e.g. 
                                           
138 The W3C team consists of employees of the different W3C host institutions working for W3C. 
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the case at AFNOR’s CCPN, ETSI, CEN-CENELEC, SAC, TSDSI, and W3C. In the case of 
secret ballots, CEN-CENELEC announces which decisions were supported by a majority of 
votes, but not the extent of the majority. Many SDOs, such as DVB, may issue press 
releases on important decisions taken by the steering board. Decision-making in DIN 
governing boards is not open, and the results are not published. At VITA, there have been 
specific cases in which the results of particularly important decisions have become public 
information, but in the majority of cases, it stays within the VITA membership. 
At IEEE SA, the governing boards may vote in open or executive session, and the results of 
votes in open session may be included in public meeting minutes. At IETF, the entire 
process is open and accessible online.  
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Table 5.8. – SDO decision-making on policy matters
 AFNOR ANSI CEN-
CENELEC 
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5.2.4 Dispute Resolution 
SDO rules are complex, and different SDO participants may seek different business and 
policy goals by participating in SDOs.  Accordingly, the interpretation of existing SDO rules 
and policy requirements sometimes becomes important to participants, and disagreements 
can occur. Resolving these disagreements can proceed in different stages, from seeking 
interpretive advice from different sources, to escalating a disagreement through channels 
for appeal within an SDO, to external dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration and 
litigation.  Often, the lines between these mechanisms is not entirely clear, and seeking a 
rule interpretation from an SDO’s governing body can, in some cases, resemble a formal 
appeals process.   In our interviews with SDOs, we sought to gain an understanding of the 
range and nature of these approaches to resolving disagreements over existing SDO rules 
and policy. 
5.2.4.1 Interpretation of Policies 
SDO policies can be lengthy and complex, and policy language can be ambiguous or 
unclear.  We asked SDOs whether they have formal or informal mechanisms for rendering 
authoritative interpretations of SDO policy and rule language.  Some SDOs, such as ISO and 
IEC, responded that no such interpretive mechanisms existed. Their general view was that 
the policy language must stand on its own merits.  However, these organizations still have 
staff responsible for providing personalized interpretations to the enquirers. Other 
organizations responded that interpretations of policy language may be provided, either by 
staff (ANSI, DIN, JEDEC, VITA, SAC, W3C) or a governing board or body (DVB, IEEE).  In 
such cases, discussion of the relevant policy language often occurs at relevant committee or 
board meetings.  IETF policies are interpreted by staff (legal counsel), document authors 
and the IESG, depending on the circumstances.   
If policy interpretations are given, few SDOs have formal systematic mechanisms for 
disseminating these interpretations or archiving them for future reference.  W3C 
commented that if an inquiry is made on a public mailing list, a response will be sent to that 
list, but if an inquiry is made by private email, a private email response will be made. 
Interpretations of the ANSI Essential Requirements, decisions of the ANSI Executive 
Standards Council, BSR and Appeals Board are publicly available on the ANSI web site. In 
addition, ANSI has published Guidelines for Implementation of the ANSI Patent Policy. IEEE 
indicated that interpretive advice could be included in meeting minutes which, presumably, 
could be accessed by the public.  VITA includes a public online Question and Answer section 
relating to policies and procedures, and W3C indicated that it, too, maintains an online 
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) document regarding its processes and patent policy. 
While IETF does not have a single repository for posting answers to policy-related questions, 
it maintains several FAQs on different policy topics (e.g., trademarks, copyrights), and 
sometimes publishes IESG statements to memorialize particularly important policy 
interpretations or decisions. ETSI Board issues its ETSI Guide on IPRs. However, on some 
occasions, changes to the IPR Guide may be agreed during a meeting of the General 
Assembly.139 
5.2.4.2 Appeals of SDO Decisions  
As discussed above, the existence of an appeals process is one of the due process 
characteristics required of SDOs under various accreditation and governmental guidelines 
(e.g., ANSI Essential Requirements, US OMB Circular A-119, ISO/IEC Code of Good 
Practice).  Typically, such appeals are understood to relate to standardization issues.  
                                           
139 See ETSI Directives, page 5 
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However, most SDOs indicated that they have an internal appeals process to address 
member disagreements with policy-related decisions of the SDO.  Such disagreements can 
range from differences in opinion over rule interpretations (see above) to more serious 
allegations that SDO processes were violated, a member was treated unfairly, or that an 
action of the SDO is in violation of law.  Several SDOs commented that simply being 
unhappy with the outcome of a valid SDO vote would not be appealable.  These processes 
varied as to the type of process, number of appeal levels and ultimate deciding body.  Most 
of these processes were specified as being internal to the SDO.  Some SDOs encouraged 
discussions with staff as a first step in resolving the issue (DVB, VITA).  ANSI has a specific 
appeals board, but most allowed appeals to be definitively resolved by the governing board 
or body.  For disputes between members on SEP licensing, DVB requires external dispute 
resolution (ADR) via the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Only SAC indicated that 
no such appeals process exists. 
5.2.4.3 Disputes Among Members 
Overall, the SDOs that we studied reported that disputes among members over policy-
related issues are relatively rare (none or fewer than one per year).  In addition, several 
SDOs indicated a strong aversion to intervening in disputes between members, even when 
they were willing to offer members interpretive advice regarding SDO rules and policies. 
JEDEC expressed a similar sentiment regarding involvement in disputes among members: 
“Never have, never would.” 
Disputes among SDO members can arise in several contexts.  Members may claim that 
other SDO members acted improperly or in violation of the law with respect to technical 
decisions made at the SDO (e.g., excluding a member’s technology from a standard without 
adequate technical justification, thereby violating competition and antitrust laws).  Members 
may also allege that other members failed to comply with their obligations to the SDO, such 
as, most prominently, such members’ obligations to grant patent licenses on FRAND terms, 
but also ethical obligations and good conduct policies. Other types of violations, such as 
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of confidentiality, and the like are also possible, but were 
not mentioned by the SDOs that we interviewed. Most SDOs indicated that such disputes 
are rare (none or fewer than one per year).   
There are, however, several exceptions to this general approach. A minority of SDOs take 
an active role in intervening in disputes between their members.  W3C, for example, will 
form a patent advisory group (PAG) when one or more working group members raises a 
concern about patents and a particular standard under development.  Another notable 
exception is VITA, which reports having two or three “big” disputes per year concerning 
policy and procedure implementation.  In these cases, SDO management takes “an 
aggressive, active role” in resolving the dispute. And while VITA’s policies establish a formal 
arbitration procedure for the resolution of member results, the organization reports that 
arbitration has never been invoked, as all such disputes have been settled informally after 
management intervention. Likewise, as noted above, DVB has a mandatory arbitration 
requirement relating to disputes among SDO members, but reports that it has never been 
invoked. 
We note that several SDOs, including ANSI and IEEE, declined to respond to several of the 
questions in this section. 
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5.3 Stakeholder Influence vs. SDO Leadership 
We have described and analyzed strategies of stakeholder participation and representation 
in SDO processes and decision-making. We have seen that most stakeholders expect their 
employees participating in SDO processes to represent stakeholder interests. As noted in 
Section 5.3.3.5, only a minority of stakeholders feel that SDO staff or elected boards 
represent their interests. All SDOs rely on the participation and contributions of these 
stakeholders for their standard development activities, and many SDOs also involve 
stakeholder representatives in policy development. Nevertheless, the expectations of SDOs 
with respect to the conduct of these individuals may differ from the expectations of their 
employers, with some SDOs having explicit policies against individuals representing specific 
stakeholder interests in the course of SDO policy development. Moreover, the group of 
stakeholders within the membership might not necessarily fully overlap with entire range of 
stakeholders in society. The autonomy of SDOs might be thus be used to represent interests 
of these non-member stakeholders indirectly. 
As we have seen, SDOs differ in the extent to which they cater to their members’ and other 
stakeholders’ interests and expectations. Some organizations have a relatively high degree 
of autonomy with respect to their membership or stakeholder base. This category includes 
AFNOR, ANSI, DIN, IEEE SA, VITA, and W3C. In these groups, important functions are 
carried out by staff or leadership. Election processes for boards and other leadership 
positions reduce the direct influence of the parties with the most immediate and significant 
commercial stakes in standards. Important decisions are taken by staff or boards, as 
opposed to member assemblies. The legal form of these groups can further contribute to 
strengthen the autonomy of the SDO with respect to corporate stakeholders in the 
membership. Some of these SDOs furthermore have explicit policies discouraging 
individuals participating in the SDO from representing individual stakeholder interests (IEEE 
SA), or asking these individuals to represent the SDO, general interest, and an entire 
category of SDO stakeholders instead of their individual employer (ANSI).  
While many of these elements are present in some, but not all SDOs included in this group, 
some SDOs distinguish themselves with institutional features contributing to organizational 
autonomy (in particular W3C, and to a lesser extent IEEE SA and VITA). 
In other SDOs, the role of the organization as such is much less pronounced, and decision-
making is to a much larger extent driven by SDO membership, stakeholders, or individual 
participants. We include DVB, ECMA, ETSI, IETF, JEDEC, and TSDSI in this group. In these 
SDOs, decisions tend to be reached by the consensus of stakeholders or members. Policy 
decisions are primarily made in the general assembly of members (DVB, ETSI, TSDSI), by 
boards directly elected by and accountable to organizational members (DVB, ECMA, JEDEC), 
or in consensus-processes open to all interested stakeholders (IETF). In some of these 
SDOs, voting and election rules emphasize the influence of the SDO’s most significant 
stakeholders (ETSI for board elections, JEDEC), ensure that no decision is made against the 
vote of a specific stakeholder category in the membership (DVB), or generally require 
consensus for SDO policy decisions (IETF). There are no formal policies discouraging 
individuals from representing specific stakeholder interests; in some cases, such 
representation is explicitly required (DVB, ECMA, TSDSI). As a result of these institutional 
features, compared to the first group of SDOs, decisions of this second group of SDOs are 
more likely to represent the joint decision of SDO membership or participants than an 
autonomous organizational decision. On the other hand, they are less likely to represent 
interests of non-member stakeholders. These SDOs are thus significantly less likely to make 
decisions opposed by a specific stakeholder category (as discussed in more detail in Section 
7). 
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The international and regional SDOs based on national membership (CEN-CENELEC, ISO, 
IEC, ITU) are a somewhat special case. In their institutional features, these SDOs tend to be 
member-driven: member assemblies play an important role in the determination of SDO 
policies, and SDO leadership is directly accountable to SDO membership. Nevertheless, this 
membership consists in national members (CEN-CENELEC, IEC, ISO) or national 
governments (ITU).  Commercial stakeholders are thus only indirectly represented in these 
organizations. Similarly unrepresented are other non-member stakeholders in society. 
Nevertheless, this institutional feature may also contribute to a more consensus-oriented 
form of decision-making, as the positions represented in the SDO already represent the 
respective national consensus. Similarly, the votes of national delegations at ETSI may 
represent a compromise of the national members, thus further cementing the consensus-
oriented nature of ETSI’s governance processes. 
 
 
  
  115 
6 Governance principles 
 
Highlights 
 Policymaking is generally less open than standard development. Participation tends to 
be restricted to SDO members. Membership is not free at most SDOs, and it is not open 
at SDOs that are made up of national standardization bodies.  
 Policymaking tend to be far less transparent than in standard development, even 
though our survey indicates stakeholders would prefer more transparency.  
 Many SDOs seek to achieve a balance of interests in policymaking, along both 
geographical and commercial dimensions. In practice, many SDOs experience 
difficulties in attracting sufficient representatives outside of the producer and 
implementer constituencies. In addition to balance in representation, a few SDOs also 
seek to balance voting, by having majority-per-category requirements (e.g. DVB). 
 SDOs reported a tension between openness and balance: both objectives can be hard to 
attain at the same time. Some SDOs privilege openness (e.g. IEEE-SA and IETF), others 
balance (e.g. DVB), and others emphasize openness in standard development and 
balance in policymaking matters (e.g. AFNOR and DIN). An alternative path is to rely on 
the fiduciary duties of SDO leaders towards the SDO or the general interest of SDO 
members in order to dampen any adverse effects from openness or balance (e.g. IEEE-
SA). 
 In the light of this chapter and the previous two, a model is put forward of how and why 
SDO activities and decisions are legitimate, i.e. worthy of support, from a public policy 
perspective: 
o In the understanding of SDOs and their stakeholders, the consent of 
participants, as expressed through SDO decision-making, provides a 
substantial measure of ‘internal’ legitimacy to SDO activities and decisions. 
o External constraints applicable to SDO procedures, as found in the principles 
arising from trade, competition/antitrust and procurement law, channel 
consent so as to avoid clashes with the policies underlying these laws. 
o Market discipline is more elaborate than previously thought and can also 
confer some legitimacy. 
o While SDOs are not themselves democratic institutions, they sometimes 
receive delegated tasks from democratic bodies, also contributing to their 
legitimacy (CEN-CENELEC, DIN, AFNOR, ETSI). 
o SDOs concentrate expertise, even though they sometimes deal with policy 
matters that lie outside of the typically technical expertise of the participants. 
 Through the combination of all these sources, SDO activities and decisions can 
therefore aspire to sufficient legitimacy from a public policy perspective, warranting the 
self- or co-regulatory model that is generally applied to them. 
 
6.1 Procedural principles (due process) 
6.1.1 Ensuring SDO Procedural Due Process  
As a means of achieving compliance with legal requirements and the support of private and 
public stakeholders, many SDOs adhere to and endorse a set of fundamental procedural 
principles for standard development. As discussed in Section 4.1, in the WTO agreement on 
TBT, these principles are defined as Transparency, Openness, Impartiality and Consensus, 
Effectiveness and Relevance, Coherence, and Development Dimension; and these principles 
are reflected in many other legal documents relative to standardization (e.g. OMB Circular 
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119 in the US). EC Regulation 1025/2012 states that “European standardization […] is 
founded on the principles recognised by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the field of 
standardisation, namely coherence, transparency, openness, consensus, voluntary 
application, independence from special interests and efficiency (‘the founding principles’).” 
Many SDOs not only claim to comply with these principles, but actively promote these or 
similarly worded principles as fundamental guidelines for standardization. The SDOs 
participating in the OpenStand initiative e.g. actively promote the principles of ‘Due Process, 
Broad Consensus, Transparency, Balance and Openness’.140  ANSI defines essential 
requirements for due process, including openness, lack of dominance, balance, coordination 
and harmonization, consideration of views and objections, consensus vote, appeals, and 
written procedures. A large number of SDOs voluntarily seek to demonstrate compliance 
with these essential requirements; recognized through ANSI-accreditation as an American 
Standards Developer.  
While these principles are broadly recognized as fundamental principles of the 
standardization activities taking place within SDOs, the relevance of many provisions 
mandating adherence to these principles is limited to purely technical standardization; as 
opposed to other SDO activities ancillary to standardization, and most importantly to the 
development of SDO policies and strategies. The provisions in this respect in Annex 3 of the 
WTO agreement on TBT for instance constitute a “Code of good practice for the preparation, 
adoption and application of standards”, and do not discuss principles for developing or 
adopting other SDO documents, such as policies or strategies (except as regards the 
principle of openness). Similarly, ANSI’s essential requirements “apply to activities related 
to the development of consensus for approval, revision, reaffirmation, and withdrawal of 
American National Standards (ANS)”, and – as stated by ANSI in our interview – the 
processes for developing SDO policies are immaterial to an SDO’s status as ANSI-accredited 
body.  
 As discussed in Section 5, all SDOs in our sample except IETF and VITA use processes for 
the development of policies that differ from the processes for developing standards. 
Nevertheless, a significant majority of the stakeholders participating in our survey stated 
that the principles of ‘openness, transparency, balance, consensus and availability of appeal’ 
should also apply to the process of adopting SDO policy changes. 36% of the stakeholders 
stated that the processes for adopting policy changes should be similar in terms of these 
factors to the processes for adopting technical standards, and 49% (85% among patent-
centric firms) stated that the processes for policy changes should be even more stringent in 
terms of these principles than processes for standard development. Only a combined 8% of 
respondents indicated that the processes for policy development should be less stringent 
than for standardization, follow whatever SDO leadership thinks is appropriate under the 
circumstances, or do not matter to their organization. While fewer explicit legal 
requirements exist for SDO processes for adopting policy changes than for standard 
development processes, it is therefore clear that a large majority of stakeholders expect 
that policy development processes reflect the fundamental principles of openness, 
transparency, balance, consensus and availability of appeal to a similar or even larger 
extent than standardization.  
.   
However, as noted in Section 4.1.2, the various legal provisions that direct SDOs to adopt 
such due process principles do not define or explain these principles in great detail.  
Furthermore, several SDOs state that some of these principles do not or cannot apply to 
                                           
140SDOs such as IEEE SA publicly promote these principles as serving the best interest of the public: 
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/position-0514.pdf 
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policy development; or should apply differently. Accordingly, the implementation of these 
principles in general and in SDO governance in particular varies from SDO to SDO. 
Below we discuss how various SDOs implement these principles in their governance 
structures. 
6.1.2 Openness and Transparency 
While openness and transparency are often discussed together, they are different, but 
related, concepts.  Openness generally relates to a party’s ability to participate in an SDO, 
and transparency generally relates to the availability of information regarding an SDO’s 
internal processes.  
Moreover, the important degree of reliance of regulatory authorities on private SDOs for the 
development of technical standards used in binding regulations raises concerns regarding 
free access to the law. The first concern regards access to the text of the standard itself, as 
the public must often pay private SDOs to access the copyrighted content of a standard, 
even if the standard becomes public law through incorporation by reference into regulation 
(Bremer, 2013; Mendelson, 2014). The second concern regards access to the technology 
necessary to implement the standard, which may be subject to patent or other IP 
protection. IPR policies of SDOs regarding copyright over the standard and licensing 
requirements for SEPs thus have important implications for the acceptability of the use of 
standards in public regulation. 
6.1.2.1 SDO Openness 
All of the SDOs that we studied (other than SAC, a governmental agency) view themselves 
as open to all materially interested parties. This openness takes two forms: (1) openness to 
membership in the SDO,141 and (2) ability to participate in the SDO’s standardization work. 
Nearly all SDOs that we studied permit all interested parties to participate in technical 
standardization activities.  In many cases this is an express requirement of the SDO 
governing documents. ANSI’s Essential Requirements (Sec. 1.1), which must be observed 
by all developers of American National Standards, provide that: 
Participation shall be open to all persons who are directly and materially affected by the 
activity in question. There shall be no undue financial barriers to participation. Voting 
membership on the consensus body shall not be conditional upon membership in any 
organization, nor unreasonably restricted on the basis of technical qualifications or other 
such requirements. 
 
Openness to SDO membership, however, is often more limited than the right to participate 
in technical discussions at an SDO. First some SDOs, such as CEN-CENELEC, ISO, and IEC, 
e.g. restrict membership to national standards bodies (other stakeholders can then 
participate via those bodies). Second, many SDOs charge non-negligible fess to its 
members.  
Participation in governance processes is often substantially less open than participation in 
technical standardization. First, in many SDOs, formal SDO members have a greater voice 
in policy and governance decisions, though non-member opinions are often considered. Our 
survey reveals that SDO participants distinguish between the roles of SDO members and 
non-members in making SDO policy decisions.  When asked who should be entitled to 
participate in proposing, discussing and adopting significant new SDO policies or policy 
amendments, 20% responded that “anyone who is interested, whether or not a member of 
                                           
141 SDO membership is discussed in greater detail in Section 5.1.2. 
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the SDO” should be entitled to participate in such activities, while 71% responded that only 
SDO members should be entitled to participate (n=45) [Q_45].  
Second, while several SDOs – including ECMA, ETSI, IEC, ISO and TSDSI – discuss and 
approve policy changes in a general assembly open to all SDO members, in other SDOs, 
including AFNOR,  DIN, IEEE, JEDEC and VITA, such decisions are taken in elected boards, 
so that not each member can directly participate in the discussion and vote. Our survey 
indicates that stakeholders observe a clear difference between direct participation in policy 
development and indirect representation by elected boards. Only 9% of the surveyed 
stakeholders indicated that significant new policies or policy changes should be discussed 
and adopted in a governance or policy board, as opposed to a process open to all members 
or to anyone interested in participating. Consistent with this response, only five out of 36 
survey respondents indicated that elected SDO boards are likely to adequately represent 
their organization’s interests in a situation where the organization is not directly 
represented, and only one respondent indicated that boards were very likely to adequately 
represent the organization’s interests. 
6.1.2.2 SDO Process Transparency 
Virtually all SDOs that we studied maintain some level of process transparency.  This 
includes, in varying degrees, making available for public inspection the technical standards 
development process, including draft standards and revisions, the process whereby 
technical standards are approved, and final standards documents themselves.   
Some SDOs, such as IETF and W3C, conduct all standardization work through publicly 
available mailing lists and open meetings and publish all draft and final standards 
documents on their web sites without charge.  These organizations portray themselves as 
completely transparent.  Short of this extreme level of transparency, most SDOs announce 
upcoming or ongoing standardization projects on their websites and many regularly publish 
drafts of standards and solicit comments from the public, and even ask their members to 
help with distribution of draft documents and solicitation of feedback. At CEN-CENELEC and 
ETSI, specific public enquiry processes exist for these purposes.  
On the other hand, some industry-led SDOs, such as DVB, VITA and JEDEC, generally do 
not make draft standards available outside of their membership before they are approved 
and/or submitted for ANSI public review. There are two general reasons offered for 
declining to provide draft standards for public review: to prevent non-members from using 
such drafts to obtain patents that would be then asserted against the SDO members, and to 
avoid sending inaccurate signals to the marketplace regarding the content of final 
standards. SDOs adopting this approach emphasize that the openness of their membership 
counter-balances the lack of public distribution of their work (i.e., anyone sufficiently 
interested in their standards is welcome to join).  
Some SDOs that are very transparent in the process of standards development make final 
standards available to the public only upon payment of a fee (e.g. CEN-CENELEC, DIN, IEC, 
IEEE), while some SDOs that publicly disclose less during the process might publish the 
resulting standards free of charge on their websites (e.g. JEDEC, DVB).  
These variations result, among other things, from different business models. Those SDOs 
that support themselves by selling standards cannot make them freely available, while 
SDOs that can support themselves through membership dues, meeting fees and 
contributions may not need to charge for their standards. 
Separately from the availability of standards documents (both draft and final), SDOs differ 
in terms of transparency of their internal decision-making processes. At many SDOs, 
individual votes by members of governance bodies are not disclosed, either to the public or 
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even to SDO members. This contrasts starkly with the stakeholder expectations expressed 
in our survey.  83% of the survey respondents stated that SDO deliberations over 
significant new policies or policy changes, including meeting minutes and outcomes of 
votes, should be fully visible to the public (47%) or visible to SDO members (36%). But 
even where SDOs do not make all votes public, certain safeguards exist to ensure that 
voting is conducted appropriately.  In particular, many SDOs including IEEE and W3C, as 
well as ANSI, have express policies concerning conflicts of interest for their governing body 
members, requiring disclosure of both financial ties and corporate affiliations for these 
individuals. 
6.1.3 Balance of Interests 
Most SDOs recognize that achieving a balance of interests in standardization decision-
making is desirable, if not legally required. A significant majority of surveyed stakeholders 
(89%) stated that SDOs should ensure balance among different types of stakeholders when 
considering a significant new policy or policy change. Many SDOs (including AFNOR, CEN-
CENELEC, DIN, ETSI, IETF, and TSDSI), as well as ANSI, have specific rules regarding the 
composition of their governing boards to make sure that there is a balance of interests. SDO 
balance requirements can generally be divided into two categories: geographic and 
commercial.  Geographic balance seeks to achieve representation from a desired 
combination of different political units (countries, regions) in SDO governance.  Commercial 
balance seeks to achieve representation from different commercial sectors (e.g., 
manufacturers, users, consumers).  We discuss each of these approaches in turn below. 
6.1.3.1 Geographic Balance 
SDOs with significant governmental involvement often require that their governing bodies 
be comprised of representatives from specified national or regional political units. The 
intention is that SDO decisions be made by politically-recognized representatives of member 
states, each speaking with an equal voice, thereby avoiding dominance by larger 
economies. The most pronounced of these are ITU-T and ISO, in which membership and 
voting are by officially-recognized national delegations. Likewise, the voting members of IEC 
and CEN-CENELEC are national standardization committees. ETSI members are also 
grouped in national delegations for the purposes of voting on certain matters, including 
changes to the Statutes and the Rules of Procedure. TSDSI, with significant sponsorship 
from the Indian government, allocates part of its board to Indian governmental agencies, 
which collectively have a single vote. 
6.1.3.2 Commercial Balance 
In addition to geographic balance, many SDOs seek to achieve balance among the different 
commercial interests that participate in standards development. Such SDOs often divide 
participants into specified membership categories such as producers, consumers and civil 
society, and limit participation to specified numbers or proportions of participants from each 
category.  Just to illustrate this point, one such large SDO is ASTM International (not in our 
sample), which explains the need for balance as follows: 
The ASTM consensus process and its purpose of producing the most useful standard 
possible calls for representatives of small firms or consultancies to have the same vote as a 
large corporation. Small- and medium-sized enterprises have an equal footing with 
multinational corporate giants with numerous representatives on a subcommittee or 
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committee. This collective expertise should lead to more technical proficiency in a standard, 
but it must not lead to results that favor a certain company's process or product.142 
In order to achieve this desired balance, ASTM requires that on technical committees, 
“producers may not outnumber the rest of user, consumer and general interest members of 
a subcommittee, and producers can have only 50 percent or less of the vote.” 
SDOs differ in terms of whose interests they try to balance. ANSI-accredited SDOs are 
obliged to follow its Essential Requirements, which require that ‘[p]articipants from diverse 
interest categories shall be sought with the objective of achieving balance’. The ANSI 
Essential Requirements further specify that “in defining the interest categories appropriate 
to standards activity, consideration shall be given to at least the following: a) producer, b) 
user, c) general interest.” ANSI itself divides members into four “Member Forums” 
(company, government, organizational and consumer).143  The Nominating Committee for 
ANSI’s Board of Directors must have “a diversity of representatives and a balance of 
interests” and in selecting Directors must “attempt to ensure Board diversity and balance.” 
144 
In the European Union, according to Regulation 1025/2012, ESOs – CEN-CENELEC and ETSI 
– are required to ‘encourage and facilitate an appropriate representation and effective 
participation of all relevant stakeholders, including SMEs, consumer organisations and 
environmental and social stakeholders in their standardisation activities.’  At ETSI, for 
instance, this translates into a policy according to which one of its vice chairs is always held 
by a representative of users or SMEs. Similarly, at AFNOR and DIN, there are policies aimed 
at assuring balance in the representation of private companies, public administration and 
civil society.  
IEEE has a policy of balancing different categories of interests that are defined ad hoc at the 
committee level depending on the project. This is in line with the ANSI Essential 
Requirements stipulating that “interest categories appropriate to the development of 
consensus in any given standards activity are a function of the nature of the standards 
being developed. Interest categories shall be discretely defined” [cite]. ISO explicitly 
requires its members to take appropriate measures to facilitate the participation of 
consumers, SMEs, civil society and public authorities. Similar project-based ad hoc 
balancing was said to be employed at W3C.  
In our interviews, several organizations emphasized that they try to involve all relevant 
participants in SDO decisions. In other words, their balance strategy is one of 
representation. This mostly refers to the make-up of technical committees which are seen 
as key ways to assure balance of interests. For example, DIN obliges its members to inform 
the SDO if relevant stakeholders are not represented in particular matters, viewing broad 
participation as a requisite for state-of-the-art standards. At VITA, the technical director is 
responsible for making sure that there is a balance in the make-up of each technical 
committee. If there is a clear imbalance, the chairman may request the committee to solicit 
additional participants. DVB likewise requires broad representation from different sectors of 
the broadcast industry as a pre-requisite of initiating and continuing standardization work.  
Many of the above balance requirements apply to technical standardization work.  At IETF, 
where there is no express balance requirement for working groups, there are at least some 
                                           
142 ASTM Intl., Committee Balance and Voting Requirements, ASTM Standardization News May/June 2013, 
https://www.astm.org/standardization-news/?q=en-route/committee-balance-and-voting-requirements-
mj13.html  
143 https://www.ansi.org/membership/membership_forum/overview?menuid=2  
144 ANSI Constitution and By-laws, Sec. 3.03 (2015) 
https://share.ansi.org/Shared%20Documents/About%20ANSI/Governance/ANSI_Constitution_and_ByLaws_2
015.pdf  
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requirements for balance in terms of governance.  For example, membership on the 
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), the principal governing body for IETF, is 
structured to achieve broad representation not among different types of organizations, but 
among individuals with different areas of technical expertise. Thus, the IESG consists of the 
Area Directors of each of IETF’s seven technical work areas, together with certain ex officio 
appointees. 
Despite the perceived desire for balancing interests, several SDOs indicated that they have 
experienced difficulty convincing less usual stakeholders to invest time, effort and resources 
in the standardization process. Even large firms are sometimes interested in only part of the 
standardization process, and do not participate as broadly as they could in SDO governance. 
One illustration of this issue described in the literature involves the Smart Grid 
Interoperability Panel (SGIP) (not in our sample), a U.S.-based SDO formed by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to facilitate the development of technologies 
supporting a “smart” electrical power grid. In that case, despite the clear impact that 
resulting standards would have on the electrical power industry, it was difficult to attract 
interest by electrical utilities in SGIP’s governance or policies, particularly those surrounding 
IPR. Instead, SGIP’s IPR committee was populated largely by representatives of 
telecommunications and computer networking firms that had established an interest in 
standardization policy in those industries.145 
6.1.3.3 Balance in Voting 
The balance requirements described above typically mandate the composition of SDO 
technical and governance bodies by members of particular categories.  In addition, some 
SDOs also impose balance requirements on voting.  For example, DVB requires that 
decisions be supported by a majority of stakeholders within each membership category. At 
ETSI, votes of members are weighed: on certain matters – including amendment of the 
ETSI Statutes and Rules of Procedure – votes are cast by national delegations and weighted 
according to a formula that resembles that previously in use in the Council of the European 
Union; on other matters, votes are weighted by national GDP (for public administrations) or 
turnover in the electronic communications sector (for private firms),  as set forth in ETSI’s 
Directives. For the most part, however, SDOs rely on their compositional balance 
requirements to ensure that voting reflects the will of a balanced constituency.  For 
example, ASTM’s requirement that producers comprise no more than 50% of any technical 
committee means that producer firms will not be able to dominate any particular vote.  
SDOs that use consensus decision-making make it even more likely that minority views, so 
long as they are represented in the room, will be heard and respected. 
Implementing a requirement for balance in voting can be difficult in practice when an 
unbalanced set of industry stakeholders expresses the desire to participate in a decision 
making process (on standards or policies). In application of this principle, some 
stakeholders could be excluded from a process on the ground that their industry or category 
is already over-represented. Nevertheless, respondents to our survey on average did not 
feel that firms from the same industry would adequately represent their organization’s 
interests in an SDO governance body in which their organization could not directly 
participate. While the likelihood that firms from the same industry adequately represent an 
organization’s interests is rated at 2,86 out of 5, firms from the same industry are 
nevertheless ranked as the second-best proxy for a company’s interests, second only to 
trade or industry associations, and ahead of SDO staff or boards, government agencies, and 
firms from upstream or downstream industries. 
                                           
145 See Contreras (2012) 
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6.1.4 Consensus decision-making 
Another important principle of standardization in SDOs is consensus decision-making. As 
discussed at greater length in section 5, many SDOs strive to make important policy 
decisions based on a broader consensus of stakeholders, even though most SDOs do have 
processes allowing them to reach policy decisions by vote. As discussed, the extent to which 
SDOs make policy decisions in the absence of consensus varies between SDOs depending 
on fundamental features of the SDO governance. Nevertheless, consensus is often described 
as a desirable if not always achievable goal by SDOs, and viewed as an important 
requirement by a large number of stakeholders. 
As we have seen, even though the rules of most SDOs allow them to make policy decisions 
by vote, many SDOs have a tradition of decision-making by consensus.  The term 
“consensus” itself has different meanings in different contexts, and few SDOs define it 
explicitly.  ISO/IEC define consensus as “General agreement, characterized by the absence 
of sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part of the concerned 
interests and by a process that involves seeking to take into account the views of all parties 
concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments.” (ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004).  At ISO 
and JTC1, if there is a doubt regarding the existence of consensus, approval by a two-thirds 
majority of the relevant committee or subcommittee will suffice, though every attempt 
should be made to resolve negative votes.  Perhaps the SDO that has devoted the most 
consideration to the question of consensus is IETF, which has developed an entire document 
devoted to the topic.  As explained in RFC 7282 (June 2014): 
'Having full consensus, or unanimity, would be ideal, but we don't require it: 
Requiring full consensus allows a single intransigent person who simply keeps saying 
"No!" to stop the process cold.  We only require rough consensus: If the chair of a 
working group determines that a technical issue brought forward by an objector has 
been truly considered by the working group, and the working group has made an 
informed decision that the objection has been answered or is not enough of a 
technical problem to prevent moving forward, the chair can declare that there is 
rough consensus to go forward, the objection notwithstanding.' 
 
As is apparent from the above, consensus is different from a voting rule in that consensus 
factors in not only the preference of the voters, but also the intensity of these preferences. 
Consensus is typically characterized by the absence of sustained, intense opposition: a 
participant that is opposed to a given measure would vote against it in a voting procedure 
but, in a consensus procedure, that participant might decide that its opposition is not so 
fundamental as to warrant making a stand to prevent consensus from emerging. The 
standard for decision in a consensus procedure is not whether one agrees with a proposed 
measure or not, but rather whether one disagrees with the proposal to the extent that one 
cannot bear with it being accepted. This being said, it is not usually understood that 
consensus cannot be attained when a single stakeholder continues to object to a proposal, 
particularly when that stakeholder’s objection can be attributed to self-interest (e.g., an 
insistence that its own patented technology be included in a standard when the majority of 
participants prefer a superior technology).146 In such cases, many consensus-based bodies 
will recognize consensus even while acknowledging the dissenter’s objection. 
In our survey, 36% of respondents said that an SDO’s processes for adopting policy 
changes should be the same or similar to its processes for adopting technical standards, and 
                                           
146 This observation is generally supported by case law, in which claims by SDO participants that the exclusion of 
their proprietary technology from a standard evidences anticompetitive conduct by the SDO and its other 
participants have generally been rejected absent other evidence of collusion.  See, e.g., Addamax v. OSF (1st 
Cir.), Golden Bridge. 
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49% responded that the process for adopting policy changes should be more stringent than 
for adopting technical standards with respect to a list of factors including consensus [Q.28].  
Interestingly, there was a significant difference in responses as between Patent-Centric and 
Product-Centric respondents.  Of Patent-Centric respondents [n=13], 85% said that the 
process for adopting policy changes should be more stringent, while only 36% of Product-
Centric respondents responded in this manner.  A similar divergence appears in responses 
regarding the type of approval that should be required for important SDO policy 
amendments [Q.30].  Thus, 77% of Patent-Centric respondents, compared to only 40% of 
Product-Centric respondents, said that consensus should be obtained for important SDO 
policy amendments.  The remainder of Product-Centric respondents were almost evenly split 
between super-majority voting (24%) and “it depends on the policy” (28%).   
6.1.5 The Interplay of Due Process Principles and Resulting Tensions 
While most SDOs take one or more of the above due process approaches, none that we 
observed attempt to implement all approaches simultaneously, at least not to a significant 
degree.  One of the reasons for this may be an inherent tension among these principles.  In 
our interviews, some SDOs identified this tension.  IEEE, for example, was of the view that 
“you cannot have balance and openness.” IEEE, which emphasizes openness in its 
processes, explained that allowing all interested parties to participate in its processes can 
lead to an unbalanced distribution of participants.  That is, those parties most interested in 
a particular SDO’s activities may cluster within certain industries, business models or 
geographies.  Seeking to involve parties who are outside of those clusters may degrade 
SDO decision-making by enabling participants who are less invested in the outcomes to 
override the concerns of those who are most interested or who possess the greatest 
expertise.  IETF, also recognizing this tension, has no specified balance requirements, but 
instead relies on openness and transparency to achieve consensus on both standardization 
and most policy matters. 
By the same token, SDOs that impose balance requirements, thereby restricting 
participation to members of designated groups in pre-determined proportions, cannot be 
fully open to all interested parties (i.e., interested parties that are members of over-
represented categories may not be permitted to participate, or to vote on, matters affecting 
them). 
Some SDOs, recognizing this tension, diverge in their requirements of openness and 
balance depending on the context.  AFNOR, for example, favors openness in standard-
setting but balance as to governance and policy. Its technical committees are open and may 
therefore be unbalanced. For this reason, technical committees are not allowed to reach 
decisions by vote, but instead must make decisions by consensus. In contrast, AFNOR’s 
governing bodies have a specified composition aimed to achieve a balance of interest, and 
can decide by vote. 
There is a similar tension between both openness and balance, on one hand, and relying on 
the fiduciary duties of individuals in leadership roles towards the SDO as organization or 
requesting them to take into consideration public interest on the other hand. IEEE for 
instance stated that important decisions with respect to SDO governance are made in 
bodies that are not fully open to participation by any interested party, because such 
decisions must be made by individuals bound by a fiduciary duty to IEEE. While this 
sentiment was expressed by IEEE, IEEE is not unique in recognizing fiduciary duties of its 
governing body members, duties that are often imposed by corporate law in relevant 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, an approach of balancing decision-making processes according to 
stakeholder categories is in tension with requesting individuals to consider the public 
interest as opposed to the interest of a stakeholder or stakeholder category. 
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6.2 SDO governance and legitimacy 
6.2.1 Legitimacy and Institutions 
In Section 4.5.2., we have seen that there is a public interest in the activities of SDOs, 
including the development, production and management of standards. That public interest 
has long been recognized and acted upon: section 4.1. chronicles how standardization is 
affected by a set of laws that were created specifically to govern it, as well as by more 
general laws (e.g., antitrust and competition laws) that were applied to standardization so 
as to give rise to a distinctive legal corpus. Section 6.1. describes a set of procedural 
principles implemented to a varying degree by SDOs in their different processes to comply 
with legal and other external requirements, but also with the explicit goal to “serve in the 
best interest of the public”.147 
At a more analytical level, the question arises as to why and how the framework of external 
constraints outlined above – with its combination of legal and market constraints – and the 
SDO-internal processes designed to organize stakeholder participation and representation 
provide sufficient guarantees that SDO activities meet public policy objectives. In other 
words, what makes the activities and decisions of SDOs legitimate from a public 
perspective? For our purposes, we understand legitimacy as the property of SDO 
governance that makes SDO activities and output “worthy of support” (Baldwin, Cave and 
Lodge, 2012).  
There is a wide range of literature on institutional legitimacy, which we will not review here 
(see Peter, 2017). Its central focus is to justify the existence and exercise of authority and 
coercion by a political entity. To the extent that we apply this literature to SDOs, we take it 
out of the traditional context of the nation-State and into the less charted realm of 
‘transnational’ or ‘global’ governance (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006). As described in the 
literature, a number of sources of legitimacy can apply to institutions. While they all 
contribute to the legitimacy of the decisions taken by an institution, they attach to different 
elements of that institution. In line with a frequently-made distinction,148 some of them 
attach to the input to the institution (input-legitimacy), others to the process(es) followed 
by the institution (process-legitimacy) and others still to the output as such (output-
legitimacy). These sources of legitimacy include: 
1. Consent of affected parties. Legitimacy flows from the fact that affected parties have 
consented to the action and the decision of the entity in question. At its most basic, 
consent provides a basis for the legitimacy of contracts. In a more elaborate fashion, 
consent can also serve to legitimize more complex institutions – such as corporations 
or associations – where stakeholders expressly agree to the rules of the institution 
upon joining and are then bound to the decisions of the institution, even if they 
might not agree with a specific decision. Legitimacy by consent reaches its limits 
when the effects of the decisions made by an institution extend beyond the set of 
parties that have consented, i.e. when there are spillovers or externalities. 
2. Market forces. When an institution is subject to market forces, it will be punished for 
‘bad’ decisions and rewarded for ‘good’ ones. This source of legitimacy is essentially 
output-oriented, and it depends on a number of assumptions. First of all, market 
forces must work in line with public policy objectives: if the public policy is to 
maximize welfare in the short term, then market forces will probably be aligned with 
it. More complex policy aims – including those relating to safety, health, etc. which 
lie outside of the purview of this report – might not be achieved through the 
                                           
147 http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/position-0514.pdf 
148 See Bekkers & Edwards (2007). 
  125 
operation of market forces alone. Secondly, market forces must be effective, i.e. 
reward and punishment must follow and be visibly linked with performance.  
3. Democracy. A key source of legitimacy is democracy, i.e. there is a cohesive demos 
from which the institution has emerged, and it follows democratic principles in its 
activities and outcomes. In the transnational realm, this is unlikely to occur; rather 
democratic legitimation would be indirect. This would imply that the institution would 
be under the control of a democratic body, as evidenced through mechanisms 
designed to make the institution accountable to the democratic body (delegation, 
transparency, reporting, review, etc.). 
4. Procedure. Here legitimacy is seen to arise from the procedure that is followed by 
the institution (process-legitimacy). Procedural guarantees – including the cluster of 
principles regrouped under ‘due process’ or ‘fundamental justice’ – ensure that the 
outcome of the process is legitimate. Courts are the epitome of legitimation by 
procedure, since they are bound to a strict set of procedural rules in rendering their 
decisions and the strength of these decisions results from compliance with these 
rules. At the same time, even in the case of courts, one can question whether 
procedure is sufficient to ensure legitimacy. 
5. Expertise. In the contemporary regulatory literature, expertise is seen as a source of 
legitimacy, in what are often pejoratively called ‘technocratic’ models. Because the 
institution is expert at what it is doing (or it is staffed by experts), then its decisions 
gain legitimacy. This is a form of input-legitimacy. Some assumptions must 
nevertheless be satisfied for expertise to contribute to legitimacy: expertise must be 
genuinely present, decisions must be based on expert considerations and not on 
extraneous motives, and decisions must be within the scope of the expertise. This is 
why expertise alone – not unlike procedure – is rarely sufficient to establish overall 
legitimacy. 
 
6.2.2 Legitimacy and SDO Governance Models 
The SDO ecosystem illustrates how public authorities are relying on a mix of the sources 
listed above in order to ensure the legitimacy of SDO activities and decisions. Taken 
individually, each of the sources has its limits, but they complement one another in the case 
of SDOs. 
6.2.2.1 SDOs and Consent-Based Legitimacy 
As a starting point, for many SDOs themselves and many of their stakeholders, consent 
provides legitimacy. SDOs can be seen as essentially private organisations, which draw their 
legitimacy from the consent of the parties. They are too complex to be based on a simple 
contractual model where every party has to consent to every action (which would translate 
into unanimity decision-making). Rather, as their legal status indicates,149 they follow an 
associative or corporate model. Members join freely, and upon joining they accept the rules 
of the SDO. These include decision-making rules (as will be detailed below), which allow the 
SDO to decide matters following a specific voting procedure. Consensus decision-making – 
common among SDOs – comes close to consent, to the extent it is characterized by the 
absence of sustained opposition. Otherwise, SDOs make decisions according to some form 
of majority voting rule (simple or enhanced). As long as an SDO follows its decision-making 
rules, so the argument goes, then the resulting decision would be legitimized by the consent 
given upon joining that SDO, even with respect to parties that would have been outvoted.  
                                           
149 See supra, Heading 5.2.1.1. 
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In many cases, legitimation by consent can extend beyond the explicit provisions of the 
SDO policy documents. Several SDOs are established organizations, sometimes with more 
than a century of history. They operate under a large number of implicit organizational 
norms that are transmitted from experienced participants to newcomers. New members 
joining the SDO adhere and consent to these observable practices and implicit norms in 
addition to the explicit policy provisions. When analyzing the legitimacy of the process that 
was followed for making a specific decision, it can therefore be useful to assess whether the 
established practices and processes of the SDO were followed. Nevertheless, conformity 
with the implicit norms of an organization is often more difficult to assess than compliance 
with explicit policy provisions; especially in the case of SDOs that do not keep archives of 
their policy deliberations or make these available to stakeholders.  
From the perspective of the SDO and its stakeholders, consent is generally seen as 
sufficient to endow the resulting decision with legitimacy. Building thereon, as discussed in 
Section 4.1, applicable laws provide that standard-setting should usually be done by 
consensus, which represents a relatively high level of consent, i.e. the absence of sustained 
opposition. Reliance on consensus not only reflects the practice of SDOs, but it also 
guarantees some measure of protection for all stakeholder interests, even those in the 
minority, by emphasizing the forcefulness of the opposition rather than its sheer numerical 
strength. In any event, from a public perspective, SDO decisions may create externalities or 
give rise to spillover effects: in such cases, while consent would provide a kind of ‘internal’ 
legitimacy, it might not suffice to establish the ‘external’ legitimacy of all SDO decisions.  
6.2.2.2 SDOs and Market-Based Legitimacy 
The disciplining and incentivizing effect of market forces is often brought up as an external 
complement to consent. Our survey [Q.9.f] confirms that SDO reputation is an important 
factor leading firms to decide whether or not to join (79% of respondents rating SDO 
reputation as important or very important to decision to join, n=42). The activities and 
decisions of SDOs would then be legitimized because participants are free to defect to a 
competing SDO if they are not satisfied with an SDO’s conduct or policies. If participants 
remain, then it must be that the SDO is operating in an acceptable manner and hence its 
decisions would be worthy of support. This is in line with the predictions made in the more 
theoretical literature (See section 4). However, our research has also highlighted more 
complex competitive dynamics.  
Standards are often written not on a blank slate, but rather against the background of 
existing standards concerning the same product or service. These existing standards were 
often developed in an established SDO, which then benefits from incumbency: it regroups 
the stakeholders, the expertise and the know-how concerning the product or service in 
question, and it is the natural forum to develop further standards. As our interviews 
indicated, SDO membership is sticky: it is not so easy for a dissatisfied participant to create 
another SDO or move to a competing SDO. In addition, at the very least, a critical mass of 
dissatisfied participants must leave for standard development in the alternative forum to be 
viable. Failing such a critical mass, the only real option is exit, which is what was predicted 
(but did not materialize) in the wake of VITA’s policy change in 2007 (Contreras, 2013a). 
Our survey also confirms that stakeholder firms do pay attention to the IPR policies of an 
SDO before joining, suggesting that they are aware that it is difficult to move out once an 
SDO becomes established [Q.9.i].  Specifically, 75% of respondents stated that an SDO’s 
IPR policies were important or very important to their decision whether or not to join a 
given SDO. 
Rather, in the course of this study, we have come across instances where stakeholders “left 
the room” rather than “voted with their feet”. These stakeholders – visibly dissatisfied with 
the IPR policies of established SDOs – decided to form consortia to make progress on 
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certain issues or develop new standards. Once these consortia achieve their goals, their 
work feeds back into or is submitted to those SDOs for validation and official status. The 
threat of “leaving the room” seems a more immediate form of competitive pressure brought 
to bear on SDOs, and a more potent threat than individual stakeholder exit or a collective 
movement to another SDO (new or existing) altogether. At the same time, the stakeholders 
that “leave the room” are also constrained: they must avoid falling afoul of the SDO’s legal 
constraints, and hence they have an interest in positioning their consortium as a 
complement to the SDO, and in coming back to the SDO to benefit from its legitimacy. 
6.2.2.3 SDOs and Democratic Legitimacy 
While SDOs are not democratic institutions in the traditional sense, they can also receive 
indirect legitimation through delegations from democratic bodies, including national 
parliaments and executives, EU institutions or international institutions. As described in 
section 4.1. above, this is the case in the EU in particular, which entertains an elaborate – 
and distinctive – scheme to confer some delegated public authority on SDOs. The essence of 
the EU system is found in the ‘new approach’ as developed in the 1980s and more recently 
recast in Regulation 1025/2012, whereby EU institutions work closely with the three 
European standardization organizations (CEN-CENELEC, ETSI) and with national 
standardization bodies. As mentioned above, in order to provide democratic legitimacy, 
delegation must be accompanied by some form of accountability to the principal. In the EU, 
this takes the form of annual reports and work programmes, participation and transparency 
requirements.  
6.2.2.4 SDOs, Due Process and Procedural Legitimacy 
We observed in Section 4.1 that the governance principles emanating from trade law and 
competition law/antitrust law tend to converge. These governance principles can be seen as 
a set of safeguards designed to ensure, through procedural constraints, that the activities 
and decisions of SDOs are legitimate (at least as far as the policy goals of these laws are 
concerned). The consensus principle, for instance, could be read to imply that if and once no 
significant sustained opposition to a proposal is left, the resulting decision is likely not to run 
afoul of public policy and therefore enjoys some legitimacy. In other words, if a course of 
action was proposed that went against the public interest, chances are that some 
stakeholders would have opposed it strenuously as well. 
Not only do the due process principles described above help to ensure that SDOs comply 
with applicable antitrust and competition laws, they also serve to legitimize the role of SDOs 
as the producers of output having a substantial public character. 
The three due process principles studied above in Chapter 5 can help SDOs to achieve this 
legitimacy.  For example, SDO rules requiring balance can ensure that all relevant 
stakeholders have a voice in the governance and policy making activity of the SDO.  SDOs 
such as DIN, AFNOR, ETSI, DVB. CEN, CENELEC, ISO and IEC, by design, include 
international representation in their decision-making bodies, thereby ensuring that a diverse 
set of viewpoints is represented in SDO governance.  In our survey, 89% of respondents 
(n=45) said that when an SDO is considering a significant new policy or policy change, it 
should seek to ensure that there is a balance of interests among the persons participating in 
the proposal, discussion and adoption of that policy (n=45) [Q46]. 
Openness and transparency also help to establish legitimacy and public accountability. 
Some SDOs such as IETF take this principle to heart, conducting nearly all deliberations 
over standards development and policy (including, surprisingly, SDO financial and budgetary 
matters)150 via open meetings and online facilities, with publicly accessible archives.  But 
                                           
150 Only a small number of contractual and personnel-related matters are not made fully available to the public. 
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IETF is something of an outlier.  While many SDOs abide by principles of openness in 
standards development, a number of these do not apply the same principles to their internal 
governance or policy making.  Our survey respondents were similarly divided on this issue.  
In response to the question of how transparent an SDO should make its deliberations over 
policy changes (e.g., meeting minutes and outcomes of votes), 47% responded that such 
information should be fully visible to the public, while 36% responded that such information 
should only be visible to SDO members (n=45) [Q47]. This being said, 70% of respondents 
felt that openness of SDO processes was important or very important to their decision to 
join an SDO (n=43) [Q.9.l]. 
6.2.2.5 SDOs and Expert Legitimacy 
Finally, the SDO ecosystem relies on the expertise found within SDOs. There is no question 
that SDOs are expert fora: each SDO brings together stakeholders that are interested in a 
given product or service – whether as producers, implementers, IP holders, etc. – and these 
stakeholders151 send their respective experts to participate in the activities of the SDO. 
Inasmuch as they are expert bodies, SDOs are somewhat similar to regulatory agencies, 
and regulatory studies literature can be used in analyzing them (with the necessary 
caution). Standardization is still conceived of primarily as an expert activity, carried out by 
technical professionals. SDO management and staff are also made up mostly of technical 
experts. This concentration of expertise gives SDOs some legitimacy: their activities and 
decisions deserve to be heeded because SDOs and the participating individuals are experts 
who know the subject matter better than the general public.  
Nevertheless, as set out above, there are limits to expertise as a source of legitimacy, and 
these limits apply to SDOs as well. First, the activities and decisions of the SDO must 
genuinely be guided by expert (technical) considerations, and not by political or commercial 
considerations. In this respect, the precise role of individual participants in SDO activities is 
not always clear. They are sometimes seen as the representatives of their employers, in 
which case one can presume that they are sometimes taking positions on the basis of the 
commercial or political interests of their employers. Sometimes they are seen as delegates 
who should decide in the best interest of the organization (or in the general interest), in 
which case technical expertise should usually prevail. Secondly, expert legitimacy only 
extends as far as the relevant expertise. As is the case with regulatory agencies, SDOs are 
also called upon to decide matters that may not entirely – or at all – fall within their field of 
expertise. In such situations, there is no longer any reason to consider SDO activities and 
decisions legitimate on account of expertise. 
6.2.2.6 Multifaceted Legitimacy for SDOs 
In light of the above, we can see that legal constraints and market constraints combine to 
ensure, from a public perspective, that there is a credible case to consider that SDO 
activities and decisions are legitimate and therefore ‘worthy of support’. Consent and 
market forces already confer a strong ‘internal’ legitimacy, to which a combination of 
democracy, procedure and expertise adds ‘external’ legitimacy so that, from a public policy 
perspective, one can have a measure of confidence that SDO activities and decisions do not 
conflict with public policy and can be respected (and even endorsed by reference in public 
law). The applicable law plays a role in setting parameters for consent, conferring indirect 
democratic legitimacy through delegation, and providing a set of basic due process 
procedural principles. 
 
  
                                           
151 If they are not individuals. 
  129 
7 Application to SDO IPR policies 
 
Highlights 
 Stakeholders care about IPR policies (here with focus on disclosure and licensing 
rules), yet Product-Centric and Patent-Centric firms diverge in their assessment of 
and expectation towards IPR policies. 
 In the specific case of IPR policies, the procedural approach set out in Chapter 4 is 
supplemented with a safe harbour approach, where public authorities describe the 
general content of a “Baseline IPR policy” that would be deemed to comply with 
applicable legal requirements, including competition/antitrust, public procurement, 
and trade law.  
 The Baseline Policy typically includes a requirement of patent disclosure and licensing 
at a high level of generality. 
 It is part and parcel of the self- or co-regulatory approach to SDO governance, as it 
applies to IPR policies, that SDOs have some autonomy to move beyond the Baseline 
Policy. 
 Many leading institutions limit their IPR policy to this “Baseline Policy” without 
significant additional detail (ISO/IEC/ITU joint IPR policy, IPR policy in the ANSI 
Essential Requirements). 
 SDOs that are particularly constrained by the external factors outlined in Chapter 4 
tend to stick more closely to the Baseline Policy (including the first layer 
organizations AFNOR, ANSI, CEN, CENELEC, ETSI, IEC, ISO, ITU; and the third layer 
organizations ECMA and JEDEC).  
 Over time, prompted by legal or market developments, some SDOs have gone 
beyond the Baseline Policy (DVB, IEEE-SA, VITA, W3C), or adopted idiosyncratic 
policy approaches that differ from the Baseline Policy (IETF). Common variations 
include the creation of a licensing obligation for certain parties and/or defining 
requirements for inclusion of patented technologies that go beyond a general FRAND 
licensing commitment. 
 IPR policy changes moving beyond the Baseline Policy comprise: (i) uncontested 
policy changes (transfer requirement for FRAND commitments and licenses), (ii) 
changes contested among the stakeholders, where the SDO ends up committing 
itself in the outcome (‘committal choices’) and (iii) changes contested among the 
stakeholders, but where the SDO ends up not committing itself in the outcome (‘non-
committal choices’), for instance by offering a menu of options, an optional choice or 
a broad interpretation open to many readings.  
 When mapping IPR policy choices to governance architectures, it can be seen that 
committal choices tend to be made by leadership-driven SDOs, and non-committal 
choices by membership-driven SDOs.  
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 Committal choices Non-committal choices 
Policy choices 
Ex-ante 
disclosure of 
licensing 
terms 
Mandatory ex-
ante disclosure 
VITA Optional ex-
ante disclosure 
ETSI, IEEE 
(2007) 
Dispute 
resolution 
Mandatory ADR DVB, VITA Leave dispute 
resolution to 
parties 
most SDOs 
(incl. ETSI, 
IETF, 
ISO/IEC/ITU) 
Restricting 
right to seek 
injunctive relief 
IEEE (2015) 
Royalty-free 
licensing 
mandatory RF W3C optional IEEE, IETF, 
many, other 
SDOs potentially 
mandatory RF 
ECMA  
Interpretations 
FRAND Define specific 
criteria of 
FRAND 
IEEE (2015) provide no 
position as to 
what (if any) 
specific pricing 
criteria define 
FRAND 
ETSI, IETF, 
ISO/IEC/ITU, 
and most other 
SDOs 
Component-
level 
licensing 
Specific policy 
provision 
requiring 
component-
level licensing 
IEEE No position 
with respect to 
ongoing 
controversy/ 
ambiguity of 
policy 
ETSI 
Specific policy 
interpretation 
ANSI 
 
 The Baseline Policy enjoys legitimacy because of its link with the external constraints 
arising from law. Both committal and non-committal choices can be legitimate, but in 
different ways.  
o For committal choices, consent is important: legitimacy depends on how solid 
a consensus was reached in the SDO on a contested issue. 
o Non-committal choices might enjoy a broader consent within the SDO, but are 
more likely to be subject to market discipline. 
 SDOs are therefore forced to confront contested issues and seek a legitimate 
solution, whether head-on by making a committal choice or indirectly by facing 
market responses to a non-committal choice. In all cases, SDOs can seek to bolster 
the legitimacy of their choices through endorsement by a public authority. 
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 Since each SDO decides for itself, in the light of its specific circumstances, whether 
and how to manage its IPR policy, some variance in IPR policies will result. Yet, 
because of competitive and cooperative relationships between SDOs, IPR policy 
changes circulate amongst SDOs: 
o For uncontested policy changes circulation and adoption by many SDOs can 
be very fast, and eventually the Baseline Policy can evolve to include these 
changes.  
o For contested policy changes, two mechanisms are at work: 
 On one hand, horizontally as between SDOs, the changes adopted by a 
first-mover SDO are studied by subsequent SDOs, by way of 
experiment or emulation. Diversity in IPR policies is likely to remain, 
since membership-driven and leadership-driven SDOs will probably opt 
for different choices (non-committal or committal, respectively). 
 On the other hand, circulation through precedent is also possible if a 
hierarchically superior institution is involved, so that a decision of one 
SDO is made binding for another SDO through the endorsement of 
that institution. Such institutions face limitations, however: 
competition authorities and courts are constrained by the limits of 
competition law, and do not always intervene consistently, over time 
or over jurisdictions. As for ANSI, it is not truly a public authority, and 
its remit is limited to a subset of US-based SDOs. 
 
7.1 Brief Review of SDO IPR policies 
SDO IPR policies, particularly those relating to patents, have been studied extensively 
(Lemley, 2002; Chiao et al., 2007; Blind et al., 2011; Bekkers and Updegrove, 2012; NRC, 
2013; Tsai & Wright 2015; Baron and Spulber, 2018). The purpose of our analysis is not to 
replicate these studies, but to examine the governance implications of SDO policies on IPR, 
and to use prominent changes to SDO IPR policies as case studies for our analysis of SDO 
governance. While SDO IPR policies can address a range of issues, including copyright, 
trademarks, and the prior art status of contributions to standard development, our analysis 
will focus on the most prominent and contentious aspect of SDO IPR policies, i.e. the 
provisions regarding disclosure and licensing of standards essential patents (SEPs).  
7.1.1 Documents defining SDO IPR policies 
SDO policies with respect to SEPs are often part of an SDO’s broader IPR policies (e.g. ETSI, 
IETF, TSDSI). Nevertheless, many SDOs have a specific patent policy, and address other 
IPR matters (such as copyright and trademark usage) in other documents or other sections 
of the same document (e.g. IEEE, ISO/IEC/ITU, W3C, IETF). Whether as part of a broader 
IPR policy, or as a stand-alone policy, patent policies are generally defined by one of the 
following documents: a separate policy document, one or several of the SDO’s general 
policy documents (e.g. bylaws, rules and procedures, operations manuals, etc.), or the 
SDO’s member agreement (sometimes called a Memorandum of Understanding). In addition 
to actual policy documents, numerous SDOs have published guidelines or explanations 
relating to their IPR policies. 
ISO, IEC and ITU-T have adopted a common code of practice, the “ISO/IEC/ITU common 
patent policy”; which is explained in the “Guidelines for Implementation of the Common 
Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC”. These documents define a common policy with only 
minor differences that are specific to each organization. IETF’s patent policy is described in 
RFC 8179, “Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology”. ECMA has adopted the “ECMA 
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Code of Conduct in Patent Matters”, W3C has adopted the “W3C Patent Policy”, and TSDSI 
the “TSDSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy”, which are all defined by separate policy 
documents.  
CEN-CENELEC have a specific policy document on patent policy, the CEN-CENELEC Guide 8: 
“CEN-CENELEC Guidelines for Implementation of the Common Policy on Patents (and other 
statutory intellectual property rights based on inventions)”. Nevertheless, this document is 
only “intended to complement, clarify and facilitate the implementation of the Patent 
Policy”, which refers to the ISO/IEC/ITU common patent policy endorsed by CEN-CENELEC. 
Other SDOs that we studied include a patent or IPR policy in their general policy documents 
(e.g. ETSI, IEEE SA, JEDEC, VITA). At ETSI, the IPR policy is included in Annex 6 to the 
“ETSI Rules of Procedure”, the main policy document accompanying the Statutes and co-
defining most of the high-level aspects of the organization. At IEEE SA, article 6 of the 
Standards Board Bylaws defines the organization’s patent policy. This document “covers the 
organization and basic procedures of the IEEE-SA Standards Board.” The Standards Board 
and its Bylaws are instituted by the “IEEE Standards Association Operations Manual”. JEDEC 
and VITA include IPR policies in their most fundamental policy documents (Section 8.2 of 
the “JEDEC Manual of Organization and Procedure”, and Section 10 of the “VSO Policies and 
Procedures”, respectively). 
The IPR policy of the DVB project is laid out in Article 14 of the « Memorandum of 
Understanding” among DVB members. In addition to the SDO’s own documents, policies of 
other organizations sometimes also apply. AFNOR, DIN and CEN-CENELEC directly 
implement the ISO/IEC/ITU common patent policy, either by translating and transposing it 
into the organization’s policies (AFNOR); or by reference and endorsement in the SDO 
documents (CEN-CENELEC and DIN).  
AFNOR and DIN determine patent or IPR policies that apply to a variety of subsidiary 
national standards organizations.  
ANSI has a patent policy, the “ANSI patent policy - Inclusion of Patents in American 
National Standards”, which is Art. 3.1. of the ANSI Essential Requirements, and binding 
upon all ANSI-accredited SDOs with respect to their development of American National 
Standards. In our sample, ANSI-accredited SDOs include IEEE SA, JEDEC and VITA.  
AFNOR’s IPR policy, is included in the “Règles pour la normalisation française”, ‘Instances et 
procédures de travail, Partie 1’ (Article 2.9., including the patent policy in art. 2.9.3.2.). 
This is AFNOR’s main policy document, developed under the responsibility of AFNOR’s board 
and the CCPN. In addition to AFNOR, this document is applicable to the French sectoral 
standardization bodies. DIN has a very short section on IPR in clause 7.9 of DIN 820-1 
“Standardization – Part 1: Principles”. This document is a basic German standard; it 
describes “general principles, organization and results of standardization. It applies for the 
bodies of DIN, the German Institute for Standardization e. V. and for other organizations as 
well as any person, including the ‘public’ if their involvement in accordance with this 
standard is intended.” 
In addition to these hierarchical relationships, SDO IPR policies are shaped by horizontal 
agreements. ETSI and TSDSI, together with other SDOs not in our sample, are part of 
3GPP. In the “Third Generation Partnership Project Agreement”, Section 3.1., they agree to 
“make their IPR Policy available for consideration by the other Organizational Partners”, to 
“encourage that their IPR Policies are respected by their members”, and to “encourage their 
respective members to declare their willingness to grant licenses on fair, reasonable terms 
and conditions on a non-discriminatory basis”. The same principles are also institutionalized 
in Article 55 of the 3GPP Working Procedures.  
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7.1.2 Participant perceptions and concerns re. IPR policies 
Our survey asked several questions regarding SDO participant perceptions and attitudes 
toward SDO IPR policies.  As noted above [Q.9.i], 75% of the respondents to our survey 
stated that an SDO’s IPR policies were important or very important to their decision whether 
or not to join a given SDO. 53% of respondents viewed exorbitant patent royalty demands 
or patent litigation as significant or very significant risks relating to standardisation, while 
48% viewed obligations to make IP available on undesirable terms as significant or very 
significant risks. 
Likewise, attitudes toward IPR roughly divided survey respondents into camps that were 
either Patent-Centric or Product-Centric. Most Product-Centric firms stated that it would be 
beneficial to have more guidance from SDOs regarding the meaning of licensing 
commitments (average score of 4.36 out of 5), more guidance regarding the specific 
obligations arising out of a FRAND commitment (average score of 3.73 out of 5), SDO 
participation in the formation of patent pools covering standards (average score of 3.5 out 
of 5), and SDO determination of aggregate royalty rates applicable to particular standards 
(average score of 3.5. out of 5). Patent-centric firms on average did not support these 
measures (average score of 2.50 for more guidance regarding the meaning of licensing 
commitments, 2.79 for more guidance regarding the specific obligations arising out of a 
FRAND commitment, 2.17 for SDO formation of patent pools, and only 1.5 for SDO 
determination of aggregate royalty rates). Other potential SDO policy responses, including 
SDO arbitration of policy disputes among SDO members (average score of 2.79 among 
product-centric, 1.75 among patent-centric respondents) and greater discussion of patent 
licensing terms among SDO members (average score of 2.86 by Product-Centric 
respondents, and only 1.50 by Patent-Centric respondents) were on average viewed 
unfavorably by both groups of respondents; even though patent-centric firms were once 
again significantly more likely to disagree with these policy options.152   
Both types of firms on average were more likely to agree than disagree with the statements 
that “SDO policies requiring FRAND commitments have proven generally successful” and 
“FRAND ensures an adequate balance between implementers and IPR holders”. Patent-
Centric respondents generally evidenced higher levels of satisfaction (average scores of 
4.64 and 4.43, respectively) than Product-Centric respondents (3.59 and 3.50, 
respectively). Conversely, Product-Centric respondents gave an average score of 3.64 to the 
statement “The terms ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ are too vague and open to too many conflicting 
interpretations”, compared to an average score of 2.71 from Patent-Centric respondents.  
The implications of this divergence are clear but not surprising: Patent-Centric firms prefer 
an environment in which SDOs do not interfere with patent licensing negotiations, while 
Product-Centric firms feel that some forms of increased SDO involvement in the patent 
licensing context would be beneficial. Given this clear divergence, SDOs do not have an 
easy task in developing IPR policies that satisfy all stakeholder groups. Below, we discuss 
how SDOs have approached the development and approval of their IPR policies against this 
backdrop. 
7.1.3 Main IPR policy features and policy options 
7.1.3.1 Patent Disclosure 
 
                                           
152 Possible reasons that SDO participants are unwilling to discuss SEP licensing terms, including potential 
competition law and commercial rationales, are discussed in Contreras 2017b (pp. 702-04).  
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Many SDOs require their members to disclose potential SEPs. Several researchers have 
empirically analyzed the differences in IPR disclosure rules both between SDOs and over 
time (Lemley, 2002; Chiao et al. 2007; Bekkers and Updegrove, 2012; Tsai and Wright, 
2015; Bekkers 2017; Baron and Spulber, 2018).  
Bekkers and Updegrove (2012) offer an in-depth survey of the policies of 12 SDOs 
representing a cross section of organizational models, geographic region, and technology 
focus.  They describe in detail the many variants that SDOs have adopted regarding the 
mechanics of patent disclosure (timing, knowledge, level of detail, definition of essentiality, 
updating). Several papers analyze the effects of patent disclosure rules in a dynamic 
standard adoption process (Layne-Farrar, 2011; Contreras, 2011; Ganglmair and Tarantino, 
2014). 
7.1.3.2 Patent Licensing 
SDOs have developed various policy requirements regarding the licensing of SEPs covering 
their standards. These policies differ among SDOs. Bekkers and Updegrove (2012) and ABA 
(2007) describe in detail the many variants that SDOs have adopted regarding licensing 
commitments (FRAND vs. royalty-free, beneficiaries, duration, field of use, geographic 
scope, transfer with underlying patents, suspension of licenses, requirements that licensees 
license-back their own patents (reciprocity), and the patent holder’s ability to opt-out of 
granting licenses under certain circumstances). Several papers investigate the economic 
effects of existing or suggested licensing rules (Ganglmair et al. 2012, Dewatripont and 
Legros, 2013; Layne-Farrar et al., 2014) 
According to existing studies, most of the SDO policies require licensing of SEPs on terms 
that are at least FRAND. Of 36 SDO patent policies reviewed by Lemley (2002), 29 
contained FRAND commitments; and of 251 laptop standards identified by Biddle et al. 
(2010), 75% were subject to FRAND commitments.  In their recent study of 36 SDO 
policies, Baron and Spulber (2018) find 9 SDOs that require FRAND licensing and 23 that 
permit the licensor to choose from a menu of licensing options, with FRAND licensing being 
the least restrictive. Pohlmann and Blind (2016) find, based on analysis of more than 
200,000 SEP disclosures across a range of SDOs, that 68% of such disclosures contain 
FRAND licensing commitments. Though less common than SDO policies permitting SEP 
holders to charge royalties at FRAND rates, some SDOs require their participants to license 
patents on reasonable terms that are royalty-free (RF).  
Much has been written regarding the meaning of FRAND.  Comprehensive discussions of the 
many diverse terms found in FRAND licensing agreements can be found in Pentheroudakis 
and Baron (2017), NAS (2013), Bekkers and Updegrove (2012) and ABA (2007). In 
addition, there is an extensive literature proposing economically grounded interpretations of 
such FRAND licensing commitments (Baumol and Swanson, 2005; Layne-Farrar et al., 
2007; Sidak, 2013; Carlton & Shampine 2014). 
7.1.3.3 Patent Transfers 
An increasing number of SDOs have required in their internal policies that participants that 
transfer SEPs as to which licensing commitments have been made must ensure that those 
commitments are binding on successive owners of the SEPs (ISO/IEC, IETF, IEEE, ETSI). 
The ANSI Essential Requirements (Sec. 3.1.1) contain a similar requirement. Bekkers and 
Updegrove (2012) catalog SDOs that impose such transfer requirements, and NAS (2013) 
and Block (2017) discuss the variety of SDO policy provisions that can be employed in this 
regard. The IEEE’s 2015 policy amendments are an example of such provisions.  Most 
commentators who have considered the matter support the implementation of voluntary 
policy mechanisms to ensure the binding nature of SEP licensing commitments following a 
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transfer of the SEPs (Kühn et al. (2013), NAS (2013), Kesan and Hayes (2014), Contreras 
(2015a), CRA (2016)). 
In some cases, SDO participants have transferred SEPs to patent assertion entities (PAEs) 
for the purpose of monetization and assertion (this practice is sometimes referred to as 
“privateering” (Lundqvist, 2014, Hovenkamp & Cotter 2016, Ewing, 2011). Pentheroudakis 
(2016) found that approximately 80% of patents asserted by PAEs were obtained from 
operating companies. Contreras (2016b) and Contreras et al (2018) analyze the 
enforcement of SEPs in litigation by practicing and non-practicing entities in the U.S., 
Germany and UK, finding that a significant proportion of SEP assertions in each of these 
jurisdictions are brought by PAEs. In one recent case, a product manufacturer has alleged 
that a SEP holder conspired with a number of PAEs in violation of its FRAND commitments 
and U.S. antitrust laws to subdivide a portfolio of SEPs in order to collect excessive licensing 
fees (Apple (2016)). These issues will bear close scrutiny as such cases progress. 
7.1.3.4 Encouragement of Patent Pools 
Licenses for SEPs for several important standards, particularly in the consumer electronics 
industry, are available through patent pools.  Despite the potential benefits offered by pools 
(Shapiro and Varian, 1999, Shapiro, 2001, Contreras, 2013b, Lundqvist, 2014), relatively 
few patent pools have been formed around technical interoperability standards. Biddle et al. 
(2010) find that of 251 standards implemented in a typical laptop computer, only 3% were 
subject to patent pools, with the remainder subject to FRAND or royalty-free licensing 
commitments. Pohlmann and Blind (2016), analyzing more than 200,000 individual SEP 
declarations, find that only 9% of declared SEPs are pooled. Among the existing patent 
pools, many pools only contain a subset of the known SEPs covering the standards for which 
the pools were formed.  Examples include the Via Licensing and Sisvel pools for IEEE’s 
802.11 standard and MPEG-LA’s pool for ITU’s H.264 standard.  There are several possible 
explanations for the relative scarcity of patent pools in the field, including significant up-
front costs associated with evaluating pooled patents for essentiality (Contreras, 2013b). 153  
While patent pools are administered by pool licensing administrators operating 
independently from SDOs, some SDOs and consortia have policies of actively encouraging 
pool formation. The DVB Forum offers a unique example of a developer of voluntary 
consensus standards, all members of which participate in a patent pool (Eltzroth, 2008). 
7.1.3.5 Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Given the increase in litigation concerning standardization and SDO policies, several 
commentators have suggested the use of alternate dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms to 
streamline the resolution of disputes relating to SEPs (Kühn, et al, 2013). The FTC and 
European Commission have also recognized arbitration as a suitable method for resolving 
SEP-related disputes (Mororola and Google, 2013, Samsung EC, 2014). 
As a matter of implementation, Lemley and Shapiro (2013) propose that disputes regarding 
FRAND royalty rates be settled by binding “final offer” or “baseball” arbitration. In such 
proceedings, each party provides the arbitrator with a sealed “final offer,” of which the 
arbitrator must choose only one, without modification. This approach is supported by CRA 
(2016, p.80), who offer the alternative of ‘night baseball’, in which the arbitrators are not 
                                           
153 Unlike SEPs subject to licensing commitments by the patent holder, current interpretations of antitrust law 
require that patents contributed to a pool must be found to be essential to the standard by an objective 
evaluator.  DOJ-FTC (2000), DOJ-FTC (2007). CRA (2016) reports that the estimated cost of a third party 
patent essentiality assessment is approximately EUR 9000 (p.50), and that imposing such a cost on ETSI’s 
2G/3G/4G standards would result in an aggregate cost of approximately EUR 427.5 million (p.59).  Merges and 
Mattioli (2016) estimate that the cost of the essentiality analysis for the MPEG Audio pool operated by Via 
Licensing was approximately US$5.25 million. 
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informed of the parties’ offers, but must make an independent assessment of the royalty 
level, after which the royalty is set at the party’s offer that is closest to the arbitrator’s 
assessment. Larouche, Padilla and Taffet (2014) and Sidak (2014) challenge baseball 
arbitration as unnecessary and likely to undermine the standardization process. Contreras 
and Newman (2014) develop a framework for conducting arbitration concerning standards 
and SEPs.  Among other issues, they raise concerns regarding the general confidentiality of 
arbitral awards.  
A few SDOs have adopted ADR mechanisms in their rules and policies. Contreras and 
Newman (2014) identify and describe four long-standing SDO ADR policies. The DVB Forum 
has had such a policy in place since 1995 (Eltzroth, 2008).  Most recently, IEEE amended its 
patent policy to permit, but not require, arbitration of SEP-related disputes (IEEE, 2015).   
In addition to SDOs, several international arbitration bodies have begun to modify their 
practices and policies to accommodate proceedings concerning SEPs and standardization. 
The most ambitious of these has been the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
which has developed a bespoke procedure specifically addressed to SEP disputes, including 
mediation and arbitration (Greenbaum, 2015). 
7.1.4 External calls for IPR policy changes in the literature 
Many authors raise the argument that “stacking” multiple complementary patents could lead 
to excessive levels of aggregate royalty rates (e.g. Lerner and Tirole, 2004; Llanes and 
Trento, 2012; Llanes and Poblete, 2014; Lerner and Tirole, 2015). Another perceived risk is 
the possibility of patent hold-up, i.e. an opportunistic increase in royalty levels for a patent 
after an SDO makes irreversible choices in standardization, and after standard users incur 
sunk costs in implementing the standard (Lemley and Shapiro, 2007; Farrell et al., 2007).  
Even though the empirical evidence regarding the existence and prevalence of royalty 
stacking and patent hold-up is disputed (Galetovic et al., 2015; Contreras (2018a)), these 
perceived risks have motivated calls for legislative reform (Lemley, 2007) and antitrust 
intervention in standard setting (Cary et al., 2011). While many commentators contend that 
widely practiced SDO policies, such as disclosure and FRAND licensing requirements for 
SEPs, successfully address these concerns, many others suggest that there is a need for 
reform (Lemley, 2007; Kuhn et al, 2013). Some recent policy amendments, such as 
guidance on FRAND or ex ante disclosure of most restrictive terms, generated a significant 
controversy in the industry (IEEE 2015 (Lindsay & Karachalios 2015), ETSI 2007 (Tapia 
2010), VITA 2007 (Contreras 2013a), W3C 2000 (Contreras 2016a)). 
The academic analysis of the effectiveness of SDO policies is still undermined by the 
insufficiency of empirical evidence. Several authors and commentators critically observe 
that an important part of the debate on SDOs’ IPR policies focuses on theoretical concepts 
with unclear and unproven empirical relevance. Satisfactory causal evidence regarding the 
effects of different SDO policies remains to date very limited. 
A first fact-finding study for the European Commission analyzes data on declared SEPs, and 
presents the results of a survey of SDO stakeholders (Blind et al., 2011). The surveyed 
stakeholders reported on their experience with the SEP disclosure process, and their view on 
the impact of SEPs on standard development and entry into standard-implementing 
industries. Another study carried out for the European Commission (Bekkers et al., 2014) 
provides ample empirical data on standards subject to SEPs and on licensing in standard-
dependent industries. This study points to litigation concerning SEPs and the insufficient 
transparency of SEP disclosures (e.g. because of so-called “blanket declarations”) as 
particular areas of concern and proposes arbitration mechanisms and patent pools as 
potential solutions.  
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There are very few empirical analyses of the economic effects of specific SDO policies so far. 
Contreras (2013a) analyzes the consequences of the adoption of a unique IPR policy at VITA 
which instead of a more flexible FRAND commitment requires the ex ante disclosure of the 
most restrictive licensing terms before a patented solution is chosen for a standard. The 
study finds no evidence for the adverse effects of this policy predicted by its opponents, 
such as exit of IPR owners, reduction in the number of standards developed or delays in 
standard development. Stoll (2014) studies the effects of a change to the IPR policy of 
OASIS which allowed its working groups to determine by vote whether they want to practice 
a FRAND or royalty-free licensing requirement. The study finds that the adoption of this 
policy was followed by a significant decline in SDO membership. As for the 2015 IEEE policy 
change, some available evidence indicates that some SEP holders have reacted by issuing 
“negative” LOAs (letters of assurance), i.e. disclosure statements indicating that they own 
SEPs that are not available for licensing under the terms of the IEEE patent policy 
(Katznelson 2018). It is nevertheless unclear whether the IEEE policy change or the 
existence of negative LoAs has had an impact on standard development at IEEE SA. Some 
studies find no evidence for diminished technical support and engagement at IEEE 
(Pohlmann 2017; Pohlmann 2019). Other studies point to a decrease in the number of new 
projects initiated in particularly IP-intensive IEEE working groups and an increase in the 
average duration of specific phases in the development of IEEE standards as evidence for 
negative effects on innovation and consensus-finding (Gupta and Effraimidis, 2018). 
In addition to this limited evidence on the effects of specific policies, a broader empirical 
literature analyzes relevant aspects of the performance of SDOs and industries 
characterized by a significant presence of SEPs. In particular, there is evidence that SDOs 
identify promising technologies and influence their subsequent adoption (Rysman and 
Simcoe, 2008); that standards including SEPs progress more quickly and survive longer 
than other, comparable standards (Baron et al., 2016); and that industries characterized by 
the presence of SEPs exhibit rapid innovation, decreasing prices and dynamic firm entry 
(Galetovic et al., 2015). In the absence of exogenous policy variation, the existing studies 
cannot identify causal effects of specific SDO policies.  
7.1.5 IPR policy changes in practice  
SDO policies, far from being static documents, are amended and adapted with some 
regularity. According to Tsai and Wright (2015), most SDOs change their IPR policies once 
per year. The changes are often a reaction to market developments that prompt SDOs or 
their stakeholders to call for a discussion of IPR policy. For instance, as discussed in 7.1.3.3,  
many major SDOs as well as ANSI have adopted limitations on the transfer of SEPs in order 
to prevent circumvention of FRAND declarations. Most of the policy amendments 
implementing this change, however, are not significant.  Surveys of rule changes (Layne-
Farrar 2014; Tsai and Wright, 2015; Baron and Spulber, 2018) highlight a large number of 
small changes, tending towards increasing sophistication; but relatively few substantial rule 
changes. 
Layne-Farrar (2014) identifies substantial patent policy amendments at 10 major SDOs. She 
finds that most of the changes at the SDOs she studied have addressed concerns regarding 
patent ambush and excessive royalty rates. Tsai and Wright (2015) study SDO policy 
amendments pertaining to licensing rules and disclosure at 11 SDOs and find a gradual 
reduction in policy ambiguity across the board.  On the basis of these findings, both Layne-
Farrar and Tsai and Wright urge enforcement agencies to moderate their enforcement 
actions in order to give SDOs time to amend their policies to address concerns.   
In their review of 36 SDO patent policies, Baron and Spulber (2018) observe a general 
strengthening of SDO licensing requirements over time, with four SDOs moving to royalty-
free or non-assertion requirements after permitting royalties to be charged on SEPs, and 
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two moving to a mandatory licensing requirement from no licensing obligation at all.  They 
observe no significant modification to disclosure requirements over the period studied.  
Contreras and Housley (2008), however, discuss a clarifying amendment to the IETF patent 
disclosure policy prompted by the alleged failure of a participant to disclose a patent 
covering an optional portion of a draft IETF standard. 
A few recent SDO patent policy amendments have been more consequential and have 
attracted more attention:  
- In 2003, W3C adopted a policy requiring W3C members participating in a W3C 
working group to make patents that are essential to the standards developed in this 
working group available to implementers on royalty-free licensing terms.  
- In 2006, VITA adopted a patent policy amendment requiring that its participants 
disclose not only patents essential to the implementation of VITA standards, but also 
the maximum royalty rates they would charge for those patents. 
- In 2007, IEEE and ETSI adopted policy amendments permitting, but not requiring, 
participants to disclose the maximum royalty rates that they would charge for SEPs.  
- In 2015, IEEE adopted a set of major policy revisions. These included various 
clarifications regarding the meaning of the licensing commitments made to IEEE, 
limiting the ability of participants to seek injunctive relief against willing licensees, 
requiring commitments by transferees of committed patents, and permitting the 
arbitration of disputes over licensing terms (IEEE (2015)).   
- In the last few years, a number of SDOs (IEEE, IETF, ISO/IEC, ETSI), as well as 
ANSI, have added to their IPR policies a requirement that SEP owners ensure that 
their FRAND commitments are transferred to any acquirer at the same time as the 
SEPs that those commitments encumber.154    
These amendments are discussed in greater detail further below. 
Using the observable variation in SDO policies regarding the main IPR policy features 
discussed above as well as the limited number of significant policy changes as empirical 
case studies, we can now apply our general analysis of SDO governance to the specific case 
of IPR policies.  
7.2 IPR Policies in the Standardization Ecosystem  
As we have discussed in Section 4, SDOs are part of a standardization ecosystem. As such, 
their rule-making, including their decision-making on IPR policies, is subject to legal 
constraints, market discipline and institutional norms. At the same time, SDO activities with 
respect to IPR policies participate in the creation, development and modification of such 
institutional norms. In this section, we will first analyze how IPR policies reflect the external 
constraints acting on SDOs, resulting in a widely accepted baseline policy with few examples 
of SDOs moving beyond the baseline. Second, we will analyze how different activities of 
SDOs with respect to IPR policies contribute to the evolution of the institutional norms 
reflected in this baseline policy.  
SDO IPR policies have been thoroughly reviewed in a large number of studies, which we 
briefly surveyed in the previous section. The purpose of our analysis is not to replicate these 
studies. We therefore mostly focus on policy provisions with respect to SEP licensing, and 
address these specifically with respect to their governance implications. 
                                           
154 See Section 7.1.3.3 above. 
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For the purpose of analyzing the governance implications of SDO policies on SEP disclosure 
and licensing, it is useful to distinguish between (1) policies that define common 
requirements relating to SEP disclosure and/or licensing at a high level of generality, closely 
following international norms reflected, e.g., in the ISO/IEC/ITU common patent policy and 
the ANSI essential requirements (which we term “Baseline Policies”), and (2) policies that 
go beyond the general requirements included in Baseline Policies by creating specific 
requirements and obligations. For the second group, we distinguish between policies 
containing specific obligations for designated parties (such as SDO members or 
participants), and policies containing requirements for the inclusion of patented technology 
in SDO standards that go beyond Baseline Policy requirements. 
7.2.1 Legal Background Rules and Baseline policies 
As discussed in Section 4.1.1 above, standardization is covered by international trade 
agreements, including the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement (part of the WTO 
Agreement). In parallel, the international standardization bodies – ISO, IEC, ITU-T – have 
taken an interest in ensuring that standardization does not hinder international trade. 
Accordingly, in the Joint ISO/IEC Guide 59:1994 (Code of good practices for 
standardization), one finds under heading 5 “Advancement of international trade”, the core 
of an IPR policy at Article 5.8. ISO/IEC/ITU have developed a joint IPR policy elaborating on 
that core. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 4.1.3 above, SDOs are subject to competition law in 
most developed countries. Generally speaking, competition law does not impose specific 
requirements with respect to SDO IPR policies. However, a long line of judicial decisions, 
actions by enforcement agencies and legislative and regulatory enactments have created a 
relatively well-understood set of competition law principles guiding the behavior of SDOs in 
the area of IPR.  
In general, there are no strict rules regarding the approach that SDOs should take, though 
it is generally understood that (a) the collective action of market competitors in developing 
industry standards warrants competition law scrutiny, (b) patents covering widely-adopted 
standards can confer market power on the patent holders, and (c) granting broad market 
access to such patents is desirable to mitigate the effects of both collective action by 
competitors and market power of patent holders.  In other words, a failure to make SEPs 
broadly available to the market after a jointly-developed standard is adopted in the 
marketplace gives rise to significant antitrust and competition law concerns. 
Through the 1990s, the policies of most SDOs were loosely formulated. In its early policies 
ANSI (including its predecessor organizations) required, among other things, that 
“[s]tandards should not include items whose production is covered by patents unless the 
patent holder agrees to and does make available to any interested and qualified party a 
license on reasonable terms (..)” (Contreras 2015b).  
In Europe, competition authorities started to encourage SDOs to take a more proactive role 
with respect to IPR with the adoption of 2G mobile telecommunication standards (Iversen, 
1999), which included significant numbers of SEPs. During the development and initial 
adoption of 2G standards, several third parties complained about exclusionary cross-
licensing practices effectively barring them from implementing the standards (Bekkers et 
al., 2002). The European Commission intervened with its 1992 Communication on 
Intellectual Property Rights and Standardization,155 which contained a set of principles that 
the Commission strongly insisted ESOs adopt. The Commission strongly influenced the ETSI 
IPR policy, adopted in 1994.  
                                           
155 COM(92)45 (27 October 1992). 
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As a result, most SDO IPR policies today seek to ensure that SEPs will not be used to give 
undue market power or leverage to SEP holders. SDOs may seek to accomplish this goal in 
a variety of ways. Most SDOs require that for a patented technology to be included in a 
standard, holders of potential SEPs must commit to license their SEPs to implementers of 
the relevant standard on terms that are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND), 
and carry either no compensation (royalty-free (RF) or RAND-z) (W3C) or carry 
compensation that itself is considered FRAND (ETSI, IEEE SA, VITA). In most SDOs, this 
policy is implemented by requiring that if the SDO or its working groups receive notice that 
a standard may necessitate the use of patented technology, the SDO should request a 
licensing commitment from the holder of the potential SEP. Generally (with the exception of 
IETF156), SDOs will only standardize the patented technology if such a commitment is given. 
For this process to work, SDO policies generally encourage or require their participants to 
disclose potential SEPs. Depending on the policy, such a disclosure can be held to indicate 
specific patents, or simply identify known owners of potential SEPs (IEEE). No policy in our 
sample requires participants to actively search for potential SEPs. Instead, the policies 
typically rely on good faith disclosure based on personal knowledge (ETSI’s IPR policy 
requires members to use “reasonable endeavours” to inform ETSI of potential SEPs, but also 
explicitly states that IPR searches are not required). 
These policies do not necessarily constitute an obligation on members, participants or other 
parties to make licenses available. In some policies however, as discussed below, SDO 
participants may affirmatively be bound to offer licenses under their SEPs to implementers 
of a standard. In the case of DVB (and other SDOs not included in our sample), a general 
licensing obligation on members or participants can also replace a policy of requesting 
licensing commitments from owners of known SEPs. SDOs assuring openness of their 
standards through a general licensing obligation may dispense with a policy for disclosing 
SEPs.  
These provisions are generally seen as implementing substantive competition and trade law 
requirements, in line with the general analysis made above under heading 4.1. 
In the early 2000s, a series of legal actions involving Rambus, which was alleged to have 
circumvented the loosely worded IPR policy of the JEDEC, provided the impetus for many 
SDOs to develop more robust patent disclosure policies (Contreras 2015b; Larouche and 
Overwalle 2015). In the wake of the Rambus and Qualcomm cases (Geradin, 2013, 2016; 
Larouche and Overwalle, 2015), the Commission issued another pronouncement on the 
application of competition law to IPR policies in its 2011 Guidelines on Horizontal 
Agreements.157 According to the Guidelines, ‘[w]here participation in standard-setting is 
unrestricted and the procedure for adopting the standard in question is transparent, 
standardization agreements which contain no obligation to comply with the standard and 
provide access to the standard on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms will 
normally not restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1)’. The SDOs are thus 
encouraged by this safe harbor to implement ‘a clear and balanced IPR policy, adapted to 
the particular industry and the needs of the standard-setting organisation in question’ 
(Horizontal Guidelines 2011). ‘The IPR policy would need to require participants wishing to 
have their IPR included in the standard to provide an irrevocable commitment in writing to 
offer to license their essential IPR to all third parties on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms (‘FRAND commitment’)’. FRAND commitments should also be subject 
to a transfer obligation, so that the subsequent owner would be also bound by it. At the 
same time, the Guidelines do not preclude IPR holders from excluding specified technology 
from the standard-setting process and the associated obligatory commitment to license, 
                                           
156 Though, as noted below, IETF participants have, in many cases, adopted an informal royalty-free approach with 
respect to many IETF standards. 
157 [2011] OJ C11/1. 
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though they do reflect an expectation on the part of the Commission that such exclusion 
take place at an early stage in the development of the standard. 
SDOs however have no obligation to assess whether the owners of SEPs offer licenses on 
FRAND terms, or to offer guidance on the specific obligations arising out of a FRAND 
commitment. According to the Guidelines, “participants will have to assess for themselves 
whether the licensing terms and in particular the fees they charge fulfil the FRAND 
commitment.” 
The latest authoritative pronouncement is Huawei v. ZTE, where the Court of Justice of the 
European Union set out the following ‘choreography’ for FRAND licensing: (i) the SEP holder 
specifically alerts the implementer to the infringement of the SEP; (ii) the implementer 
indicates its willingness to conclude a FRAND license; (iii) following (ii), the SEP holder 
makes a specific, written offer to the implementer for a license on FRAND terms, including 
all the terms and conditions normally found in a license, and in particular the amount of 
royalty and its method of calculation; (iv) the implementer responds in a serious manner to 
the offer, ‘in accordance with recognized commercial practices in the field and in good faith’, 
and particularly without delaying tactics. If it does not accept it, it submits a written and 
specific counter-offer that corresponds to FRAND terms; (v) if the SEP holder does not 
accept the counter-offer, the implementer provides appropriate security for the payment of 
royalties in case it decides to proceed to use the SEP ahead of the conclusion of a license 
agreement. Only if and when the SEP holder has complied with its duties above, and the 
implementer failed to do so, can the SEP holder seek injunctive relief without breaching 
Article 102 TFEU. The implementer would then be an ‘unwilling licensee’.  
Following Huawei, subsequent case-law at national level has further clarified the conditions 
under which an SEP owner committed to FRAND licensing may seek injunctive relief against 
a standard implementer under Article 102 TFEU.158 This cluster of issues is analysed in a 
growing literature.159 
Under U.S. law, in contrast, these requirements are less clear-cut. While U.S. antitrust 
enforcement agencies (DOJ and FTC) have made numerous recommendations regarding 
standard-setting conduct that are roughly consistent with those of the EU discussed above, 
and have assessed various standardization arrangements both in litigation and DOJ business 
review letters, agency guidance in individual cases does not carry the weight of law in the 
U.S.  The EU guidelines go one step further in that they are meant as a generalization from 
individual cases dealt with by the Commission, and therefore can be used to predict the 
view of the Commission in future cases. The European Commission can be bound by the 
statements it makes in Guidelines, but these Guidelines do not bind EU and national courts.  
Next to trade law and competition/antitrust law, procurement rules also influence the 
content of IPR policies. In the EU, for ICT technical specifications produced outside of 
“traditional” bodies (ISO, IEC, ITU, CEN-CENELEC, ETSI or one of the national 
standardization bodies) to be referenced for the purpose of public procurement, Annex II of 
Regulation 1025/2012 requires that “essential” IP be available under a FRAND commitment. 
In the US, OMB Circular A-119 describes that SDOs “often have intellectual property rights 
(IPR) policies that include provisions requiring that owners of relevant patented technology 
incorporated into a standard make that intellectual property available to implementers of 
the standard on nondiscriminatory and royalty-free or reasonable royalty terms (and to bind 
                                           
158 See for instance Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) in the United Kingdom and a number of cases 
in Germany (for overview see Picht (2017) and Larouche and Zingales (2018) and the Netherlands (Archos v. 
Philips, Rechtbank Den Haag, 8 February 2017 – Case C/09/505587 / HA ZA 16-206 
(ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025). 
159 Jones (2014), Larouche and Zingales (2014), Contreras (2015b), Larouche and Zingales (2018), Korber (2013), 
Petit (2015), Picht (2017), Jacob and Milner (2016), Petrovcic (2017), Colangelo and Torti (2017), Zingales 
(2017). 
  142 
subsequent owners of standards essential patents to the same terms). In order to qualify as 
a ‘voluntary consensus standard’ for the purposes of this Circular, a standard that includes 
patented technology needs to be governed by such policies, which should be easily 
accessible, set out clear rules governing the disclosure and licensing of the relevant 
intellectual property, and take into account the interests of all stakeholders, including the 
IPR holders and those seeking to implement the standard.”  
In addition, the ANSI Essential Requirements state that “Participants in the ASD/ANSI 
standards development process are encouraged to bring patents with claims believed to be 
essential to the attention of the ANSI-Accredited Standards Developer (ASD).” If an ASD 
receives such a notice, it shall require that an assurance be made that SEP licenses will be 
made available “under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any 
unfair discrimination”.  
Competition law enforcement guidelines, public procurement rules, regulations, and the 
requirements of accreditation bodies such as ANSI thus consistently recognize certain key 
provisions of SDO IPR policies: an obligation for participants to disclose potential SEPs,160 
and a requirement to include patented technology only if the patent holder commits to 
FRAND or less restrictive licensing terms and conditions. Accordingly, the vast majority of 
SDOs implement one or both of these provisions in their policies, which constitute the core 
elements of what we term a “Baseline Policy”.   
In most cases, these Baseline Policy requirements are stated in very general terms.  This 
degree of generality is not inadvertent. Some SDOs implement these general requirements 
without additional detail, e.g. in order to avoid protracted disputes regarding the precise 
contours of patent licensing transactions, which they leave to negotiation among members.  
In many cases, patents are simply not important enough to the standardization work of the 
SDO to merit significant debate or discussion. 
An important SDO policy that closely follows the Baseline Policy, without adding additional 
detail, is the ISO/IEC/ITU patent policy. This policy defines the policies for hundreds of 
SDOs that are members of ISO or IEC, or follow the policies of a national SDO that is 
member of ISO and/or IEC. In our sample, CEN-CENELEC, DIN and AFNOR directly 
implement the ISO/IEC/ITU patent policy, with the respective policy documents of these 
organizations merely offering additional guidance regarding the implementation of this 
policy, but not creating specific additional obligations. While ECMA is not part of this 
ecosystem, its own patent policy adopts the provisions of the ISO/IEC/ITU patent policy 
verbatim-. 
ANSI’s patent policy, reflected in the Essential Requirements, is quite brief, without adding 
substantive specific obligations or requirements. While the ANSI-accredited SDOs that we 
studied have each developed and elaborated their own IPR policies, although remaining 
within the guidelines prescribed by ANSI, the large majority (more than 90%) of ANSI-
accredited SDOs simply adopt the ANSI patent policy verbatim or with only cosmetic 
alterations (see Contreras (2015b, p.42 n.72)).  
There are thus hundreds of SDOs around the world that have similar IPR policies. Many of 
these SDOs have not developed their own policies, but endorse or implement the language 
of ISO/IEC/ITU, ANSI or another body practicing a similar policy. Presumably, many of 
these SDOs did not adopt these policies in pursuit of a specific policy or institutional goal. 
Implementing this “baseline” policy is often the easiest way for an SDO to operate within 
recognized legal boundaries, in a situation where IP issues are not looming large within the 
SDO and its activities, and where accordingly it is not warranted for the SDO and its 
                                           
160 Disclosure of SEPs is not required, but merely encouraged, by the ANSI Essential Requirements. 
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members to invest time and resources into developing a more specific IPR policy for that 
SDO. 
Nevertheless, some SDOs have developed their own policies that address substantive 
competition law concerns in different ways. In particular, IETF requires specific disclosure of 
all patents and patent applications that may become essential to a standard, but does not 
require a licensing commitment for an IETF RFC to include patented technology identified in 
such a disclosure. RFC 8179 nevertheless notes that “It is likely that IETF will rely on 
licensing declarations and other information that may be contained in an IPR disclosure and 
that implementers will make technical, legal, and commercial decisions on the basis of such 
commitments and information.” 
However, in practice most holders of SEPs covering IETF standards voluntarily declare either 
that they will license their SEPs on FRAND or RF terms, or that they will not assert those 
SEPs against implementers of IETF standards (Contreras 2013a). 
It is thus possible for SDOs to develop their own IPR policies, tailored to the SDO’s 
objectives and needs, as long as the policy complies with the substantive requirements of 
law. IETF has not sought accreditation by ANSI. 
7.2.2 Policies going beyond the Baseline Policy 
In addition to the many SDOs that have a very general IPR policy along the lines of the 
Baseline Policy, a number of SDOs have developed their IPR policies further, going beyond 
this general policy. These developments typically take place in the wake of discussions held 
within the SDO, as a result of an event or experience that prompted the SDO or its 
stakeholders to put the IPR policy on the agenda. When this occurs, the SDO and its 
stakeholders dedicate time and resources to adapting or developing the Baseline Policy in 
order to address the concern that arose within the SDO. Accordingly, because of that 
policymaking effort, the IPR policy of that SDO will move off the well-laid path of the 
Baseline Policy and will feature new provisions. Broadly speaking, with respect to SEP 
licensing, an SDO policy may then go beyond the Baseline Policy by (1) creating a licensing 
obligation for specifically designated parties, or (2) defining requirements for inclusion of 
patented technologies that go beyond requiring a general FRAND licensing commitment. 
7.2.2.1 Licensing obligations for members and/or contributors 
 While all SDO IPR policies that we reviewed (other than IETF’s) have provisions seeking to 
ensure that their standards only include essential IPR if the IPR owner has committed to 
make licenses available on FRAND or other, less restrictive terms (RF or RAND-z), this does 
not necessarily imply that a SEP holder has an obligation to make such a commitment.  That 
is, many SDOs (e.g., ETSI, IEEE, IETF, ISO/IEC/ITU) permit contributors to declare that 
they are not willing to license their SEPs at all, or that they are not willing to license them 
on FRAND terms (so-called “opt out” licensing provisions (see ABA 2007)). Some SDOs may 
however require that a licensing commitment be made as a condition of membership, 
working group participation, and/or contribution to standard development (DVB Project, 
ECMA, JEDEC, VITA, W3C).  
Article 14.2 of the Memorandum of Understanding of the DVB Project states that “each 
Member hereby undertakes, on its behalf and on behalf of its affiliated companies, that it is 
willing to grant or to cause the grant of non-exclusive, non-transferable, world-wide licences 
on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions under any of such IPRs”. A 
member may refuse to make licenses available “only in the exceptional circumstances that 
the Member can demonstrate that a major business interest will be seriously jeopardised.”  
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At ECMA, the owner of a SEP may declare that it is willing to grant licenses on a royalty-free 
basis, it is willing to grant licenses on FRAND basis, or it is not willing to grant licenses to 
the SEP. With respect to patented technology contributed by a member, the member cannot 
elect not to make licenses available. In the event that such a member makes no 
declaration, it still has an obligation to make licenses available on FRAND terms. 
At JEDEC, “all companies, as a condition of committee membership or participation, agree 
to license their Essential Patent Claims on RAND terms and conditions.” A JEDEC member 
unwilling to make SEPs available on RAND terms for standards developed in a JEDEC 
committee must withdraw from the committee. At VITA, each working group member 
agrees, on behalf of the VITA member he or she represents, to grant FRAND licenses with 
respect to all claims essential to the VITA standard developed in this working group.  
At W3C, “[a]s a condition of participating in a Working Group, each participant (W3C 
Members, W3C Team members, invited experts, and members of the public) shall agree to 
make available under W3C RF [royalty-free] licensing requirements any Essential Claims 
related to the work of that particular Working Group.” Specific claims may be excluded from 
this requirement by a participant, if that participant indicates its refusal to such specific 
claims no later than 150 days after the publication of the first public working draft. A 
participant may also resign from the working group within 90 days after the publication of 
the first public working draft, and be exempted from all licensing obligations.  
ETSI and TSDSI do not obligate their members or participants to offer licenses, but require 
that when a SEP is brought to the attention of the SDO, the SDO will “immediately request 
the owner to give … an irrevocable undertaking in writing that it is prepared to grant 
irrevocable licenses on [FRAND] terms and conditions” (Section 6.1 at ETSI, Section 5.1. at 
TSDSI). While a patent holder may refuse to comply with this request, a patent holder that 
is also a member of ETSI must explain this refusal in writing within three months of the 
request.   
Unlike the policies of ISO/IEC/ITU, IEEE and many other SDOs, ETSI and TSDSI thus have 
member-specific provisions that formulate an increased expectation towards members to 
give licensing commitments. In other respects, the licensing requirement in their policies is 
similar to the requirements in other SDOs’ IPR policies. In both ETSI and TSDSI, and similar 
e.g. to IEEE, if the owner of a potential SEP (irrespective of whether it is a member or not) 
fails to make a licensing commitment with respect to this patent, the relevant committee or 
working group is authorized to suspend work on the affected standard or remove the 
patented technology. Furthermore, similarly to ETSI and TSDSI, IETF will request a licensing 
assurance from a party whose patents are alleged to be essential to an IETF standard if 
such an assurance has not previously been made.   
As discussed in Section 7.1.3.3, in addition to the IPR policy changes mentioned above, a 
number of SDOs (IEEE, IETF, ISO/IEC, ETSI), as well as ANSI, have added to their IPR 
policies an obligation on SEP holders to transfer their FRAND commitment along with a SEP, 
so that the transferee is equally bound by the commitment (NAS 2013). 
7.2.2.2 Requirements for inclusion of patented technology extending beyond 
general FRAND licensing commitment  
SDO policies may further define requirements for the inclusion of patented technology in 
their standards that go beyond requiring a general FRAND licensing commitment. DIN and 
IETF express a general preference for non-patented solutions. Historically, the policy of IEEE 
SA included such a provision, even though it is no longer part of the current patent policy. A 
statement of a general preference for non-patented solutions may imply that the inclusion 
of any patented solution must be justified on objective technical grounds.  
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Alternatively, or in addition, SDO polices may generally allow the inclusion of patented 
technologies in their standards, but require commitments to license these technologies to 
standard implementers on licensing terms and conditions that are more specific or less 
restrictive than FRAND. As noted above, some policies (W3C) require royalty-free licensing 
as the general rule. Other policies require FRAND licensing commitments, but define specific 
interpretations of FRAND, or impose additional obligations on participants (we term these 
“Baseline-Plus Policies”) (IEEE, VITA). 
As noted above, there is no obligation for SDOs to determine specific licensing terms or 
specific methods or criteria for the determination of FRAND licensing terms. Some SDOs 
have even issued statements that explicitly state that their policies do not obligate SEP 
owners to specific licensing terms, or specific methods of determining licensing terms. CEN-
CENELEC in a joint statement e.g. stated the view that “FRAND has no precise pricing 
content, but instead is a ‘comity device’ designed to promote good faith negotiation 
between patent owners and prospective licensees.”161  Likewise, IETF states that “The IESG 
will not make any determination that any terms for the use of an Implementing Technology 
(e.g., the assurance of reasonable and non-discriminatory terms) have been fulfilled in 
practice.” (RFC 8179, Sec. 4.D). 
SDOs may however choose to define more specifically the requirements arising from a 
licensing commitment in a Baseline-Plus Policy. Thus the patent policy of IEEE SA creates 
requirements for SEP licensing that are more specific than Baseline Policy requirements. In 
particular, paragraph 6.1. of the IEEE SA patent policy provides a definition of “reasonable 
rate”, which should exclude “the value, if any, resulting from the inclusion of that Essential 
Patent Claim’s technology in the IEEE Standard.” Furthermore, the policy states factors to 
be considered in the determination of such a rate. In addition, the owner of a potential SEP 
submitting a Letter of Assurance pursuant to IEEE’s patent policy commits not to seek a 
Prohibitive Order (i.e., an injunction, importation ban or exclusion order) against an 
implementer of an IEEE standard, unless the implementer fails to participate in a third-party 
determination of such a rate. 
The policy of VITA obligates members to declare the maximum royalty rate they will charge 
for a disclosed SEP before the standard is approved. The licensing offers made to 
implementers of VITA standards must be on terms and conditions that are both FRAND, and 
not more restrictive than the more specific terms and conditions initially announced.  
7.2.3 Baseline-Plus IPR Policies and the standardization ecosystem 
As we have seen, only a limited set of SDOs develop IPR policies based upon their own 
identified policy goals. Most SDOs have only Baseline IPR policies, merely translating legal 
principles emanating from competition law and other legal sources. Few SDOs formulate so-
called Baseline-Plus policies, which add additional obligations to the provisions included in 
the baseline policy, or replace provisions of the baseline policy with alternative means of 
implementing similar requirements. In our sample, these SDOs can be identified as DVB, 
IEEE, IETF, VITA, and W3C.  
SDOs wishing to go beyond Baseline Policies must often expend both financial resources 
(legal fees), staff time (diverted from standardization work) and social capital (member 
goodwill) to adopt Baseline-Plus Policies. They must also incur some degree of legal risk, 
since Baseline-Plus policies add to the well-understood content of the Baseline Policy. For 
this reason, Baseline Plus policies are comparatively rare, but when they are adopted they 
likely represent approaches that have been regarded as important and highly valuable by 
                                           
161 https://www.cencenelec.eu/News/Policy_Opinions/PolicyOpinions/EssentialPatents.pdf 
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the responsible decision-makers within the SDO. Such policy modifications beyond the 
baseline however can raise significant issues with respect to SDO governance. 
Our analysis in Section 4.5 of the different exposition of SDOs to external constraints can 
contribute to explain the observable variation in IPR policy approaches. First, we observe 
that Baseline-Plus policies are rare among the most formal SDOs in our sample, such as 
AFNOR, DIN, CEN, ETSI, IEC, ISO, or ITU-T. Similarly, ANSI’s essential requirements stick 
close to the baseline requirements. Each of these SDOs serves as a focal organization for a 
number of national or sectoral standardization bodies. Furthermore, in several cases, these 
SDOs have public functions conferred to them by governmental authorities. Finally, AFNOR 
and DIN are subject to vertical constraints resulting from their membership in CEN and ISO; 
and ETSI and TSDSI are subject to the constraints of 3GPP. The policies of these SDOs are 
characterized by a significant degree of stability and generality. This could be due to the 
constraints arising from the role that each of these SDOs occupies in their respective 
networks and the standardization policy of their respective countries or regions. 
At the same time, we observe that a number of significantly less formal SDOs also stick 
very close to the Baseline policy. This is for instance the case of ECMA or JEDEC. These 
organizations are not bound by the type of formal constraints that apply to the former 
group. Perhaps the most immediate constraint on their governance is the need to attract 
and retain membership. In our interview with JEDEC, we were told that JEDEC does not 
view its IPR policy as a tool to attract potential members; but that SDOs lose membership if 
they implement bad IPR policies. This statement suggests that SDOs that are most 
concerned about their competitive position may favor Baseline policies to retain 
membership. Significantly, many smaller SDOs adopt or copy the IPR policies of larger 
and/or more established organizations. ECMA’s policy for instance follows the ISO/IEC/ITU 
policy almost verbatim; and most of the ANSI-accredited SDOs adopt the ANSI essential 
requirements verbatim as patent policy. Such an approach may help smaller and less 
established SDOs build trust in their policies, in addition to being cost-effective.  
While VITA would also fall into the category of smaller and less formal SDOs, the majority of 
the SDOs whose policies we characterize as “Baseline-Plus” policies tend to be intermediate 
cases, which are less immediately subject to both formal and competitive constraints. While 
IEEE and VITA are ANSI-accredited ASDs, DVB, IETF, and W3C are unbound by the formal 
hierarchical networks of SDOs. Furthermore, these organizations tend to have a well-
established technological leadership position in their respective field. Particularly in the case 
of IETF and W3C, it is precisely this strong competitive position that allows the 
organizations not to seek ANSI-accreditation, and thus to remain unconstrained by formal 
requirements.
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Table 7.1. – Overview of SDO IPR policies 
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7.3 IPR-Policies and Internal SDO Governance Processes 
We have identified elements of a Baseline Policy that are common to the policies of a 
large number of SDOs. The Baseline reflects external constraints on SDO policy making 
with respect to IPR: as we have seen, the Baseline includes policy provisions usually seen 
as necessary to conform with legal constraints, and often it has also been approved – or 
at least assessed – by public authorities. It has also been endorsed by the most 
established SDOs at the international and regional levels. In that sense, following the 
Baseline is often the path of least resistance for an SDO that has no specific policy goals 
or other reasons that would motivate incurring the expense of developing policy 
provisions that are not required by external constraints. 
In addition to conforming with external constraints, SDOs or individual SDO stakeholders 
may propose IPR policy revisions in response to a perceived need or inadequacy in the 
existing policies. When SDOs are prompted to revisit their IPR policies, the stakeholders 
sometimes hold different views as to whether and how the policy should be changed. 
Indeed, some policy changes have redistributive implications, meaning that some 
stakeholders stand to gain from them, and others stand to lose. We analyse these IPR 
policy changes in light of how much they were contested amongst the stakeholders and 
whether the SDO took a position in this contest. 
As a preliminary note, it is not helpful to analyze the controversial character of a policy 
decision in terms of the degree to which it is “balanced”. There is a positive connotation 
to the degree to which a policy choice is “moderate” or “balanced”, leading most SDOs to 
claim that their position is close to the middle of the appropriate range of policy options. 
Such classification would be thus heavily influenced by its framing. As perhaps the most 
salient example, a FRAND licensing requirement is often characterized as a balanced 
compromise between “proprietary” standards including IPR not subject to licensing 
obligations, and standards subject to royalty-free licensing policies (e.g. Larouche and 
Overwalle (2015)). Our proposed classification is orthogonal to the degree to which a 
policy is “balanced” and implies no value judgement about the appropriateness of the 
decision. 
From the set of policies going beyond the Baseline Policy, as set out above under 7.2.2., 
we can put forward the following classification, based on whether the potential outcome 
of the IPR policy discussion was contested or not amongst the membership, and in the 
latter case, whether the actual outcome reached at the end of the policymaking exercise 
reflects a commitment on the part of SDO to one or the other side of the debate, or 
rather an attempt to avoid any commitment: 
(i) Uncontested IPR policy changes; 
(ii) Contested changes where the SDO commits itself to one side in the outcome; 
(iii) Contested changes where the SDO does not commit itself in the outcome. 
7.3.1 Uncontested IPR policy changes 
As mentioned earlier, many SDOs have policies to ensure that licensing obligations 
arising out of SDO policies continue to bind any party acquiring an encumbered SEP. 
SDOs can adopt provisions prohibiting the transfer of an SEP with the intent of 
circumventing a licensing obligation, requiring committing SEP owners to contractually 
bind a purchasing party to honor their commitment, or directly stipulating that licensing 
obligations arising out of the licensing commitment bind any successors of rights (NRC, 
2013). The choice among these options (or menus of these options) is mostly a technical 
legal question. Given that the policy is successful at achieving its objective, all options 
have comparable redistributive consequences. Such policy questions are relatively 
uncontroversial, and most easily lend themselves to a technical governance process, 
whereby experts chosen for their technical/legal expertise design a policy based on its 
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technical merits (in particular its capacity of dealing with all circumstances and 
withstanding any legal challenges). 
The choice whether to adopt such a policy in the first place however is not a technical 
question, as a policy allowing a licensing obligation to extinguish with the transfer of the 
patent is more favorable to SEP owners. Similarly, a policy requiring that licensing 
commitments are irrevocable offers less options to the SEP owner, but provides greater 
clarity to implementers. Similarly, an SDO decision to make information on technical 
contributions available to examiners at patent offices has redistributive effects, because 
it may lead to more patent applications being rejected (Bekkers et al., 2016). While 
these decisions thus have redistributive implications, they can still be favorably received 
by stakeholders with different business models and adopted by consensus or relatively 
large super-majorities. 
Provisions regarding the transferability of licensing obligations are rare examples of non-
contested IPR policy changes that have a direct bearing on the policy’s licensing 
requirements. Nevertheless, with respect to other aspects of SDOs IPR policies, such 
non-contested changes are much more frequent. Several SDOs have thus adopted tailor-
made policies on SEP disclosure, or adopted measures intended to facilitate the creation 
of patent pools. Many of these changes were adopted without significant controversy. 
7.3.2 Contested IPR policy changes – Committal and non-committal 
choices 
Many policy questions related to SEP licensing requirements do not allow for such a 
consensual decision. The questions whether and under what circumstances to require 
royalty-free licensing of SEPs, whether and how to define FRAND licensing terms, 
whether to prescribe specific licensing models or forms of dispute resolution, and 
whether to specify whether licensing commitments require SEP owners to provide 
licenses at the component level, affect generalized commercial practices and have 
redistributive implications for a large range of SDO stakeholders. Such questions almost 
inevitably oppose stakeholders with different business models. 
On these questions, an SDO can decide upon IPR policy changes that either commit the 
SDO to one side of the discussion (committal choice) or seek to avoid making such a 
commitment (non-committal choice). 
A relatively non-committal choice is the adoption of a menu of options, including the 
status quo obligation as the least restrictive option. Baron and Spulber (2018) e.g. 
document that a number of SDOs requiring SEP owners to commit to FRAND licensing 
over time adopted polices requiring SEP owners to choose between commitments to 
FRAND and royalty-free licensing (and sometimes unconditional non-assertion as a third 
option).162 By contrast, on the same issue, W3C in 2003 made the committal choice of 
requiring royalty-free licensing of SEPs mandatory for working group participants.  
Similarly, in 2006-07 ETSI and IEEE considered policies of ex-ante disclosure of most 
restrictive licensing terms, and took the non-committal choice of explicitly allowing SEP 
holders to make such announcements at their sole option. ETSI offered to create a 
database where such ex-ante disclosures could be accessed. In contrast, VITA in 2006 
revised its policy to a committal choice, to require ex-ante disclosure of most restrictive 
licensing terms.  
A non-committal SDO choice regarding policy interpretation means that the SDO takes 
no stance by either refraining to offer an interpretation of the controversial provision, or 
offering a broad interpretation encompassing or allowing a variety of differing views. 
Most SDO IPR policies e.g. do not specify criteria to determine the FRAND-compliance of 
specific licensing terms and conditions, but also do not specify that the FRAND-obligation 
arising out of the SDO policy does not entail such criteria.  By contrast, the IEEE patent 
policy of 2015 makes a committal choice : it specifies a (committal) definition for the 
                                           
162 In many cases, SDOs added corresponding boxes on their SEP declaration form. 
  150 
reasonableness of licensing rates,163 and lists more specific (but not limitative) criteria 
that should be considered to determine licensing rates that comply with the patent 
owner’s obligations under the policy (even though other criteria can be considered as 
well).164  
CEN’s 2017 position paper on FRAND can be seen as either committal or non-committal. 
On one hand, the paper explicitly states CEN’s non-committal policy stance, according to 
which CEN leaves the determination of licensing terms to the parties. On the other hand, 
the position paper can be seen as committal, as it provides a specific and potentially 
controversial “definition” of the meaning of FRAND. CEN explicitly specifies that in its 
view a FRAND commitment does not bind an SEP owner to offer licensing terms and 
conditions in a specific range, but is merely a “comity device”.165  
As discussed, a similar disagreement exists over whether SEP owners committed to 
FRAND licensing can satisfy their licensing obligation by offering licenses to the makers of 
standard-compliant end products alone. The non-committal choice is exemplified by 
ETSI, which does not provide an unequivocal definition of standard implementations 
covered by the licensing commitment in its policy, leading to unresolved controversy: 
while some argue that the text of the policy decidedly constitutes an obligation to license 
to all (Rosenbrock, 2017), others interpret the same text such that it “does not and has 
never required compulsory ‘license to all’” (Huber, 2017). IEEE’s 2015 policy by contrast 
represents a committal choice, as it adds a definition of “compliant implementation” that 
explicitly mentions “component”. The IEEE policy thus affirmatively requires that a SEP 
owner make a licensing offer to all interested implementers, including component 
makers. 
  
                                           
163 Under Art. 6.1. (‘Definitions): ‘Reasonable Rate’ shall mean appropriate compensation to the patent holder 
for the practice of an Essential Patent Claim excluding the value, if any, resulting from the inclusion of that 
Essential Patent Claim’s technology in the IEEE Standard” [emphasis added]. 
164 Ibid.: “In addition, determination of such Reasonable Rates should include, but need not be limited to, the 
consideration of…” [emphasis added]. 
165 Both the IEEE approach to specify criteria for a FRAND determination and the CEN position paper represent 
controversial interpretations of FRAND obligations. On average, patent-centric firms are more likely than 
product-centric firms to agree with CEN’s statement that a “FRAND commitment is a comity device and has 
no specific pricing content” (average of 3.71 for patent-centric and 3.14 for product-centric firms on a scale 
from 1 [strongly disagree] to 5 [strongly agree]). With respect to the idea of SDOs providing more explicit 
criteria for FRAND, patent-centric firms overall rather disapprove of such additional guidance (average of 
2.79), whereas product-centric firms are more likely to view additional guidance favorably (average of 
3.73). 
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7.3.3 Controversial policy changes and SDO governance 
In the following table, we summarize the preceding examples of committal and non-
committal IPR policy choices regarding SEP licensing requirements, to relate these policy 
choices to governance models identified in section 5. 
 Committal choices Non-committal choices 
Policy choices 
Ex-ante disclosure 
of licensing terms 
Mandatory ex-ante 
disclosure 
VITA 
Optional ex-ante 
disclosure 
ETSI, IEEE (2007) 
Dispute resolution 
Mandatory ADR DVB, VITA 
Leave dispute 
resolution to parties 
most SDOs (incl. 
ETSI, IETF, 
ISO/IEC/ITU) 
Restricting right to 
seek injunctive 
relief 
IEEE (2015) 
Royalty-free 
licensing 
mandatory RF W3C 
optional 
IEEE, IETF, many, 
other SDOs potentially 
mandatory RF 
ECMA  
Interpretations 
FRAND 
Define specific 
criteria of FRAND 
IEEE (2015) 
provide no position 
as to what (if any) 
specific pricing 
criteria define 
FRAND 
ETSI, IETF, 
ISO/IEC/ITU, and 
most other SDOs 
Component-level 
licensing 
Specific policy 
provision requiring 
component-level 
licensing 
IEEE No position with 
respect to ongoing 
controversy/ 
ambiguity of policy 
ETSI 
Specific policy 
interpretation 
ANSI 
Table 7.2. – Committal and non-committal choices 
From the table and the preceding discussion, a general picture emerges. Some SDOs, 
and in particular IEEE, VITA, and W3C, are more likely to make committal decisions. 
These SDOs make decisions with broad redistributive consequences (royalty-free 
licensing requirement, mandatory ex-ante disclosure of licensing terms, restrictions of 
access to injunctive relief), or provide specific (and potentially contested) interpretations 
of general terms (such as “reasonable” in FRAND, or regarding the scope of the licensing 
obligation). These SDOs are also characterized by institutional features that we 
associated with a more autonomous form of decision-making and stronger SDO 
leadership with respect to stakeholder influence. These institutional characteristics of 
SDO governance arguably make it easier for these SDOs to make decisions that are 
opposed by significant stakeholders or stakeholder categories. 
Other SDOs tend to favor non-committal choices, meaning that they remain silent on 
inherently contested policy questions that divide SDO membership or the stakeholder 
base, or provide policy provisions leaving options to stakeholders, including the general 
baseline requirement as least restrictive option. Important provisions of the IPR policies 
of these SDOs remain open to diverging interpretations, and the SDO does not take a 
position with respect to e.g. the meaning of FRAND, or the extent of licensing obligations 
at the component level.  
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While this policy approach is characteristic for many SDOs where SEP-related issues are 
not particularly important, ETSI, IETF, and ISO/IEC/ITU also follow this approach. These 
SDOs have a large number of standards subject to SEPs, and SEP controversies 
regarding their standards are significant. The approach taken by these SDOs is thus more 
likely to reflect institutional features of the SDO governance. In particular, as we have 
seen in section 5, all these SDOs are characterized by a more consensus-oriented form of 
decision-making, with a lower degree of autonomy of the SDO and SDO leadership with 
respect to stakeholders and participants. 
7.4 IPR Policy Changes, Legitimacy and Public Policy 
In this section, we apply the analysis of Sections 4.5.2 and 6.2. to IPR policymaking in 
SDOs. As we have seen in Section 7.2., many SDOs limit their IPR policy to a Baseline 
Policy implementing legal and other external requirements constraining the SDO. 
Prompted to spend more time and resources to develop a policy that is more attuned to 
the needs of the stakeholders, some SDOs adopt IPR policy provisions that develop the 
Baseline Policy further and go beyond it. In some cases, these provisions reflect a 
consensus of the SDO’s stakeholders. Nevertheless, in other cases, the policy discussions 
taking place in SDOs are contested, with stakeholders being divided as to their preferred 
outcome. In these cases, the legitimacy of SDO policymaking becomes salient; all the 
more so when the SDO adopts a policy change that commits to one or the other side in 
the debate, and is therefore opposed by some of the SDO’s members or stakeholders.  
As discussed in Section 6.2, legitimacy is a complicated issue. There are many sources of 
legitimacy for SDO activities and decisions – consent of the participants, constraints from 
market forces, democracy, procedure and expertise – all of which can apply to SDOs and 
none of which is likely to suffice on its own to legitimize SDO activities and decisions. For 
many of their decisions, SDOs draw from a combination of sources of legitimacy. 
Next to the legitimacy of SDO policymaking in individual instances, the effects of such 
policymaking within the broader standardization ecosystem must also be considered. As 
a starting point, SDOs define the policies applicable to their own organization and their 
own standardization processes. However, policy decisions of individual SDOs have an 
impact on other SDOs, or on the interpretation of general legal principles. This raises the 
question of whether and how SDO policy changes circulate amongst SDOs, and whether 
and when such changes would prompt public authorities to intervene in the 
standardization ecosystem.  
Before analyzing the legitimacy of SDO IPR policy changes and their effect on the 
broader standardization ecosystem, we address the status of SDO policy changes that 
can be characterized largely as internal “housekeeping” matters.  
7.4.1 The nature of IPR policymaking – standardization vs. 
housekeeping 
Some SDO decisions produce external effects on the SDO stakeholder base and beyond, 
giving them a public dimension that led public authorities to intervene in SDO matters. 
Standardization itself is such a decision, which has an impact that reaches beyond the 
SDO membership, sometimes to an entire industry. Because of these external effects, 
standardization is governed not only by the rules of the SDO, but typically also by 
outside legal norms, found in the areas of law covered in Section 4.1. These norms have 
a bearing on SDO governance, including participation in standard-setting, decision-
making, etc. Beyond these governance-related norms, sometimes public authorities will 
even request an SDO to develop a standard, as is the case with European Norms (EN) 
developed by ETSI or CEN-CENELEC. As regards legitimacy, this implies that standard-
setting derives its legitimacy not just from the consent of the participants or the effect of 
market forces, but also from the interplay with public authorities in a co-regulation 
model, which generates a mix of democratic, procedural and expert legitimacy that 
underpins the actions of the SDO.  
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Other decisions however are more internal to the SDO. They regard the functioning of 
the SDO as an organization. The canonical case is that of ‘housekeeping’ SDO decisions 
concerning, for instance, the frequency and location of meetings. These relatively 
inconsequential decisions have little or no effect outside of the SDO membership. Hence 
it would seem that as long as these decisions receive the consent of SDO members, 
according to the decision-making rules of the SDO, they should be considered as a 
legitimate exercise by the SDO of its decision-making powers.  
Many consequential SDO decisions have significant external effects, but are nonetheless 
primarily SDO-internal decisions. Whether the SDO primarily funds its activities through 
membership fees, participation fees, or sales of standards documents is a decision that 
fundamentally defines the functioning of the SDO as organization. Unlike standardization 
decisions, SDOs do not typically leave such decisions to a consensus of interested 
participants in an open process; but to governance bodies of the SDO. Nevertheless, in 
light of the external effects, these decisions may be subject to some legal constraints and 
judicial review, and many SDOs attempt to involve affected stakeholders in the process 
of making such decisions in a variety of ways.  
When it comes to IPR policies, it would be tempting to seek to bring ‘IPR policies’ into 
either of these two canonical cases, i.e. standardization and internal governance, thus 
turning the analysis into a simple classification matter. In our view, it is not possible to 
reach a conclusive answer on the legitimacy of IPR policy-making through such a quick 
exercise, because the line between external and internal matters is not so clearly drawn, 
and in any event IPR policy would straddle that line.  
To be sure, some IPR policy matters come close to internal housekeeping. For instance, if 
an SDO chooses to specify particular time periods for the disclosure of patents, or to 
specify a particular form of letter of assurance, one could argue that these are merely 
internal matters and that the SDO decision is legitimate because it is adopted by the 
consent of its membership. Other provisions of IPR policies, such as decisions on how to 
manage the IP arising out of SDO activities – e.g., copyright on the standard documents– 
may have substantial external effects and be heavily controversial among SDO 
stakeholders. At the same time, these decisions still primarily pertain to the functioning 
of the SDO itself.  
More often than not, however, IPR policies venture into matters that are ancillary to 
standardization, and that have a direct bearing on standardization activities and 
outcomes. To name but one of the oldest provisions, when IPR policies express a 
preference against including patented technology in standards, they are directly affecting 
standardization decisions. The same goes for a requirement not to include patented 
technology unless it is available on specified licensing terms. In such cases, it would 
make sense to link the IPR policy provisions with standardization, as the IPR policy has a 
direct bearing on the standardization outcome. As an illustration of such an approach, the 
US Standards Development Organization Advancement Act (SDOAA) of 2004, discussed 
earlier in Chapter 4, expressly includes “actions relating to the intellectual property 
policies of the [SDO]” within the definition of ‘standards development activity’ that is put 
under the rule of reason for antitrust law purposes.166  
When moving beyond the Baseline policy, for instance in stipulating licensing 
requirements for SEPs, SDO policies also more directly regulate the conduct of SDO 
members or participants outside the standardization process itself. They increasingly act 
as regulators for their stakeholder base; accentuating the external dimension of their 
policy choices. 
Indeed, in many respects, concerns regarding the democratic and institutional 
legitimation of SDOs’ standard setting processes may also be raised with respect to their 
processes for defining their rules and policies, including their IPR policies (Craig (2014)). 
This is echoed in our survey, where – as set out above under Heading 5.2.3.1. – the 
                                           
166 15 USC 4301(7). 
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large majority of respondents (85%) stated that policymaking should be carried out with 
at least the same if not higher procedural stringency as standardization. 
7.4.2 Legitimacy of SDO policymaking  
SDO policies find their origin in contractual and corporate relationships. They are defined 
by the SDO’s bylaws, statutes, or similar document, to which a party agrees, or is 
otherwise bound, upon becoming a member. Similarly, upon joining members explicitly 
or implicitly agree to the SDO’s processes for making changes to these policies. 
Accordingly, SDO policymaking enjoys legitimacy through the consent of SDO members 
to the substantive policies of the SDO, or to the processes that were followed for making 
substantive policy changes. The contractual legitimacy model reaches its limits, however, 
where SDO policymaking produces effects or reverberations beyond the SDO 
membership.  
In the case of IPR policies, such an external dimension is often present, and there is thus 
a public policy character to IPR policymaking (Contreras 2017a).  
The general approach to SDO legitimacy set out above in Sections 4.5.2. and 6.2. relies 
on co- or self-regulation: private parties are trusted to act and decide in a way that 
fosters public policy objectives. As a starting point, public policy should therefore grant 
some deference to SDOs when they decide on their rules and policies through their 
processes agreed upon by their membership. The legal constraints imposed on SDOs – as 
set out above in Section 4 – aim to channel SDO decision-making in a direction that is 
compatible with public policy objectives. They create the conditions for SDOs to be 
legitimized through consent, indirect democracy (delegation), market discipline, 
procedure and expertise.  
Most commonly, SDOs implement legal requirements by adopting elements of a widely 
recognized Baseline policy. We explained above in Section 7.2.1. how relying on the 
Baseline Policy is efficient in that it reduces transaction costs and creates trust. In 
addition, from a legitimacy perspective, the Baseline Policy is closely linked to 
requirements arising from competition law, trade law and public procurement, and as 
such it is a legitimate exercise of the policymaking power of an SDO. 
As we mentioned, however, nothing in law dictates that SDOs adopt the Baseline Policy: 
it is part and parcel of a self- or co-regulation scheme that an SDO can decide on the 
appropriate IPR policy for its specific circumstances (as long as it does not overstep legal 
boundaries). Hence, as will be discussed later, there is no one-size-fits-all IPR policy. 
Hence it is worth examining in general terms how the various sources of legitimacy play 
out in the case of IPR policymaking.  
As regards consent as a source of legitimacy, it is worth noting that many of the IPR 
changes studied in Section 7.3. are contested amongst the stakeholders, and hence that 
consent is not a given. Decisions relating to IPR often have distributional effects, in favor 
of either patent holders or licensees. Resolving the clash between the interests of these 
two groups of participants is not a mere technical matter, where experts may disagree on 
the most efficient means for achieving a goal that is not itself particularly contentious. 
For IPR policy questions with significant redistributive implications, there often is no such 
agreement on goals, so that policy disagreements are unlikely to be resolved by simply 
assessing the technical efficiency of different approaches. Of course, as in the case of 
requirements on the transfer of FRAND commitments and licenses with SEPs, if there is a 
clear consensus within the SDO, a strong case can be made that the IPR policy change is 
legitimate. In other cases, in the presence of clashing interests, even consensus or 
super-majority voting rules may not serve to eliminate all disagreement or controversy 
over a particular policy change, especially if the policy change has an impact beyond the 
SDO membership. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the SDO’s decisions 
lack legitimacy. 
As always, the devil is in the details: the temporal dimension of an IPR policy change 
might also play a role. On the one hand, policy changes that are meant to have 
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retroactive effect might require the clearest form of consent from all the affected parties; 
actually, retroactive changes might be so consequential that the general interest in legal 
certainty would be directly affected. On the other hand, changes that modify IPR policy 
ex nunc only, for any future standardization effort, might be more easily legitimized by 
consent alone. The intuition is that while retroactive changes affect past investments, 
prospective changes concern situations where no investment has yet been committed. 
Policy changes that are not truly retroactive, but still indirectly affect existing standards, 
e.g. in their next generations, fall somewhere in-between. 
Other sources of legitimacy can complement consent. Market constraints, for instance, 
also play a role. The evidence gathered from our survey indicates that firms do pay close 
attention to IPR policies before joining an SDO, because leaving an SDO on account of an 
undesirable IPR policy (in particular, as it may result from a change) is difficult. Yet our 
research has unearthed more complex competitive mechanisms – short of leaving an 
SDO altogether – than had been heretofore assumed in the literature, as described above 
in Section 4.4. For one, dissatisfied stakeholders can ‘step out of the room’, form a 
consortium to work on a satisfactory outcome, and then come back to the SDO to feed 
that outcome back into the SDO process. Some of these consortia were formed in 
response to dissatisfaction with IPR policies, and in some cases even opting for open 
source as an alternative to patent-based technological solutions.  
Actually, a closer look at the table included at the end of Section 7.3. reveals a 
connection between consent and market disciplines. Faced with calls to develop their IPR 
policy in order to tackle contested issues, SDOs have followed two paths, which can be 
traced to their governance architecture: some of them went for committal choices, where 
the IPR policy is changed in such a way as to take one side on the contested issue, while 
others adopted non-committal choices. For the former, the legitimacy of the committal 
choice depends on establishing consent despite the contestation. For the latter, the 
legitimacy of a non-committal choice can also be questioned when the competitive 
response indicates that some stakeholders “step out of the room” in dissatisfaction and 
form a consortium to implement their preferred policy option. Indeed, many of the 
instances of “stepping out” that we listed in Section 4.4. responded to non-committal 
choices on the part of SDOs. In the end, therefore, SDOs are forced to confront 
contested issues regarding their IPR policies, whether head-on through a committal 
choice or by indirectly facing market responses to a non-committal choice.  
Furthermore, SDOs can have their IPR policy changes endorsed by public authorities, for 
various legal reasons (antitrust compliance, accreditation, avoidance of liability). Public 
authorities enjoy delegated authority from democratic institutions, and they are 
presumably guided by the public interest. Through their endorsement, they would 
accordingly confer some indirect democratic legitimacy on SDO decisions. For instance, 
IPR policy development at ETSI has been done in close contact with the European 
Commission, in order to avoid competition law difficulties. On the basis of its interaction 
with ETSI and others, the Commission then proceeded to include pronouncements on IPR 
policy in SDOs as part of its policy guidelines (Horizontal Guidelines 2011), thereby 
offering a safe-harbour to SDOs that align with those pronouncements. VITA obtained a 
DoJ Business Review Letter (BRL) for its 2007 changes. Similarly, IEEE obtained a BRL 
for its 2007 and 2015 IPR policy changes. The BRL does not amount to a positive 
endorsement of the IPR policy, rather it is a statement that the IPR policy change does 
not contravene US antitrust laws, in the opinion of the DoJ. 
In a similar vein, ANSI-accredited SDOs are required to submit their IPR policy changes 
to ANSI, in order for ANSI to verify that these policies continue to comply with the ANSI 
Essential Requirements. While not a public authority, ANSI carries considerable weight in 
matters of standardization; undoubtedly, a ruling that an IPR policy is compatible with 
the ANSI Essential Requirements conveys some legitimacy on the policy in question. 
Finally, as regards legitimation through expertise, IPR policy matters often exceed the 
bounds of the technical expertise assembled in SDOs. It is true that some matters – for 
instance the prior art status of disclosures made in working groups – fall within the 
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bounds of what technical experts can be expected to decide knowledgeably (even then, 
whether disclosures are really prior art is a legal matter). For the bulk of IPR policy 
matters, however, many of the technical experts taking part in SDO activities do not 
possess the requisite expert knowledge.  
In the light of the above, SDOs can make legitimate IPR policy changes, taking their IPR 
policy beyond the Baseline Policy. Depending on the path chosen from those set out in 
Section 7.3., a combination of consent (according to due process), market discipline, 
endorsement through public authorities and – to a lesser extent – expertise can ensure 
that IPR policy changes carry sufficient legitimacy. 
7.4.3 Effects of individual SDO policy changes on the broader 
standardization ecosystem 
Legitimacy does not imply unity, however. When SDOs revisit their IPR policies, they are 
usually prompted to do so by requests from the membership, in light of market or legal 
developments. Policy changes typically aim to refine and further develop the IPR policy in 
order to better suit the circumstances of the SDO and the needs of its stakeholders. 
Considering that the starting point is often the Baseline Policy, which is largely 
streamlined across SDOs, IPR policy changes will tend to increase the variance in IPR 
policies across SDOs. 
At the same time, as was indicated in Sections 4.3. and 4.4., SDOs are in relation with 
one another, whether cooperatively or competitively. Furthermore, as our survey 
indicated, there is a core of firms that are members of a large number of SDOs in the ICT 
sector. IPR policy changes made in one SDO are therefore bound to be known to other 
SDOs. 
Accordingly, the circulation of IPR policy changes between SDOs takes place against the 
backdrop of two potentially conflicting dynamics. On the one hand, it is in the nature of 
the SDO ecosystem that SDOs reach differentiated solutions, since each SDO operates in 
its specific context, with its specific market realities and specific set of members. On the 
other hand, there is a broader sense of community as well, that was reflected throughout 
our interviews, our survey and at the stakeholder workshop: the set of experts on IPR 
policies is not so large, they meet repeatedly in different fora and they are aware of 
developments across the SDO ecosystem (at least as regards ICT). Similarly, the 
academic and public policy communities also tend to look at the SDO ecosystem globally. 
The mechanisms by which IPR policy changes circulate from one SDO to the other are 
not well analyzed, however.  In the debates surrounding the W3C move to RF licensing, 
the IEEE 2015 policy change, or the more recent X9 case before ANSI, we find a common 
thread, namely the fear by some stakeholders that the policy course chosen by one SDO 
will become ‘contagious’ and spread to other SDOs. The debates in the first-moving SDO 
are amplified and dramatized by a perception that a precedent is being set for other 
SDOs. When the policy change made by the first SDO is presented as a mere 
‘clarification’ or ‘interpretation’ of widespread concepts, as opposed to modifications 
intended to address the specific context of a given SDO, that fear is amplified. In the 
case of the 2015 IEEE patent policy change, industry experts on both sides agree that 
the particularly heated debate around the IEEE policy change is in part attributable to the 
fact that many of the policy change’s advocates expected, and many of its detractors 
feared, that the policy change could produce effects going well beyond IEEE.167 
                                           
167 One IEEE participant states in defense of the IEEE policy: “I have never believed that the furore around the 
IEEE policy has much to do with the policy itself but more to do with the concerns that some companies 
have about contagion. Fundamentally what they’re worried about is if what has happened at IEEE spreads 
beyond the IEEE.” Intellectual Asset Magazine May 16, http://www.iam-
media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=e8f72d6e-a3f8-45d8-882f-3ebdd3a1d69e. In a recent blog post hostile to 
the policy change, an industry expert taking the side of the patent holders laments that “The 2015 IEEE 
patent policy change, endorsed by a BRL from the previous DoJ antitrust head, is dangerously serving as a 
template for antitrust enforcers worldwide – not only with respect to IEEE standards, but also for other 
standards such as 3GPP’s mobile communications standards.” K. Mallinson, “Tide turns in US and EU 
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As a preliminary matter, not all SDO policy decisions have the potential to become 
‘contagious’. Some policy changes address perceived idiosyncratic problems or needs of a 
specific organization. Other policy changes however do address general IPR policy topics 
that also apply in very similar form at other SDOs. The latter type of policy changes often 
arises in a context of a broader public discussion, during which various stakeholders 
(including SDO participants and various public agencies) publicly debate perceived 
problems with existing IPR policies and possible policy options, or even expressly call 
upon SDOs to take specific actions.168  
7.4.3.1 Uncontested IPR policy changes – the case of SEP transfers 
There has long been debate over the binding nature of SDO licensing commitments on 
subsequent purchasers of SEPs. NRC (2013) describes how competition authorities in 
Europe and the US identified the risk that SEPs transferred to third parties might cease to 
be subject to SDO licensing commitments as a serious competition law concern and 
brought enforcement actions when such commitments were not honored (e.g., In re. N-
Data and IPCom169). In addition, these authorities encouraged SDOs to amend their 
patent policies to clarify that FRAND obligations bind third parties acquiring encumbered 
SEPs.  
Such policy clarifications can offer guidance to other SDOs regarding the meaning of 
obligations or provisions included in their policies.  That is, even if SDO A has not made a 
policy change, the clarification made by SDO B to a similar provision in SDO B’s policy 
can inform both the leadership and members of SDO A regarding the interpretation of 
SDO A’s policy. Thus, as a result of various SDO policy changes, in addition to court 
decisions and antitrust proceedings, SDO patent licensing commitments are now 
generally viewed as being binding upon a party purchasing an encumbered SEP. Policy 
changes such as these, if they become broadly recognized as desirable, can shift norms 
and expectations, thereby encouraging other SDOs to adopt similar clarifications. Baron 
and Spulber (2018) document that an increasing number of SDOs adopted policy 
provisions relating to the binding nature of SDO licensing commitments over time.170 In 
time, as this policy spreads, it might even become part of the Baseline Policy.  
This process is thus an example of how SDO IPR policy changes (supported by court 
decisions and competition authority enforcement practices) can spread very quickly, 
when the solution adopted is not contested and is rapidly seen as the best option by all 
stakeholders.  
7.4.3.2 Contested IPR policy changes 
The 2015 IEEE policy change introduced several policy modifications responding to 
perceived needs that also apply to other SDOs. The 2015 IEEE policy changes occurred in 
a context in which many observers and stakeholders publicly stated that existing FRAND 
licensing obligations were insufficiently defined in SDO policies, and various policymakers 
explicitly invited SDOs to clarify the licensing obligations arising out of their policies.171 
                                                                                                                                   
agencies’ policies on SEP licensing”, IP Finance, December 2017.  http://www.ip.finance/2017/12/tide-
turns-in-us-and-eu-agencies.html  
168 The simultaneity of the public debate and SDO policy initiatives is not necessarily an indication of causality. 
Initiatives for SDO policy changes and the public debate (including non-legislative government initiatives) 
can also be a simultaneous response to a perceived problem, e.g. because of litigation. In any case, the 
potential for policy changes of individual SDOs to affect institutional norms is strengthened if the policy 
change takes place in the context of a broader public debate, during which academic writings, public 
declarations by stakeholders, government communications, or court decisions have stated perceived 
insufficiencies in existing SDO policies, or expressed support for a specific SDO policy option. 
169 European Commission, “Commission welcomes IPCom's public FRAND declaration” MEMO/09/549 (10 
December 2009). 
170 See NRC (2013) for a discussion of different SDOs’ approaches to the issue of transferability of the 
commitment’s obligations. 
171 In her 2012 speech at an ITU-T roundtable, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the DoJ Antitrust 
Division, Renata Hesse, made “six small proposals for SSOs before lunch”, and inter alia invited SDOs to 
“Make improvements to lower the transactions cost of determining F/RAND licensing terms. Standards 
bodies might want to explore setting guidelines for what constitutes a F/RAND rate or devising arbitration 
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Furthermore, several of the new or revised provisions of the IEEE policy closely reflected 
preceding court decisions or antitrust investigations (e.g., IEEE’s reference to the 
“smallest salable compliant implementation” as a possible starting point for FRAND 
determinations mirrors an evidentiary rule developed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit. These modifications thus had a potential of affecting established 
institutional norms.  
Some of the new or modified provisions of the IEEE 2015 policy have the character of an 
explicit policy change (e.g., a qualified waiver of the use of injunctive relief), whereas 
others are formulated as more specific interpretations or clarifications of the obligations 
arising out of provisions previously included in the policy (e.g., definitions of general 
terms such as “reasonable rates” or “compliant implementation”). Similarly, in their 
position paper on SEPs,172 CEN and CENELEC profess to interpret the meaning of 
“FRAND” under CEN’s policy,173 but their statements can be read more broadly as 
guidance on the meaning of FRAND in general. Unlike the IEEE policy change, this 
document does not constitute an amendment of CEN’s policy adopted under CEN’s 
procedures for policy modifications.  
These examples illustrate how SDO policy changes and other activities of SDOs with 
respect to IPR policies have the potential to inform the interpretation of concepts and 
terms shared by the policies of a larger number of SDOs, or even generally accepted 
legal principles. Yet because of the contested nature of the changes, it is important to 
understand how these policy changes can circulate amongst SDOs. 
In this respect, there are two analytical avenues: horizontal circulation amongst SDOs via 
some form of experiment or emulation mechanism, or a more hierarchical circulation 
through the intervention of an authoritative institution, via a precedent mechanism. 
7.4.3.3 Horizontal circulation – Experiment and emulation 
IPR policy changes taking place at individual SDOs, but responding to perceived general 
needs common to various SDOs, have the potential to serve as experiments for similarly 
oriented changes at other SDOs. 
Innovative SDO policies on IPR can have experimental value. That is, SDOs can 
implement policies that are discussed e.g. in academic research or abstract policy 
discussions, but not yet widely practiced. If the adoption of the policy by an SDO is 
judged successful, the SDO policy establishes a model for other SDOs.  
The mechanism by which circulation occurs would resemble the theoretical models of 
regulatory competition or legal emulation (Larouche (2012)). First of all, as part of the 
discussion on IPR policy, an SDO and its stakeholders identify the concerns at stake and 
the aim they want to achieve (e.g. reduction of transaction costs, greater adoption of 
standards, etc.). Secondly, they consider the experience of other SDOs as potential 
options that they can choose. Thirdly, they assess the suitability of these options in the 
light of the concerns and aims that they identified. Fourthly, the SDO comes to a 
decision. Of course, that decision is a function of the views of the stakeholders, both as 
expressed internally in the SDO policymaking process and as anticipated by way of 
competitive response to the option chosen (as detailed in Section 4.4.). 
                                                                                                                                   
requirements to reduce the cost of lack of clarity in F/RAND commitments”.  The same six proposals were 
made by DoJ officials at a series of conferences. In a speech in December 2012, then-Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General Fiona Scott-Morton states that “one of the actions we [the DoJ] have taken is to advocate 
for changes at the SSO level to address the inability of the current F/RAND commitment to protect 
licensees from holdup.”  
See https://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/17120801/pdf/p-6_kallay.pdf for a documentation of similar speeches of 
DoJ representatives in the course of 2012 and 2013. See also Kühn et al. (2013) 
172 https://www.cencenelec.eu/News/Policy_Opinions/PolicyOpinions/EssentialPatents.pdf 
173 Remarkably, CEN’s current policy is to follow the ISO/IEC/ITU common patent policy, with CEN’s own policy 
documents merely providing additional guidance. CEN’s interpretation of the meaning of FRAND is thus 
CEN’s interpretation of the meaning of FRAND under the common ISO/IEC/ITU patent policy. 
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In practice, when W3C adopted a royalty-free licensing policy, this change was 
vehemently opposed by some stakeholders, who argued that the policy change would 
produce significant adverse effects on innovation. After the policy change, other SDOs 
also adopted royalty-free policies. OASIS for instance in 2005 allowed its newly created 
working groups to select to operate in royalty-free licensing mode, and in 2009 
introduced a third, non-assertion mode. In 2011, the American Petroleum Institute (API) 
adopted a royalty-free policy, leading opponents of this change to challenge API’s ANSI-
accreditation. In a letter in support of API, two ANSI members argued that the 
“widespread adoption of policies with default RF licensing rules, including by groups 
responsible for prevalent standards such as the HTML standard [W3C]” showed that 
“there is demonstrably no merit to the argument that such policies have discouraged or 
will discourage innovation”. Hence, “ANSI should do nothing to discourage 
experimentation with different IPR policies and models by accredited standards 
developers”. ANSI found that the RF policies adopted by both OASIS and API complied 
with the ANSI Essential Requirements. ECMA introduced an “experimental royalty-free 
patent policy” in 2013.  Under this policy, ECMA may designate specific task groups of 
one of its technical committees as royalty-free groups.  
The adoption of other royalty-free patent policies and the reference to W3C in the 
discussion suggest that the early move by W3C constituted a model for similar policy 
changes at other SDOs. It provided some empirical basis to analyze the expected effects 
of making a similar change at another SDO. Nevertheless, policies with default royalty-
free licensing rules did not spread widely across all SDOs, but mostly remained confined 
to SDOs with a similar technological focus on web-based technologies and to smaller 
technology-specific consortia (e.g., USB, Bluetooth, HDMI). Furthermore, more recent 
adoptions of royalty-free policies tended to be more limited in scope. Finally, even the 
more recent changes at API and ECMA were described by the SDOs introducing the policy 
or by stakeholders defending it as “experimental” policies. This suggests that the effects 
of policies with default royalty-free licensing rules continue to be perceived as 
insufficiently understood. Nevertheless, there seems to be some emerging agreement 
that such policies represent a viable solution in at least some technological areas.174   
A different example is the adoption of policies providing for ex-ante disclosure of most 
restrictive licensing terms and conditions (i.e., maximum royalty rates). In 2006, VITA 
adopted a policy making ex-ante disclosure of most restrictive licensing terms and 
conditions compulsory; whereas in 2007 ETSI and IEEE added provisions to their policies 
allowing SEP holders to make such a disclosure on a voluntary basis after mandatory 
disclosure of such terms was rejected by significant stakeholders at each SDO. Similar to 
W3Cs adoption of a royalty-free policy, VITA’s policy of compulsory ex-ante disclosure 
was strongly opposed by some stakeholders, who predicted significant adverse effects of 
the new policy. Contreras (2013a) analyzed the consequences of this policy change, and 
found no conclusive evidence for such adverse effects. Nevertheless, VITA’s example was 
not followed by other significant SDOs for reasons explored in Contreras (2013a). The 
probative value of the example may be limited by the fact that VITA is a comparatively 
small SDO with a limited number of SEPs. Furthermore, there is limited overlap in 
membership between VITA and other SDOs where SEPs play a more prominent role. 
Stakeholders in these SDOs thus have limited exposure to VITA’s policy in practice.  
The policies providing for voluntary ex-ante disclosure of licensing terms at ETSI and 
IEEE however seem to have been unsuccessful, because SEP holders did not make 
significant use of the policies. IEEE partly justified its 2015 policy revisions using the fact 
that the attempt to provide clarity through voluntary means in 2007 did not produce the 
expected results. Independently of the specific policy provisions at ETSI and IEEE, 
significant SEP holders made early announcements in 2009 of expected reasonable 
aggregate royalty levels for patents essential to the LTE standard, and stated what share 
                                           
174 Contreras (2016a) discusses how cultural and historical distinctions between Internet-focused SDOs (IETF, 
W3C) and telecommunications-focused SDOs (ETSI, TIA) have led to different approaches to patents and 
related policies. 
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in the aggregate royalty amount they expected for their own SEPs (Contreras 2015a, 
pp.560-61). In Unwired Planet v Huawei, Justice Birss of the UK High Court (Patents) 
called these statements “self-serving” and of limited value for the determination of 
reasonable royalty rates, though he did utilize these statements in his calculation of 
FRAND royalty rates in the case.175 The limited success of SDO experimentation with ex-
ante disclosure of licensing terms, in spite of the theoretical appeal of such policies (e.g. 
Leveque and Meniere, 2015), thus illustrates how experimentation with a proposed policy 
can reveal its shortcomings or problems.  
Similarly, after or in the wake of the 2015 IEEE policy change, discussions regarding 
similar changes were held at other SDOs, either as a result of the IEEE policy change, or 
in response to similar forces that induced the initiative at IEEE. As indicated above under 
7.4.3.2, CEN-CENELEC issued a position paper on FRAND, which can be seen as a 
contribution to the debate, but differs completely from the IEEE policy change on 
substance.  
The preceding examples reveal the essence of this horizontal circulation mechanism: 
even if the policy change made by one SDO can potentially apply to the policies of other 
SDOs as well, each SDO controls its own policymaking. Whether an SDO decides to follow 
the lead of the first-moving SDO is a function of whether, in the specific context of the 
second SDO, the policy change made by the first-mover is perceived as a success, and 
whether the circumstances of the second SDO allow for that change to be adopted by the 
second SDO, as explained above. Given that each SDO evolves within its own context, 
and stakeholder expectations may vary from one SDO to the other, it should not be 
surprising that contested IPR policy changes may not circulate so easily, even if members 
of the first-moving SDO intend its policy change to spread out to other SDOs.  
Moreover, next to the variance induced by the specific circumstances of each SDO, the 
analysis in Section 7.3. would indicate that committal and non-committal choices would 
co-exist side by side, in line with the different governance architectures present amongst 
SDOs. What is more, it is entirely conceivable that, on substance, more than one 
committal choice would be observed, since SDOs could side with one or the other side on 
a contested issue. Similarly, there are a variety of non-committal choices (menu option, 
inaction, etc.) that could each be present.  
In the end, if and when IPR policy changes are presented as interpretations or 
clarifications of widely used terms, a confusing picture could emerge, where the term 
FRAND, for instance, could have a different meaning depending on whether it is used in 
SDO A or SDO B.176 While unfortunate, this situation is not unusual in law (see Prechal 
and Roermund (2008) for an theoretical and practical exploration of “conceptual 
divergences”, against the backdrop of diverging interpretations of the same EU law 
concepts as between various jurisdictions).  
Within the web of horizontal relationships amongst SDOs, and considering the 
predominantly consent-based understanding within which SDOs and their stakeholders 
operate (see Section 4.5.2.), there is no theoretical basis for a model of circulation of IPR 
policy changes that would override the autonomy of each SDO over its own policymaking.  
7.4.3.4 Hierarchical circulation – Precedent 
If a more constraining model for the circulation of IPR policy changes amongst SDOs is to 
be found, it would hence require the participation of a hierarchically superior institution 
that could bind SDOs, following a precedential model – with which lawyers are familiar. 
Under that model, a pronouncement by that institution would turn the IPR policy change 
of one SDO into a precedent which the others are bound to heed, if not to follow. 
                                           
175 Similar use of these statements was made by the Japanese Patent Court in Apple Japan v. Samsung and the 
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in TCL v. Ericsson. 
176 Much like forking in open source software. 
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A review of the literature and the data we have gathered throughout our research points 
to two institutions that play such a precedent-setting role in the development of IPR 
policies, namely competition authorities and courts applying competition law, as well as 
ANSI. 
Precedent-setting through competition law or antitrust institutions 
As was explained in Sections 4.1.3. and 7.2.1, above, competition or antitrust law has 
had a major influence on both SDO governance principles and on the Baseline Policy in 
IPR matters. 
That influence has been felt through the decisions of authorities and courts applying 
competition or antitrust law to individual cases. Since these decisions are based on 
generally-applicable law that affects all economic actors across the board, the reasoning 
of authorities or courts in applying competition or antitrust law to a case involving one 
SDO is prima facie applicable to other SDOs as well, unless that first case can be 
distinguished from a subsequent case. Competition authorities and courts are well aware 
of the precedential effect of their pronouncements, and know how to frame these 
pronouncements to set out legal boundaries without unduly limiting the autonomy of 
SDOs.  
A review of SDO policies by antitrust authorities can thus confer precedential status to 
these policies, and clarify the legality of certain SDO policy provisions under antitrust 
law. SDOs themselves can bring competition authorities and courts to step into a case, 
through various means. The most direct one is to request a Business Review Letter (BRL) 
from the US Department of Justice, with the hope that such letter will not only provide an 
assurance that the DoJ does not currently intend to bring an antitrust enforcement action 
with respect to a proposed IPR policy change, but also to confer some legitimacy on the 
change (see Section 7.4.4.) and possibly give it some precedential value. IEEE sought 
and obtained favorable Business Review Letters from the US DOJ with respect to 
substantial patent policy amendments in 2007 and 2015, and VITA obtained a favorable 
Business Review Letter from the US DOJ in 2006.177 These SDO policy changes thus 
clarified the antitrust enforcement intentions of the DoJ with respect to such policies. The 
policies also established a soft precedent, which provides other SDOs with guidance 
regarding what IPR policies SDOs can adopt under antitrust law and the antitrust 
agencies’ then-current enforcement practices.178   
Nevertheless, Business Review Letters only provide an indication of the antitrust 
enforcement priorities of the DoJ as of the date they are issued. In a speech delivered on 
10 November 2017, without specifically mentioning IEEE, the DoJ Assistant Attorney 
General for Antitrust stated that the “Antitrust Division will […] be skeptical of rules that 
SSOs impose that appear designed specifically to shift bargaining leverage from IP 
creators to implementers, or vice versa.  SSO rules purporting to clarify the meaning of 
‘reasonable and non-discriminatory’ that skew the bargain in the direction of 
implementers warrant a close look to determine whether they are the product of collusive 
behavior within the SSO.” In light of these remarks, the precedential value established by 
the 2015 business review letter may be limited.179 
Beyond that implicit criticism of the BRL issued by the previous administration, the 
remarks of the Assistant Attorney General also point out a fundamental issue with the 
intervention of competition authorities and courts in disputes arising out of SDO IPR 
policies and their implementation. Competition authorities and courts intervene from the 
                                           
177 In a similar procedure, ETSI in 1992 sought “negative clearance” of its draft IPR policy from the European 
Commission, asking the Commission to certify that there are no grounds for action on its part under 
competition law provisions of the Treaty. The Commission however decided that it did not possess 
sufficient information for such an assessment (Iversen, 1999). The procedure is no longer available under 
current EU competition law enforcement practice. 
178 In a related area, Gilbert (2004) analyzes how the positive business review letters for the DVD and MPEG2 
patent pools in 1997 and 1999 created a “template” for patent pools not running afoul of antitrust law; and 
facilitated the subsequent creation of a large number of pools following the same model.   
179 See Contreras, 2018b (discussing implications of DOJ policy shift toward IEEE and SDOs, in general). 
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angle of competition law and antitrust, which is concerned with a specific set of market 
phenomena (collusion and agreements in restraint of competition, monopolization and 
abuses of dominant position), and cannot necessarily deal with all the issues arising in 
the course of SDO IPR policymaking. The Assistant Attorney General makes it clear that 
in his view, there should be no collusion within the SDO to affect the terms of bargaining 
between implementers and innovators. Beyond that, disputes are better left to contract 
law or property law, which are better able to take into account the specificities of each 
case. In that sense, the Assistant Attorney General might also have been criticizing 
earlier advocacy action by the DoJ (in 2012 and 2013), when the DoJ called for SDO 
policy provisions requiring or allowing ex-ante disclosure of licensing, placing restrictions 
on access to injunctive relief, and/or clarifying the meaning of FRAND.  
Moreover, as the shift at the DoJ shows, the application of competition or antitrust law 
might be undermined by a lack of consistency over time within a single authority, or a 
divergence as between authorities in the same jurisdiction (which is e.g. a possibility in 
the US, where the DoJ and FTC share the responsibility for enforcing antitrust law) or 
with other key jurisdictions (US, EU, China, among others). These limitations can reduce 
the precedential value of antitrust authorities’ review of specific SDO practices. In some 
instances, more generally formulated guidance can thus provide for greater stability and 
predictability of antitrust enforcement practices. 
For example, in its 2011 Horizontal Guidelines regarding the application of EU 
competition law, the European Commission carefully generalizes from its experience to 
state that SDO rules “would need to ensure effective access to the standard on fair, 
reasonable and non discriminatory terms”, “would need to require participants wishing to 
have their IPR included in the standard to provide an irrevocable commitment”, and 
“would need to require good faith disclosure, by participants, of their IPR that might be 
essential for the implementation of the standard.”180 The Commission sets out safe 
harbour conditions that SDOs can follow in order to avoid breaching EU competition law, 
and for the remainder the Commission leaves it to individual SDOs to develop their 
policies accordingly. 
Similarly, in Huawei v. ZTE, the CJEU frames its reasoning in general terms: it discusses 
SEPs and FRAND commitments by reference to ‘a standardization body’ and not to ETSI 
specifically, whose IPR policy was at stake in the case.181 This indicates that the Court is 
aware that the ETSI IPR policy is representative of a larger set of IPR policies that are 
bound to be affected by the ruling as well. In return, however, the Court leaves its ruling 
relatively open: as commentators have noted, the Huawei choreography, while useful 
and well-received, still leaves many issues open and requires further fleshing out in 
practice. 
Precedent-setting through ANSI 
Given its position within the US standardization ecosystem, ANSI is uniquely placed to 
give precedential value to IPR policy changes put forward within its accredited SDOs. 
Indeed ANSI accreditation depends on whether an SDO complies with the ANSI Essential 
Requirements. It is hence possible for an IPR policy change to be challenged before ANSI 
for failure to comply with the ANSI Essential Requirements. Since the Essential 
Requirements are the point of reference for all reviews of individual IPR policies, ANSI 
rulings on the meaning of its Essential Requirements and on the conformity of a specific 
                                           
180 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011XC0114(04)&from=EN 
181 CJEU, Judgment of 16 July 2015, Case C-170/13, Huawei v. ZTE, ECLI:EU:C:2015:477 throughout, including 
in the operative part of the judgment. While in a preliminary reference proceeding such as Huawei, the 
CJEU will necessarily rule in more general and abstract terms, it could still have limited the ambit of its 
ruling to ETSI, or even more specifically to the LTE standard that was at stake. The referring court, 
however, had asked its question in the most general terms, with the intent to challenge the CJEU to break 
the deadlock between the case-law of the German Supreme Court (Orange Book) and the Commission 
decisions in Samsung and Motorola: see Larouche and Zingales (2015). The CJEU was well aware of that 
and chose to take up the challenge from the referring court. 
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IPR policy with them are liable to have a precedential value across the entirety of ANSI-
accredited SDOs.  
For example, as both VITA and IEEE are ANSI-accredited SDOs, their amended policies 
were examined by ANSI to ensure that they continued to comply with the Essential 
Requirements. ANSI determined in both cases that the amended policies were in 
compliance with the Essential Requirements, though there was substantial opposition to 
this conclusion at ANSI by members of these SDOs who had opposed the changes. 
Similarly, the policies of OASIS and API including default royalty-free licensing provisions 
led to challenges before ANSI.  In all of these cases, ANSI concluded that the policies 
were in compliance with its Essential Requirements. These policies thus established the 
precedent that default royalty-free licensing policies are compliant with the ANSI patent 
policy, which is part of the normative features of the ANSI Essential Requirements. 
The precedential value of ANSI examinations of the compliance of modified SDO policies 
with its Essential Requirements is exemplified in the ongoing controversy regarding the 
response of the ANSI Executive Standards Council (ExSC) to a question submitted by X9, 
an ANSI-accredited SDO, regarding the conformity of a letter of assurance (LoA) received 
by X9 from one of its SEP-holding members. In that letter the SEP owner limits the scope 
of its licensing commitment to “wholly compliant standard implementations”. The ExSC 
decided that the LoA conforms with ANSI’s essential requirements, because absent a 
definition of “wholly compliant implementation”, the scope of the commitment must be 
understood to be equivalent to the scope of a commitment under the more general 
language in the ANSI Essential Requirements and X9’s patent policy. Nevertheless, in its 
initial decision, the ExSC also provides a more general interpretation of the meaning of 
“implementing the standard” under the ANSI essential requirements supported by 
additional examples and analysis. Importantly, under this interpretation, the scope of a 
licensing commitment must generally be understood to include both the makers of end 
products conforming to all normative standard features, and the makers of components 
used by such end products. If an ANSI-accredited SDO intends a narrower scope of the 
licensing obligation, it must explicitly define this narrower scope in its policy. 
Several parties criticized and appealed the ExSC decision because of the additional 
examples and analysis. In its appeal decision of February 23, 2018, the ExSC upheld the 
initial decision and rejected various procedural appeals, but deleted some of the 
examples and analysis in the initial decision and replaced this text with a more open 
interpretation of the ANSI Essential Requirements. This interpretation does not 
unequivocally establish the extent to which the ANSI Essential Requirements constitute 
an obligation to provide licenses to component makers.182 
The ANSI ExSC in its appeal decision acknowledged that the added analysis and 
examples created controversy, as there currently is not consensus regarding the 
interpretation of the term “wholly compliant implementation”. The additional examples 
and analyses were meant to provide guidance to ANSI-accredited SDOs more generally, 
going beyond the narrower question submitted by X9.183 The revision of the decision on 
                                           
182 “While the ExSC determined in the IEEE case that such a requirement was not inconsistent with the ANSI 
Patent Policy, that does not mean that ANSI’s Patent Policy requires licensing at the component level. We 
do not wish to express or imply any such “default” interpretation and we leave it to negotiations between 
patent holders and implementers to decide what licensing terms are appropriate in particular standards, 
subject to the terms of an ASD’s patent policy. 
The ExSC does not accept the arguments advanced at the February 5th hearing … that the ANSI Patent Policy 
requires only “access” to essential patent claims, as opposed to a “license” to such claims. Nor do we 
accept arguments that the ANSI Patent Policy cedes unilaterally and unconditionally to patent holders the 
right to decide “where on the value chain” they choose to license. These words and concepts are not 
reflected in the current language of the ANSI Patent Policy.” ANSI EXECUTIVE STANDARDS COUNCIL 
SUMMARY DECISION February 23, 2018; 
https://share.ansi.org/Shared%20Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20National%20Standard
s/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/ANSI%20Executive%20Standards%20Council%20(ExSC)%2
0Interpretations/ExSC_087_2017_091417_patent%20policy_022318%20amended.pdf  
183 “In an effort to provide future guidance to ASDs who may confront similar forms of customized assurances, 
in the Initial Decision the ExSC outlined potential considerations through the use of examples, drawing in 
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appeal, upholding the specific decision but reducing its potential to impact the 
interpretation of the policies of other SDOs, illustrates the power of ANSI’s capacity to 
make decisions with a binding precedential value for a larger number of accredited SDOs. 
 
Neither of the institutions discussed in the preceding paragraphs is ideally placed to serve 
as a precedent-setting authority for IPR policy changes. Competition and antitrust 
authorities and courts work with a body of law that requires caution in its application, 
given its strong impact across the board and its focus on a specific set of concerns. 
Furthermore, consistency across time and jurisdictions may be lacking. As for ANSI, it 
appears better placed on substance (being a body specializing in standardization, with an 
IPR Policy Committee where expertise is gathered), but it may not yet have the tools to 
handle complex, high-stake disputes surrounding IPR policies. ANSI is not a public 
authority either, in the sense that it is not implementing public policy objectives in its 
activities. Finally, ANSI covers much of standardization, but not all, since many 
significant SDOs are primarily based outside of the US and do not require or seek ANSI 
accreditation, and even some important U.S.-based SDOs such as IETF and W3C, as well 
as most consortia (Bluetooth, USB, HDMI) have not sought ANSI accreditation. 
7.4.4 The role of public authorities in defining SDO IPR policies 
7.4.4.1 Public policy objectives in SDO IPR policies 
As we have seen, the primary responsibility for defining and modifying SDO IPR policies 
falls upon SDOs themselves and their respective stakeholders and constituencies. 
Nevertheless, public authorities may perceive the need to address IPR policy matters so 
as to settle contested issues that are dividing stakeholders and potentially affecting the 
flow of innovation. Within the self- or co-regulation model set out above in Section 
4.5.2., IPR policymaking suffers from a lack of a focal actor on both the public authority 
and the private (SDO) side. There is no established tradition for SDOs to make policy 
decisions as a group to resolve controversial debates. While some focal organizations, 
such as ISO or ANSI, provide guidance and directions that are used and/or followed by a 
larger number of SDOs, each SDO remains responsible for the content of its own IPR 
policy. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the decisions of one SDO can produce direct 
reverberations for the policies of other SDOs. In addition, policy changes of individual 
SDOs can indirectly affect other SDOs via the intervention of public authorities or focal 
organizations (such as ANSI), because policy changes of individual SDOs can serve as 
experiments or precedents for more generally applicable regulation. 
In spite of their primarily SDO-internal, private nature, SDO IPR policies thus often 
address issues that are also highly relevant for public authorities in their pursuit of more 
general policy objectives, and public authorities have often taken an active interest in 
SDO policy discussions. The recent European Commission Communication “Setting out 
the EU approach to SEPs” illustrates the extent to which the policies defined by SDOs are 
viewed as instrumental to the pursuit of the Commission’s policy objectives:  
[T]here is an urgent need to set out key principles that foster a balanced, smooth and 
predictable framework for SEPs. These key principles reflect two main objectives: 
incentivising the development and inclusion of top technologies in standards, by 
preserving fair and adequate return for these contributions, and ensuring smooth and 
wide dissemination of standardised technologies based on fair access conditions.  
While this statement of objectives does not necessarily imply a FRAND regime, it 
nevertheless describes the objectives that a FRAND regime is typically portrayed to 
pursue. IPR policymaking must pay attention to the need to have appropriate 
mechanisms in place to ensure a sufficient and continuous flow of technology into 
                                                                                                                                   
part on the discussion that occurred at the IPRPC and the ExSC. It appears that this effort and the use of 
the examples and the discussion of whole versus partial implementations has generated controversy.” 
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standard development, while ensuring that the standard is available for wide 
implementation.184  
While the overall attitude of public authorities with respect to SDO IPR policy 
deliberations has been mostly deferential, there have been various episodes of more 
active involvement of public authorities in the discussion, definition or modification of IPR 
policies.185 
7.4.4.2 Public authorities calling for SDO policy activities 
In the IPR realm, there are multiple instances where public authorities call upon SDOs to 
perform certain actions. The latest example is the EC communication on SEPs, stating 
e.g. that “SDOs should provide detailed information in their databases to support the SEP 
licensing framework”, and that “SDOs should […] provide the possibility and incentives 
for patent holders and technology users to report the case reference and main outcome 
of final decisions, positive or negative, on declared SEPs.” An example of further calls for 
SDO policy reform is the 2012 and 2013 DoJ advocacy in favor of SDO policy provisions 
requiring or allowing ex-ante disclosure of licensing, placing restrictions on access to 
injunctive relief, and/or clarifying the meaning of FRAND. While such calls have no 
immediate legal or regulatory significance, they can be indicative of future regulatory 
action. In the case of DoJ advocacy, the favorable discussion of such policy changes gave 
a solid indication of the DoJ’s enforcement intention with respect to SDOs adopting such 
policies, even before the DoJ issued a favorable business review letter to IEEE’s patent 
policy incorporating several changes reminiscent of some of the DoJ’s proposals.186 
Public authorities calls upon SDOs to clarify provisions of IPR policies in conjunction with 
ex post regulatory sanction of SDO policy changes bear elements of delegation: public 
authorities perceive the need for a solution at a global level. Nevertheless, at global level, 
there are only loose inter-governmental institutions; and at a national level, 
governmental regulatory authorities are widely perceived as lacking the expertise to 
issue specific rules. Public authorities thus recognize that private SDOs are in a better 
position to address the perceived problems. Nevertheless, public authorities are unwilling 
to defer entirely to these organizations, because the question to be addressed has clear 
public implications, and is viewed as within the prerogatives of regulatory authorities. 
While there is no explicit regulatory mandate in the call upon private organizations to 
perform any particular activity, these activities gain some official status through a 
combination of ex ante calls from government and ex post actions by regulatory 
authorities recognizing and reinforcing the rules issued by the private organizations.187 
Nevertheless, important elements of regulatory delegation are missing. First, there is no 
clear recipient of public authorities’ repeated calls for action, as there is no focal SDO, 
and there is controversy which organization may legitimately take the lead. Different 
SDOs have different processes, and processes within SDOs are evolving, and not all 
processes are viewed as equally legitimate and appropriate. Second, SDOs are 
                                           
184 These two aims cannot be viewed strictly from a static point of view (with reference to a single standard 
once it has been adopted). Rather, inventors must be incentivized such that they continue contributing to 
subsequent standards; similarly, availability does not imply success, and the contribution of implementers 
to the diffusion and adoption of a standard must be recognized as well. 
185 An exceptional case is ITU-T, where national governments directly participate in deliberations on changes to 
the IPR policy and other SDO policy matters.  
186 Though, of course, it may also be the case that the policy changes advocated by the DoJ are themselves the 
result of lobbying by private interests, as suggested by former ITC Commissioner F. Scott Kieff (Kieff 
(2017)). 
187 There are precedents for situations in which such calls from governmental authorities to private actors to 
perform a certain task in combination with ex post sanction of the decision by regulatory authorities de 
facto constituted a delegation of a regulatory authority. The International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) e.g. developed international accounting standards after repeated calls by government leaders of 
WTO and G20 countries. In the interpretation of Joel Trachtman, “this statement signaled the WTO’s 
willingness to delegate regulatory authority (at least in political as opposed to legal terms) to the IASC. 
‘The WTO [thus] has … “delegated” to specific functional organizations the task of establishing standards to 
facilitate the free movement of accountancy services.’” Cited from Buthe and Mattli, The New Global Rulers, 
2011; p.70-71 
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confronted with a multiplicity of calls to action from different public authorities with 
different priorities and preferences, along with stark warnings against overreach and 
collusion. ETSI’s development of its IPR policy in 1993 and 1994 provides an early 
example of an SDO subjected to opposing political pressures on its IPR policy 
development from different public authorities.188 More recently, the pronounced change 
in the position of the DoJ, evidenced by the contrast between the public speeches of 
Hesse and Delrahim, as well as the differing approaches by the DoJ and FTC, show that 
there is a dissonance of politically opposing positions within the U.S. Third, SDOs are 
designed to create technical standards, which is the activity for which they have 
uncontested legitimacy. Issuing rules on IPR licensing is an exceptional SDO activity, yet 
is still formally and procedurally part of the SDO processes for developing internal rules 
and procedures.  
7.4.4.3 Towards public-private cooperation 
The EC’s 2017 Communication on SEPs takes into consideration a significant number of 
contested topics, e.g. it considers the importance of “a balanced and predictable 
enforcement environment” with a framework for the availability of injunctive relief and 
the availability of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and provides general 
principles of IP valuation to be taken into account in FRAND negotiation. Nevertheless, 
the Commission does not specifically invite SDOs to take action with respect to these 
controversial questions. The actions that the Commission explicitly calls upon SDOs to 
take are more ministerial and administrative: “improving the quality and accessibility of 
information recorded in SDO databases” and “raising awareness of the FRAND licensing 
process (particularly for SMEs).” These seem to be questions on which SDOs can develop 
non-controversial approaches in a consensus-driven manner. In addition, the 
Commission proposes that SDOs should give parties the “possibility and incentives” to 
report the outcome of final decisions on declared SEPs. As discussed, such an optional 
approach is characteristic of consensus bodies’ response to controversial topics. 
The Communication does not give direction to SDOs, but rather signals the availability of 
the Commission to engage in a collaborative process: “Working together with all 
stakeholders will be necessary for a successful implementation of the principles and to 
ensure concrete results of the actions announced.”189  
                                           
188 The Commission took an active interest in the definition of the policies. The 1993 policy was adopted by 
88% of the weighted votes of ETSI members, but did not go into effect because of intense pressure inter 
alia by the US government. “The European Union is retained on the ‘priority watch list’ because” [among 
other reasons] “the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) adopted an IPR and 
standardization policy that differs significantly from that adopted by other countries, and it is considering 
measures to expel or significantly reduce the membership status of ETSI members who do not accept this 
policy.” US Trade Representative Decision of April 30, 1994. 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/1994%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf. Iversen (1999) claims that the 
Clinton administration used pressure on governments of CEPT member countries, and in particular the UK, 
at the highest government level, in order to persuade them to withdraw their support of ETSI’s IPR policy. 
189 “Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents”, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee 
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8 Conclusions 
8.1 Best practices for interplay of IPR systems and SDOs from a 
public policy perspective 
In this study, we have produced a comprehensive overview of the interplay of IPR 
systems and SDOs from a public policy perspective, as it occurs in compatibility 
standardization in the ICT sector. While we have focused on some of the most salient 
aspects of this interplay, and in particular policy questions with respect to the disclosure 
and licensing of SEPs, our study of the governance processes of SDOs has implications 
for many other IPR-related policy discussions, and processes of decision making on the 
rules for standard development more generally. 
Both industry stakeholders and public authorities take an active interest in the interplay 
of IPR and standardization systems. The details of this interplay are most specifically 
addressed by the IPR policies of SDOs. While these policies are primarily defined through 
SDO-internal processes involving SDO members, staff, and leadership, SDO policy 
choices also respond to the actions taken by public policymakers in pursuit of the public 
interest. Our study has identified elements of best practices for the interaction between 
public policymakers and SDOs in the definition of IPR policies for standard development. 
Even though we have studied a diversity of SDO approaches to decision making on IPR 
policies, we refrain from evaluating the merits of the approaches taken by different SDOs 
as that question was outside of the focus of this study, and rather concentrate on 
recommendations for policy makers on how to most productively pursue public policy 
aims with respect to IPR policies in the light of the diversity of SDO approaches and 
stakeholder interests. 
We have cast our analysis of the interplay between IPR and standardization in the 
context of the general regulatory model with respect to standard development. Technical 
standards respond to a variety of critical societal needs and requirements, and many 
standardization choices have significant implications for public policy objectives. Public 
authorities have therefore often taken an active interest in the substance of standard 
development work. Nevertheless, over the recent decades, both in Europe and to an 
even larger extent in the US, a consensus has emerged that the public interest is often 
best served by relying on the existing system of private-industry driven SDOs, ranging 
from the more established standardization bodies to the more informal SDOs that 
characterize the ICT sector. The authorities therefore predominantly focus on creating 
the conditions under which SDO activities and decisions will carry some legitimacy in the 
public eye and produce results that accord with the public interest. In Section 4, we have 
chronicled the evolution of regulatory models for standard development and described 
the prevalence of a self-regulatory scheme which relies on the expertise and the 
competitive environment in which SDOs operate, and in which the input of authorities 
bears on institutional and procedural matters, i.e. on SDO governance. In particular, a 
large body of legal norms and guidance arising out of the application of trade/WTO and 
competition law enshrines the due process principles of consensus decision making, 
openness, balance of interests, transparency, and availability of appeal. Public authorities 
in the EU (Regulation 1025/2012 Annex II) and the US (NTTAA and OMB Circular A-119) 
have stated their willingness to rely on standards produced by private bodies for public 
policy objectives, provided these standards are developed in processes respecting these 
procedural principles. 
This general policy approach to standard development, which we refer to as a 
procedural approach, partly carries over to the development of SDO policies on IPR, 
which are ancillary to standardization. SDOs have substantial leeway in the definition of 
their IPR policies. Public authorities usually do not participate directly in the discussion or 
development of these policies or amendments thereto. Policies are discussed and 
developed in SDO governance bodies, often based on significant contributions from 
industry stakeholders. In line with the overall regulatory model sketched out above, 
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public authorities are willing to defer to industry-led processes drawing on the expertise 
of private interests for the definition of policies that – like standards – have a significant 
level of technicality. In Section 6, we have seen that this deference is grounded on the 
legitimacy of SDO policy making, as it arises from a combination of factors (internal 
consent, competitive environment, indirect democratic legitimation, due process and 
expertise); as an important condition for this deference, policy makers and stakeholders 
generally expect that the processes for defining these rules meet high levels of 
procedural quality. Nevertheless, there is a dearth of guidance on procedural principles 
as specifically applicable to the development of SDO policies in general, and the 
development of IPR policies in particular. 
In the specific realm of IPR policies, policy makers have supplemented the general 
procedural approach with more substantive guidance on the legal boundaries and 
requirements applicable to the substance of IPR policy choices. We refer to this approach 
as a safe harbour approach. Under this approach, the policy maker defines and states 
legal requirements and identifies general SDO practices that usually comply with these 
requirements. SDOs are responsible for devising specific policies in line with the identified 
general practices. SDOs can also develop alternative practices if they satisfy the 
underlying legal requirements. A sizeable number of regulatory instruments follow this 
approach. In competition law, the Horizontal Guidelines of the European Commission and 
various business review letters from the U.S. DoJ describe general principles of IPR 
policies that are seen as usually compliant with competition law. Outside of competition 
law, Regulation 1025/2012 and OMB Circular A-119 describe the general principles of IPR 
policies in similar terms. In Section 7, we argue that along with the actions of private 
organizations, such as the ANSI Essential Requirements and CEN Guides for European 
National Standard Bodies, these regulatory instruments have contributed to the 
emergence of a baseline IPR policy. While SDOs remain responsible for defining specific 
aspects of their IPR policies, and some SDOs adopt policies deviating from or going 
beyond the baseline policy in significant ways, the safe harbour approach resulting in the 
baseline IPR policy has arguably been the most influential form of regulatory involvement 
in the definition of SDO IPR policies. 
We believe that the interplay of these approaches could serve the public policy interests 
in SDO policies, while preserving SDO autonomy over their policy development. In 
addressing any of the shortcomings of the current model for the interplay of IPR systems 
and SDOs discussed below, we invite policy makers to prioritize strengthening and 
further developing these approaches over more direct intervention in SDO decision 
making on IPR policies. Examples of the latter are the adoption of ETSI’s IPR policy in 
1993 and 1994 under political pressure from various sides, and the shifting policy 
positions of the U.S. DoJ regarding the IEEE policy amendment in 2015. Both initiatives 
were of much more prescriptive nature. A strengthening of the procedural and safe 
harbour approaches may reduce or obviate the perceived necessity for public authorities 
to directly participate in SDO policy deliberations in such a prescriptive fashion.  
8.2 The representation of diverse stakeholder interests in SDOs 
The dominating regulatory approach described above thus rests to a large extent on an 
interplay between public authorities and SDO-internal governance processes, where 
public authorities define broad procedural and substantive requirements, and SDOs in 
their interaction with their members and other stakeholders define a diversity of specific 
policies that implement the regulatory requirements while also responding to SDO-
specific needs and objectives. This regulatory model currently faces various challenges. 
In particular, as a consequence of the increasing spread and importance of ICT, SDO 
policies on IPR have an increasingly broad societal, legal, and economic impact. This 
technological convergence, which has recently accelerated in the context of the IoT 
revolution, raises the question whether the set of stakeholders directly participating in 
the process of developing specific SDO IPR policies is sufficiently inclusive and 
representative of the diversity of stakeholders impacted by these policies.  
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Traditionally, debates on SDO IPR policies have often been dominated by a few industry 
stakeholders directly impacted by these policies, and in particular the most prominent 
contributors and implementers of proprietary technology. The set of SDO insiders actively 
participating in the debate is rapidly evolving, reflecting the pace of technological change 
and convergence. So-called ‘vertical’ players (in particular auto makers) are among the 
stakeholders with more recent engagement with SDO IPR policy debates, along with a 
diverse range of Asian (and predominantly Chinese) stakeholders. Both groups have 
rapidly gained influence in SDO governance bodies and the more general governance 
model. Several Special Interest Groups (such as the Fair Standards Alliance) were also 
created, combining and coordinating the active efforts of various incumbents and 
“entrants”.  
While there seems to be little doubt that large industrial companies in industries recently 
exposed to SEP licensing issues will rapidly acquire (or already have acquired) the 
necessary means to influence SDO governance on IPR policies, this is not the case of the 
much larger constituencies of individually less significant or less affected stakeholders. 
Many SDOs, especially the more informal and industry-driven ones  (e.g. Jedec) 
acknowledge that the interests of these other stakeholders, and in particular non-
commercial interests, are only marginally represented. Our survey responses also 
indicate that many of the organizations responsible for representing dispersed and non-
commercial interests in matters of standardization do not significantly participate in the 
debates regarding IPR policies. This situation raises the necessary question how societal 
and dispersed commercial interests are represented in the current governance model. 
Consumers and other dispersed interests could potentially have an interest in IPR 
policies. While consumers and other end users of standardized technologies rarely 
participate directly in the technology market for SEPs, they may be impacted by the rules 
in this market through the effects that these rules may have on end product prices, 
product variety, and technological innovation. Nevertheless, the impact of these policies 
on consumers and other end users is more ambiguous and certainly more indirect and 
muted than on the immediate participants on both sides of the market for SEP licenses. 
This could explain why consumer and other societal groups are not more active in the 
debates on SDO IPR policies than they are, in stark contrast to the very significant and 
often highly effective participation of civil society in other debates at the interface of 
technology and policy (e.g. related to privacy, copyright protection of cultural goods, net 
neutrality, etc) or in the area of safety, health, consumer protection and environmental 
standards. While consumer participation in SDOs is generally discouraged by a lack of 
information/expertise on the issues, disaggregation of the consumer/civil society voice 
and lack of funding to participate in SDO activities, consumer interests are particularly 
under-represented in the debates that we have studied. 
By and large, we observe that the stakeholders that are most effective at influencing 
SDO governance simply seem to be the companies that are most willing to devote 
significant resources to this activity. The willingness to spend is a direct consequence of 
each company’s individual stakes in IPR policy outcomes. The overrepresentation of 
these companies does not result from absence of openness in the SDO processes, but 
from their investment in the personnel and expertise that are necessary to be effective in 
influencing a complex and broad governance system across many relevant SDOs. This is 
a general characteristic of self-regulation processes, and only warrants government 
intervention or external pressure on SDOs and their stakeholders if there is evidence that 
the practical barriers to effective SDO participation (cost, expertise, network, time) have 
a detrimental impact on social welfare. 
The impact of unbalanced representation in SDO governance debates on social welfare is 
difficult to determine. The predominant regulatory approach seems to rest on the general 
idea that the interests of the end users of the standardization system are best served by 
vigorous competition at each layer of the process. Consumers and other end users are 
influential because standardized technologies need to meet the test of consumer 
demand. Antitrust authorities have spent significant resources policing the interface 
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between standards and IPR to preserve free competition in the product and (increasingly 
over time) the technology markets directly affected by standardization. Our study has 
furthermore documented a significant array of competitive checks on the power of 
individual SDOs to impose IPR rules. Perhaps as a consequence of the competitiveness of 
the industry, there is significant fluctuation in the set of SDO “incumbents” that have 
dominated SDO governance over time.  
Nevertheless, there are specific policy aspects at the intersection of standardization and 
IPR that do not easily lend themselves to a resolution through competition. One such 
aspect is access to standards including proprietary technology that are mandated by 
binding regulation. An example of this is eCall, an emergency communication standard 
mandated by the European Commission, whereby proprietary technology has been 
integrated into a standard and made available to all implementers. The regulatory 
requirement to implement this technology in all vehicles greatly diminishes competitive 
pressure and raises a legitimate demand for the technology to be most broadly available. 
More generally, the massive importance of ICT (and in particular the internet) for social 
and political processes arguably raises a societal demand that these technologies be 
available to all. This may warrant a regulatory intervention to guarantee low cost access 
to proprietary technology for people in need. These specific societal demands are not 
guaranteed to be met by regulatory approaches limited to preserving competition in the 
market.  
These situations may warrant a more explicit representation of consumer and other end 
user interests in the governance model. Of course, there is a range of measures that can 
be taken to reach this objective, like financing the participation of certain groups (SMEs, 
consumers, etc.) in SDO governance activities. The EU already provides some funding for 
representation of societal interests in SDOs, but it is apparent that present levels of 
support are inadequate to allow for an effective influence on policy outcomes. 
Nevertheless, it must carefully be analyzed whether directing further resources into this 
representation may impair the performance of the system. The current regulatory 
approach is characterized by a significant extent of self-regulation by the most directly 
affected stakeholders, which generally hold the highest levels of technical expertise. 
Infusing a significantly larger degree of participation by remotely affected and dispersed 
interests may further reduce the speed at which decisions are reached, or simply lead the 
directly affected stakeholders to create new forums for coordination. Standard 
development in ICT has witnessed a significant shift from formal and inclusive SDOs to 
more agile and industry-driven consortia. Imposing even higher standards of 
inclusiveness in SDOs by incentivizing greater participation of societal interest groups 
that at present do not exhibit a particular zeal to get involved could further accelerate 
this evolution.190 
In the absence of direct representation, consumers and other societal interest groups can 
be represented by SDO governance bodies with a mandate to take their interests into 
consideration. Such mandates are not uncommon in SDOs; but there is no track record 
of how individuals serving on SDO boards interpret their mandate, or how (if ever) the 
mandate is enforced. In practice, we see the danger that broad reference to the under-
defined interests of SDO “outsiders” is a convenient tool that could be used to justify 
almost any policy decision, even against the explicit resistance of a significant and active 
constituency. Whether consumer interests are better served by strict royalty-free 
requirements or by an open-ended royalty scheme is clearly a political choice. Absent a 
political process, it is difficult to see how a broad mandate to represent consumer or 
societal interests adds legitimacy to SDO policy decisions and processes. 
The only organizations that can speak with legitimate authority on behalf of broader 
social interests are public authorities. At the same time, given the diverging stakeholder 
                                           
190 It should also be noted that in the European political system civil society organizations act autonomously. If 
consumer groups have chosen to concentrate their resources on other aspects which they deem to be of 
more immediate relevance or concern to consumers, we do not see at present a strong basis to use 
political means to redirect their efforts.  
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interests and the high stakes, public authorities must beware of being instrumentalized 
by certain stakeholders and must keep their focus the public interest. The orthogonally 
opposed but invariably active initiatives of the US DoJ before and after the last election 
provide a vivid example of a public authority directly expressing its interpretation of 
broader social interests. To many who are disconcerted by the instability that these shifts 
may create, they also offer a cautionary tale about greater participation of authorities 
purporting to speak on behalf of the dispersed interests of the silent masses of indirect 
stakeholders, even when they are vested with the legitimacy of democratic elections. 
Broad societal interests tend to come in different flavors, depending on who is tasked to 
represent them. 
In this light, we uphold our general statement that the public interest is often best served 
by a regulatory scheme in which public authorities focus on creating the general 
conditions most conducive to the functioning of private SDOs. In most instances, public 
authorities should prioritize providing the appropriate regulatory framework over more 
direct forms of participation. Competition policy is likely, in general, to continue to be the 
most salient regulatory instrument to defend consumer interests in sustained 
technological innovation at low prices. If the Commission identifies societal needs that 
require specific responses in SDO IPR policies, it is within its mandate to define relevant 
regulatory requirements (e.g. for the access to standards incorporated by reference into 
legislation etc.). We have identified several best practices for the interplay of public 
regulatory approaches with the IPR policy development of SDOs. Following these 
practices, the Commission could generally leave it up to SDOs to define the specific IPR 
policies that implement its regulatory requirements. 
8.3 Weaknesses of the current model of governance for the 
interplay of IPR systems and SDOs and general 
recommendations for possible improvement 
Our analysis has revealed the predominance of a regulatory model in which public 
authorities define broad legal requirements regarding the substance of SDO IPR policies, 
and defer to SDO-internal processes for developing a diversity of specific policies 
complying with these general requirements. Under this model, a variety of public 
authorities have stated that potential SEPs should be publicly disclosed, patented 
essential technologies should only be incorporated into standards if the patent owners 
are committed to making licenses available on at least FRAND terms, and provisions 
should be made for these commitments to also bind any party subsequently acquiring the 
SEP. For each of these general requirements, many SDOs have developed a significant 
number of diverse and tailor-made specific policies. Several SDOs have also adopted 
original additional policies, such as rules for alternative dispute resolution, 
encouragement of pool formation, voluntary ex-ante disclosure of licensing terms, and 
other policy provisions related to IPR. Many of these policies were developed at the 
SDO’s or its members’ initiative, and often without significant conflict. 
While it is difficult to assess the success of the current model of governance for the 
interplay of IPR systems and SDOs from a social perspective, we see several indicators of 
an overall well-functioning governance model: In line with the general benefits of self-
regulatory processes, many SDO IPR policies were developed within specialized 
governance bodies vested with a technical expertise that it would be difficult for public 
authorities to provide. Furthermore, the deference to SDO-internal processes for 
producing the diversity of specific IPR policies saved scarce resources in the 
administrative and judicial systems. Finally, private SDOs could develop specific rules 
that comply with the general requirements formulated by different public authorities from 
different jurisdictions and with different regulatory mandates. While specific rules may 
differ considerably from one SDO to the other, the process thus preserves a substantial 
degree of harmonization across national borders and stability over time. 
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the described regulatory model is the diversity of SDO 
approaches that it accommodates. While we identify a fairly stable baseline policy 
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practiced by a large number of SDOs, there also is a significant number of SDOs with IPR 
policies that significantly differ from the baseline policy. Also within the relatively broad 
confines of the baseline policy, there is a large variety of idiosyncratic specific policy 
choices. There thus is a rich diversity of policy approaches tailored to individual SDOs 
and their needs. As a starting point, such diversity is beneficial, if it enables each SDO to 
entertain the IPR policy that its stakeholders in a process of balanced and inclusive 
decision making prefer, provided that SDOs respect the applicable legal requirements.  
In addition to these classic ‘local preferences’ benefits, our study has shown that the 
existing diversity of approaches across SDOs and over time can be beneficial from a 
policy perspective. As we have shown, diversity in SDO approaches can have 
experimental value and inform policy makers and stakeholders of the effects of specific 
policy choices. Through a combination of experimentation and precedent, the existing 
diversity makes the generally stable governance model more dynamic and responsive to 
technological or societal change.   
Nevertheless, for what is probably the most contentious SDO IPR policy problem – the 
definition of licensing obligations for SEPs – we observe a significant departure from the 
overall self-regulatory model for SDOs. In contrast to the general interplay between 
public authorities and SDO-internal processes described above, most SDOs only provide 
for a very general FRAND licensing requirement. To an important extent, the specific 
substantive content of the obligations resulting from a FRAND commitment has been 
developed and defined by public authorities (and in particular antitrust authorities) and 
courts. A very substantial case law is currently under development to determine the 
specific licensing obligations resulting from a FRAND commitment. This case law 
comprises “some of the longest district court decisions ever written” (Lemley and 
Simcoe, 2018), and produced criteria for appropriate conduct in licensing negotiations 
(CJEU in Huawei) or for the determination of FRAND licensing terms (e.g. Unwired Planet, 
Microsoft v Motorola etc.) that are substantially more specific than any guidance 
produced through SDO-internal processes. 
Among the SDOs that did provide a specific interpretation of FRAND or replaced a general 
FRAND obligation by more specific and generally more restrictive licensing requirements, 
these efforts generally led to significant controversies within the respective SDO and 
beyond. Furthermore, at least for now, these efforts do not seem to have contributed to 
a clarification of general legal terms or policies common to large numbers of SDOs. 
Rather than helping to clarify “the” meaning of FRAND, SDO efforts in this respect have 
contributed to creating a diversity of licensing obligations under different SDO policies (cf 
Chapter 7.4.2 and 7.4.3.3.). 
To the extent that policy makers and society at large have an interest in greater clarity, 
predictability of licensing costs, resolution of conflicts at lower costs to the judicial 
system, and overall reduced transaction costs, SDO policy making on licensing 
obligations has overall not been conducive to this goal. While the SDO governance model 
for IPR has been good at producing creative solutions for idiosyncratic needs, it has thus 
not significantly contributed to resolving the essentially redistributive conflict about the 
specific meaning of the baseline’s core policy. This void has been filled by different 
national courts and public authorities, producing diverse interpretations of the SDOs’ 
general licensing obligations, and thus reducing the international consistency of SDO IPR 
policies. The process has furthermore placed a considerable burden on the judicial 
system, especially in the EU Member States concentrating the largest number of SEP 
licensing disputes. Finally, the specific processes and obligations applicable to SEP 
licensing were developed and interpreted by generalist courts and authorities, instead of 
the highly specialized expert bodies that exist within the SDO governance model.  
Our detailed analysis of individual SDOs’ governance processes provides some insights 
into the reasons for this relative failure. We observe a dichotomy of relatively more 
stakeholder- or leadership-driven SDOs, where the former are associated with non-
committal policy responses to controversial policy issues. By the nature of their 
governance model, these SDOs are unlikely to make necessarily contested policy choices. 
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Leadership-driven SDOs have a variety of idiosyncratic institutional specificities allowing 
the SDO to make decisions against the resistance of a significant constituency. While 
these SDOs thus have the ability to make committal choices, these choices often lack 
legitimacy in the eyes of the stakeholder constituency frustrated by the specific decision. 
Indeed there is virtually no guidance from public authorities regarding appropriate 
processes for policy development. The self-regulatory model of standard development is 
to a large extent based and conditioned upon the core due process principles of 
consensus, openness, balance of interests, transparency, and availability of appeal. 
These principles are enshrined in numerous legal instruments, and a number of bodies 
exist to review standard development processes against these principles. No such legal 
instruments or review mechanisms exist for SDO processes for policy development.  
The direct applicability of these fundamental principles to policy development itself is 
disputed. On the one hand, most participants in the debate would agree that each of 
these principles is generally relevant to the development of SDO policies. Since IPR 
policies have a direct bearing on standardization decisions, for a standardization process 
to be fully open, balanced and consensus-based, the processes for making fundamental 
decisions on IPR policies should arguably follow similar principles. At least the type of 
highly involved stakeholders that predominantly participated in our survey (and which 
dominate most policy debates on SDO IPR policies) expressed the view that processes for 
SDO policy development should reflect each of these principles to a large extent. On the 
other hand, a strict application of these principles is – as confirmed by our analysis – 
associated with non-committal choices and a general stability of the status quo in 
substantive rules, an outcome that is not necessarily desirable, equitable or balanced 
from the viewpoint of the entirety of stakeholders impacted by SDO policies. Moreover, a 
uniform application of truly open, consensus-based decision-making processes at all 
SDOs may result in the same set of highly motivated stakeholders repeating the same 
discussions with the same non-committal results in each SDO. A meaningful diversity of 
IPR policy choices on substance arguably requires at least some SDOs to be able to make 
decisions that are opposed by a significant constituency, in departure of at least the 
principle of consensus. 
As a significant contribution to the strengthening of the self-regulatory governance model 
of SDOs, we thus recommend that the European Commission and other public 
authorities produce guidance on the appropriate procedural principles for SDO 
policy development along the following lines. 
The guidance should be conceived of within the current self-regulatory model, with its 
general procedural approach and its IPR-specific safe harbour approach. This would 
represent, in essence, an extension of the procedural approach to clarify the governance 
principles that apply when SDOs engage into policy development and change. The 
guidance should state, endorse and clarify the extent to which principles of consensus, 
openness, balance of interests, transparency, and availability of appeal should be 
embraced as attributes of SDO policy development processes.  
The three-layer model of SDOs developed in Section 4 provides a useful framework for 
this differentiation. In the third layer, with its large number of competing and sometimes 
short-lived SDOs, social interests are most likely to be served best by a diversity of 
approaches. To this end, public policy should be more tolerant of committal policy 
approaches in these SDOs, but carefully monitor behavior by SDOs or their participants 
that may reduce competition between SDOs or increase collusion within SDOs. In the 
first layer however, where SDOs regularly take on a regulatory function delegated by 
public authorities or are otherwise shielded from meaningful competition in significant 
aspects of their activity, demonstrated compliance with explicit procedural principles 
must be the basis for SDO self-regulation. In the second layer, where we observe the 
most significant departures from the general baseline policy, a case-by-case analysis 
may be warranted. A high degree of deference to the SDO’s internal processes could 
apply to explicitly experimental policies with narrowly circumscribed direct effects. SDO 
decisions with significant direct effects should be held against higher procedural 
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standards, especially if such decisions impact the value of existing property rights or the 
policies for legacy standards.  
While it is up to public authorities, including the European Commission, to propose 
guidelines they deem most consistent with their public mandates, one path that such 
guidance might follow is outlined below: 
- SDOs in the first layer – i.e. those that fit the traditional, hierarchical model, 
namely ISO/IEC/ITU, CEN-CENELEC, ETSI and the national standardization bodies 
– should apply the same principles (though not necessarily the same procedures) 
to policymaking as they do to standardization activities. In other words, the 
principles of openness, transparency, balance of interests and consensus decision-
making and availability of appeal should apply to their policymaking activities as 
well; 
- As a starting point, SDOs in the third layer – the large number of informal 
industry consortia that exist and may be created or dissolved at any point in time, 
including in our sample DVB, ECMA, JEDEC, VITA – should not be held to any 
specific governance principles in policymaking as they are in standards 
development. In essence, policymaking would run according to the rules set by 
each SDO in its constitutive documents. More specifically, policymaking need not 
be open to participation beyond members, no balance of interests needs be 
sought, and decisions can be made by majority instead of consensus. In principle, 
these SDOs are subject to competition from outside, and are likely to face 
consequences if they adopt policies that are not suitable for their membership (or 
for the broader set of stakeholders that may decide to join standardization efforts 
or not). That competitive pressure should suffice to ensure that their policymaking 
decisions do not run counter to the public interest. In addition, a certain amount 
of policy diversity could result from the various decisions of the SDOs, enabling 
knowledge to be gained through experimentation and circulation of ideas. Of 
course, should it be found that competitive pressure is absent, a closer 
examination of policymaking at these SDOs might be warranted in a given case.  
- Our study has also identified a number of SDOs in a second layer, somewhere 
between the two layers set out above. This second layer comprises IETF, IEEE and 
W3C. These SDOs should be treated on a case-by-case basis. Hence, the guidance 
should put forward criteria identifying circumstances (varying with the nature of 
the decision) that may warrant a closer scrutiny of procedural principles followed. 
Decisions that impact existing standards or ongoing standard development 
warrant decision making procedures engaging broader stakeholder consent than 
policies explicitly restricted to new projects (e.g. ECMA), or subjected to an 
additional approval within each working group.191   
Another reason for the insufficiency of the self-regulatory model of SDOs is the ambiguity 
and instability of the legal boundaries within which SDOs can safely operate. We 
observed that conflicts among different public authorities or within the positions of the 
same authority over time undermine the usefulness of the guidance provided through the 
safe harbour approach. SDOs would benefit from a greater degree of coordination among 
the relevant policy makers, such as among competition law authorities through the 
International Competition Network (ICN). In addition, policy makers should be 
encouraged to provide reliable and stable guidance that extends beyond the electoral 
cycle. 
The development of substantive policy guidance for SDO IPR policies has taken place 
almost exclusively in the realm of competition policy (and to a lesser extent trade policy). 
Nevertheless, other bodies of law also prescribe substantive requirements for SDO IPR 
                                           
191 An SDO (not included in our sample) that subjects important IPR policy choices to an individual decision in 
each working group is OASIS. The IPR policy of OASIS stipulates that “At the time a TC [technical 
committee] is chartered, the proposal to form the TC must specify the IPR Mode under which the Technical 
Committee will operate.” https://www.oasis-open.org/policies-guidelines/ipr#tcformation  
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policies, and these requirements often align with the requirements of competition law. EC 
Regulation 1025/2012 Annex II for example states the necessity for SEP licenses to be 
available on FRAND terms as a requirement for the use of ICT standards developed by 
SDOs other than the officially recognized ESOs to be used in procurement and regulation. 
If the European Commission believes that some SDO policies providing for a generally 
formulated FRAND requirement may be insufficient to ensure that SEPs are effectively 
available on such terms, it could provide formal guidance on its application of Regulation 
1025/2012 (akin to the Horizontal Guidelines for Competition Law). Consistent with the 
safe harbour approach, the guidance should not add new requirements to the 
requirements already listed in the regulation, but could provide a general template of 
SDO policies that usually satisfy the requirement to ensure that SEPs are effectively 
available on FRAND terms. It would still be incumbent upon SDOs wishing to have their 
standards considered for public procurement and/or regulations in the EU to adopt 
specific IPR policies conforming with these guiding principles, or develop IPR policies that 
satisfy the underlying substantive requirements of Regulation 1025/2012 through 
alternative means. As we have discussed in this Report, such a safe harbour approach 
can usefully contribute to the further development of the baseline policy, while 
preserving the self-regulatory scheme of SDO policy making on IPR. 
8.4 SDO policy coordination 
Another challenge to the current governance model results from technological changes in 
the context of IoT: SDOs are increasingly required to work together on technology 
standards. Tight technical cooperation often requires compatibility of IPR policies. This 
raises the question whether SDOs should coordinate their policy development efforts to a 
greater extent than they currently do. In addition, there is a public interest in legal 
clarity, which may be served by greater coordination among SDOs on the general 
meaning of policy terms that are common to their policies.  
To address this question, we first observe that coordination among SDOs on IPR policies 
is neither rare nor recent. Individual SDOs such as DVB that generally wish to have their 
specifications adopted as standards by another body often consider the IPR policy of the 
other SDO as a factor when making their own policy choices. SDOs working together on 
standards can create partnerships with guiding principles on IPR. The most prominent 
example of such a partnership of SDOs is 3GPP, resulting in virtually identical IPR policies 
between e.g. ETSI and TSDSI. New SDOs can also be created to craft specifications 
combining the work of different SDOs (which can be incorporated by reference into the 
standards of the new body). The new SDO can set its own IPR policy requirements in 
addition to the requirements already set by the SDOs that developed the incorporated 
standards. These additional requirements can produce more specific or more stringent 
disclosures of IPR or set more restrictive or more specific licensing requirements than 
those of individual SDO policies, thus establishing a common floor for diverse IPR 
policies. Overall, the system seems to be flexible and capable of responding to diverse 
standardization needs.   
Second, we caution that broader coordination among SDOs as a result of forced 
harmonization of policies beyond these focused collaborations may have adverse 
consequences. Our study has shed light on important benefits of diversity of SDO 
approaches. Stakeholders have strongly emphasized that there is no “one size fits all”, 
and SDOs need to tailor their policies to their own specific needs. In addition, we have 
studied beneficial instances of experimentation and emulation. 
Nevertheless, there is scope for some beneficial coordination. There is a clear policy 
interest in legal clarity. The very idea of a baseline policy implies that there is some 
commonality as between SDOs, even if only with respect to central terms and concepts 
with which SDOs can design their respective SDO policies. For instance, it would be 
confusing and costly if FRAND had vastly different substantive meanings across the IPR 
policies of various SDOs, whereas this concept is at the core of the baseline policy. At the 
very least, one would expect the set of possible acceptable meanings to be set out clearly 
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(FRAND-1, FRAND-2, etc.), as is the case now with the choice between RF and royalty-
based options.  
Clearly, there is a strong public interest in the existence of common principles and terms, 
so that the case law developed around the IPR policy of one SDO provides guidance for 
the IPR policy of other SDOs with the same or similarly worded obligations. This public 
interest cannot override the sovereignty of the SDO over the development of its own 
policy, and SDO policies can substantially differ from each other if SDOs decide so. A 
desirable objective is “ordered diversity”, where SDOs can tailor their policies to their 
own specific needs, and competition among SDOs preserves stakeholders’ freedom of 
choice, but there is some agreement on the meaning of common terms and the general 
process for the interplay of individual SDOs’ decision-making (e.g. conflicting obligations 
resulting from a patented technology being incorporated into standards of multiple 
bodies).  
While we observed instances in which the policy making of individual SDOs contributed to 
the clarification of policy terms that are common to a larger number of SDOs, there 
currently is no clear process for this “circulation” of SDO policy clarifications. For one, 
there needs to be some forum where the SDO-specific solutions can be discussed and 
their potential circulation can take place, outside of a single SDO and outside of a 
litigation forum.  
The ISO architecture provides a certain degree of policy coherence. The NSBs AFNOR and 
DIN reported that their policy making efforts are concentrated on participation in the 
relevant ISO and CEN processes. The NSBs ensure the application of the commonly 
agreed policy principles at national level, e.g. through accreditation processes (France) or 
DIN standards on standardization principles that apply to all standardization bodies 
seeking to comply with DIN processes. This architecture also provides guidance that 
extends into the ICT world, but there is a substantial number of ICT-related SDOs, 
including several of the most relevant bodies, that operate outside of this architecture. 
There is no similarly explicit architecture for the large number of ICT-related SDOs. 
Consequently, there is much less coherence in the ICT world. Perhaps the most salient 
form of policy coordination among a larger number of SDOs (including SDOs with a 
strong ICT focus) is the ANSI accreditation process. As we have seen, the accreditation 
process (and the decisions of the ANSI Executive Standards Council) can provide some 
interpretation of policy language used in the ANSI essential requirements and the policies 
of a large number of ANSI-accredited SDOs. The process can also give precedential value 
to the policy choices of individual bodies. There is a fine line between restricting SDOs’ 
sovereignty over defining their own policies, and the provision of authoritative 
interpretations of policy language, but the process can be helpful. However, it is worth 
noting that several significant U.S.-based SDOs (IETF, W3C) have voluntarily elected to 
remain outside the ANSI framework in order to preserve their own rulemaking flexibility. 
While there is no similar accreditation process or ‘meta-SDO’ in Europe, Annex II of 
Regulation 1025/2012 specifies criteria for ICT standards that are broadly similar to the 
ANSI essential requirements. The criteria in Annex II include criteria for the standards, 
and for the SDO processes from which these standards result. While the European 
Commission, with the help of the  Multistakeholder platform, identifies ICT standards that 
can be referenced under Regulation 1025/2012 (similar to ANSI’s accreditation of 
American National Standards), there does not seem to be an equivalent to the 
accreditation processes of SDOs comparable to the accreditation of American Standards 
Developers by ANSI. In view of promoting coordination among SDOs in the ICT sphere, 
the role of the Multistakeholder platform could be strengthened and expanded, perhaps 
taking inspiration from the ANSI accreditation process. It is worth noting that ANSI does 
not have any formal legal authority over accredited SDOs. Its importance results from 
the effective weight and legitimacy that its accreditation process carries. In addition to 
the breadth of the represented interests, the technical expertise and high level of 
commitment of participants in ANSI processes are key ingredients to this effective weight 
of ANSI accreditation. This example suggests that strengthening the Multistakeholder 
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platform does not necessarily imply that additional formal competences should be given 
to it, but rather to draw more intense participation from the most relevant and most 
competent stakeholders.   
Nevertheless, both Regulation 1025/2012 Annex II and the ANSI Essential Requirements 
are silent on policy development processes or governance in general. The specific policies 
of SDOs with respect to standardization processes and IPR vary. In addition to assessing 
compliance of individual standardization processes and IPR policies, it would be useful to 
reference acceptable processes through which such individual policy decisions are 
reached. This would allow the ‘meta-SDOs’ or review bodies to be more deferential 
towards SDOs for their specific, individual policy choices.   
In addition to these review processes, SDOs can further define commonly accepted 
standardization principles, and provide agreed-upon definitions for common policy 
language (such as “open”).  As example of such a process is the OpenStand initiative, 
whose scope of activity seems to be quite limited at present.  
8.5 The road ahead: the emergence of a “tandem approach” 
In its communication “Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents”, the 
European Commission states an “urgent need to set out key principles that foster a 
balanced, smooth and predictable framework for SEPs.” We have seen in Section 7.4.4.2 
that the Communication includes a number of calls on SDOs to adopt specific IPR policies 
or to take specific policy actions. While the communication thus follows an established 
tendency of public authorities to advocate specific SDO policy activities, we noted that 
the specific actions that the Commission invites SDOs to take are mostly ministerial or 
non-committal. 
With respect to the most contested SDO IPR policy problems, the Communication adopts 
a less directive approach. Rather, the Communication “draws on the responsibility of all 
actors in the SEP licensing context, and all stakeholders are encouraged to contribute to 
making this framework work in practice”. In particular, with respect to the development 
of specific criteria for FRAND licensing, the Commission commits to “work with 
stakeholders to develop and use methodologies, such as sampling, which allow for 
efficient and effective SEP litigation, in compliance with the industry practice of portfolio 
licensing.” The Commission furthermore announces the creation of “an expert group with 
the view to deepening expertise on industry licensing practices, sound IP valuation and 
FRAND determination.” 
In the light of the analysis set out above, the Commission’s approach might be the best 
available option. On one hand, a more directive approach with respect to SDO IPR 
policies public would run against the autonomy of SDOs and could potentially deprive 
SDOs of the benefit of having tailor-made solutions reflecting their specific 
circumstances, within the broad constraints of the law. Our research has revealed that 
SDOs and their stakeholders value this autonomy. Furthermore, the diversity of 
governance models found amongst SDOs is bound to produce a diversity in the means of 
policymaking, yet all governance models are apt to produce legitimate IPR policy choices. 
In addition, the Commission recognizes that private industry stakeholders hold the most 
significant expertise for the development of evaluation methodologies for SEP licenses.   
On the other hand, as we have seen, the existing self-regulatory model has failed to 
produce specific SDO guidance on the substantive content of SEP licensing requirements, 
in particular as applicable to a larger number of SDO. Consequently, as put by the 
Commission, “licensing is hampered by unclear and diverging interpretations of the 
meaning of FRAND”. The existing mechanisms for policy coordination among SDOs are 
insufficient to provide elements of commonly accepted interpretation of policy terms 
common to a larger number of SDOs. In this context, a collaborative endeavour involving 
public authorities, SDOs and their stakeholders might be the best vehicle to identify both 
the scope of the need for an authoritative pronouncement and the substance of such 
pronouncement.  
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The Commission’s strategy resonates with earlier efforts to address perceived policy 
problems with respect to SEP licensing obligations. In particular, an emerging consensus 
regarding the transferability of SEP licensing obligations was clarified in a process that 
combined policy amendments by individual SDOs and more general pronouncements by 
public authorities. The general pronouncements of public authorities had an impact on 
SDO policy development and vice versa, and both processes followed up on a number of 
studies and a broader stakeholder debate. Overall, the combined effect of these activities 
was what appears to be an industry consensus regarding the transferability of SEP 
licensing obligations, though the ultimate ruling on this issue in any given national court 
remains less than certain. 
We see in these examples the emergence of a third regulatory approach, in addition to 
the procedural and safe harbour approaches. We call this interaction between the 
activities of policy makers and SDOs the tandem approach: policy makers and SDOs 
jointly contribute to clarifications of IPR policy ambiguities, where SDO amendments of 
their own policies and agency or judicial guidance on the applicability of general legal 
principles jointly contribute to an evolution of general legal and institutional norms, 
resulting in reduced uncertainty. This is a desirable outcome, but the set of issues that 
have been successfully resolved in this manner is quite circumscribed.  
As the example of FRAND specification shows, before the tandem approach can be 
extended successfully to more conflictual issues, it needs to be further developed. 
Providing greater resolution on the transferability of licensing obligations was possible 
because there was a high degree of convergence of views between stakeholders and 
public authorities. In the case of specifying FRAND commitments, issues are more 
contested, so that the details of a tandem approach would need to be better specified, in 
particular the conditions for public authorities to participate in such an approach. In the 
procedural and safe harbour approaches, public authorities intervene mostly on the basis 
of trade and competition law, both of which have specific sets of public policy objectives 
(fair conditions in international trade, market competition and consumer welfare). In 
these legal areas, public authorities typically intervene after the fact, in a litigation 
context. A tandem approach might require public authorities to participate along other 
more pro-active parameters. 
General conclusion 
As a general conclusion, we observe the predominance of a self-regulatory approach to 
the development of SDO IPR policies. Public authorities have primarily participated in this 
process by clarifying the substantive legal requirements and boundaries of SDO IPR 
policies. Within these boundaries, SDOs have developed specific policy provisions through 
SDO-internal governance processes, drawing on the expertise and active participation of 
directly affected industry stakeholders. Guidance from public authorities has nevertheless 
contributed to the definition of a baseline policy, a set of core principles of IPR policies 
that are viewed as generally complying with legal requirements. Some SDOs have 
adopted IPR policies going beyond this baseline (e.g. DVB, IEEE, Vita, and W3C), 
presumably in pursuit of their own policy objectives in addition to the more general 
objective of achieving conformity with legal norms. Some of these SDOs (Vita, W3C and 
more recently IEEE) have made committal policy choices on contested issues, which were 
often opposed by a significant SDO constituency. Other SDOs adopted non-committal 
approaches (most notably ETSI, but also IEEE in its policy revisions prior to 2015) , 
providing for option-based or openly formulated rules.  
From a social perspective, this regulatory model has several advantages. It draws on the 
expertise and resources of directly involved stakeholders, allows for idiosyncratic policy 
approaches tailored to individual SDOs’ needs, and provides useful opportunities for 
policy experimentation. Nevertheless, the self-regulatory approach has provided little 
guidance on the substantive interpretation of FRAND licensing requirements, thus leaving 
an important gap to be filled by courts and public authorities. We attribute this departure 
from the otherwise successful self-regulatory model, at least in part, to the dearth of 
specific guidance on appropriate procedural principles for SDO decision making on 
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contested issues, the instability and inconsistency in substantive governmental guidance 
regarding the legal boundaries of SDO decision making, and the weakness of the 
institutions structuring and coordinating the circulation of policy clarifications among 
SDOs. Addressing these weaknesses may strengthen the self-regulatory model, and 
empower it to resolve more controversial policy questions. Overall, this general and rule-
based regulatory approach should be preferred over more specific participation by public 
authorities in the policy development of individual SDOs.  
In view of the policy objectives stated in the Communication, we view an opportunity for 
the Commission’s participation in the further development and clarification of existing 
policies through a tandem approach. Pursuant to this approach, collaborative efforts 
involving the participation of SDOs, industry stakeholders, public authorities, and 
independent experts can provide useful guidance regarding the application of general 
legal principles and policies common to a larger number of SDOs, provided these efforts 
are in phase with SDOs’ internal governance processes and respect SDOs’ autonomy over 
their policies. 
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Glossary 
 
3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project. A consortium of seven SSOs 
in the field of mobile telecommunication, including ETSI. 
AFNOR  Association française de normalization 
ANS American National Standard. Standards developed by an ANSI-
accredited standard developer in accordance with ANSI’s essential 
requirements and approved by the ANSI Board of Standards 
Review. 
ANSI   American National Standards Institute 
CEN   European Committee for Standardization 
CENELEC  European Committee for Electrotechnical standardization 
CEPT European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications 
Administrations 
CJEU   Court of Justice of the European Union 
DIN   Deutsches Institut für Normung 
DoJ United States Department of Justice (generally referring to Antitrust 
Division herein) 
DVB Digital Video Broadcasting (Project) 
EPO European Patent Office 
ESO European Standardisation Organisations (CEN, CENELEC, ETSI) 
ETSI European Telecommunication Standards Institute 
FRAND Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory. Also Reasonable and Non-
Discriminatory (RAND). Concept describes the licensing terms to be 
offered by the owner of an SEP to standard implementers. 
FTC United States Federal Trade Commission 
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications. An ETSI standard 
describing the protocols for 2G digital cellular networks used by 
mobile phones. First deployed in 1991 
IEC   International Electrotechnical Committee 
ICT Information and Communication Technologies 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. The IEEE Standards 
Association (IEEE SA), which is part of IEEE, is an important SDO 
best known for developing the IEEE 802.11 standard. 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
ISO   International Organisation for Standardization 
ISOC The Internet Society, a tax-exempt District of Columbia non-profit 
corporation, which also provides financial support to IETF. 
ITC United States International Trade Commission.  
ITU International Telecommunications Union 
JEDEC   JEDEC Solid State Technology Association 
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LTE Long-Term Evolution. Standard for 4th generation high-speed 
wireless communication for mobile phones and data terminals 
developed by 3GPP 
NSB National Standards Bodies, such as AFNOR and DIN 
NGO Non-governmental organisations.  
OASIS Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information 
Standards 
OMB Office of Management and Budget (OMB), part of the Executive 
Office of the President of the United States 
OSS Open Source Software is software licensed under a license that 
conforms to a definition maintained by the Open Source Initiative. 
PAE Patent assertion entity. An entity specializing in the assertion of 
patent rights against infringers.  
PAS Publicly available specification. PAS procedure is an ISO/IEC 
procedure under which accredited organizations can send their 
specifications directly for country voting. 
SAC Standardization Administration of China  
SAE  Professional association and SDO initially established as Society of 
Automotive Engineers  
SEP Standards-essential patent. A patent that is essential to the 
implementation of a standard.  Various definitions exist regarding  
the scope and nature of essentiality. 
SDO (also SSO) Standards Development Organization (also Standard Setting 
Organization). Organization that develops (sets) technology 
standards.  
SIG Special-interest group 
SME Small and medium-sized enterprises. Defined in EU 
recommendation 2003/361 as enterprises with no more than 250 
employees and 50 million Euro turnover. 
TAG Technical Advisory Group 
TBT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, commonly referred to as 
the TBT Agreement, is an international treaty administered by the 
WTO. 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
USPTO United States Patent and Trademark Office 
TSDSI   Telecommunications Standards Development Society, India 
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System. A 3G mobile cellular 
system for networks developed and maintained by the 3GPP. 
VITA VMEbus International Trade Association 
WTO World Trade Organization 
W3C   World Wide Web Consortium 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Stakeholder survey questionnaire 
 
Survey on Governance of Standards Development Organizations 
 
To fill in the survey, please use the provided online link. This pdf is for 
information purposes only and does not show all tables as presented in the 
survey. 
General Instructions 
This survey is part of a study commissioned by the Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission. It is administered under contract by Tilburg University, which has 
subcontracted portions of this study to investigators at Northwestern University and 
University of Utah. Participation in this survey is voluntary and you may discontinue your 
participation at any time.  If you do not wish to answer any question, you may press 
“NEXT” and you will be taken to the next question.  We expect that completion of this 
survey should take no more than 30-45 minutes of your time. 
The study aims at achieving a comprehensive overview of the governance of Standard 
Developing Organizations (SDOs) with a focus on the interplay of intellectual property 
right systems and SDOs from a public policy perspective. To this end, we seek to collect 
information regarding your organization’s participation in technical SDOs. This includes 
national standards bodies, formal SDOs, industry consortia, and other open organizations 
that develop or accredit voluntary technology standards. We are most interested in your 
experience regarding the governance of SDOs, including questions of membership, 
participation, transparency, decision making, policy development and dispute resolution. 
If you feel that you are not the most appropriate person within your organization to 
respond to this survey, please contact (see below) and let us know the name and e-mail 
address of a more appropriate person. 
If you elect to provide us with your e-mail address, we will send you a link to our final 
study report when it is completed.  Other than this, there is no compensation associated 
with completing this survey. 
Your responses will be used by the investigators to study attitudes and behavior 
regarding organizational participation in SDOs.  Your responses will be aggregated with 
those of other survey respondents and will not be disclosed or published individually.  
Your individual responses will not be reported to your employer or to the EC.  If you wish 
to obtain additional information about this survey, or need to authenticate the survey, 
you can contact searlecenter@law.northwestern.edu. 
We thank you in advance for your participation in this important project. 
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1. Where is your organization primarily based: 
a. Europe 
b. North America 
c. Asia 
d. Other 
 
2. Which best describes your organization: 
a. For-profit firm 
b. Civil society, public interest organization 
c. Trade association  
d. Academic/educational institution 
e. Governmental agency 
f. Other: ______________________ 
 
3. How many employees does your organization have: 
a. 1-10 
b. 11-50 
c. 51-250 
d. 251-1,000 
e. 1,001-5,000 
f. 5,000-10,000 
g. more than 10,000 
 
4. Which of the following sectors/industries does your organization focus on (check 
as many as applicable): 
a. Telecommunications 
b. Computing and networking 
c. Semiconductors 
d. Automotive 
e. Aviation 
f. Consumer Electronics 
g. Heavy industry 
h. Education 
i. Biomedical 
j. Health care 
k. Civil rights/human rights 
l. Consumer protection 
m. Other: ____________ 
 
5. In general, how important is technical standardization to the mission of your 
organization?  [scale of 1-5, Very important – Not important] 
 
6. Approximately how many employees at your organization are actively engaged in 
standards development and/or policy (e.g., by attending meetings, serving as a 
voting representative, submitting technical contributions, etc.)? 
 a. 0 
 b. 1-10 
 c. 11-50 
 d. 51-100 
 e. 100+ 
 f. Don’t know 
 200 
 
7. In approximately how many different standards-development organizations 
(SDOs) does your organization actively participate (e.g., by attending meetings, 
appointing a voting representative, submitting technical contributions, etc.)?   
 a. 0 
 b. 1-5 
 c. 6-10 
 d. 11-20 
 e. 21+ 
 f. Don’t know 
 
8. What is your organization’s approximate annual budget in Euro relating to SDO 
participation and other standards-related advocacy, policy and development 
work? 
(As of June 30, 2017, 1.0 Euro = 1.14 USD.) 
a. below €10,000 
b. €10,000-50,000  
c. €50,000-250,000 
d. €250,000 – 1 million 
e. greater than €1 million 
f. Don’t know 
 
9. Please rate the factors influencing your organization’s decision to join or 
participate in a specific SDO [scale of 1-5, with 1 being not important and 5 
being very important]  
a. membership cost 
b. relevance to business 
c. geographic location/emphasis of SDO 
d. employee interest in participation 
e. opportunity for leadership positions within SDO 
f. reputation of SDO 
g. size of SDO or working groups 
h. number of competing SDOs/standards 
i. SDO’s intellectual property policies 
j. identity of other SDO members 
k. availability of standards 
l. openness of SDO’s processes 
m. access to other firms’ patented technologies 
n. ease of making technical contributions 
o. relevance of SDO to public policy 
p. other: _________________________ 
 
10. What is the principal role of your organization in standardization processes? 
(Check the one that best describes your organization) 
a. Active contributor to standards development, and if so 
i. Contributor of patented technology seeking to derive licensing 
revenue as a primary goal 
ii. Contributor of patented technology not seeking to derive licensing 
revenue as a primary goal 
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iii. Contributor of unpatented technology, or active commenter, 
reviewer or editor of standards documents without significant 
patented contributions 
b. Attendee and observer of SDO proceedings without making significant 
contributions  
c. User of standards that does not actively participate in standards 
development (e.g. manufacturer or purchaser of standardized products) 
[skip directly to question 17] 
d. Stakeholder interested in standardization processes, without being an 
active participant in SDOs or a user of standards. [skip directly to question 
17] 
11.  To what degree are your organization’s personnel involved in the formation 
and/or leadership of SDOs? [scale of 1-5: very/somewhat/not involved] 
 
12. Do employees of your organization currently hold any of the following positions 
within SDOs (check all that apply): 
 
a. Chair of an ad hoc working group or project group   
b. Chair of a permanent technical working group/committee/division/council 
c. Member of the SDO’s governing body (Board of Directors, Steering Board, 
etc.) 
d. Other: ________________ 
e. Don't know 
 
13. How does your organization reward employee participation and leadership in 
SDOs? 
 
 [open ended] 
 
14. Which of the following statements best describes your organization’s 
expectations of employees participating in SDOs? (Select one) 
 
a. They use their independent expert judgment to contribute to the general 
interest  
b. They use their independent expert judgment to represent the interests of 
the organization within the SDO 
c. They use their independent expert judgment to pursue clearly defined 
goals and strategies of our organization 
d. They liaise with management before taking positions within the SDO 
e. Other: [   ] 
 
15. How does your organization involve attorneys (either in-house or external) in the 
SDO/standardization process (check all that apply)?  
a. Attorneys participate in SDO committees or working groups on behalf of 
the organization 
b. Attorneys are available to advise technical participants upon request 
c. Attorneys review technical submissions prior to submission 
d. Attorneys cast votes at the SDO on behalf of the organization 
e. Attorneys review SDO policy and membership documents before the 
organization approves them 
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f. Attorneys discuss technical contributions with technical personnel to 
determine whether patent filings may be made 
g. Attorneys submit patent disclosures/declarations to SDOs on behalf of 
organization 
h. Attorneys train/educate the organization’s SDO participants on legal issues 
Attorneys are not involved 
i. Other: ____________________________ 
 
16. Does your organization engage external consultants (other than law firms) to 
advise or represent it on technical standards-development work?  [Yes/No] 
 
If YES, please describe what types of firms are engaged and the extent of their 
involvement. 
 
17. Does your organization engage external consultants (other than law firms) to 
advise or represent it on SDO policy issues?  [Yes/No] 
 
If YES, please describe what types of firms are engaged and the extent of their 
involvement. 
 
18. From the following list of SDOs, please check those that are important to your 
organization (check at least one): 
 
 [SDO list with check boxes] 
 
19. For each of the SDOs important to your organization [GENERATES FROM THE 
ABOVE RESPONSE], please rate the effectiveness of the SDO in each of the 
following technical respects (with 5 being the most effective and 1 being the least 
effective) 
a. Ease of introducing new standardization projects 
b. Organization of standardization process 
c. Leadership of standardization process 
d. Consideration of member contributions 
e. Speed of standardization process 
f. Quality of standards 
g. Updating of standards 
h. Accessibility of standards to implementers 
i. Usefulness of standards 
j. Compatibility with open source software 
 
20. For each of the SDOs important to your organization [GENERATES FROM THE 
ABOVE RESPONSE], please rate the effectiveness of the SDO in each of the 
following policy respects (with 5 being the most effective and 1 being the least 
effective) 
a. General organization and efficiency of SDO administration 
b. Transparency of SDO decision making 
c. Fairness of SDO governance processes 
d. Assessing consensus of SDO members 
e. Openness of participation in SDO governance 
f. Clarity of SDO policies 
g. Ability of members to influence policy decisions 
 203 
h. Management’s explanation of policy decisions 
i. Amendment of policies to respond to new situations 
j. Processes for approval/voting on policy amendment 
k. Addressing minority viewpoints in policy decisions 
l. Addressing the public interest in policy decisions 
 
21. In a situation where your organization is not directly represented in an SDO 
governance body, how likely are the following organizations to adequately 
represent your organization’s interests (through their representatives in that 
SDO)?. 
a. SDO staff 
b. Trade associations 
c. Government agencies 
d. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
e. Competitor firms 
f. Firms upstream in the market (i.e., suppliers) 
g. Firms downstream in the market (e.g., customers) 
 
22. How effective has your organization found the following means for affecting SDO 
policy making? [For each item, 5-point scale: very effective/somewhat 
effective/neutral/somewhat ineffective/very ineffective plus not applicable] 
a. Propose changes to SDO policies  
b. Propose formation of new task force or working group within SDO 
c. Seek leadership role(s) within SDO 
d. Seek to change leadership of SDO 
e. Petition governmental agencies 
f. Seek assistance from trade associations/organizations 
g. Form alliances with like-minded SDO members 
h. Withdraw or disengage from SDO 
i. Publish opinion pieces/articles  
j. Participate in industry discussions/forums  
k. Engage external consultants to represent organization at SDO 
l. Bring or threaten legal action against SDO  
   
23. For the SDOs that are important to your organization, what is the principal 
source of important policy proposals and amendments at the SDO:  
a. Proposals by your organization 
b. Proposals by other members 
c. Proposals by SDO staff/administration 
d. Influence by government officials 
e. There have been no important policy changes of which we are aware 
 
24. When an SDO is considering a significant new policy or policy change, who should 
be entitled to participate in the proposal, discussion and adoption of that policy 
matter:  
 
Anyone who is interested, whether or not a member of the SDO   
All members of the SDO        
Members of the SDO’s governance or policy board     
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SDO leadership         
Does not matter to my organization       
Whatever SDO leadership thinks is appropriate under the circumstances  
Do not know          
 
25. When an SDO is considering a significant new policy or policy change, to what 
degree should the SDO seek to ensure that there is "balance of interests" among 
the persons participating in the proposal, discussion and adoption of that policy: 
Ensure balance among different types of stakeholders (e.g. producers, users, 
general interest stakeholders, or other relevant categories) 
Do not make special efforts to ensure balance 
Does not matter to my organization 
Whatever SDO leadership thinks is appropriate under the circumstances 
Do not know    
26. How transparent should an SDO make deliberations over significant new policies 
or policy changes (including e.g. meeting minutes and outcomes of votes)? 
Fully visible to the public 
Visible only to SDO members 
Visible only to members of the SDO governing body/board 
Visible only to SDO leadership/management 
Does not matter to my organization 
Whatever SDO leadership thinks is appropriate under the circumstances 
Do not know          
27. What appeals process should exist for SDO policy-related decisions? 
 
The same appeals process that exists for technical standards decisions 
  
A more robust appeals process than exists for technical standards decisions  
A more limited appeals process than exists for technical standards decisions  
Does not matter to my organisation       
Whatever SDO leadership thinks is appropriate under the circumstances 
Do not know          
 
28. In general, how should an SDO's processes for adopting policy changes compare 
to its processes for adopting technical standards in terms of factors such as 
openness, transparency, balance, consensus and availability of appeal?  
 
Processes should be the same or similar      
Process for policy changes should be more stringent than for tech standards  
Process for policy changes should be less stringent than for tech standards  
Does not matter to my organisation       
Whatever SDO leadership thinks is appropriate under the circumstances  
Do not know          
 
29. What level of approval should an SDO use for the adoption or amendment of 
routine SDO policies and procedures: 
a. Unanimous approval of voting members 
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b. Consensus (lack of sustained opposition by any stakeholder group) 
c. Super-majority vote of voting members (e.g., 2/3 or ¾ majority) 
d. Majority vote of voting members 
e. Decision of SDO management/administration 
f. Depends on the policy or procedure 
 
30. What level of approval should an SDO use for the adoption or amendment of 
important SDO policies and procedures: 
a. Unanimous approval of voting members 
b. Consensus (lack of sustained opposition by any stakeholder group) 
c. Super-majority vote of voting members (e.g., 2/3 or ¾ majority) 
d. Majority vote of voting members 
e. Decision of SDO management/administration 
f. Depends on the policy or procedure 
31. What role do you believe government agencies (other than competition 
authorities) such as the European Commission, national ministries, regulatory 
authorities and regional or municipal bodies should play in technical 
interoperability standardization (i.e., not health and safety standards)?  [1-5 
scale:  A leading role, a strong role, a moderate role, small role, no role at all] 
 
32. What role do you believe competition authorities, such as the European 
Commission’s DG Competition, the US Department of Justice Antitrust Division, 
or national fair trade commissions should play in technical interoperability 
standardization? [1-5 scale:  A leading role, a strong role, a moderate role, small 
role, no role at all] 
 
 
33. To what degree should SDOs cooperate with the following types of public 
authorities: [scale 1 to 5, 1 not at all to 5 very closely] 
a. National ministries; 
b. Research funding agencies; 
c. Competition and antitrust authorities; 
d. Patent offices; 
e. Health and safety regulators 
f. Trade bodies (WTO); 
 
34. Which of the following aspects of technical interoperability standardization should 
governmental agencies concern themselves with (check all that apply):  
Ensuring that participants in standardization do not engage in anticompetitive 
conduct 
Ensuring that standards support the best technological features 
Choosing which technological features should be included in standards 
Ensuring that standardized products are available at reasonable prices 
Ensuring that standardized products are available at the lowest possible prices 
Ensuring that standards serve the public interest 
Ensuring that standards serve national interests 
Ensuring that SDO patent policies are fair and balanced 
Ensuring that small businesses are able to participate in developing standards 
Ensuring that standards enable product compatibility at the international level 
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Ensuring that standards do not impose barriers to free trade 
 
35. How would standardization be impacted by greater participation by individuals 
representing any of the following groups? [scale 1-5 from very negatively to very 
positively impacted]  
a. Government competition regulators  
b. Government health and safety regulators 
c. International representative bodies such as the United Nations 
d. Least-developed countries 
e. individual inventors 
f. small businesses 
g. trade associations of users of standardized products and user groups 
h. universities and research institutions 
i. civil society groups (human rights,  privacy, consumer protection, 
environment) 
j. intellectual property attorneys 
 
36. Does your organization participate in open source consortia? [y/n] 
 
37. How compatible are open source licenses with FRAND licensing requirements in 
standard setting? (1-5, not compatible at all, fully compatible) 
 
38. Does your organization see an opportunity for closer interaction between open 
source consortia and SDOs?  If so, please describe. [OPEN ENDED] 
39. What is the key barrier in collaborating with open source projects with respect to 
standardization activities: 
a. Intellectual property. 
b. Governance. 
c. Difficulty of collaboration. 
d. Sustainability of the results (e.g. limited support by the OSS community). 
e. Different development times  
f. None. 
g. Collaboration with OSS projects is not applicable 
Other: ____________________________________ 
 
40. In which area(s) would stronger collaboration between SDOs and OSS 
communities benefit the standardization process? [select up to 3] 
a. Cloud. 
b. Internet of Things. 
c. 5G. 
d. Data economy. 
e. Cybersecurity. 
f. Big Data. 
g. Geospatial technologies. 
h. Internet technologies. 
i. Software engineering. 
Other: ____________ 
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41. How significant to your organization is each of the following risks relating to 
standardization? [scale of 1-5, 1 not significant, 5 very significant] 
a. Exorbitant royalty demands and/or patent litigation 
b. Obligations to make intellectual property available on undesirable terms 
c. Conflicts over intellectual property among different authors of a joint 
contribution 
d. Losing the ability to protect intellectual property (e.g. apply for a patent) 
by early disclosure in SDO working groups 
e. SDO participants may file patents on your organization’s contributions  
f. Cost of purchasing copyrighted standard documents 
The next several questions relate to patents covering standards being developed at an 
SDO (standards-essential patents or SEPs). 
42. Has your organization ever disclosed potential SEPs to an SDO?  [YES/NO] 
[IF NO: Has your organization ever participated in a standard development project 
or working group in which a potential SEP was disclosed? If YES, SKIP TO 
Question 46; IF NO, SKIP TO Question 50] 
43. What internal processes exist at your organization to identify and disclose SEPs 
to relevant SDOs? 
  [OPEN ENDED] 
44. Who at your organization generally files SEP disclosures with an SDO? 
  a. Individual SDO participant 
  b. Business unit manager 
  c. Legal department 
  d. Standards department 
  e. Other: __________________ 
 
45. Has your organization ever experienced conflicts over SEPs or SEP disclosures 
with co-developers/submitters of contributions to an SDO?  [Y/N] 
 [IF YES] How were such conflicts resolved? [OPEN ENDED] 
 
46. What actions has your organization taken in response to specific SEP disclosures 
by others during the standardization process (check all that apply): 
a. Consult with attorneys 
b. Evaluate product designs for potential infringement 
c. Develop product design work-arounds to avoid infringement 
d. Propose alterations to standard to avoid infringement 
e. Contact SEP discloser regarding available license terms 
f. Withdraw from SDO 
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g. Change product release plans 
h. File your own SEP disclosure 
i. File additional patents 
j. Consider prior art or other means for invalidating a disclosed SEP 
k. None of the above 
 
47. To what degree is your organization aware of SDO working groups that have 
attempted to work-around or avoid disclosed (or otherwise known) SEPs?  
 [Scale of 1-5:  This happens frequently/sometimes/occasionally/never/don’t 
know] 
 
48. How would each of the following impact SDO standardization processes:  
[1-5: very positively impact to very negatively impact 
a. More guidance from SDO regarding the meaning of licensing commitments 
b. Greater discussion of patent licensing terms among SDO members 
c. SDO determination of aggregate patent royalty rates applicable to 
particular standards 
d. SDO arbitration of policy disputes between members 
e. SDO formation of patent pools covering standards 
 
49. How strongly do each of the following factors affect your organization’s decision 
whether or not to discuss patent and licensing-related matters within the 
standard-setting process: [scale of 1-5] 
a. Risk of antitrust/competition liability 
b. Prohibitions in SDO policies 
c. Such discussions will jeopardize current relationships with SEP licensors 
d. Long-term licenses with SEP holders are already in place 
e. Desire not to reveal information to competitors  
f. Lack of legal/patent expertise among SDO participants 
g. Such discussions will hinder/lengthen the standardization process 
h. Such discussions would make the SDO less attractive to major SEP holders 
 
50. Has your organization ever left an SDO, ceased to participate in its activities, or 
considered doing so, because of its IP policy or because of IP litigation arising out 
of your participation in this SDO?  [y/n – IF YES, please elaborate] 
 
51. How effective do you feel the following methods are for resolving disputes among 
SDO members regarding SDO policies: [1-5: very/moderately effective/neither 
effective nor ineffective, moderately/very ineffective] 
a. Private negotiations between the disputing members 
b. Negotiation mediated by SDO staff 
c. Negotiation mediated by external mediator (e.g., JAMS, AAA, etc.) 
d. Formal (binding) arbitration by SDO staff 
e. Binding decision by SDO staff/executive 
f. Formal (binding) arbitration at external institution (e.g, ICC, AAA, LCIA, 
WIPO, etc.) 
g. Intervention of governmental agencies 
h. Administrative (governmental) procedures or complaints 
i. Court litigation in a single country 
j. Court litigation in multiple countries simultaneously 
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52. Has your organization ever opposed or voted against adoption of a proposed 
standard as a result of a SEP disclosure and/or the royalty rate or other licensing 
terms offered by a SEP holder?  [y/n] 
 
53. Is your organization more likely to approve a proposed standard if SEP holders 
have stated that they will license patents on a royalty-free basis?  [y/n] 
54. To what degree does your organization monitor SEP disclosures of others that 
may be relevant to its products or standardization work?   
  [scale of 1-5, Significant, some, little, no monitoring + I do not know] 
 
55. In your view, what does the existence of SEPs covering a particular standard 
indicate (check all that apply): 
l. The standard includes valuable technology 
m. The standard will be more expensive to implement in products 
n. Fewer manufacturers will be able to produce standardized products 
o. Litigation is likely with respect to the standard. 
p. None of the above 
 
56. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (1-5; strongly disagree 
to strongly agree)   
a. SDO policies requiring FRAND commitments have proven generally 
successful   
b. FRAND ensures an adequate balance between implementers and IPR 
holders  
c. The terms ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ are too vague and open to too  many 
conflicting interpretations 
d. A FRAND commitment is a comity device and has no specific pricing 
content  
e. More guidance would be desirable as to the specific obligations arising out 
of a FRAND commitment 
 
57. Do you agree or disagree:  It would be preferable if SEP owners commit to 
specific most restrictive licensing terms (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly 
disagree). 
 
58. OPTIONAL:  Please provide any other comments or information clarifying or 
expanding upon any of your prior responses [OPEN ENDED – 15 LINES] 
 
59. OPTIONAL: If you wish, please provide your name and email address for follow-
up: 
(Your name and e-mail address, if you elect to provide these, will not be disclosed 
as part of the study results, and will only be used to contact you for follow-up 
questions and to provide you with a link to our final study report.)   
 
 Name: _________________ 
 Email address: ___________________ 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey! 
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GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the 
address of the centre nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this 
service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by 
contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see https://europa.eu/european-
union/contact_en). 
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